


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THE
CAMPAIGN OF 1781
IN
THE CAROLINAS;
WITH
REMARKS HISTORICAL AND CRITICAL
ON
JOHNSON'S LIFE OF GREENE.
TO WHICH IS ADDED
AN APPENDIX
OF ORIGINAL DOCUMENTS, RELATING TO THE HISTORY
OF THE REVOLUTION.

By H. LEE.

PHILADELPHIA:

PUBLISHED BY E. LITTELL.

WILLIAM BROWN, Printer.

1824.



Checked
May 1913

Eastern District of Pennsylvania, to wit :

BE IT REMEMBERED, That on the thirteenth day of February, in the forty-eighth year of the Independence of the United States of America, A. D. 1824, Henry Lee, of the said District, hath deposited in this office the title of a book, the right whereof he claims as author, in the words following, to wit :

“The Campaign of 1781 in the Carolinas ; with Remarks Historical and
“Critical on Johnson’s Life of Greene. To which is added an Appen-
“dix of original Documents, relating to the history of the Revolution.
“—By H. Lee.”

In conformity to the act of the Congress of the United States, intituled, “An act for the encouragement of learning, by securing the copies of maps, charts, and books, to the authors and proprietors of such copies, during the times therein mentioned;”—and also to the act, entitled, “An act supplementary to an act, entitled, ‘An act for the encouragement of learning, by securing the copies of maps, charts, and books, to the authors and proprietors of such copies during the times therein mentioned,’ and extending the benefits thereof to the arts of designing, engraving, and etching historical and other prints.”

D. CALDWELL,
Clerk of the Eastern District of Pennsylvania.

CAMPAIGN, &c.

CHAP. I.

THERE is no point of modern history, upon which the eyes of posterity will be turned with more frequency and interest, than upon the American Revolution. Its effect in giving success to a noble cause, and birth to an independent nation, however important, bears no proportion in grandeur or utility, to its consequences in substituting to fortuitous, rational constitutions, and in vindicating the adequacy of man to self government.

Considerations arising from the natural relation between events and actors, independently of its inherent attractions, appear likely to render the principal subject of the following pages acceptable to the American public, and to forbid any expense of ingenuity to recommend it.

From the lowest rudeness, to the highest refinement of society, no state is conceivable, in which the effort of a son to defend the memory of his father, would not be commended; and it is apprehended no apology or propitiation can be required for the remarks intended

to expose and to frustrate the attempts of *William Johnson of South Carolina*, in his *Sketches of the Life and Correspondence of General Greene*, to defame the late General Henry Lee.

Elevated sentiments involve high moral duties, and the gratitude of nations is seen in justice to the fame of their benefactors. Restraining the application of this remark, General Greene had a right to expect from the nation, for whose existence he toiled, and whose liberty he fought, an historian worthy of recording his exploits, and giving immortality to his virtues. A critical examination of the "*Sketches*," with a view of ascertaining in what degree, Judge Johnson, himself, clothed with public dignity, has fulfilled this national duty, is to be considered as both pertinent and proper. In conducting it, little method is to be required, as little can be attained, its course not being regulated by choice, but governed by extrinsic deviation, and modified by a complicated plan. The reader will not be surprised, therefore, and it is hoped not dissatisfied, to find that we criticise Mr. Johnson, before the commencement of the *campaign of eighty-one*.

In a preface, rather curious than instructive, his motives and materials are described, and a strange disproportion discovered between them. He professes to construct his work of 4000 original materials, while the specified object of his labours is

his own amusement, and that under the facetious phrase, new to the readers of Horace at least, of "*carpe horam*." It is then observed that General Greene, General Wayne, and Governor Read, all intended to live on the banks of the Savannah, and the latter to write a history of the revolution, when a sentence occurs, which though utterly unintelligible, will at once show, that our author's *English* is as original as his *Latin*. "Of all these, Mr. Read could have furnished the most perfect narrative, and of all military events, the illustrious trio that would then have graced the banks of the Savannah river, could not have been surpassed." Among such important matters, as the trip of Mr. Johnson to Rhode-Island, the zeal of Mr. Vaughan, and the doggedness of Mr. De Silver, who would not, to the amazement of our author, be soothed even by the promise of a respectable number of the "*Sketches*;" it is intimated that Mr. Johnson, within the last three or four years, actually "met with" the late General Otho Williams; a piece of good fortune, which we venture to affirm, had not fallen to the lot of any other living wight for twenty years; seeing that the gallant general departed this life, nearly a quarter of a century before the itinerant judge encountered him in Baltimore. This supernatural interview is followed by a metaphysical miracle; when Mr. Johnson talks of "engraving on our recollection by the association of memory;" and by a physical phenomenon hardly less surprising, when he de-

scribes himself as at one and the same time "entrenched behind" and "encircled by," the same objects. A position at once picturesque and impossible. Here, however, we must leave him, and proceed to the body of his work.

After presenting us with a portrait of Greene, calculated for the time when he was placed at the head of the southern armies, Mr. Johnson, miscalling his "sketches" "memoirs," gives an account of his parentage and birth. The ancients, unable to discover the source of the Nile, disguised and embellished their ignorance by feigning, that nature had shaded with magnificent mystery, the fountains of that sacred stream,

"Arcanum natura caput non prodidit ulli,
Nec licuit populis parvum te Nile, videre."

But no mystery is left about the birth of Greene. The "*man midwife*" is kindly immortalized, "who held up the little Greene in his hands, and observing his vigorous limbs and sonorous pipes, predicted that he would one day become a mighty man in Israel." The occurrences attending his birth, are not more remarkable than those that quickly succeeded it. Upon the death of his mother his father begins to "deliver himself," (p. 6.) and though a rigid Quaker, gives his son a Spartan education, founded exclusively on the study of the Holy Bible, a book which appears to have escaped the attention of that archquaker,

Lycurgus. In spelling and reading, it seems "little Greene" was instructed by an "erratic teacher," (p. 9.) the same probably who enlightened his biographer, but "enjoyed all the eminence of contented ignorance," until "a lad of the name of Giles" (whose "protosire" was probably the saint of that name) revealed to him the important information, "that there are other things to be learned in the world, besides reading and writing!" This too, his father endeavoured to impress upon his attention, by keeping him employed at the plough, the forge, or the mill—beside the hopper of which "our hero" is described, (p. 10.) "seated with his book in his hand; nor were his eyes always withdrawn from it, until long after the ebbing grain had vanished from between the millstones." In this "assiduous discharge" of his duties, we are told (p. 11.) "working and reading went on without jostling against each other." From a Mr. Maxwell he learned a little Latin; and here Mr Johnson, in the abundance of his own classical and metaphysical knowledge asserts, "this was a study which brought into exercise nothing but memory!" This position, coming from a judge of the Supreme Court of the United States, would be apt to startle Dugald Stewart and the Edinburgh Reviewers. These writers have ventured to affirm that the study of the dead languages exercises the judgment in a remarkable degree, and by the habit which it enforces of rapid and repeated induction, and of drawing firm and quick conclusions

from varying and evanescent premises, is favourable to the acquisition of sagacity and taste. And Polybius, in his chapter on the signals invented by Cleoxenus, has left a lucid and very interesting description of the diversified exertion of the mind, even in the familiar operation of reading a language already acquired; which indicates a theory on the subject of philological studies, at variance, it must be confessed, with Mr. Johnson's. The exact sciences, we are told, Greene studied in "the school of Euclid," where he acquired "those clear conceptions which it will be seen distinguished his pen." As the reader will perhaps be disappointed in the expectation here excited, it may be well to suggest to him, that this affirmation is probably hazarded in conformity with the practice of the "father of biography," and is intended to be classed among the "omens, tales, and superstitions," which we are told (p. 7.) he was in the habit of "introducing." In his seventeenth year, Greene became acquainted with Lindley Murray, since celebrated as an English grammarian; an advantage which, it is obvious, his biographer has never enjoyed. If he had we should doubtless not have been told of "transporting anchors in *shaloupes*," of "the *confidence* of an *abashed* boy," of "grinding off the *calosity* of his hands on the grindstone;" that in the reign of James the First, the rights of the colonies were "very *weakly established*;" that sturdy republicans "*swarmed to*" the United States—a century before the nation exist-

ed; that as soon as "Greene became convinced of the justice of our cause, he resolved to take part in the opposition," or that "arming and disciplining *was* the order of the day." So passed the days of "our hero," as Mr. Johnson, after the manner of the historians of Tom Jones and Peregrine Pickle, calls "little Greene," until he reached his twentieth year, about which time we are informed, with the most laudable sincerity, he would risk his neck to pass the evenings in "carnal indulgence" with "the village lasses," and "scandal says Nathaniel Greene could be gay among the gayest." His father, it seems, with the vigilance "of an Argus that could not *always sleep*," (p. 14.) detected these gallantries, and true to his system of education, had immediate recourse to the *rod*; but "little Greene," even at the tender age of twenty, was as wily as a Carthaginian; for (p. 14.) "by the timely and military interposition of a *rear guard*, promptly thrust *up* his clothes, (he wore, of course, the Spartan habit,) he protected his back from severe castigation inflicted by an angry father." This "discipline," *in time*, prevailed; but how long it was continued after twenty, Mr. Johnson does not say. His feeding, it seems, was "altogether spontaneous," and is curiously considered an imitation of the "frugal habits of Lacedemon."

Such is an abridgment of Judge Johnson's account of the early youth of General Greene, and such the manner in which he has defaced the simplicity of his

education. Its substance is, that he was bred to the illustrious labours of the forge, and while his body was invigorated by hardy toils, a generous thirst for knowledge incited him to the improvement of his mind. His diligence brought its reward, and his attainments, though neither elegant nor scientific, were not inconsiderable; and like his biographer, (p. 15.) "he actually acquired a very tolerable stock of legal knowledge." When he had reached his twenty-third year, arose the troubles and dissensions produced by the stamp act. Into the consequent discussions he warmly entered, when "the career for which heaven had destined him was pointed out to him" (p. 17.) by seeing a militia muster! In these times, and in this part of the country, a muster is a concourse of the most squalid, vicious, and ignorant of the community, and is a spectacle at once tame and loathsome. But the muster to which we are told Greene "galloped away with the rest," although it appears the men were not armed, was not only "an assemblage of men," but a "grand parade," "in all the pomp and circumstance of glorious war." So we may judge of *Othello's occupation*. "The command of money" Mr. Johnson affirms to be "the command of books;" a splendid generalization which is likely to bring into discredit the once famous one of Bacon, "knowledge is power." On this occasion, it appears to have supplied Greene with Marshall Turenne's works, and Sharp's Military Guide; and (p. 18.) "under these two preceptors he entered himself a disci-

ple of “(a third)” “Mars,”—quite a complicated matriculation. Our author, whose chronology is equal to his grammar, now informs us (p. 19.) that, in the year 1770, Greene was elected to the *state* legislature, at a time when Rhode-Island was called a *plantation*, and was a British province. Nevertheless, that about this period he was in the habit of early rising, is clearly established by this very surprising anecdote, (pp. 19-20.) “A guest of his, when about to retire to bed, apologized over night to his host, for the necessity he would be under of leaving the house before the family would be up in the morning. But what was his surprise at finding, in the morning, the table neatly set, his breakfast ready, and (mirabile dictu) Greene at the fireside poring over a book before day-break.” This last circumstance is peculiarly valuable, as it evolves the cogent inference that the early traveller was an Irishman. In his thirty-fourth year, Greene married Miss Catharine Littlefield, a blooming young lady, sprightly, intelligent, and engaging. And (p. 21.) “it was in the Kentish guards, and in the year 1774, that he first assumed the panoply of the soldier;” when fire-arms being scarce, and as “every individual provided for himself,” “our hero took off the panoply of the soldier,” and set out in the garb of a Quaker, to purchase a firelock. Upon his arrival in Boston, after the imposing ceremony of “being introduced into the streets.” this expert Spartan, contrived to buy from a deserter, a musket and accoutrements, and to conceal

them in a returning waggon. After acquiring, in this delicate adventure, "a stock of military knowledge," he returned homeward, when "fortune threw in his way another boon," viz. a British deserter; probably the same one who had sold him the musket. Hostilities having commenced at Lexington, in '75, Greene displayed a decided sympathy with the whigs. As the wrongs and resentment of the colonies were aggravated, his mettle and bearing became more important and patriotic, and he was soon appointed to the command of the Rhode Island "army of observation;" and, at the head of this corps, in June, '75, he appeared in the camp before Boston. Our author now recurs to his own intentions and opportunities, and cheers the reader on his way by promises of characteristic delineations, of brevity in his sketches of a thousand pages, and with assurances, that the private and public life of Greene are to be fully, and for the first time unfolded. But here a truly lamentable accident seems to depress him grievously, and with the most engaging ingenuousness he confesses it. (P. 28.) "The most discouraging circumstance attending his inquiries on the subject now before his readers, has been the utter impossibility of eliciting from any one who was intimate with Greene, the acknowledgment that he had a fault." Deeply as we feel for the *sincere* distress of Mr. Johnson, we must yet request him to explain a subject which is suggested by the following remark. "The cabinets of all

his most intimate friends have been open to us, and to us alone. It is here alone that the private man is to be traced out." We have the best authority for affirming, that about five years ago, Mr. Edmund I. Lee of Alexandria, made application in behalf of Judge Johnson, to one of the representatives of the late General Lee, for the inspection of his military papers, and for the use of such as might have reference to the life of Greene. That in reply Mr. Lee was assured, there were a number of letters from General Greene among those papers, which were illustrative and characteristic, although there was no sketch of his life. That the originals would not be given up, but that Judge Johnson was welcome to copies. Nothing further was heard on the subject—and it is natural to inquire for what cause Judge Johnson, who appears to have traversed the continent, and even to have disinterred the heroic dead, in search of materials, should have forborne to avail himself of the opportunity thus offered, of inspecting General Greene's correspondence with an officer, who is acknowledged to have exhibited "brilliant military talents," and a "cordial and devoted attachment to his general." Was this incurious neglect, fair in regard to the memory of this *friend*, whose reputation in the double aspect of soldier and writer Mr. Johnson was about to scrutinize, and not to exalt?—was it pious and honourable to the illustrious memory of Greene? Does it bespeak a desire to discover and relate the

truth, and to furnish candid and incorrupt materials to the future historian? These questions we trust Mr. Johnson may find leisure to answer. He acknowledges more than one hiatus, in his copies of General Greene's letters to Lee. For aught he knew, many a discriminating sentiment—many a pregnant fact—many an important opinion—many a sound suggestion—many a brave mistake, might be contained in these letters. Difficulties, which he confesses yet embarrass the history of the period, might have been removed by them, and stronger and more distinct lights returned upon the character of Greene. An honest apprehension he expresses (p. 28.) that his work will be censured for venality; and since it may be considered as venal to sacrifice the duties of biography to the pleasure of malice, as to love of gold—as culpable to suppress important truths, as to utter falsehoods—we confess his apprehension appears to us as just as it is lively. Yet it is possible to conjecture, that his singular inattention to the papers of Lee, arose from the melancholy disappointment he experienced in not discovering a fault in the character of Greene. Life, in its purest and brightest phases, is but a compound of virtue and vice—and to bring his sketches to something like reality, by exhibiting an adequate supply of the latter ingredient, it may have been necessary to infuse a double portion of demerit into the character of Lee—so that the pale insipidity of Greene's perfection might be coloured

by the deep reflection of his friend's faults. For this purpose, it is obvious that a knowledge of pertinent facts might have been inconvenient, and therefore it may be Mr. Johnson deemed it prudent to restrain his inquiries in this perilous direction.

In the camp before Boston, Greene, now a Brigadier, appears to be employed in disciplining his contingent, or as our author says, his 'command,' and in writing long and tedious letters to his friends, with excerpts from which, and a lifeless compliment to his hero, he ekes out his second chapter.

In '76 Greene is made a Major General, is prevented by sickness from being in the engagement on Long Island, and commands a 'command' near Fort Lee. Here the author suspends the course of his narrative, for the purpose of introducing more of Greene's correspondence, from a fragment of which it appears, he had not yet forgotten his "*Spartan education*." This is a paragraph of a letter addressed, as Mr. Johnson says, to "a gentleman interested in several privateers;" and prefixed to it, is a laudatory sentence, the more valuable as coming from a judge of the maritime courts of the country. This letter encourages what is pleasantly termed a "*ruse de guerre*;" the practice namely of lying, effrontery, and treason—as the surest means of succeeding in this abominable species of warfare; and displays, on the part of Greene, a violent desire to engage in a calling, which promotes public war by private rapacity, and can only be *palli-*

ated upon the dangerous principle of justifying the means by the end. We give the letter of the General and the remark of the Judge, (p. 59.) “There is in this letter a paragraph which is rather foreign from the subject we are upon; but it merits to be copied into these pages, as it exhibits a mind fertile in resources, whatever it be applied to, and suggests a *ruse de guerre*, which has actually in later times been resorted to within the knowledge of the writer. The letter is addressed to a gentleman who was interested in several privateers, and who had suffered by repeated recaptures.” “This fall,” says the writer, “will be the last of the harvest. After this season all the navigation of Great Britain will go armed sufficiently to manage the small cruisers of America. If your privateers should take any vessels bound to America or Great Britain, let the prize-master assume the character and personate the original captain, if he should have the misfortune to fall in with an enemy’s vessel, let him answer ‘bound to and come from the port mentioned in the ship’s papers.’ If the captain or prize-master does this with sufficient effrontery, nothing but personal knowledge can detect him. It would be a good method to engage the crews of the prizes by giving them an opportunity to enter on board the privateer, and to share in all the prizes made after they entered on board. This may enable the captain of the privateer to continue his cruize and make a number of prizes, when he would otherwise

be obliged to return home for want of men. And as to the fidelity and attachment of the sailors, you may depend upon it they will be as faithful after becoming interested as the generality of our own seamen. This fall is the golden harvest. I think the fishing ships at the eastward may be objects of attention this fall. In the spring the East India ships may be intercepted on the coast of Africa. Were I at liberty, I think I could make a fortune for my family. But it is necessary for some to be in the field to secure the property of others in their stores."

Although it is to be regretted that Greene should ever have written this letter, yet the sentiments it contains are in a great degree extenuated by the rudeness of his education, the exigencies of the war, the nature of the injuries which produced it, and of the interests depending on its event. But, if General Greene is to be excused, can his biographer be pardoned? Is he to prostitute the majesty of history, in this enlightened age and Christian country, by the plausible recitation of such reprehensible suggestions. The conduct of men is apt to be bad enough, however amiable their sentiments may be, and these it is the duty of the historian to correct and refine, by clear distinctions between right and wrong, and by the firm and even application of moral justice, to the conduct and opinions of the personages who tower above the level of the world. By the sacrifice of this duty to the silly pleasure of fashioning a

warrior, who was nursed by the forge and the anvil, into a "faultless monster" after his own heart, our author gives grievous evidence of the taste as well as the honesty of his book. To every sensible reader, the sentiments contained in the letter we have been considering, will appear a blemish in the character of Greene, more distinct from the lustre of his subsequent reputation, and from its contrast with his great virtues. But in Mr. Johnson's portrait, deformity and beauty are confounded, and a speck with which fond nature marked one feature of the original, is mixed with the martial colours, and spread over the heroic countenance.

Having mentioned the surrender of Fort Washington, (p. 60.) he revives, for the sake of refuting it, a censure which was cast upon the conduct of Greene on that occasion, and gives a prolix and tortuous account of the preliminary operations of the hostile armies, in which he informs us, (p. 61.) with a glow of patriotic resentment, that the saucy vessels of the enemy not only passed our forts on the Hudson, but "passed them with an air of ridicule!"

"In the course of his justification of General Greene's conduct, it is insinuated, (p. 64.) that Mr. Marshall has made unfounded assertions in regard to it. Apart from the claims of decorum, the statements of an author so fair, so temperate, and judicious, ought not to be lightly questioned or invidiously distorted. And when examined, they will be found to

contain neither a charge against General Greene, nor assertions in support of one, nor any thing in the slightest degree repugnant to candour, or contrary to truth. Marshall's words are these: "From too great a confidence in the strength of the post at Fort Washington, and a hope that by still further increasing the obstructions in the North River, the original object for which that place had been fortified might be obtained; from an unwillingness too, further to discourage the army, by an evacuation of its posts, General Greene had not withdrawn the garrison, under the discretionary orders he had received on that subject; but still indulged a hope that the post might be maintained; or if its situation should become desperate, that means might be found to transport the troops across the river to the Jersey shore, which was defended by Fort Lee." After quoting them, Mr. Johnson declares with a refinement of courtesy and economy of language for which he is remarkable, "never were the views and motives of a military commander *more entirely* misunderstood. We know not upon what authority Mr. Marshall attributes too great confidence in the strength of Fort Washington."

If Mr. Johnson had copied the extract from General Washington's letter to Greene of the 8th of November, which is given by Marshall, and that from the reply to it, which is given by Gordon, he would have been fully satisfied as to Mr. Marshall's authority—and as he has excluded them from his pages, we shall here

transcribe them. "On being informed of this, another letter was addressed to General Greene, in which it was stated, that this fact was so plain a proof of the inefficacy of all the obstructions thrown in the river, as to justify a change in the dispositions which had been made. If," proceeded the letter, "we cannot prevent vessels from passing up, and the enemy are possessed of the surrounding country, what valuable purpose can it answer, to attempt to hold a post from which the expected benefit cannot be derived? I am, therefore, inclined to think it will not be prudent to hazard the men and stores at Mount Washington; but as you are on the spot, I leave it to you to give such orders respecting the evacuation of the place, as you may think most advisable; and so far revoke the orders given Colonel Magaw to defend it to the last." Here not only does Washington express his opinion in favour of evacuating the post; but assigns reasons for it, and not only commits the expediency of maintaining or abandoning it to General Greene, but removes an obstruction from his pursuit of that branch of the alternative which he himself declares he thought it prudent to adopt. To this letter General Greene replies on the 9th—"Upon the whole, I cannot help thinking the garrison at Fort Washington is of advantage; and I cannot conceive it to be in any great danger.—I was over there the last evening, and the enemy seem to be disposing matters to besiege the place; but Colonel Magaw thinks it will take till December expires be-

fore they can carry it.—If the enemy do not find it an object of importance they will not trouble themselves about it; if they do it is a full proof they feel an injury from our possessing it. Our giving it up will open a free communication with the country as far as **Kingsbridge**—that must be a great advantage to them and injury to us.”*

From this correspondence it is clear that General Washington considered the advantage of maintaining the post was outweighed by the danger to be apprehended from defending it, and that General Greene was expressly of the contrary opinion—thought it was not then in any great danger—and even if besieged, could be held until the end of **December**, or evacuated safely any time before. These opinions, which evinced his *too great confidence*, turned out to be erroneous; for the post was summoned on the 15th, attacked and carried on the 16th of **November**, with such expedition on the part of the **British**, and such disastrous consequences on that of the **Americans**, as impressed deeply upon the nation the sagacity of General **Lee**’s advice, and the prudence of General Washington’s inclination to evacuate it. So that Mr. Marshall’s assertion is not only authorized by the opinions of Generals Washington and Lee, but is experimentally confirmed by the event of the siege, for the place was attacked and taken not a day after General Greene had assured General Washington *it would make a good defence*.

* Gordon, vol. ii. p. 123.

As to our author's observations, it is to be lamented that they are neither supported by authority nor reconcilable to reason. He gives the statement of Marshall, but omits the extract of the letter of the 8th of November, upon which that statement is obviously founded, citing in lieu of it a passage from Washington's letter of the 16th to Congress. General Washington, in this comprehensive report, says, "The preservation of the passage of the North River was an object of so much consequence, that I thought no pains or expense too great for that purpose; and therefore I determined to *risk something* to defend the post called Mount Washington." This state of mind it ought to have been perceived by Mr. Johnson, could not exist a moment after the enemy's insolent vessels had passed that fort "with an air of ridicule," and was succeeded by the change of dispositions which is referred to by Marshall, which was executed by General Washington, and was in vain suggested to General Greene. "*Afterwards,*" General Washington continues, "reflecting on the smallness of the garrison, and the difficulty of their holding it if General Howe should fall down upon it with his whole force, I wrote to General Greene, who had the command on the Jersey shore, to govern himself according to circumstances, and to retain or evacuate the post according as he should think best." But neither in this letter, nor in the one to General Greene which it refers to, does it appear that Greene was directed or advised to *rein-*

force the garrison—and yet Mr. Johnson declares, “It is the weakness of the garrison which he avows to Congress as the ground upon which he wavered at this time in his original design of defending the post at all hazards.” But this is a construction of the sentence with which, if the letter to Greene of the 8th be considered, none of Mr. Johnson’s readers can concur. There General Greene is told the place is not worth the risk of *an attempt* to defend it, that the troops and stores ought not *to be hazarded there*. This shews that so far from wishing the garrison to be reinforced, he wished it to be *withdrawn*. The less the value of the place, the less exertion and hazard was he inclined to incur for its defence, and therefore the determination of General Greene to reinforce it, instead of “comporting with General Washington’s views,” as our author asserts, was in direct opposition to his policy. It appears that Mr. Johnson’s delusion, in respect to the views of Washington, arises from his impression that if the determination of Greene to reinforce the garrison had not coincided with his opinion, he would have declared his disapprobation of it; insensible to the elevation of mind which would not permit him, after putting Greene upon his discretion, to censure its honest exercise, however contrary it might be to his own judgment. One considers it imprudent to risk twelve hundred men for the defence of Fort Washington, the other adventures to hazard more than two thousand. And Mr. Johnson himself

(p. 69.) deems it absurd to suppose that the garrison, when thus reinforced, was competent to the defence of the place.* But the ways of Heaven are not more intricate than those of vain man. After attempting to prove that the conduct of Greene on this occasion conformed to the wishes of the commander in chief, he declares that when General Washington actually advised it, the evacuation of the fort would have been little short of madness.” These are his words, (at p. 65.) “to have abandoned the fort until the

* The imprudence of attempting to defend Fort Washington, might easily be *demonstrated*. The Hudson flows between the Hackensack and East river, and with them forms two peninsulas, on which, separated by the Hudson, stood Forts Washington and Lee. The British commanded the Hudson, from its mouth to the head of Haverstraw bay. Knyphausen held King’s bridge, Sir William Howe, (Mr. Johnson confounds him (p. 63.) with his brother, Admiral Lord Howe) with at least 20,000 men, lay between that point and Dobb’s ferry, situate at the foot of the Tappan Sea. Had Lord Cornwallis, who landed below Dobb’s ferry, on the west bank of the Hudson, pushed down to Hackensack bridge, which was six miles above Fort Lee, it is evident that both garrisons must have surrendered without striking a blow ; nor could a man have escaped but by swimming the Hackensack. Again, the British accounts state, that “the quantity of gunpowder was inadequate even to the shortest defence.” And it is notorious, that the garrison was both too small for the enemy, and too large for the fort—able neither to keep the field, nor to hold the out-works against the British ; and when driven from these, too numerous to find shelter in the fortress.

main army had effected the passage of the river, would have been little short of madness;" and in the next page he says, "the army made good its passage on the 13th," five days after the date of Washington's letter to Greene advising the evacuation. His absurdities are however endless, as may be discovered by reading his 65th page, where he talks about the "last of three alternatives;" and affirms that the guns of Fort Washington "controlled the operations of the enemy's naval force"—after acknowledging that they had passed them with impunity, and positively asserting, (p. 61.)—"That the design with which this fort had been constructed," to wit: "to prevent the ships of the enemy from ascending the river," was "conceived in military ignorance." He goes on to disprove Marshall's statement, by attempting to show, that as on the night of the 15th, General Washington arrived in person at Fort Lee, the discretionary power of General Greene was terminated by his presence—which, even if admitted, would not justify his criticism, as Marshall's remark is retrospective. The most entertaining part of this convincing justification, and which rivals in humour the exhibitions of Mathews, is the following logical dialogue, which is conducted on both sides by Mr. Johnson himself; and will be found fully as conclusive as any part of his impertinent strictures on Marshall, or his superfluous defence of General Greene, (p. 66.) "And why was not the garrison removed between the 13th and the

day of the attack? To this we are not called upon, nor competent to give an answer!!” Nor is it probable that Mr. Johnson will “be competent if called upon” to say why he undertook this unnecessary and unsuccessful defence. For if there is the smallest censure or disparagement of General Greene expressed or implied in the paragraph quoted from Marshall, it must be what Fontenelle calls, *extrait de la lumiere, quintessence d’atome*. The best conceivable reasons are assigned for his conduct, in terms studiously temperate and favourable: and the disagreement between the event of the siege and his calculations, although it must have presented itself to the writer’s mind, is not alluded to in his narrative, and would probably have never been animadverted on, but for the defamatory praises inflicted on the reputation of Greene by his awkward biographer. Against these the plain truth is the best antidote, and therefore it is just to his memory to observe, that although on this occasion when a young general, his prudence was not conspicuous, yet in the acceptance of the large authority devolved on him by Washington, and its independent and enterprizing exercise, contrary to the opinions of experienced commanders, he displayed for the first time, that firm and adventurous cast of character, for which he was afterwards distinguished.

In the surprise of Trenton and the attack on Princeton, styled “a masterly manœuvre,” and “a brilliant *coup de main*,” Greene commanded not the *left wing*,

as Mr. Johnson supposes, but the left division of the column, commanded by Sullivan and attended by General Washington in person. It is not to be forgotten, that the style of the Sketches continues to maintain its peculiar elegance and dignity. We read that Washington "crossed a part of his army," instead of the Hudson; (p. 62.) "that the capture of Fort Washington was the achievement of a masterly manœuvre practised on the American post;" that "the American commander (p. 72.) knew it to be the *chief attribute* of a general" (Frederick the Great thought it the first maxim*) "*to fight when he pleased*;" "that Howe would not *proceed on* to Philadelphia;" and, says Mr. Johnson, "it were a folly even to gain that by a battle which could be effected without the sacrifice." By the rule *e converso*, it must be the *attribute* of a good general to run when he pleases. In conformity with this latter maxim, both Washington and Greene failed to come to blows with Sir William Howe, who was suffered to return unmolested to New York. But "fortune" it is declared, and upon the best mythological authority no doubt, "ever delights to tease and mock the god of war," ("little Greene's" old school-master,) and it appears from Mr. Johnson she had some hand in preventing a battle. However, it is not long before the two armies meet at Brandywine, where our author displays astonishing command of military language, and a thorough knowledge of the art of war.

* Letter to General Fouquet—Breslau, 23d December, 1758.

The American army under Washington, here styled "the most immaculate," being advantageously posted at Chadsford on the left bank of the Brandywine, Sir William Howe ordered Lord Cornwallis to pass the stream, at the head of one division, six miles above, and to assail the right of Washington, while the other, under Knyphausen, should advance against his front. This operation, and its alleged effect, are thus related: (p. 74.) "The familiar artifice of amusing in front, while manœuvring to gain *an* adversary's rear, was destined a third time to baffle the valour of the Americans." Awful as this *artifice* must have been, we should rather ascribe the trepidation of the Americans to an event which is mentioned immediately after it, and which being evidently prodigious, may well be deemed the work of destiny. Our author affirms that at the very time the "two armies were facing each other," it happened unfortunately that the creek forked about six miles above Chadsford! The bravest armies have been discomfited by prodigies less fearful and manifest than this. It is matter of history that Hannibal owed his first victory in Italy, less to his own skill or the courage of his troops, than to a prodigious wolf which struck terror through the Roman camp. It is then but fair to presume, that the valour of the army was proof against "the familiar artifice," and was confounded only by this portentous bifurcation of the Brandywine; which, as it doubtless facilitated the passage of Cornwallis, and favoured his

attack upon the American right, must have elevated the courage of his troops in a corresponding degree. Another surprising incident, first mentioned by this authentic and scrupulous writer, is, that "while the *whole* British army advanced upon Chad's ford, *the greater part of it* crossed the miraculous creek about six miles above." Upon this a singular reflection follows. "How the American general could suffer himself to be thus deceived, has been hitherto *unaccounted for*, as from *all accounts hitherto published*, it would appear he had not bestowed proper attention to reconnoitre the movements of the enemy, and guard the roads by which his flank might be approached." Now, whether this alleged inattention on the part of Washington existed or not, it is certainly sufficient to account for the problem to which the judge has appended it. But is it true, that in the previous accounts given of this action, any impression is made or attempted to the disadvantage of Washington's circumspection? Those of Ramsay, Gordon, and Marshall give him credit for the greatest vigilance, and for a display of blended enterprise and caution, which would not have appeared unbecoming in Turenne.* But what solution could be given, or can be required of a state of things obviously preternatural? Washington, seeing the *whole British army* immediately in his

* Ramsay, vol. ii. p. 193. Gordon, vol. ii. p. 225. Marshall, vol. iii. p. 147.

front, could not, by any effort of reason, conceive the probability that at the very same moment the far greater part of it was six miles on his right. Taking this puzzling circumstance out of view, this “ubiquity of talent” exercised by Cornwallis, and it appears Lee, who did not advert to it, has pretty clearly accounted for Washington’s insecurity on his right, without leaving it possible to impute to him the smallest inattention. In his Memoirs, published about ten years ago, he says—* “Washington was quickly informed of the separation of the enemy’s columns, and that the left was making a very circuitous sweep. Persuaded of the fact, he wisely determined to pass the Brandywine with his whole force, and to strike at Knyphausen. In the very act of giving his orders to this effect, Colonel Bland of the Virginia horse, brought him intelligence which very much obscured, if it did not contradict the previous information, and his original judicious decision was abandoned. Colonel Bland was noble, sensible, amiable, &c.” This bold and judicious resolution, which would have frustrated the detour of Cornwallis, and thrown the weight of the American army upon the weaker division of the English, which would have squared with the practice of Frederick and Bonaparte, and with the rules of Jomini, our modern Polybius reprobates as absurd and ruinous, and avers that the “*falsehood*” (p. 75.)

* Vol. i. p. 14.

which provoked it, so far from having been suggested to General Washington, would seem to have been "dictated by some favouring deity." Polytheists of old, as far as we remember, represented their deities as revealing the truth to the heroes they favoured, and telling *falsehoods* to those they maligned, more particularly when the truth would answer the purpose contemplated, as well as a lie. The Pallas of Homer never deceives Achilles, but is fraudulent to Hector in his last battle. It does appear strange, therefore, that the propitious Brandywine goddess did not deter the meditated enterprise of Washington, by the same oracular declaration in which this inspired writer demonstrates it would have been fatal to the American army.

In the course of the evolutions produced by the impression of Cornwallis upon the American right, we find Greene selected for a very singular service. While "Wayne, at the head of one brigade," is charged to dispute the passage of the creek against Knyphausen, we are informed by Mr. Johnson, that "Greene, with the brigades of Weedon and Muhlenburg acting as a reserve, *was halted* in the rear of Wayne, in a situation, from which he could readily fly to the relief of *either of the parties engaged*." Here, indeed, it may be truly said that "in no account hitherto published, has this *masterly manœuvre* been accounted for;" and what is equally remarkable, our author has failed to account for it himself. However, it must be confess-

ed, he has furnished the attentive reader with the means of explaining it very satisfactorily. It will be remembered he has proved that if the resolution to attack Knyphausen had been successfully executed by General Washington, the American army would have been destroyed. Now it is more than probable, that by this time, Washington had been apprised of this disastrous consequence by the favouring deity, and had stationed Greene, with the flower of the army, in striking distance, not only to support Wayne, should he be forced, but to assist Knyphausen, lest the daring temerity of Wayne should bring on the interdicted catastrophe. As it happened, there occurred no demand for this *backing of his friends*, on the part of Greene. He was soon ordered up to the support of the main army, engaged with the enemy's left column, where he checked the progress of Cornwallis, rescued the park of artillery,* and covered the retreat. Yet in spite of his gallantry and talent, so adverse was the course of the action, we are solemnly assured, (p. 76.) that but for the unaccountable accident of the "night fortunately closing in upon the unfortunate day," the defeat might have been, not only decisive, but ruinous.

After mentioning that Congress "acted the Aulic Council," and that Sir William Howe "*moved his*

* This fact is not mentioned by Mr. Johnson, but by Greene, in a letter to Colonel Lee, which Mr. Johnson declined publishing.

fleet" from the Chesapeake, our author affirms (p. 80.) that the fact of the two armies encamping within sixteen miles of each other, "brought on the action of Germantown." On the other hand, Marshall and Lee intimate, that this affair grew out of Washington's anxiety to prevent the success of measures taken by his adversary, to secure the navigation of the Delaware, and the consequent communication of his fleet and army; and was particularly determined on in a council of war, in consequence of the arrival of reinforcements to the American army, at a time when large detachments from that of the enemy were employed in the occupation of Philadelphia, and in co-operating immediately with Lord Howe. However this may be, our author's description of the battle is as misty as the morning it happened. After setting down "the armies opposed to each other, as equal in number," and taunting the inaccuracy of all previous accounts, he tells us, in a tone of rueful tribulation, that "Washington had nothing to depend upon (besides the effect of a surprise and equal numbers at least) but the native valour of his troops, his many excellent officers, and the favour of a just God!" What stronger and surer reliances could have been required? "All the writers," he proceeds, (p. 82.) "who have given a relation of this action, assert, that the British encampment extended from the village westwardly, but we are in possession of the sketch of the battle and encampment, drawn up by the assistant engineer

of the British army, and the following are the positions assigned to it." Upon looking into Lee's memoirs, we find he makes no such assertion. Marshall,* referring to the Annual Register, says, "the line of encampment of the British army *crossed* this village at right angles." Gordon† says, "the line of encampment *crossed* the town at right angles." Ramsay‡ uses the very same words, and Stedman§ says, "the line of the British encampment intersected the village near the centre." This palpable and hazardous misstatement, inclines us to doubt the novel assertion, that Pulaski, who commanded the American patrol, was found by General Washington asleep in a farmhouse. At the outset an error is committed, which Mr. Johnson himself has the goodness to expose. He says the army marched to the attack "divided into two columns," but immediately afterwards mentions that Sullivan led one column, Greene another; that a third proceeded under Armstrong, a fourth under Smallwood, and that the reserve, consisting of three brigades, was commanded by Lord Sterling;" thus contradicting his own account, and agreeing with that of Stedman, who observes, "Washington advanced with his army divided into five columns." It is well known that the failure of the American columns in making their attacks simultaneously, and the error

* Vol. iii. p. 175. † Vol. ii. p. 232. ‡ Vol. ii. p. 197.
§ Vol. i. p. 295.

committed in endeavouring to force Chew's house, were the proximate causes of Washington's miscarriage. Lee, who was present, and in the suite of the commander in chief, assigns remote and more formidable ones—the undisciplined and dispirited condition of the troops, the inexperience of the generals, and the complication of the plan. But the penetration of our author has discovered other causes; the slumbers of Pulaski, the cowardice or treachery of Conway, and the inexplicable oversight of Washington, in not directing the principal attack against the enemy's left, “which would infallibly have turned his left and gained his rear.” To enforce this remark, he takes great pains to show that the British left wing did not touch the Schuylkill. But he admits, that strong detachments were posted at intervals, in a line with it, as far as the Ridge road, that “the German chasseurs were posted to watch the road, which at this place approaches very near to the bank of the Schuylkill;” while Stedman says, “the Schuylkill covered their left.” Whereas the right, against which Greene operated, had no natural protection, and the centre was at least as assailable as the left, and a more important point for a decisive impression. Admitting that the left of the British did not actually *touch*, it evidently leant on the river; and the detachments by which it was strengthened would, of course, in that situation, have rendered every attempt to turn it abortive. So that this alleged oversight is not very distinctly made out.

The confusion of the narrative is embroiled by the mistake made at the outset, in calling the British left their right; and it is overspread by a cloud of such ill-connected words, such impertinent allusions to the insipience of other writers, his own perspicacity, and the intrigues and malevolence of Washington's enemies; that but for the "accounts of other writers" it would be utterly unintelligible.

As it is, it is probable few will read, and fewer comprehend it. There is a prodigious effort made to array and to demolish sundry light and forgotten aspersions, which grew out of the discontent of the army at the loss of the day, and were at the moment aimed at General Greene. Lee consigns them to contempt, under the denomination of "*attempts to censure too feeble to attract notice.*" Not so our author. He falls upon them with all the ardour and judgment of Don Quixotte attacking a flock of sheep, and by force of bad writing, drives them completely from the view of the reader. No man can read, without regret and indignation, the cruel and indecent allusion which he makes to the misfortune of General Stephens, who was a brave and honourable man. He recurs to it with a view of imputing to Stephens, the embarrassment occasioned by the interference of Greene's and Sullivan's columns, and attempts to excuse his own indelicacy, by saying this assertion is established by the decision of the court martial; (p. 91.) but on turning over the next leaf, he declares that this same court

martial "acquitted Stephens altogether of misconduct in the affair of the embarrassment produced between the extremities of the two lines," thus falsely aggravating the misfortune of Stephens, in order to justify the wanton injury he offers to his name. Nevertheless the language is worthy of the sentiment, and his "affair of Germantown" cannot fail to entertain those who are curious to observe new modes of expression, and sentences destitute of meaning, such as "the *monopoly of the attention* of the aids to a certain object;" and "another *cause* which favoured the propagation of an opinion unfavourable to Greene in the affair of Germantown, was his not entering into action until *from a half to three quarters* of an hour later than the column on the right." But the offer of a premium, even in these times, would hardly detect a particle of meaning in the following collection of words, which, although it is included between two periods, we cannot venture to call a sentence. (p. 86.) "Greene, whose division was on the left of the whole, and who, upon the lines being formed, commanded the American left, pressed on his men to find their enemy, who, from the direction of his line of march, was considerably in advance; and who, from the darkness of the morning, could only be discovered by the fire, now opened upon the left wing of Sullivan's column."

It would be inexcusable to pass over unnoticed, the following observation of Mr. Johnson, because it shows that he would probably conduct armies, with

as much ability as he describes battles. It is his argument to explain and justify the comparative lateness with which Greene brought his column into action. "General Washington, in his letters to Congress, says three quarters of an hour;" (after Sullivan's column was engaged) "Mr. Marshall, half an hour; and some others, some minutes over half an hour. But no one has paused to remark, that all things considered, at the highest computation, it was much less time than ought to have been expected. And yet it was obviously so. For it must be recollected that Greene had a route of *a mile at least longer to perform* than the other column, to *reach opposite* to the head of the village, where the right column engaged the enemy; and then had to proceed near a mile further to reach the centre of the village, where the enemy was drawn up which he had to engage." So that concerted movements, and simultaneous attacks, upon the same point, are utterly impracticable, unless the assailing bodies move over precisely the same distances; and General Washington ought to have abandoned the enterprise, as soon as it was discovered, in prescribing the routes of the several columns, that Greene, who at Brandywine "moved on a trot," would have, in the course of an October night, to march a mile and a half further than Sullivan. The notion of regulating the pace according to the distance, does not appear to be admitted into our author's military calculations. And it may be presumed, that if he had commanded in the "affair

of Germantown," instead of directing his columns to reach the points of destination at the same moment, by the natural mode of expediting the departure or accelerating the march of the column upon the longer route, he would have drawn Sullivan back one mile and a half into Greene's rear, and then put them both in motion! Greene is next despatched with "his command," to intercept an expedition of Cornwallis, who, with "his command," (p. 92.) had been detached into Jersey, for the purpose of collecting supplies, and reducing the post at Red Bank. The duties assigned to Greene, were "to meet and engage the enemy," in order to secure the fort; but from their celerity and superior strength, he was unable to execute them, and Cornwallis succeeded in the object of his enterprise. For this it is obvious Greene could not be censured: but how a justifiable failure, a prudent inactivity, is to provoke or merit strenuous encomiums, we are at a loss to imagine. If his failure is to be violently lauded, in what terms would Mr. Johnson have extolled his success? In recounting what he calls (p. 93.) this "trying kind of struggle" on the part of Greene, occasion is taken to suggest a confusion between a remark of Marshall, and a letter from General Washington to Congress, the unfairness of which will be easily exposed. "It has been said," writes our author, quoting Marshall, "General Greene's instructions, though not peremptory, indicated the expectation of the commander in chief, that he would be in a condition to

fight Lord Cornwallis." And then adds, "Let the commander in chief speak for himself." In a letter to Congress, of the 23d of November 1777, he says, "General Greene is still in New Jersey, *and when Glover's brigade joins him, if an attack can be made on Lord Cornwallis with a prospect of success, I am persuaded it will be done.*" Now, the expressions of Marshall and those of General Washington, evidently refer to two points of time, and *therefore* might reasonably be expected to disagree in their import. But it happens that they exactly agree. Marshall affirms, that when General Washington delivered his instructions to Greene, he manifested an expectation that that "officer would be in a condition to fight Lord Cornwallis." And General Washington declares, some days after, that he was still in the same expectation, viz. *that when Glover's brigade joined General Greene, if an attack can be made with a prospect of success, I am persuaded it will be done.* But if Mr. Johnson wished to controvert Marshall's exposition of the instructions given to Greene, would it not have been fairer to quote the instructions themselves, than to refer for their purport to a document, which, of necessity, would not be so precise, and might well have been composed under very different impressions. The fact is, the account given by Marshall, of this expedition, is altogether favourable to General Greene, and is at the same time conceived in terms of well-weighed and con-

scientious respect to truth and candour.* The distress for provisions experienced in the American camp, was now so great that Washington determined to forage as in an enemy's country, and availing himself of the tenderness and authority of General Greene's disposition and character, motives which escape the attention of his biographer, charged him with that service. In the performance of it, we are told, "he had the first occasion of experiencing the activity and intelligence of the late General Henry Lee, who afterwards served under him with so much eclat in his southern campaign." About this time, Greene was induced to accept the appointment of quartermaster general, an event which draws forth the following turbid and tasteless effusion from his biographer: (p. 101.) "To those who are unacquainted with the duties of a quartermaster general, it may still appear surprising that the subject of these sketches should quit a station that he was fond of, and the duties of which were familiar to him, to enter upon the *untried career of an office* which, notwithstanding its vital importance, is still like the useful arts, considered of inferior gradation. But military men" (*like our author*) "are competent to appreciate the importance of the duties of a quartermaster general. The fact is, *it* gives life and motion to an army. The commissary general must purchase, but the quartermaster general must transport every article of the first necessity to camp. The

* Marshall, vol. iii. pp. 219-21.

army may be ordered to move, but he only can furnish the means of setting it in motion, and it may be ordered to halt, but he must provide for its halting in comfort. In fact, although he does not move the automaton" (automatons generally moving themselves) "he prepares the whole machinery." Although no one can deny the wisdom and elegance of these *dicta*, yet they cannot be compared in importance with the following receipt, which ought to be translated into all the languages of Europe. (p. 101.) *To make a Quartermaster General.* To "an arranging and combining mind," add "habits of industry and business," and then mix with the compound, "an ubiquity of talent that will leave nothing unattended to."

Meanwhile some "masterly manœuvres" were occurring. Sir Henry Clinton, who had succeeded Sir William Howe, upon evacuating Philadelphia, "crossed the Delaware;" but Washington "*crossed his own army*," as Cornwallis before "*had crossed his baggage*." Upon approaching the enemy in the neighbourhood of Monmouth, Washington held a council of war, on the expediency of attacking them. Lee and others urge the prudence of forbearing—Wayne and Cadwallader advise instant battle—while Greene and Lafayette, to their immortal honour as our author deems, advise neither one thing nor the other, and, according to his terse and perspicuous summary of their counsel, declare (p. 103.) "it was impossible to anticipate a decision." Lafayette, nevertheless, at the

head of a strong corps, is directed to assail the rear of the British. But Sir Henry Clinton, reflecting that the Marquis was a young Frenchman, and that Washington, in spite of all his virtue, was a man of warm temperament, shrewdly concluded that "the establishments, matrimonial or otherwise, made by his officers in Philadelphia, was the object aimed at." This at least he determined to disappoint, and very judiciously placed these tempting "establishments under a very strong escort commanded by Knyphausen," a chilly old German, who would have had "*his cravat kissed off*," without the slightest emotion. In the action which soon ensued, Greene displayed both gallantry and judgment. We hear of "the command under Lee," and Mr. Johnson pathetically declares that "the oppressive heat of this day will long be a subject of painful recollection." Upon mentioning the arrival of the French fleet, he breaks out into the following astrological exclamation, (p. 118.)—"But all the ill omens of the heavens must have been in conjunction at the birth of this expedition." Count D'Estaing, the admiral, we are told was, "in the *English* opinion," guilty "of evil conduct," of which it seems, from the following lucid statement, Lord Howe was inclined to take advantage. "When arrived before Newport, Lord Howe, being reinforced by Byron's squadron, followed him from New York, with a resolution to relieve Newport." D'Estaing is treated with very little ceremony, considering he was a French

count, and is accused of "*pretermittig*" "a golden opportunity" of capturing Newport, "to a stupid affair of etiquette." The weathergage, we are assured, was a *sine qua non* of that day, "among nautical men;" so that in their engagements they had the art to obtain it on both sides. On this occasion, however, a storm scattered the rival fleets even "over the ocean;" and while "Howe *made* for New York," "D'Estaing" (split) "for Newport."

About this time, insinuations unfavourable to Greene's conduct as quartermaster general, were made and propagated by his enemies. From Mr. Johnson's account, (p. 125.) he had contrived a sort of Thespian bureau for his department, and his enemies discovering that he silently conducted its duties behind a curtain, invented the following "syllogism," (p. 132.) which is so conclusive, that Mr. Johnson did not perceive it contains but the major and the minor. "The officers in that department are all acquiring the estates of nabobs, and the expenses of the army are enormous." And here, for the first time, the biographer of "poor Greene" favours the world with a scrap of his own history, for he intimates that, in this syllogistic censure, himself and General Knox were involved. "This affair requires the more attention from his biographer, as its malevolence was particularly directed against *himself and General Knox, as the known inseparable adherents of the commander in chief.*" It would not be candid to conceal that we

were so ignorant of the history of the Revolution, as never before to have heard the intimation, that Mr. Johnson flourished in that heroic period, and stood by the side of its immortal leader. Even now, notwithstanding his positive declaration, it is scarcely possible to suppress incredulity, or to reconcile the existence of a fact so important with the silence of "all other writers" in relation to it, and with the profound ignorance displayed by Mr. Johnson of the men who adorned, and of the events which distinguished that illustrious age. From these considerations we cannot help suspecting there is some mistake in this matter, and venture to predict, that in his "*next edition*" Mr. Johnson will correct it, by confessing that he was neither behind the curtain with General Greene, nor in the field with General Washington. Deeming himself, however, personally obnoxious to the charge of speculation, he devotes more pages than can be read with patience to its refutation. Its supposed application to Greene is met at once, and its syllogistic charm dissolved by a letter to his "cousin Griffin," reprobating the malice and jealousy of his accusers. Now, who could imagine for a moment, that even if General Greene had been as corrupt as his accusers represented or believed him, he would hesitate to assure his friends he was innocent, and that the charge against him was false. We are far from suspecting, that a mercenary thought ever inhabited his great and valiant heart; but his *mal a droit* biogra-

pher, with a view of exhibiting his own skill and devotedness, makes it a point to revive every obsolete aspersion that lived and perished with the slander of the day, and swells them to an importance almost too great, in some instances, for his feeble efforts to remove. On the occasion now alluded to, the mere mention that an unfounded imputation, arising from error or malice, was instigated by his enemies, somewhat countenanced, but soon dispelled by the force and lustre of his merit, would have been amply sufficient; for of such subjects, "*more than a little is by much too much.*" Mr. Johnson's explanation is long, complicated, and unintelligible.

After telling us with great financial clearness that one means of supplying the necessities of the army, was (p. 142.) the ingenious contrivance of "chaining opinion to the car of legislation," he enters deeply into an examination of the alleged intrigues of Gates against Washington, charges that the calumnies against Greene were subservient to the scheme against Washington—that Samuel Adams and the Lees of Virginia, were ranked among the enemies of Washington, and exposes in no favourable light the reputation of General Mifflin. The only impression in regard to Greene, which this part of the Sketches fixes upon the mind of the reader, is one which appears to be the reverse of the writer's design, viz. that he discovered an inordinate sensibility to these odious rumours, and thereby increased their weight and aggravated their

effect. They finally produced some ungracious proceedings in Congress, and at the treasury board, as well as the retirement of General Greene from the quartermaster department, poorer than even when he was appointed to it.

The following passage struck us as containing profound and original views of finance and economy, conceived and expressed with the force and precision peculiar to our author. (p. 152.) "In times of depreciation, those who have it in their power to anticipate funds, must realize a profit; but *to* those who have to wait the gradual accumulation of their resources, the receipts of yesterday are to-day reduced to half their value." It is somewhat surprising that Mr. Cheves, who had the honour of being a countryman of our author, instead of resorting to foreign loans and treasury indulgences, to sustain the credit and replenish the coffers of the bank, did not adopt this system of profitable depreciation and cumulative reduction, the principles of which are so vigorously condensed into this sentence. For it is demonstrable, that if, according to the process here indicated, the bank can realize a profit by the depreciation of its currency, it would have nothing to do but to extend its issues indefinitely; and, on the other hand, if its resources would gradually accumulate, though reduced daily to half their amount, they would augment rapidly if exempt from any reduction. Indeed, such is the force of this invaluable system, that there is every reason to believe

the enormity of the public debt of Great Britain would sink before its application.

Soon after Greene resumed his station in the line, the affair of Springfield occurred, in which, for the first time, he commanded an army. The river Rahway flows in front of that village, and is formed by two streams that unite a little to the north of it. Over the river, as well as over each of its branches, was a bridge, and Mr. Johnson notices this remarkable fact, (p. 191.) that the bridges were placed precisely where the roads crossed these several streams! The enemy, commanded by Sir Henry Clinton in person, had moved from New York for the purpose of seizing or destroying the military stores at this post, and advanced in two columns of twenty-five hundred men each. As soon as they appeared on the opposite heights, Greene, having pushed forward two light parties under Colonel Dayton and Major Lee, to obstruct and disorder their progress, descended from the hills and drew up his army on the plain between the village and the river. The columns of the enemy, bearing before them the resistance of Dayton and Lee, approached and commenced a cannonade, which was kept up for two hours on both sides. Meantime, a demonstration against his left, "baffled the valour of Greene," and he retreated to a new position on the rearward hills. To favour this operation, parties under Shrive, Angel, and Lee, were posted at the bridges, with orders to defend them as long as possible. After

a very spirited resistance, they were driven back successively, and being united under Shrive, retired to the main body on the hills. In performing this movement, Shrive, it is said, immortalized himself by "baffling every attempt of the enemy to retard or alarm him." Greene, then forming his regular infantry in one line, flanked by the dragoons of Lee and the Jersey militia, presented so firm a countenance, that the enemy, disconcerted by the fierce opposition they had encountered at the bridges, paused, and declining an attack, set fire to the village. Upon this, we have the authority of Mr. Johnson for a very singular and inconceivable fact. "Many an English soldier bled that *day* by the light" (not of the sun) but "of the flame." Thus terminated the affair, and Sir Henry Clinton, without offering or receiving further annoyance, returned to New York—the sooner, it appears, from an apprehension of reinforcements to Greene, and of the imminent arrival of a French fleet on our coast.

Some of the finest specimens of historical composition, are the reflections made on battles by those who have recorded them. In our little reading we have seen nothing of the kind, comparable to the following passage, (p. 193.) "This was, upon the whole, a disgraceful day to the British army. If the burning of Springfield was their sole object, it was one which stamps indelible infamy upon them. If the burning of a beautiful and delightful village was not their ob-

ject, then were they repulsed by a very inferior foe." The depth and sagacity of this reflection may be more fully established, by bearing in mind that the British first drove in Greene's advanced parties, then forced him to retire, and finding his position formidable, burnt the village in his face; an operation intended not only to destroy a place of deposit for the army, but in all probability to draw him from his strong ground. Mr. Johnson is of opinion that Greene was too modest in not claiming great credit for his conduct in this "battle;" in which, it seems, that with the exception of a harmless cannonade, he did not strike a stroke. As he is ambitious of the fame of fine writing, it would be unjust in us not to lay before the reader the paragraph in which he celebrates the yielding fair of Philadelphia, (p. 196.) "The reader will not be surprised to learn that it was not unusual to fit out the officer of the day by contributory loans for the honour of a regiment, or even of a state; and that, in one instance, there was but one suit of parade clothes in a whole regiment. And from whence did relief arrive at last? From the heart where patriotism erects her favourite shrine, and from the hand which is seldom closed or withdrawn when the soldier solicits. The ladies of Philadelphia immortalized themselves by commencing the generous work, and it was a work too grateful to the feelings of the American fair not to be followed up with zeal and ability. The *profane* pen of a Rivington may have sneeringly writ-

ten that the linen of the fair one was converted into a corresponding garment to decorate the person, or add to the comforts of her lover; but the fear of ridicule shrunk away from the more interesting reflection that soon it might be tinged with the heart's blood of the wearer." This lyrical effusion, decorated with the "corresponding linen of the fair one and her lover," from the delicacy of which, "the fear of ridicule shrinks away," is followed by allusion to a "*joint* attack," meditated on New York, in which the reader is sagely informed, that the assailing army "marched to brave the assault," leaving the British, who, doubtless, had expected to perform this duty, nothing in the world to do.

While the last and memorable enterprise of André, has excited reprobation on the one hand, and secured on the other esteem, the cruel and untimely fate to which it led him, the firmness, and yet sensibility, with which he endured the complicated horrors of his last hour, command the sympathy and admiration of mankind. By his friends he was wept as a martyred hero; and his enemies, remembering his romantic character, rather than his unjustifiable conduct, beheld him with more of regret than of censure. The bright and majestic justice of Washington stood eclipsed for a space, by sorrow for his fate; the noble soul of Hamilton melted at the scene; and down the warlike cheek of Greene, the tear of generous pity trickled upon André's tomb. But with these feelings

of brave compassion, these sentiments of unqualified praise or mitigated reproach, Mr. Johnson disdains to sympathize. The terms in which he speaks of this gallant and unfortunate man, are not only harsh, but cruel; truculent indeed, and taunting. To his sportive fancy, the capture of André appears in the light of a penalty, for a harmless pleasantry in verse; and the generous hazard with which he maintained his fidelity to Arnold, this "stern moralist," who looks with arch and encouraging smiles upon such peccadillos, as privateering, lying, and treason, stigmatizes as a selfish artifice;* lavishes in floundering profusion the epithets, "ungenerous," "base," "dishonourable;" paraphrases in sinister terms, an innocent paragraph of his letter; and with the most ruthless injustice, attempts to substantiate his misrepresentations, by charging him with having been a spy, long before,

* In recording this part of André's history, Marshall, who has unaccountably omitted to adorn his work with any intimations of his own "stern morality," observes, vol. iv. p. 281: "Regardless of himself, and only anxious for the safety of Arnold, he still maintained the character he had assumed, and requested Jameson to inform his commanding officer that *Anderson* was taken;" and, "when sufficient time for Arnold to make his escape had elapsed, André no longer affected disguise or concealment." These just expressions, which convey the only reasonable construction of the facts, give place, in the sublime morality of the Sketches, to "it was obviously an ingenious artifice to save himself:"—"a *ruse de guerre* played off on Jameson."—Vol. i. p. 206.

in Charleston. This too, upon the strength of a story which bears as little internal appearance of truth, as it has of authority, from the *initials* annexed to it. In short, it is impossible for any man who cherishes sentiments of justice and humanity, to read this part of Mr. Johnson's work without disgust and horror. It affords a melancholy and almost singular instance of distorted and embittered accusations, generated in the fermentation and violence of civil war, instead of being permitted to soothe themselves away with the influences of peace and time, industriously revived and exaggerated, by inflaming the uncertainty of distant tradition with the rancour of contemporary resentment. Our author, assuredly, has not studied the temper of the age or of the country in which he lives, else he would have known, that such malignant and vindictive sentiments, would dishonour the one and scandalize the other.*

* One of the principal motives which determined Washington to authorize the attempt of Champe to take Arnold, was his anxiety to save André.† Would he have been actuated by this motive for an instant, had there appeared in André's character a single shade of the turpitude ascribed to it in this book? Or would not his remorse have been deep and endless, had he afterwards discovered, or believed that he had obscured the prospects, and hazarded the life and reputation of the brave and faithful Champe, in an enterprise, of which the principal object was to rescue from deserved ignominy and punishment, an artful and inveterate spy? And when estimating subsequently in

† Lee's Memoirs, vol. li. p. 179—and American Register, vol. ii. p. 58.

Greene was ordered to succeed Arnold in command at West Point; and our author, who continues to maintain a forbidding reserve toward Lindley Murray, says, (p. 211.) "Of the state in which he found *things* at West Point, the following brief extract of a letter to a friend, will show *both* the fact, the cause, and his feeling with regard to it." The extract, to be sure, abounds with information, and glows with sensibility. "Was there ever such a devil as General Arnold? What confusion he has thrown every thing into! This post has been shamefully neglected. But the mystery is now out." Writers who have the ability to use their own language with facility and power, resort to the terms of a foreign one, as seldom as the exigencies of thought will permit; but scribblers, who have never been able to compass any language, ambitiously bedizzen their tawdry pages with every little exotic sprig they can pick up. Hume, fond as he was of French literature, discommended Gibbon for writ-

his lofty and virtuous mind, the character of André—comparing his conduct with his motives,—is it to be supposed the resemblance never occurred to him, between the inducements by which he was influenced, the prospect of serving his country and gratifying his general, and the motives with which Champe was inspired, under Washington's authority, to engage in an undertaking dignified only because its execution was perilous, and its object great—or can Mr. Johnson conceive with what emotions Washington would read his account of a man, whose last words were, "*I only request you to bear witness to the world that I die like a brave man.*"

ing a treatise in the purest idiom of that tongue; and Sir James M'Intosh apologized to the House of Commons for using the tolerated term *espionage*. Mr. Johnson has more liberal notions, and embellishes *his* work with all the little cant French phrases that have been degraded into polite desuetude, for half a century at least—applying them, as might be expected, without respect to original usage. The reader will have already come across “*ruse de guerre*,” “*coup de main*,” &c. pretty often; but in the page now before us, there is not only a due degree of ignorance of our own language exemplified, in using the word *rival* in the sense of *inconsistent*, but the French word “*metier*,” and its equivalent “*calling in life*,” are exhibited side by side, not that there is a peculiar expressiveness in the first, or defect of significancy in the sound; but as Bayes, in the *rehearsal*, says, “to show the writer’s breeding.” One curious observation we noticed, (p. 199.) which, in this age of scientific discovery, may afford an important hint to physiologists. Like most other august enunciations of truth, it is indeed involved in a cloudy figure; but it indicates clearly enough, the opinion of Mr. Johnson in regard to the subject upon which the metaphor is founded. He observes, “The North river had long been the great *vein* that supplied life to the American army.” Our readers have no doubt grown up in the antiquated notion, that the *arteries* are the organs which distribute vitality throughout the animal eco-

nomy, and that the function of the *veins* is to return the exhausted blood to the heart. And some authors have undertaken to infer the soundness of this theory, from the peculiar structure of these vessels. Our author is fairly on the other side of the question, and so as to this part of the vascular system, *sub judice lis est*. Hard will be the fate of the matter of fact reader who may chance to explore the *Sketches*. It is impossible for a simple fact to find room in the throng of Mr. Johnson's words, and there can scarcely be found in his thousand pages, a single proposition distinctly stated. At page 218, he does his best to say, that Congress, in appointing General Gates to the command of the southern army, without consulting the commander in chief, committed an act of imprudence and discourtesy; of which they appeared sensible, when they delegated to him the selection of a successor. But in place of this simple proposition, the following cumbrous collection of tropes and inuendoes make their appearance. "Washington was not consulted on that occasion—Gates's star was then in the ascendant, and its brilliancy had thrown even Washington's into shade. It is impossible to avoid indulging conjecture on such an occurrence; nor would it be presumptuous to assert, that the country was made, on this occasion, to feel the effects of ungenerous distrust and unwise encroachment, with regard to the judgment and powers of the commander in chief. Congress appears, however, to have be-

come sensible of the impropriety committed in that instance; to have distrusted their own judgment for the future, and willing to make atonement to the feelings of Washington, when a successor to Gates was to be appointed." Washington offered to Greene the important command of the southern army; and our author closes his sixth chapter with an account of the circumstances attending the acceptance of it. Through the "mighty maze" of the seventh chapter, notwithstanding the redoubted name of Sir Walter Raleigh, and the awful annodomini of 1584, which stand as sentinels on the first page, under a sense of critical duty, we enterprised to work our way. With befitting fortitude, therefore, we turned over the first leaf, and though startled at the sudden apparition of "John Locke," and fearing every moment to encounter William Shakespeare and John Milton, and perhaps "*glorious John Dryden*" too, we proceeded steadily along, until we got entangled in a paragraph, through which it was found impracticable, after repeated efforts, to convey a single gleam of understanding. It seemed to float on the confines of intellectual darkness, and to stretch down to the regions of historic night. "Revolutions, such as this government had recently *passed through*, when not protracted until *excitement sinks under its own exertions*, are *eminently calculated* to produce such a *result*. Individuals are *impelled to enterprise*, and the human mind acquires vigour, independence, and acuteness, from the reflections and

discussions which are forced upon it. Awakened from that state of torpor and of habit, in which nine tenths of mankind doze away their lives, and in which it is too much the interest of the rulers of the earth to keep them absorbed, men discover that however bitted, and harnessed, and flayed, and goaded, still the physical strength is with them, whether the car of state is to be kept in motion or overturned." This was far as the eye could reach. Beyond it, a feeble and chirping voice was heard, calling out the names of "Moses and Pisgah," which sounded strange to us after West Point and Greene. The last words we collected were about "Fundamental Constitutions." They indicated that the speaker was dreaming, and expressed this direct falsification of Oldmixon. "Yet it is but justice to *John Locke* to observe, that the evidence of his having been the author of the *Fundamental Constitutions*, is by no means satisfactory. A cotemporary writer attributes this truly sciolous production to the Earl of Shaftsbury, one of the proprietors."* Oldmixon, who did not write a history of the "British Empire," but of the *British Empire in America*, says, "*They were drawn up by that great philosopher, Mr. Locke, at the desire of that famous politician, the earl of Shaftsbury.*"—Returned from this cimmerician excursion, we observe that the eighth chapter contains a retrospec-

* "Oldmixon's British Empire, vol. i. p. 332."

tive view of the war in the south, up to the moment of Greene's appointment. Although it is designed, and very properly, as a foreground to the scene of his principal exploits, it is not so connected with his life as to fall within the range of our purpose. We shall, therefore, content ourselves with a cursory and desultory examination of it—beginning with a censure of Colonel Lee, for the alleged offence of applying to the war of the Revolution the epithet *unnatural*.

Hobbes, we believe, was the first philosopher who considered war to be the natural state of man.* The sentiment has been generally reprobated, and the arguments in support of it thoroughly exploded. Of all wars, civil wars—those carried on between different members of the same political body—have been held in theory to be the most discordant with nature, and found the most calamitous in fact. In foreign wars, the external relations of amity and convenience only are severed, and when soldiers of the hostile nations meet death in the field, it is inflicted by the hand of a stranger, and is not discriminated from the mass of events, which the operation of great national principles is deemed likely to produce. But in a civil war, the social and intimate connexions are dissolved, the ties of kindness and consanguinity are snapped; and a train of aggravated horror and distress attends, such as no other condition of mankind presents—ab-

* De Cive—C. 9.—S. 3. & sequente.

horrent to our best feelings, and, like certain extremities of individual conduct, unjustifiable except upon the ground of necessity. The ancients applied to civil war such epithets as *infaustum*, *nefandum*. Livy calls it “*bellum sine hoste*,” and Menenius Agrippa compared even a civil disagreement, to the refusal of the limbs to feed the stomach. Civilians in explicit treatises denounce, and historians out of number reprobate it, unless it arise from political necessity. Admitting then that Colonel Lee does denominate the war of the Revolution “unnatural,” his sentiment coincides with the general understanding of enlightened men. But does he thereby say, that on our part it was unjust? This is the material question—the one which Mr. Johnson’s remark suggests—and to determine it, the first thing necessary is to examine Lee’s expressions. The obnoxious phrase will be found in his *Memoirs*,* where it is said that Cornwallis, on a certain occasion, with a view to the greater expedition of his movements, resolved to destroy the baggage of his army, and committed first of all his own to the flames. This example of personal sacrifice his officers and men cheerfully followed, and Lee observes—“a memorable instance, among many others in this unnatural war, of the immutable disposition of the British troops to endure every privation in support of their king and country.” It is at once evident that

* Vol. i. p. 267.

Mr. Johnson does not comprehend the meaning of this passage. Let it be recollected that Lee is the author of "Memoirs," and although his work is interspersed with historical passages, yet that it is chiefly a personal narrative, and describes the impressions made upon his mind by the several events he relates at the time of their occurrence. In the instance in hand accordingly, he is to be considered as speaking forty years ago, when this act of the British army had just come to his knowledge. Doubtless, he then may have thought—"How strange that Englishmen, late our friends and kindred, who value themselves on their attachment to liberty, should not only endeavour to force us into slavery, but to accomplish this *unnatural* purpose, should cheerfully risk their own lives and enthusiastically sacrifice their personal comforts!" These reflections, no doubt, arose in the minds of many Americans, and certainly compose the import of the expression just quoted from Lee. He has condensed them, for his thoughts were vigorous and his style concise, and it is not surprising that his sense should surpass the conception of our author. That the war on our part was just, there is at this day we believe no question even beyond the Atlantic—that Colonel Lee thought it so, he gave at the time it raged the best evidence in his power, and yet severe reprehension is glanced at his memory by a judge of the Supreme Court of his country, on account of a just and philosophical expression. On this occasion

surely the demeanour of Mr. Johnson does not come up to his station. Indeed, as the term *unnatural* is so repugnant to him, it is to be inferred that he considers even civil wars natural. But he can only deem any war natural in consequence of its being just*—that is, he must esteem every war that is just, natural. Now, as it is the received doctrine that a state of war is unnatural, it follows that it is as natural on one side as the other, and therefore, according to Mr. Johnson, as just on one side as the other, which is absurd—a conclusion towards which most of our author's arguments manifest an ungovernable propensity.

Among the memorabilia of this chapter, our attention was engaged by the mention of a high political personage—for the discovery of whose name and title the world probably is indebted to Mr. Johnson. He declares positively, (pp. 262 and 3.) that in the year 1765, "Sir Robert Grenville" was prime minister of England. It is painful for any man to confess his own ignorance, especially when it is what is called downright ignorance, yet it is too true to be concealed or denied, that the name and rank of this distinguished statesman are perfectly new to us. We remember to have read of the Honourable Mr. George Grenville, who succeeded Lord Bute in '63, and gave place in '65, after the passage of the stamp act, to the Marquis of Rockingham; and of whose character Burke

* *Bella justa quibus necessaria.*

speaks in language, not indeed comparable to that of our author, with such strong and discriminating praise. Unfortunately for Sir Robert, Burke, it seems, had no acquaintance with him. The style of Mr. Johnson still preserves its original properties, e. g. (p. 265.) the Americans are called “an *extensive* people,” (p. 286.) “immediately as” for, *as soon as*, (p. 317.) “Tarleton is stripped of the military plumes in which his exploits had heretofore decorated his character,” (p. 319.) “three colonels and upwards of 150 *others* are killed.”—With admirable decorum and consistency Mr. Marshall is reproached, because that distinct and impartial writer adopts Tarleton’s account of his numbers at Blackstock’s—upon the ground that Tarleton “must be supposed to have been best informed on this subject.” If the reader will turn back to page 82 of the Sketches, he will there find this same position laid down, as the groundwork of our author’s description of the battle of Germantown, and the spring of his promise to relieve the reader from the “abject confusion” of all other accounts. He says—“Giving each then credit for correctness with regard to what was within his own knowledge, there is no difficulty in reconciling every seeming inconsistency.” Positively the judge ought to remember the golden rule.*

* There is one subject alluded to in this chapter, upon which it may not be improper to subjoin a few remarks. It is the following observation of Mr. Johnson, (p. 154.) “Certain it is that

at that time Washington had enemies, and among them were ranked the Lees of Virginia,"—referring to the time when the intrigues and machinations of Conway and Gates were in agitation. That there may be greater pretensions to *certainly* in this assertion than in most of Mr. Johnson's declarations, we are inclined to admit, as it is probable some of "the Lees of Virginia" were predisposed, from feelings of kindred, sentiments of friendship, and pledges of hospitality, to sympathize, perhaps intensely, with General Charles Lee, on occasion of the view taken of his military conduct, at the battle of Monmouth, where, according to Stedman, the most judicious British authority, he saved the American army. It is not, however, to be believed, that this discontent placed them in alliance with Gates and Conway, or in opposition to the father of his country—was not, indeed, lost in admiration of his transcendent virtue and abilities. From the commencement to the conclusion of the Revolution, "the Lees of Virginia" were active whigs and eminent republicans. Independently of those whose public exertions were confined to their native state, and of Colonel Lee, who is not supposed to be classed with his kinsmen by the judge—one was the mover of the *Declaration of Independence*, and two signed it. Two more discharged diplomatic trusts of dignity in Europe, and in these characters only, are Arthur and William known to their countrymen. But their patriotic services began much earlier, and it may be, were more important. Before the Revolution, these gentlemen resided in London—William a merchant, and in Wilks's mayoralty, a sheriff of the city; Arthur, engaged in literary and political pursuits, and in the society of the most polite, enlightened, and eminent men of the nation—such as Lord Shelburne, Mr. Burke, Mr. Fox, and Dr. Johnson. Being both ardent whigs, they devoted themselves to the support of free principles of government, and to the promotion of American interests. On these subjects, their correspondence with the other "Lees of Virginia" was con-

stant and stimulating—filled with authentic information, important suggestions, and interesting facts. As a sample of it, there is room only for the following letter from William to his more distinguished brother Richard Henry.

London, February 6, 1770.

MY DEAR BROTHER,

I have just stole a moment to give you a little touch of politics ; and as I expect more from you and Frank for the good of America, than any others in Virginia, the subject will be chiefly on American affairs ; with this preamble, where facts are mentioned, you may depend on their authenticity ; for which reason egotisms will perhaps be too frequent, and in matters of opinion you may give what credit you please to them. Having already been in some respect hurt, by my name being indiscreetly mentioned to captains of ships and others, as a political intelligencer, I can trust only your discretion, not to do it unless there should be a necessity to authenticate any fact. Ministerial changes the papers are full of, that is, all but the king's-men and the Bedford-men are out. Lord North is fixed in the Duke of Grafton's saddle ; and though every party in the kingdom is firmly united against the present set, there is no prospect of a change. I am apt to think myself, the minority cannot succeed, owing to their union with G. Grenville, against whom there is, in the Princess Dowager and the King, such an implacable resentment, that he never can come in. If he does, I give up my faith in the king's obstinacy. The present ministry are, from principle, enemies to all political liberty, and consequently are enemies to America. They have declared for repealing the American duties on paper, paint, and glass, as being a tax on British manufactures ; but as they are very far from the design of giving up, or keeping dormant, the parliamentary right of taxing America ; the duty on tea is to be retained as an absolute fixed precedent, with the other revenue acts, viz. the 4th and 6th of George III. chapters 15th and

18th, the commissions of customs, admiralty courts, &c. Indeed they say, that the mighty boon of repealing the duties on paper, paint, and glass, is to be with restrictions; what those restrictions may be, we are left to conjecture. But from some hints, they are supposed to be, either a restraint on your manufactures, or making your associations against British manufactures, felony or treason.

Lords Camden and Chatham are greater than ever; the last is really divine. It is impossible for me to give you any idea of his sublimity. Smollett's character of his eloquence, will give you some faint notion of it. His sentiments and expressions of America are the same as before. The 2d inst. the House of Lords sate from two o'clock in the evening, till past two in the morning, later than ever was known. Lord Chatham astonished even those that had known him for near forty years; though he was labouring under a fit of the gout. Lords Mansfield, Marchmont, Egmont, and all the rest, fell before him like grass before a keen scythe. But 'twas all in vain—a question involving annihilation to the constitution, was carried against him by a great majority.

February 10th.—Little alteration in American affairs, only instead of their being heard the 12th, in the House of Commons, they are put off, and no time fixed for them. Most think the tea will not be repealed, unless the India Company should carry it in their plan, which the ministry now say they will not agree to. The minority strengthen every day; and things seem to be near a crisis; the Lords' protest makes every one think very seriously. If the high hand in government continues, a spirit will very soon be raised that may burn some people's fingers.

Be steady in America, and explicit in your demands. Now is the only time to insist firmly on them all. South Carolina has done nobly; this week the bill of Rights-men have receiv-

ed £1500 sterling, sent them by the assembly, to assist them in supporting the glorious cause they have undertaken.

My love to you all. Adieu.

WILLIAM LEE.

P. S. Colonel Barre and Mr. Burke, the first day in the House of Commons, made every body laugh ready to die, for near an hour, with their comments on Lord Botetourt's two speeches to your assembly; the last, Colonel Barre, challenged the whole ministry, and defied them to make common sense of it. But they did not accept the challenge. It was well for the assembly, their address in answer to it was not then come to hand.

CHAPTER II.

THE period which we now approach is distinguished by more important events, adorned with a greater variety of character, diversified by swifter vicissitudes of fortune, and enhanced by a more momentous catastrophe than any other portion of the war. In the north the contest had become a contention of vigilance and preparation, rather than a trial of arms. The solitary grandeur of Washington, glittering far above the region of envy and emulation, left him unopposed by a rival, unapproached by a second. Beneath him the fortune of war seemed to stand still, and to wait the maturity of those operations, which the valour and ability of Greene were destined so successfully to prosecute. Many officers of promise solicited directions to accompany General Greene to the south, and among others La Fayette and his friend Lee, "whom he loved, and in whom he confided."* On the 4th of December, 1780, General Greene assumed the command of the southern

* La Fayette to Greene, Nov. 10th, 1780. Colonel I. Lawrens was also of this number, in regard to whom Mr. Johnson makes this assertion, (p. 322, note,) "He was *literally* the Chevalier *san tache & sans peur*." Before the Sketches came out, the

army in the camp at Charlotte, and by his delicate respect for the feelings of General Gates, exhibited his own character in the most engaging light. It would seem impossible to make particular mention of the misfortune of General Gates, without adverting to the unparalleled magnanimity of the Virginia assembly, displayed in their manner of receiving him on his return to Richmond. Such men as Lee and Wirt could not fail to record it in terms of applause.* In elevated disdain of popular clamour, and in noble sensibility to the uncertainty of human greatness, it has never been equalled. The thanks of the Roman senate to Varro, denoted firmness and wisdom—political magnanimity in the highest degree. But the moral sublimity, the exalted sympathy, and the unconquered gratitude of Henry's resolution, place the assembly of Virginia far above the senate of Rome. The fortune of war defeated the armies of the republic, but the gratitude of these illustrious men could not be overcome; and the expression of it was more glorious than the greatest victory. Mr. Johnson discovers no taste for the contemplation of such events. Little misbegotten slanders he can scent out and portray admirably, but examples of real greatness and solid glory, present no attractions to his mind: and his style,

Chevalier Bayard, who was killed 300 years ago at Aost, was thought to be *literally* the knight above alluded to—but this it seems is a mistake.

* Memoirs, vol. i. p. 236. Life of Henry, p. 228.

though sufficient to float all the filth of the region, is too shallow to bear along the burthens of historic truth.

General Greene found the army feeble in numbers, but more so in spirits and supplies; for as his biographer tells us, "every thing had gone by the board" in Gates's defeat. With great diligence, therefore, and not without success, he applied himself to the task of soliciting reinforcements and collecting supplies, and on the 24th took a position at Hicks's creek on the Pedee, having previously detached General Morgan with 600 regular troops, beyond the Catawba, with a view of inspiring resistance to the enemy in that quarter, and by threatening his posts at Augusta and Ninety Six, to draw the attention of Cornwallis (now at Winnesborough, and meditating the invasion of North Carolina) in that direction; secure to himself leisure to restore the discipline and courage of his troops, and to wait in a position, safe, abundant, and menacing, the arrival of his stores and reinforcements. Here, about the 12th of January, he was joined by Colonel Green, with a detachment of Virginia regulars, and by Lieutenant Colonel Lee with his legion.* As the latter is peculiarly obnoxious to the censure of our author, having written a book which, it was apprehended might stand in the way of the Sketches, and having been fortunate enough to serve his country so effectually in some instances, as to excite an appre-

* Mr. Johnson dates the arrival of Lee on the 12th, precisely.

hension that he contributed to the glory and success of General Greene to an extent, that if fairly and fully represented, might interfere with the plan of fabulous perfection projected for this biography—the reader must not be surprised at finding an attempt at disparagement in the first expressions respecting Lee's appearance in the south, (p. 354.) “Colonel Lee had been expected to march early in October from Philadelphia, but the equipping, disciplining (and perhaps exhibiting) his *command*, had rendered his movements very slow—his *journey* from Fredericksburg to Richmond, for instance, required a fortnight, not a little to the distress of his commander, who had not a horseman in his camp.” Had the terms of this passage been less vague, its accuracy, as to facts, would have been completely exposed. It is impossible that General Greene, or any other person acquainted with the state of our military affairs at that time, could have expected Colonel Lee to march from Philadelphia “early in October,” for he was, until late in October, in actual service in New Jersey under the Marquis Lafayette.* Besides, according to Mr. Johnson's own showing, (pp. 218, 19 to 22.) General Washington's letter, conferring the appointment on General Greene, was dated the 14th, and received the day after—and General Greene did not leave West Point, on his way to the south, until the 20th, although Mr. Johnson, with his usual inaccuracy, says the 18th,

* See Appendix A. 1, 2, 3, 4.

immediately after transcribing a letter from him, dated at West Point, the 19th. Again, in General Washington's order to Greene of the 22d of October, he says, "I have put Major Lee's corps under marching orders, and when he is ready will detach him to join you." Certainly in this state of things, Colonel Lee, who never thought of going to the south until subsequently to Greene's appointment, could not have been expected, after leaving the army in New Jersey, to march from Philadelphia early in October—nor is the insinuation to be justified, that General Greene counted on his immediate arrival when he united the cavalry of Washington to Morgan's detachment. As to his *exhibiting* his corps, it is not known or insinuated that it ever deviated from the direct road. It is probable they were often seen, and as often admired for the spirit and appearance of the men and horses, to which their commander was very attentive. His commission as lieutenant colonel is dated the 6th of November, and Mr. Johnson will not contend that he left Philadelphia before that day; as the letter from Lafayette of the 29th of October, proves that he was at that time near the light camp in New Jersey. The probability then, from reference to these facts and authorities is, that the legion was not expected to leave Philadelphia before the middle of November. In order to equip the squadron, Mr. Johnson says, a requisition had been made on the state of Maryland, as one was likewise on the executive of Virginia, and

his own book sufficiently explains the difficulty and delay which always attended these transactions. The fact is, Colonel Lee left his corps somewhere in Maryland, passed the Potomac at Hooe's ferry, and after remaining but three days with his friends, joined the legion at Richmond—so that he was not engaged in any *exhibitions* between Fredericksburg and that place. The moment he was put under marching orders for the south, his attention was turned to raising the strength of the legion to its full establishment, and many of his officers and troopers were permitted to visit their friends in Maryland and Virginia, with instructions to procure the best horses. And so great was his anxiety to join General Greene, that his corps marched from Philadelphia, as the brave Captain Armstrong said, without “cash or canteens.”* He addressed letters to Governors Reed, Rodney, Lee, and Jefferson, on the subject of recruiting and equipping the legion, and endeavoured to improve and strengthen its composition by getting the finest men and horses in his native state. These assertions, though credible in themselves, will be found substantiated, so far as they are material, by the letters of Captain Armstrong, Captain Peyton, and the great Mason.† It may be aded, that he reached the camp of General Greene sooner than Mr. Johnson allows, for on the 11th, he had obtained from Governor Rut-

* See Appendix, B—1.

† See Appendix B. 2 and 3.

ledge authority to raise in South Carolina a corps of 150 cavalry, to be attached to his legion; and the governor was then at the Cheraws, a small distance south of General Greene's camp. This paper, while it exposes the fearless inaccuracy with which Mr. Johnson dated Colonel Lee's arrival, affords a further proof of the zeal with which he applied himself to the interests of the service, and of course to the success of his general.

“ Cheraws, 11th January, 1781.

“ Colonel Lee being desirous of raising about 150 cavalry, on a regular and permanent establishment, to be attached to his legion, I do not only consent to his so doing, but recommend to active and spirited young men in this state, to join him upon that footing, whereby they may signalize themselves, and render important services to their country.

“ J. RUTLEDGE.”

Since then both ends of Mr. Johnson's story are evidently false, it remains for him to show how much truth lies between them. As soon, however, as Lee joined General Greene, he was detached towards the Santee in order to co-operate with General Marion, in annoying the enemy's posts in that quarter; and these officers speedily essayed the surprise of Georgetown. The attempt was partially successful. Our author here endeavours to establish an inconsistency, between the account given of this affair by Lee in his *Memoirs*, and in his despatch to Greene. But it is plain he has not comprehended the relation of it in

the Memoirs—and that he is still insensible to the distinction between the character of memoirs and history. In the Memoirs, after describing the plan, it is said,* “On the first fire which took place at the commandant’s quarters, the militia of Marion and the dragoons of Lee, rushed into the town prepared to bear down all resistance. To the astonishment of these officers every thing was quiet; the legion infantry holding its assigned stations, and Lieutenant Colonel Campbell a prisoner. Not a British soldier appeared, not one attempted either to gain the fort, or to repair to the commandant. Having discovered their enemy, the troops of the garrison kept close to their respective quarters, barricaded the doors, and determined there to defend themselves. The assailants were unprovided with the necessary implements for battering doors and scaling windows.” This narrative is followed by the reflection, “If instead of placing Rudolph’s division to intercept the fugitives, it had been ordered to carry the fort by the bayonet, our success would have been complete. The fort taken, and the commandant a prisoner, we might have availed ourselves of the cannon, and readily demolished every obstacle and shelter.” On the contrary, his letter to Greene, or rather the imperfect extracts given from it by our author, contain no reflections on the plan, nor express account of its attempted execution. “Destitute of

* Vol. i. p. 250, 251.

the expected assistance, my force was inadequate to the assault of the enemy's enclosed works, nor was the possession equivalent to the certain loss to be expected from such a measure." Had Mr. Johnson given the antecedent sentence, his readers would have known to what assistance Colonel Lee referred—would have found probably he alluded to a want of prompt and sufficient co-operation on the part of the militia. The sentence, however, contains nothing inconsistent with the Memoirs. It alludes to a difficulty, which, under the inherent defect of the plan, could not be surmounted *after the commencement of the attack*, without the employment of certain assistance, but which could have been avoided had a wiser disposition been originally made, and so far coincides with the Memoirs. The blunder of the guides too, next alluded to in the despatch of Colonel Lee, is a casualty sufficient to have frustrated the enterprise, and is particularly incident to one encumbered with a complicated plan. Marion says, "Colonel Lee informed you of our little success, which could not be greater without artillery;" confirming Lee's opinion in the Memoirs, that Rudolph should have been directed to carry the fort and seize the artillery. To further this unsuccessful effort, our author adduces extracts from General Moultrie's narrative of this affair. It does not seem to be materially at variance with Lee's account—but, at any rate, Moultrie not having been an eye witness, cannot be brought into

comparison with Lee in regard to accuracy in this small matter, particularly when his account is recognized, and in part expressly confirmed by Marion. Before quitting this part of the subject, it may be proper to notice a palpable and invidious misrepresentation of Lee. In a letter from Greene to Sumpter, the former observes, (p. 362.) "In order to pave the way for this service, I desired Colonel Lee to surprise Georgetown;" and, in a note on this remark, our author exclaims, "and yet Colonel Lee takes the credit of the surprise altogether to himself." Now in his *Memoirs*, Lee says, * "In a few days after Lee's junction with Marion, *they* proposed an enterprise against the garrison of Georgetown;" yet it is true *he might* have taken the credit of it on authority which Mr. Johnson himself will not venture to dispute—that, namely, of General Greene—for in a letter of the 12th, he observes to Lee, † "The sooner you can carry into effect *your* projects at Georgetown the better;" and on the 15th, "It is my opinion Watson's corps may be cut off. Please consult with General Marion upon the subject, and take your measures according as you think advisable. I don't think the last object of equal importance to the one you have in contemplation." Again, from a letter of Lee's to Marion of the 20th, it is clear that the latter had no part in originating the enterprise. Lee expresses a wish to see two of Marion's prisoners, with a view of as-

* Vol. i. p. 248.

† See Appendix C. 1, 2.

certaining "several important points respecting the state of the enemy's cavalry, as well as to answer other interesting matters." "I persevere," he adds, "in my wish to join you, and expect to be able to accomplish it." This is sufficient to prove that Marion knew nothing of Lee's project at this time, and that four days before its execution was attempted, it was uncertain whether, and when he was to be joined by Lee. On the same day Lee writes to Greene, "should I attempt to strike I will advise you;" and, in reply, Greene observes, * "The difficulties you say are greater than you expected in carrying into effect *your projected plan* of attack." On the 22d, Marion writes to Lee, "There is not a British between Camden and Watson's post. I have nothing new from Georgetown. The few horse there I think might easily be drawn out and taken."

From these remarks and extracts, it appears in the first place, that Lee was not so vain as to arrogate to himself credit to which he was not entitled; but that he was disinterested enough to share with another what he might rightfully have appropriated to himself. In the next place, as the intellectual merit of the enterprise consisted entirely of the invention and capacity employed in forming its plan, General Greene neither claimed nor deserved any portion of it, when he wrote to Sumpter, "I desired Colonel Lee to surprise Georgetown." If otherwise, and he had desired Lee

* Appendix 6—3.

to take Cornwallis and his army, and that officer had, by luck or ingenuity, accomplished the interesting service, he might have lost half the glory attending it by reason of a naked or silly request. Besides, as Greene wrote to Sumpter about ten days after the affair, it is probable, that in his mind, the specific mode in which it was conducted, had come to represent the more general manner in which it might have been contemplated as practicable; and certainly in that sense, the expression, I desired Colonel Lee to *surprise* Georgetown, does not imply the invention of the particular plan which was actually adopted. Without impugning then, in any degree, the fairness of Greene's remark, it may be safely repeated, that for the individual enterprise against Georgetown, he neither claimed nor deserved the least possible credit. If, indeed, as our author insinuates, he did propose the capture of that post to Lee, or if, as his own letters intimate, he entertained and encouraged its suggestion by Lee, as a link in the chain of measures embraced in his plan of operations; so far, and so far only, as it was efficient or judicious in that respect, is he entitled to praise in reference to it. As then neither Marion nor Greene is entitled to the credit of conceiving this project, in the absence of any other competitor, it must be assigned to Lee. A conclusion which will not be without influence in determining points of future importance to the integrity of Mr. Johnson's narrative, to the dignity of Lee's mind, and

to the importance of his services, against both which, Mr. Johnson wages an inveterate war of prejudice and words; of which an incipient measure is the unfair and unfounded remark just noticed. Nor will the attention bestowed on this subject be deemed excessive, when it is discovered that it is placed at the threshold of a discussion, important in regard to the intrinsic interest of its subject, and of consequence, from the bearing its issue is likely to have on the reputation of Lee. This juxta position, by which our author has endeavoured to connect the enterprise against Georgetown, with the movement from Deep river to Camden, in the April following, discovers as much anxiety as art, in regard to his grand attack against Lee; and seems designed to transfer to the consideration of the latter subject, the effect of the injurious impressions with which his misrepresentation of the former might infect the mind of the reader. Could Lee be convicted of the attempt to arrogate undue credit, or of selfish inaccuracy in his narrative of the Georgetown affair, allowance for the existence of the same disposition and equal inaccuracy, might be claimed when we come to weigh the honesty of his narrative of that part of the campaign, against the value of Mr. Johnson's direct efforts to discredit it. The prospective interest of the subject therefore, rather than its actual importance, seemed to require a careful consideration. To facilitate and strengthen its insinuated connection with the great movement of

April, an identity is alleged between the latter, and one, which was for a moment contemplated by Greene, immediately after the surprise of Georgetown. Although this allegation is calculated to provoke an immediate investigation of the question connected with the movement from Deep river; yet, as it would be somewhat premature and inopportune, we shall wait until the progress of our author's entangled narration brings us up to that event; persuaded that forbearance will not increase our trouble, but aggravate the consequence of Mr. Johnson's failure; and that it will be as easy to destroy the full-grown serpent, even as to crush the cockatrice in the shell. At present, it is sufficient to observe that the alleged identity does not exist, and that consequently the connection attempted to be established through it, ceases to be possible. He observes, (pp. 360-61.) "The surprise of Georgetown was not a simple *coup de main*, it was the first step in gradation of the measures which General Greene had then in contemplation. The object which he proposed to himself, was to recall Lord Cornwallis from his views on Virginia, and to detain him in South Carolina until an army could be collected and equipped, of sufficient strength to penetrate into the country and fight him. This plan of operations is distinctly announced in the correspondence in October; and although the celebrated descent into South Carolina in the April following, has been treated of as an idea then first presented to the general's

mind, it constituted in January, the substance of a correspondence between Greene, Morgan, Marion, and Lee. The project was for Morgan to pass on towards Ninety Six, and even into Georgia, while a detachment ascended the Santee, and formed a junction with him before Ninety Six, and the main army attracted the attention of the enemy by threatening Camden. The advance of Colonel Lee, at this time, and his junction with Marion, had expressly in contemplation a blow at the posts on the Santee and Congaree, with a view of feeling the operation of the measure on the future movements of Cornwallis, as well as to injure him by their actual destruction. In a letter of General Greene's to Marion, of the 25th, before the news of the victory of the Cowpens was received, the general writes, "I wish to have your opinion of the practicability of crossing the Santee with a party of 3 or 400 horse, and whether they would be much exposed by being in the rear of the enemy: also, whether the party could not make good their retreat, if it should be necessary, and join our people towards Ninety Six. If the thing is practicable, can your people be engaged to perform the service? It may be a matter of the highest importance connected with other movements; and therefore I beg you to give me all the information upon the subject you can, *without hinting the design to any person whatever, except to Colonel Lee*, whom I wish you to advise with," &c. And Colonel Lee on the 30th,

writes, "In your letter of the 26th, you suggest an idea of a very extensive movement, and intimate a desire for a correspondent movement in me, at the proper moment, if practicable. My part of the game can be played; and in my opinion, will be of the most durable and comprehensive service." "I pray to hear from you, and beg you to cherish the movement mentioned in yours of the 26th," &c.

It is to be observed that the above recited extracts from and to Greene, are given to support and elucidate the statement placed at the head of them: and that it appears to contain these propositions; that the surprise of Georgetown was a measure embraced in Greene's general plan of operations, that the outlines of the plan were *to recall Lord Cornwallis from his views on Virginia, and detain him in Carolina* until an army could be formed of sufficient strength to penetrate the country, and fight him; and that this plan was entertained so far back as October 1780. That the descent into South Carolina executed in April 1781, so far from having been first presented to Greene's mind at that time, constituted the subject of a correspondence between Greene, Morgan, Marion and Lee in the January preceding; that the project so concerted between Greene, Morgan, Marion and Lee, was for Morgan to approach Ninety Six, and even to pass on to Georgia, a detachment to ascend the Santee, and form a junction with him before Ninety Six, while the main army attracted the atten-

tion of Lord Cornwallis by threatening Camden. It would seem therefore that Mr. Johnson is of opinion that the plan of operations entertained by Greene in October, is the original of that formed about the 25th of January, and this latter identical with the celebrated one which was put in execution the April following. To destroy this equation we have only to shew that the mean term is false; that the design which was actually formed in January, is dissimilar in its shape, and opposite in its origin, to the one imagined and described by our author, so that the conclusion will be the reverse precisely of that which he contends for. The design of Greene in January, instead of being formed *before* he received the news of the victory of the Cowpens, was conceived in *consequence* of his hearing of that event; and instead of contemplating the simultaneous advance of a detachment from the Santee, and of Morgan toward Ninety Six, and of the latter even into Georgia, while the main army should attract the attention of Cornwallis by threatening Camden, consisted simply of an intention to concentrate the whole army in the neighbourhood of Ninety Six. For the proof of this affirmation, the following extract of a letter of the 26th January 1781 from Greene to Lee is relied upon.* “Before this, I imagine you must have heard of Tarleton’s defeat by General Morgan. The success is so great, and the enemy’s loss so capital, that I am loth it should stand

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alone, and am therefore going to Charlotte to consult with Morgan, Generals Davidson, Sumpter and Pickens, in order to see if it would not be practicable by a combination of our forces, to move the army into the neighbourhood of Ninety Six. Should this be found practicable, and provisions can be had, it will be adopted, and of course will *entirely alter our whole arrangement*. From the probability of the thing, I wish you to accomplish your designs as soon as practicable without precipitating measures; and be in readiness to act in concert with us. I have written to General Marion, who I am told is perfectly well acquainted with the country on the other side of the Santee, to give me his opinion respecting the practicability of crossing that river with a body of horse, and how far they would be exposed after crossing. *I have not let him into my views in the least*, but wish you to consult him on those points, and to give me an account thereof. Don't let no mortal have the least intimation of what I have in contemplation," &c. Thus then the celebrated descent into South Carolina of April, being identical with the imagined plan concerted in January, and that being clearly different from the real one, it follows that the plan actually formed by Greene in January, is not identical with the one put in execution in April. By the same mode of argument it may be shewn, that the alleged plan of October 1780, bears no assignable relation to the celebrated descent of April. But from this letter of the 26th, it is further evident, that the system of mea-

asures projected by General Greene, *in consequence* of Morgan's victory, was not only independent of his previous designs, but in his judgment incompatible with them. He tells Lee, "should this be adopted, it will of course alter our whole arrangement." And so far is it from being true, as Mr. Johnson asserts, that the junction of Lee with Marion, "had it expressly in contemplation," to strike a blow at the enemy's posts on the Santee and Congaree, it is evident from Greene's letters, that Lee's expedition was limited to the attack on Georgetown, and on Watson's corps, said to be at Nelson's ferry; the former on Winyaw bay, and the latter near half-way down the Santee. And these objects were prescribed to him rather as alternative, than consecutive enterprises. On the 15th Greene writes, "since you left this place one of General Marion's people was here, and informed me that Watson's corps lies on the Santee at Nelson's ferry. It is my opinion Watson's corps may be cut off. I don't think the last object of equal importance with the other you have in contemplation, and therefore wish you not to neglect the first for the last." On the 21st, "the difficulties you say are greater than you expected in carrying into operation your plan of attack;" and after a great deal of caution, adds, "Don't forget Watson's corps on the Santee. Perhaps all things considered, that may be the most inviting object." From the letter of the 26th it is likewise evident that our author's assertion that the plan

of operations (whatever it was) projected by General Greene in January, constituted the substance of a correspondence in that month with Greene, Morgan, Marion and Lee, is utterly gratuitous and false, and that it was communicated by letter at least solely to Lee, and industriously concealed from Marion. And from the events which followed immediately Greene's departure from his camp on Pedee, it is clear that he could never even have conversed with Morgan respecting it, as it was necessarily abandoned the moment he joined that officer on the Catawba. It is somewhat important to point out this hazardous misstatement, with a view of counteracting its tendency to produce the impression that Lee was not eminent in the confidence of Greene, which is assiduously urged by our author, and probably designed to have a collateral influence in favour of his principal effort to impair the military reputation of that officer, and to discredit his work. Having then advanced this one step in the examination of Mr. Johnson's history of the important campaign of '81, let the reader reflect that there has yet been discovered nothing but unfounded assertions, absurd inferences, and false insinuations, a total ignorance, or a wilful confusion of facts, and then let him compare the work of our author with his duty. Polybius, who does not boast of 4000 documents, made it his chief study to render the beginning of his history "*clear, precise, and well established as to facts,*" and for this very good reason:

“For when the beginning of a history is involved in any kind of intricacy or obscurity,” (misrepresentation *he* did not think possible,) “the parts which follow can never obtain any great degree of credit or regard.” Mr. Johnson on the other hand undertakes with an air of confidence, which carries “the counterfeit presentment” of truth, to delineate the plan of January, to expound its spirit and demonstrate its relations, without shewing or being able to shew a single document to authorize his statement, or justify his explanations; thus adding to the indiscretion committed by laying the foundation of the history of this splendid campaign in confusion and error, the sin of being conscious of his folly. Here it is obvious a position might be taken, that would command the whole of his work, enfilade his entire line of attack, and facilitate an assault on those points especially, which are intended to disparage the authenticity of Lee’s Memoirs, and the justice of the claim set up for him, to the honour of having projected the magnificent movement from Deep river. But we shall decline using this advantage, and forbear to press against any position in the Sketches, the momentum acquired by having demolished a preceding one, or to regard any statement with that suspicion, which the detection of previous fallacies naturally inspires. The reader is therefore entreated to *imagine*, in reference to the remainder of the Sketches, that every assertion is true until it be proved to be false, every statement

correct that is not shewn to be inaccurate, and every conclusion just, the absurdity of which has not been demonstrated. But admitting that the statements in regard to the origin and character of the enterprise contemplated by Greene in January, were as authentic as they are unfounded, still it would be easy to show that no state of mind short of fatuity, would assent to the conclusion, that they could forestal competition for the credit of conceiving the plan of April. The periods of the campaign, the respective state and position of the hostile armies were so different; so much time elapsed between the dates alluded to, such various and unexpected events interposed, that besides their intrinsic difference, the two measures were sun-dered by a train of circumstances broad as the Hellespont; and must appear to the judgment of every unbiassed mind, as distinct as any other two events of the campaign. For who can conceive a movement of Greene from the Cheraw hills in *any direction*, while Lord Cornwallis was encamped at Winnsborough, can have the smallest appearance of identity with his march from Deep river to Camden, while Lord Cornwallis was refreshing his army at Wilmington, and meditating the invasion of Virginia? Strange that Mr. Johnson should have undertaken to confound them—the more so, as he confesses his ignorance of the shape and original of the first one. But our author asserts, repeats, and reiterates, his pretensions to superior accuracy of information, in regard to the

designs and operations of Greene. It has already been shown that he misapprehends the origin and end of the project of January, and is unacquainted with the extent and character of the object contemplated by the advance of Lee, and his co-operation with Marion, nor will it be difficult to prove that he has misunderstood the entire direction of Greene's mind, up to this point of the campaign. The import of his description of it is, that from the 12th of January, when Lee is said to have joined him, up to the 25th, when intelligence of the victory of the Cowpens reached him, Greene was occupied incessantly in ex-cogitating, or in directing from his camp on Pedee, movements either toward Camden, or against the enemy's line of posts on the Santee. Whereas the truth is, that until the victory of the Cowpens was known to him, with the exception of authorizing the circumscribed operations of Lee, Greene was disposed to content himself in his camp of observation, menace and security on Pedee, as long at least as Cornwallis should remain quiet at Winnsborough. On the 20th of January, Lee writes from the neighbourhood of Georgetown. "I recommend the movement of your army to this country. It will secure my re-crossing the river, and in my opinion such a movement, in case of my success, will draw the major part of the British army toward their last ground. Here provisions are plenty." In reply Greene observes,*

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“It will not be prudent or practicable for the army to take the position you propose. There is no mills in that quarter; besides which, the enemy would cross the Pedee, and fall down upon our flank, and confine us in the neck of land between Waccomaw and Pedee. Another objection is, we are forming a magazine upon this river above us, about forty miles, which the enemy would destroy if we were to move down the river such a distance from it.”

In detailing the events which produced and followed the battle of the Cowpens, our author attempts a series of military strictures on the conduct of Cornwallis, calculated to depreciate his reputation as a commander. But throughout he obviously confounds the main and collateral, the principal and occasional objects of that general. His observations, therefore, which never have weight, have seldom application; while his sentiments possess neither candour nor dignity sufficient to provoke serious attention, and serve to conceal from his own view the obvious injury to the fame of his hero, which may result from injustice to the character of his antagonist. One of these remarks we shall notice, only because it is progressively converted into a cavil at a statement made by Lee, (p. 364.) “Lord Cornwallis had been some time preparing to prosecute his design upon Virginia; the arrival of the reinforcements under Leslie was the event on which his getting into motion depended. That officer was now on his march to Camden, a destination

which his lordship informs us was intended to hold Greene in suspense as to his future movements. But how the advance of a reinforcement to Camden could produce this effect, it is not easy to imagine!" If the reader will look at the map prefixed to the judge's book, he will perceive that Camden is far east of the direct route from Charleston to Winnsborough. By directing Leslie to that point, it is evident Cornwallis rendered precarious any calculations Greene might make as to the time of commencing his movement toward Virginia—a measure which Mr. Johnson declares depended on the arrival of Leslie at Winnsborough. So that his own statement furnishes a reply to the animadversion, which to his sagacity it appeared to suggest. But further—it was of some consequence to Greene, to foresee by which route Cornwallis would march. Had Leslie pushed on directly to Winnsborough, the upper route would have been thereby indicated; of course Greene's apprehensions for his main army, his magazines, and Lee's detachment would be removed, and his immediate attention devoted wholly to measures of relief or support to Morgan. On the contrary, by ordering Leslie to Camden, the lower route was pointed at, and the views of Greene were influenced in that direction. In a string of such abortive remarks as the one just exposed, Cornwallis is censured for a want of something called (p. 368.) "concoction in design," for not obtaining and communicating "the best of intelligence,"

and for having been seduced by the “eclat of a brilliant *coup de main*.” After observing, (p. 364.) that the movements of Cornwallis were, if not governed, at least materially controlled by those of his adversary; it is observed here, that “his measures against Morgan were not forced upon him, they were perfectly spontaneous.” We are obligingly informed in what manner Morgan might have been taken, and assured that if his retreat had been cut off, he would not have escaped in that direction. From this truism to the following absurdity, our author takes but a single step. He alleges that had Cornwallis moved up the east side of Broad river, and Leslie up the east side of the Catawba, it would have been impossible for Morgan to escape, and carry off his prisoners by the route he pursued. An hypothesis absurd on the face of it, inconsistent with his previous positions, and ridiculous from his own map. Any inclination of Cornwallis to the south or west, obviously increased Morgan’s chance of escape on this route, by diminishing the distance from the *punctum terminans* of his advance, and the point at which the line of this movement would intersect that of his retreat. On the other hand, the line of march for Leslie would have been too remote and divergent from a course tending to intercept Morgan, to place him in danger. Besides, the division of his force would have been injudicious in Cornwallis, and particularly so in reference to the authors’s assertion, that while it was entire, he feared Morgan would

elude Tarleton, and fall upon him. Throughout too he adopts Tarleton as authority, for crediting whom Mr. Marshall has been already reproached. In this consistent and discriminating spirit, he places implicit faith in Tarleton's assertion, that he attacked Morgan under the impression that Cornwallis had gained a position immediately in that officer's rear, though in the next breath, with a view of contradicting a misrepresented observation of Lee, to wit: "That Morgan's decision to fight grew out of irritation of temper," he in substance controverts this declaration. But there can be little doubt that Tarleton, if not expressly apprised of the progress or successive stations of the main army, did not require to be so informed, as he knew its advance would be slow and equivocal, until General Leslie joined it, which he says was on the 18th, the day after his defeat. Besides, both he and Cornwallis* considered his force as adequate to the destruction or dispersion of Morgan's corps, and until the latter became aggrandized by his splendid and unlooked for victory, it is probable Cornwallis never entertained the design of subjecting his army to a forced march, for the purpose of intercepting him. Then, and not till then, did he turn his large and warlike views, from his great antagonist Greene, and his great object Virginia. His inclination, therefore, to-

* Tarleton's letter of the 4th of January to Earl Cornwallis, and Lord Cornwallis's despatch to Sir Henry Clinton of the 18th of January.

ward King's Mountain, in conformity with the request of Tarleton, had been neither rapid nor direct, was intended to prevent the flight, not to intercept the retreat of Morgan, and was decisively regulated by reference to the junction of Leslie, and the principal objects of the campaign. But suddenly Morgan rose from a disturbing partizan into a formidable conqueror—and from that moment he became worthy of Cornwallis's attention, and of Greene's most active support; and influenced, in a decisive manner, the future character of the campaign. But Lee does not say that Morgan's *decision to fight Tarleton grew out of irritation of temper*; nor does any part of his narrative conflict with the opinion, that Morgan was all along actuated by an intention to fight, should a favourable opportunity occur—but he says, his decision to fight *in an unfavourable position, when a favourable one might have been readily gained*, “grew out of irritation of temper, which overruled his sound and discriminating judgment.” His observations, while they display an intimate acquaintance with Morgan's character, are every way complimentary to his skill and heroism. His position was certainly unfavourable; and even after reading his own explanation of it as given by our author, it is impossible to avoid the conclusion, that his ground was *taken*, not *selected*, and that his haughty and victorious spirit, intolerant of pursuit and reckless of danger, impelled him to appeal at once to his sword and his fortune. This opi-

nion has the further advantage of being in conformity with his fierce and uncontrollable character,* of adding lustre to his soldiership, and glory to his victory. By adopting Morgan's explanation of his ground, Mr. Johnson gets into a dilemma, for if he fought with a river in his rear, that his militia might be compelled to stand, by being unable to fly—he must have been influenced by something like *irritation of temper*, as there was no necessity for his fighting at all. For although Mr. Johnson undertakes to discountenance this conclusion, and refers, (p. 362.) to General Greene's opinion to support him, yet five pages further he quotes a letter from Greene to Morgan, written on the 19th, which completely justifies it. "It is not my wish that you come to action, unless you have a manifest advantage and a moral certainty of success. Put nothing to hazard. A retreat may be disagreeable, but it is not disgraceful. Regard not the opinion of the day," &c. Could stronger caution or more rigorous restraint have been imposed by Fabius himself? Unless we suppose the extremity of a general forbidding his lieutenant to fight at all, it is impossible to conceive more forcible instructions to avoid battle. It is true they did not reach Morgan until after the action, but they show conclusively the contrast between Greene's disposition and Morgan's conduct—the one courting danger—the other enjoining caution.

* See Appendix D.

After the usual fanfaronade upon the faults of all previous accounts, in which he does not spare the veracity of his oracle Tarleton, the learned judge proceeds to describe the battle of the Cowpens. In the outset, he is puzzled to reconcile his contradiction of Tarleton's assertion, that he was outnumbered, with his effort to impugn Lee's opinion that Morgan's decision to fight, was neither prudent nor deliberate. With something like "the confidence of an abashed boy"—however, he confesses that "two pieces of artillery, and treble the number of cavalry and bayonets, presented" (in favour of Tarleton) "a most appalling superiority." Our author possesses at least one peculiar quality—a disposition, namely, to contradict every respectable writer on the subject of which he treats. It is therefore not to be wondered at, that where they happen to conflict with each other, he should, as in the present instance, contradict himself. His account of this action, however, possesses nothing of the relief and spirit of Lee's *picture*;^{*} but

* There is one mistake as to fact, worth correcting, which we shall do in the language of a gentleman who was a friend and neighbour of Colonel Lee. "Judge Johnson is mistaken, when speaking" (in a note, vol. i. p. 383.) "in regard to the fate of Sergeant Major Perry. I am satisfied he was not taken prisoner at Eutaw, and know that he survived the war many years; that he returned to Virginia, and married into a respectable family. And as a proof that Colonel Lee's benevolence was not confined to his own corps, but was extended to every meritorious soldier of the revolution, he settled Perry on his

compared with his Germantown *affair*, would really be tolerable, were it not for the miserable affectation of representing that "fortune, ever hovering over fields of battle, played off that celebrated freak;" and of encumbering this diminished conflict with French phrases from the battle of Waterloo. We are not only told of the "pas de charge," but of the "sauve qui peut."*

We marked other characteristical pastate at Stratford, the seat of his own residence, where Perry lived several years, and I believe died there. The protection he afforded his commander at the Cowpens is correctly stated; almost every author who has written on the revolution, mentions the circumstance; and Colonel Washington's mother, who was my aunt, related the facts to me in the same way."

* Of this battle, which terminated in an important victory on the part of the republican forces, it was not in our power to add any thing of interest or accuracy to Lee's description; and this it was thought needless to repeat. We have lately, however, had the good fortune to receive a very interesting note, in reference to it, from Colonel Howard, who is renowned for his gallantry in the action, and who, with his friend, Colonel Washington,

"The two Ajaces, adding fire to fire,"

was thus mentioned by Greene: "Colonels Howard and Washington were the heroes of the day." The following is a copy of such extracts as appear to correct some of the inaccuracies of our author. "Morgan was careful to address the officers and men, to inspire confidence in them. As to what Morgan has since said, 'I would not have had a swamp in the view of the militia'—I do not think it deserves any consideration. They were words used in conversation, without any definite

pages, such as, (p. 384.) "It was a bold attempt" (in Tarleton) "to adorn his crest with the plumes which there existed so many hands to pluck away." The

meaning. I am positive that Triplett and Tate were on *my left*. Major McDowell was of *North Carolina*. I do not think there was *such an eminence*; there was a slight rise in the ground; *nor was Washington's horse posted behind it*, but on the summit; for I had a full view of him as we retreated from our first position. Seeing my right flank was exposed to the enemy, I attempted to change the front of Wallace's company, (Virginia regulars;) in doing it, some confusion ensued, and first a part, and then the whole of the company commenced a retreat. The officers along the line seeing this, and supposing that orders had been given for a retreat, faced their men about, and moved off. Morgan, who had mostly been with the militia, quickly rode up to me and expressed apprehensions of the event; but I soon removed his fears by pointing to the line, and observing that men were not beaten who retreated in that order. He then ordered me to keep with the men, until we came to the rising ground near Washington's horse; and he rode forward to fix on the most proper place for us to halt and face about. In a minute we had a perfect line. The enemy were now very near us. Our men commenced a very destructive fire, which they little expected, and a few rounds occasioned great disorder in their ranks. While in this confusion, I ordered a charge with the bayonet, which order was obeyed with great alacrity. As the line advanced, I observed their artillery a short distance in front, and called to Captain Ewing, who was near me, to take it. Captain Anderson, (now General Anderson, of Montgomery county, Maryland,) hearing the order, also pushed for the same object, and both being emulous for the prize, kept pace until near the first piece, when Anderson, by placing the end of his espartoon forward into the ground, made

overseers of Virginia, and the drivers of Carolina, call their labourers *hands*, and perhaps it is in transition from this lofty idiom, that the metaphorical judge

a long leap which brought him upon the gun, and gave him the honour of the prize. My attention was now drawn to an altercation of some of the men with an artillery man, who appeared to make it a point of honour not to surrender his match. The men, provoked by his obstinacy, would have bayoneted him on the spot, had I not interfered, and desired them to spare the life of so brave a man. He then surrendered his match. In the pursuit, I was led towards the right, in among the 71st, who were broken into squads, and as I called to them to surrender, they laid down their arms, and the officers delivered up their swords. Captain Duncanson, of the 71st grenadiers, gave me his sword, and stood by me. Upon getting on my horse, I found him pulling at my saddle, and he nearly unhorsed me. I expressed my displeasure, and asked him what he was about. The explanation was, that they had orders to give no quarter, and they did not expect any; and as my men were coming up, he was afraid they would use him ill. I admitted his excuse, and put him into the care of a sergeant. I had messages from him some years afterwards, expressing his obligation for my having saved his life. Their artillery was *not thrown in the rear*, but was advanced a little at the head of the line, and was taken as I have mentioned. Washington did not *encounter the artillery*. He moved to the left from our rear, to attack Tarleton's horse, and never lost sight of them until they abandoned the ground. Major M'Arthur very freely entered into conversation, and said that he was an officer before Tarleton was born; that the best troops in the service were put under "*that boy*" to be sacrificed; that he had flattered himself the event would have been different, if his advice had been taken, which was to charge with all the horse, at the moment we were retreating.

speaks of the "existence of hands." Comments on the conduct of Cornwallis follow; which, as Mr. Johnson evidently confounds the chief with the subordinate object of that commander, are futile and illusory. His main object was to traverse victoriously, North Carolina, fix its allegiance, draw forth its strength, and then pursue the conquest of Virginia, driving Greene before him, or leaving him beaten and cut off from this formidable and sustaining province. Nor did the pursuit of Morgan ever supersede that object, or even coincide with it, until it became certain that he was to unite with Greene. For in his despatch of the 18th of January, to Sir Henry Clinton, after mentioning the defeat of Tarleton, Cornwallis says, "It is impossible to foresee all the consequences this unexpected and extraordinary event may produce, but your excellency may be assured, that nothing but the most absolute necessity shall induce me to give up the important object of the winter's campaign." In a strain of observations calculated to establish the inference, that Greene had a simpleton or a sluggard for an antagonist; that Morgan might easily, and in a variety of ways, have been intercepted, and which are chiefly remarkable for presumption, our author brings Morgan to the east side of the Catawba, and Cornwallis to Ramsour's mills, twenty-five miles in his rear. He says Morgan reached the Catawba on the 23d, and his lordship Ramsour's mills on the 25th. If he is right in these dates, as we believe he is, why repro-

bate the alleged delay of Cornwallis one day at Winnsborough, and two at Ramsour's mills; for even if neither had occurred, Morgan would have reached the Catawba two or three days before him. Upon this point, it would appear Lee and Stedman are mistaken, in asserting that Cornwallis reached the Catawba, just as Morgan had effected its passage; for had he been so near his enemy, the British commander would not have intermitted pursuit at Ramsour's mills, to destroy his baggage, but would have postponed that operation until he had made a final effort to come up with him.

Writers whose works are destined to delight and inform the latest ages of mankind, often give beauty and interest to their compositions, by the expressive power of contrast. The episodes of Homer, the shield of Achilles particularly, glow with this charming quality; and every reader remembers the pleasant and cheerful description which Duncan gives at noon, of the castle in which he is to be murdered at night. The force of this mode of writing has been perceived, and employed by the eloquent of all ages. They oppose, to the strenuous and angry occupations of war, the mild and joyful colours of peace; the stern and cruel habits of ambition, to the tender and blooming gaities of love. Active and aspiring characters are made to long for tranquillity, and brows encircled by the inflaming diadem, to throb for the peasant's repose.

K. HENRY.

“ Gives not the hawthorn bush a sweeter shade
To shepherds looking on their silly sheep,
Than does the rich embroidered canopy
To kings?”

With equal grace and equal spirit, Mr. Johnson will be found to acquit himself. While Cornwallis is urging his fierce pursuit, and Morgau, faint, but dauntless, animates his weary troops; while the Catawba, swift and brimming, foams between the hostile bands, its shores echoing the clash of arms, the shouts of warriors, and the neighing of impatient steeds, the attention of the reader is led back by our author, to one of the humblest occupations of a peaceful life, where he beholds General Greene, as in the days of his youth, watching “the ebbing grain vanish from between the millstones.” In this eager and stormy period he is discovered, “seated by the side of a hopper,” on the banks of the Pedee, content (p. 391.) to “guard the mill during the process of converting the corn into meal.”

Not yet content; from this “tantalizing situation,” we are hurried forward to one of the most perilous and awful incidents that danger ever contrived or valour encountered.

“ As full of peril and adventurous spirit,
As to o’erwalk a current roaring loud,
On the unsteadfast footing of a spear.”

It will be vain for the reader to search his memory or his books, for any thing comparable with it in in-

tensity or grandeur. Alexander's passage of the Granicus, his leaping from the walls of the Malli with only two attendants, into the midst of a host of armed enemies; and Caesar's braving the tempest and the enemy in an open boat, were enterprises of comparative ease and safety. To do justice to the author, and to the subject, we shall give its recital in his own words, (p. 394.) "The 25th,* 26th, and 27th of January, General Greene employed in making the indispensable arrangements for the march of his army; and on the 28th, he committed, what will be deemed by many, the most imprudent action of his life. With only a guide, one aid, and a sergeant's guard of cavalry, he struck across the country to gain the *army* of General Morgan, and aid him in his arduous operations. The distance was one hundred miles at least, the country infested with tories, and Camden not far on the left, where such a prize would have been liberally paid for." If this extract shows the taste and dignity of Mr. Johnson's mind, what follows evinces his deep and wonderful acquaintance with the nature and history of man, and his peculiar penetration into the imposing exigencies of a military life—which require the soul of a hero to brave them, and the hand of a master to portray. "But there is less danger in such enterprises than is generally imagined. History furnishes many instances of their successful issue.

* At page 391, it is said Greene did not hear of the victory until the evening of the 25th.

The very surprise produces hesitation in the minds of many, who, if they had time to deliberate, might be inclined to treachery; and the boldness deters or overawes those who might be disposed to make advantage of the occasion." We cannot pretend to analyse the beauties of this passage, or to foreshow the admiration it must, on many accounts, inspire. But this much may be said without the least arrogance; that it is the greatest and purest effort of the bathos on record. Compared with it, how tame and spiritless is Lee's relation of this stupendous event in the life of Greene. "Escorted by a few dragoons, General Greene hastened to reach Morgan, which he happily accomplished the last day of January."^{*} To be serious—let us remember that Greene was in his own country, that his route lay chiefly through the friendly counties of Mecklenburgh and Rowan, where there might have been disaffection, but was no hostility; recently inoffensive to the fugitives from Camden, and now quailing under the renown of Morgan's victory; Camden at least fifty miles from him, and becoming more distant at every step, and it will appear probable that the judge himself is as daring as the general, and performs adventures as hardy as this, in his yearly progress to the metropolis. Lee, it seems, was not aware of its imprudence; Greene, from his letter of the 26th, was unconscious of his danger; and Major Burnet, who boldly accompanied him, and had the

* Memoirs, vol. i. p. 268.

temerity to return alone, was so blind as to perceive no cause of apprehension; for on the 2d of February, he writes to Lee, "Camp on Pedee—I this moment returned from Rowan county, where I left the general last evening."^{*} But it appears the peril of this expedition was not greater than its celerity. The "distance is stated at one hundred and twenty-five miles," (p. 403) and that Greene compassed it in two days is thus demonstrated. "For we have his letters of the 27th dated camp at Pedee, and many of the 30th written from the camp at Sherard's ford on the Catawba, all in his own hand writing. The hiatus is only of the 28th and 29th, during which he was upon his journey." But might he not have written half a dozen letters before he took horse on the 27th, and as many on the evening of the 30th, after he halted, and consequently have consumed four days in the ride? Yet it is not probable it occupied him so long, as the distance did not require it; for Major Burnet passed over nearly the same space, returning in little more than one day, as appears from his letter to Lee of the 2d of February. This puffing and parade about the ride of a hundred miles is ridiculous; and how must the friends of the literature of the country, and the adorers of the memory of Greene deplore, that a judge of the supreme court should be the author, and "the restorer of the south," "the subject of these Sketches." It is not easy to determine

* See Appendix E.

whether there is more of folly or of presumption in his observations on the conduct of Cornwallis. One thing is certain; had that general been good enough to pursue the course of measures laid down by our literary Cæsar, Morgan would have cut off his whole army, and left Greene nothing to do. He had just cut to pieces 1100 of his best troops, and Mr. Johnson insists, out of pure patriotism doubtless, that 1000 more should have been detached against him. Captain Bobadil himself could not have planned a more brilliant campaign; for it is plain, that after destroying these, Cornwallis would have been at his mercy. The military reputation of his lordship being thus demolished, and that able and modest commander stigmatized as a boastful desperado, our author assails Lee. His inaccuracy in dating Morgan's passage of the Catawba is considered striking and unpardonable, and for calling the seasonable rise of that river and the Yadkin, "fortunate circumstances," "unforeseen events," "instances of providential succour," and adding, "Heaven was again propitious," he is ridiculed as a superstitious dolt; and Mr. Johnson triumphantly explodes, what he denominates, (p. 406,) "the celebrated miracle of modern times." We have examined Ramsay, Gordon, Marshall, Lee, Tarleton and Stedman, and find no mention of a miracle either at the Catawba or the Yadki by any one of these authors. Mr. Johnson claims the credit of its destruction, and has certainly a right to its invention. Yet that *he* should be

superstitious is astonishing, seeing that his mathematical attainments and genius are so acute and profound. In that science he has made a discovery which will render his name as famous as that of Euclid, Pythagoras or Playfair. It is neither more nor less, than that the diameter of a circle is at least equal to its periphery. For he says. (p. 407,) "a circle of 50 miles, the radius of which at no time exceeded 25 miles;" so that the proportion between these two lines is variable; they are often equal, yet the diameter is sometimes the greater. His knowledge of philology none can doubt after reading the following remark. "Colonel Lee has been so rapt with admiration of the British soldiers on this occasion, as to have broken out with the following *apostrophe*; 'a memorable instance among many others in this unnatural war, of the immutable disposition of the British soldiers to endure every privation in support of their king and country.'" We who are neither rhetoricians nor linguists, should term this a *reflection* simply, and a sentence as little figurative as the same number of words can compose, notwithstanding the note of admiration which the judge has slyly annexed to it. It is amusing to observe the ludimagistral authority with which he punishes the offences real or imaginary of the American writers who come in his way. The works of Ramsay and Moultrie, we are constrained to abandon to his learned rage; only remarking, that Gordon and Lee, the former writing chiefly from the papers of Colonel Wil-

liams and General Greene's letters, concur with them in affirming that Morgan intended to retreat across the mountains from the Catawba. As to the "tale of an altercation" between Greene and Morgan in consequence of it, which is courteously attributed to Lee, (p. 408,) he neither mentions an altercation, nor any consequent coolness, nor does he ascribe to this difference of opinion, Morgan's subsequent retirement from the army. His refusal to accept the command of the light division, Lee ascribes to an attack of the rheumatism, and does not intimate that his sickness was "feigned," as Mr. Johnson alleges, (p. 412) and comparing his sentiments with the loose and arbitrary averments of our author, we see no cause of incredulity*. After misrepresenting Lee's remarks, he proceeds to refute them, by giving an extract from Greene's letter to the whigs of Mecklenburg, which, importing that General Morgan was too unwell to command them, only repeated what Morgan himself must have affirmed; and would Mr Johnson expect General Greene to have written to the whigs, "General Morgan says he is too unwell to command you, and although I do not believe him, yet I can't prevail on him to do it?" The truth is, all agree that Morgan was unwell, but the doubt is, whether his malady was so painful or dangerous as to justify at this critical period, the retirement of an officer so efficient. Had General Greene thought so, it is absurd to suppose he

* See Memoirs, vol. i. pp. 275 and 292.

would have authorized the effort to detain him, or had Lee, that he would have made it; and Mr. Johnson disputes neither of these facts.

The moment Greene reached the Catawba, his objects were to facilitate the junction of the two divisions of his army, and to embody the militia; to retard the advance of Cornwallis, and if strong enough to fight him. The views of his adversary were equally distinct—to crush or disperse the detachment of Morgan, to repress the militia, to conquer Greene, or drive him from the province. This statement opens a direct insight into all their operations, previous to the re-union of the American forces at Guilford courthouse. And in tracing so plain a series of measures, it would seem impossible for any one to lose his way. But there is a sort of vernicular activity, a maggotty sprightliness in this author, which is perpetually misdirecting the course of his narrative. After denominating this pursuit and retreat, a “*chase*,” he takes occasion to discountenance the propriety of considering them any thing but a succession of blunders or delays on the part of Cornwallis, and a series of stratagems on that of Greene, calculated to decoy his adversary toward Guilford. For the first there is no ground; and for the second, could have been little occasion, if we believe these commanders; for Cornwallis and Greene both affirm, that the pursuit was rapid and keen, and the latter declares it afforded him no opportunity to obtain any advantage. On the 8th

of February, Greene writes to Lee from Guilford court-house, "I received your several letters last evening, and have just joined the army, having kept with the light infantry to direct the motions of the army, for the purpose of forming a junction. I knew the only chance I had of effecting it with certainty, was to be near the enemy, and govern the motion of the army by theirs. Lord Cornwallis presses us hard. His force is far greater than our effective strength, and, therefore, I dare not comply with your proposal, although I see the force of your observations, as I hinted to you before. But Lord Cornwallis would not give us an opportunity to act offensively." Indeed the judge himself furnishes evidence of the ardour and rapidity of the pursuit, in a letter which he publishes for a different purpose, and which adds another to the numerous proofs his work affords of his own critical taste in composition. "The following *rapid* letter," (he observes, p 422,) "written to General Huger on the first of the month, presents a striking specimen of measures conceived with promptness, and orders communicated with precision." "The enemy crossed the Catawba this morning at M'Cowan's ford, about seventeen miles below this, *a little after break of day*. They burnt a great many of their waggons yesterday, and seem to be preparing for forced marches. The militia is to assemble at Mr. David Carr's, where I shall remain to-night. I think the enemy will push for Salisbury, *and from the rapidity with which they march,*

will reach it in little less than a day, especially as we shall have little force to retard this march. If you have crossed the Yadkin, and are in a condition to force a march, push for Salisbury: if not, re-cross and come up the other side. And if you have not already crossed the river, move up the east side of the Yadkin." It is probable no general ever wrote a more confused, not to say contradictory order. "If you have not crossed the river, re-cross it;" and, if you have not crossed the *river*, move up the east side of the *Yadkin*. Did not the date of this letter prevent, it might be supposed that it was written in the cabin, which it is said the balls of the enemy struck while Greene was in it preparing despatches. But how sacred and canonizing must be the praise of an author, who has the judgment to extol it as a specimen of "orders communicated with precision." How fit must he be to record the achievements of Greene, or to expose the errors of Cornwallis! However, this letter and the one to Lee, show that from the 1st to the 8th of February, it was the opinion of Greene, that Cornwallis, though obstructed by deep roads, swelling creeks, and rapid rivers; encumbered with artillery, and confronted by a vigilant and daring enemy, had pressed forward with great rapidity. An opinion with which at last our author himself coincides, (p. 423.) "After reaching Salisbury, and ascertaining the impossibility of forming a junction there or on the east

side of the river, *in consequence of the rapidity of the enemy's advance.*"

The anecdote related of Mrs. Steel, on occasion of Greene's arrival at Salisbury, is in the highest degree interesting, and makes us regret that the judge did not devote his time to the collection of such touching and dramatic incidents, rather than to the injudicious task of disparaging the friend, and calumniating the enemy of his hero. The conduct ascribed to Lord Cornwallis at Mrs. Brevard's, (p. 421) would, if true and unpalliated, doubtless be damning. But when we remember the extreme infirmity of *ex parte* statements, the fallible illiberality of our author, the circumstances of the period, the rancour of the inhabitants, and above all, the memorable moderation and splendid humanity of Cornwallis, both in Ireland and in India, it is impossible not to believe that the atrocities here imputed to him, were, if committed at all, perpetrated without his knowledge or authority.* As to the indelicate out-

* It will be perceived that Colonel Lee and Mr. Johnson entertain very different opinions in regard to the professional ability and private character of Lord Cornwallis; and that the latter is indignant, and inclined to be sarcastic (p. 421,) at Lee's calling this celebrated nobleman "the amiable Cornwallis." Bonaparte, who was *perhaps* as good a judge of mankind as our author, and who, during his consulship, had personal and official acquaintance with Cornwallis, appears to have been so unfortunate as to differ from Mr. Johnson as widely as Colonel Lee. "Napoleon in very good spirits, mentioned Marquis Cornwallis in terms of great praise. 'Cornwallis,' said he, 'was a man

rage, which the dignity of the Carolina bench, and that of the Supreme Court are prostituted to insinuate, it is alike impossible to credit or refute it. But what has the biographer of Greene to do with it?

of probity, a generous and sincere character—*un tres brave homme*: He was the man who first gave me a good opinion of the English; his integrity, fidelity, frankness, and the nobleness of his sentiments, impressed me with a very favourable opinion of you. I recollect Cornwallis saying one day, "There are certain qualities which may be bought, but a good character, sincerity, a proper pride, and calmness in the hour of danger, are not to be purchased." These words made an impression upon me. I gave him a regiment of cavalry to amuse himself with at Amiens, which used to manœuvre before him. The officers of it loved him much. I do not believe he was a man of first rate abilities, but he had talent, great probity, and sincerity. He never broke his word. At Amiens the treaty was ready, and was to be signed by him at Hotel de la Ville, at nine o'clock. Something happened which prevented him from going; but he sent word to the French ministers, that they might consider the treaty as having been signed, and that he would sign it the following day. A courier from England arrived at night, with directions for him to refuse his consent to certain articles, and not to sign the treaty. Though Cornwallis had not signed it, and might have easily availed himself of this order, he was a man of such strict honour, that he said he considered his promise to be equivalent to his signature, and wrote to his government that he had promised, and that having once pledged his word he would keep it. That if they were not satisfied, they might refuse to ratify the treaty. There was a man of honour—a true Englishman. Such a man as Cornwallis ought to have been sent here, instead of a *compound of falsehood, suspicion, and meanness*."

To exhibit the character, or to display the conduct of his hero, does he deem proper to immortalize (in his way) the irregular gallantries of the British commander. No other writer has condescended to inquire into, or at least to record these matters; and it is, therefore, perhaps Mr. Johnson complains on the opposite page, of "their omission of important facts."

Among the sapient strictures on this part of the campaign, Lee and other American writers are reproached, for supposing "that the movements of Greene were influenced by those of his adversary." Even if it were possible to conceive that the movements of two contending armies are not reciprocally influenced, what purpose could be answered in the present case by such an absurd supposition? It would be instantly destroyed by the speculations of Mr. Johnson, who endeavours to ascribe the eastward inclination of Greene's retreat to an apprehension that Cornwallis would advance upon his right, and separate him from Huger.

After passing the Yadkin, and finding that Greene was assembling his force at Guilford, the British commander, persevering in his endeavour to restore North Carolina completely to his sovereign, determined either to bring Greene to action, or to cut him off from Virginia, which was truly the fountain of our southern power. With this view he pointed his march toward the upper fords of the Dan, hoping by the rapidity of his motion, either to gain the left of his

adversary, or to force him so low down the river that his army would not be able to ford it, or for want of adequate means of transportation, to pass it.* Greene, however, having collected his army at Guilford, penetrating the designs of the enemy, and finding from the advanced position held by the British on his left, it would be impossible to reach the upper fords in safety, resolved at the suggestion of Colonel Carrington his quartermaster general, to seek a passage across the Dan at Boyd's ferry, about twenty-five miles below the point aimed at by Cornwallis. To this ferry the boats from the higher parts of the river could be conveyed with the current, while their motion in the opposite direction would be laborious, necessarily, and slow. Reasoning upon these facts, and being too weak to hazard an action, with that undismayed resource for which he was distinguished, he adopted the suggestion of his zealous quartermaster, as the measure most likely to save his army.

With this plain state of the case, the learned judge is by no means satisfied. He denies that Carrington (who being a good quartermaster, must have possessed according to his receipt, (p. 101) "an arranging and combining mind, and a ubiquity of talent that left nothing unattended to,") suggested the route by Boyd's ferry, and contends in a dissertation of three or four pages, that Greene had long ago designed and pro-

* Stedman, vol. ii. pp. 331-2.—Cornwallis's Despatch, 17th March, 1781.

vided for passing the Dan at that point. To use his own exquisite language, (p. 418,) "even before he had reached his *command*;" that is, before the 2d of December, "he had adopted the means of converting the navigable rivers into highways," and had all along premeditated entering Virginia at this point, because of his wish to be near his magazines, and it would seem likewise, (p. 424,) from motives of civility to his fellow traveller Cornwallis, who intending to visit Halifax, would accompany Greene more cheerfully on a route inclining in that direction. This appears to be very unsubstantial logic. The location of his magazines had obviously no reference whatever, to this or that particular military operation; nor had Carrington's duty of exploring the Roanoke and its branches. His magazines were established for general purposes of supply, and disposed by views of permanent convenience. The Roanoke watered a rich country, and its left bank afforded security to the provisions to be collected on it. While its navigation, connected by a portage from the Dan to the Yadkin with the Pedee, was providently depended on to supply the army even if it should continue in South Carolina, where, according to Mr. Johnson himself, it will be remembered, active and extensive operations were meditated by Greene, from the month of October to the 26th of January; although he now insists, this same time had been occupied in a prudent preparation of means to facilitate his escape to Virginia! In a letter of the

4th of October 1809, Colonel Carrington himself declares, that he was directed by Greene when at Hillsborough on his way to relieve General Gates, to examine the navigation of the Dan in order to ascertain, if supplies could not be conveyed up that river, and down the Yadkin and Pedee, and he positively affirms, that until the army was united at Guilford, the retreat by the lower route had never been contemplated, and was then resolved on, in consequence of a state of things which had just arisen: viz. the advance of Cornwallis upon the left of Greene, and the consequent difficulty and danger of attempting the upper route. These are his words: "one of the Captain Smiths of the Maryland line (there were two of that name) who happened to be at Hillsborough was sent to Taylor's ferry, to ascend the Dan with a canoe and party of hands, as far as he might judge useful for the purpose of ascertaining these points. He ascended as far as the lower Sauratown, and had made his report. When the retreat was determined on, it was predicated on the certain knowledge, that there was but one boat at Dixon's ferry, from which place, Cornwallis well prepared for rapid movement, was not much more distant than Greene, and that between there and Boyd's ferry inclusive, five more were to be found. There was then a fresh in Dan, and as the rain still continued, for it was at the moment falling most heavily, the numerous and widely extended branches of that river would, upon every reasonable calculation,

have continued the fresh. There were then no boats in the river, other than the wide and shallow flats at the ferries, which it was impossible to carry against the current." So that the quartermaster himself, who joined the army two days before the retreat commenced, says its direction was determined by a certain knowledge of facts, which then and there, was for the first time afforded, and completely demolishes the frivolous hypothesis of our author, that Greene had predetermined on a particular route, before he could have known it would ever be expedient. After opposing his statements by better authority, we shall proceed to show how they conflict either with each other, or with common sense.

At p. 424, while employed in his ridiculous attempt to prove that Greene's measures were not forced upon him by those of Cornwallis, he says, "before his departure from Catawba, he had pressed on Carlington the necessity of establishing magazines on the Roanoke, foreseeing and providing for a contingency that might occur," that is, for this retreat. At page 428—"To have collected magazines on his route, would at once have unmasked his views towards the corner between the Dan and Staunton—that is, the Roanoke!" But why conceal his route from Cornwallis?—for the next collection of inconsistencies show, that Greene insisted on Cornwallis's following directly on his heels. He would not agree that his lordship should proceed on his right; for we are

assured, (p. 422,) "that to prevent Cornwallis getting on his right was all-important to General Greene for several reasons." He objected positively to his passing by his left; for at page 423, "of his moving off entirely in that direction, whilst the American army was below, General Greene felt no apprehension; because the lure of an offer of battle, he knew, would always draw his adversary's attention the contrary way." And after all this "luring with the offer of battle," Cornwallis was not on any account to approach too near; for it is said by our author, page 429, "But for the circumstance of Greene's being able to pass the Dan, his situation would have been such that he might have been compelled to fight the enemy at Guilford, or to turn on him under every disadvantage, when pressed in the pursuit." All this contempt of facts, rejection of history, and violation of reason, appear to be provoked, in a great degree, by his desire to disprove the assertion made by Marshall,* and repeated by Lee—this the friend and fellow soldier, and that the intimate connection and daily companion of Carrington—that the route by Boyd's ferry was suggested by Carrington. From a sense of peculiar decorum, perhaps, as well as from a desire to concentrate upon Lee his frontless animadversions, the name of Marshall, who first made the assertion, is not mentioned, but Lee is charged with a general disposition to detract from the fame and services of his general.

* Vol. iv. p. 355.

This imputation is, no doubt, intended to have effect on a subsequent and more important question, and is noticed now, less for the purpose of exposing its injustice, than of keeping it before us in our advance to that interesting subject. It would not become us to support, by proof, a positive declaration made by Marshall and Lee; nor do we design such an indignity to either, by confirming this fact which they announced to the world, in opposition to the statements of this author, which no man can credit, until he can bring himself to believe that Carrington would knowingly assert a false claim; and that Lee and Marshall would be weak or wicked enough to support it. But it is inconceivable in what manner the reputation of Greene can be affected by the assertion of Lee, that Carrington suggested the lower route; although to protect, or to elevate the fame of his hero, Mr. Johnson seems to think it necessary to strike with an intellectual catalepsy, all his officers.

While Greene was under the immediate command of Washington, we hear of several suggestions by him, and of the jealousy excited by the confidence he inspired. While now we are required to believe that no meritorious suggestion, no acceptable advice, could reach him. But does Mr. Johnson consider it injurious to the memory of his hero, that a confidential officer, especially conversant, from the nature of his duty, with such subjects, should be able to suggest to his general, the expediency of marching by this or

that road, to the Dan? Does he not perceive that Greene, being the soul and centre of our southern war, not only used but encouraged the counsels of his officers, and that his merit consisted, not in anticipating their proposals, but in examining the prudence of them; that the exercise of this quick and lofty meditation, by which he was able at once to reject such as were inexpedient, or to adopt such as were wise, as it is a higher effort of the intellect, is also a more glorious and important province, than the subaltern one, of pointing out the practicability of a route, or the convenience of a ferry. Yet for the sake of this insignificant theory, this imponderable increment to the reputation of Greene—without a letter from Greene, or any other document, or any authority, other than the rambling and erroneous attempts at argument already noticed, the memory of Carrington is outraged, Marshall and Lee contradicted, and the statement of the latter broadly insinuated to proceed, from a selfish and ungrateful habit of injustice to the memory of his commander. It is strange that this question did not occur to our author. If General Greene had determined on the lower route, when he found Morgan on the Catawba, why did he strenuously urge the advance of Huger to Salisbury—not assuredly to fight there—because he had then ascertained the impossibility of collecting the militia in strength sufficient to give battle—but because Salisbury was in his route to the upper ford, and finding the junction could not be

effected there, he designated as the next point, the east bank of the Yadkin, and operated on by the two objects of rejoining the main army, and reaching the upper fords, he moved on the diagonal of these directions, making the advance of Huger (or *journey* as our author has it) conform to his own progress by successive inclinations to the right. Here he found that, from the position of Cornwallis, it would be difficult to regain the original route, and the merit of Carrington consisted in the vigorous sagacity, with which, by a single reach of thought, he comprehended the difficulty of the crisis, and perceived the means of surmounting it. Had the sudden effort of his mind been protracted into a long and careful reflection, its result would have been, however useful, trite and vapid. Or had Greene premeditated this particular route, he would not have been entitled to the smallest credit for having boats provided for completing it. On the contrary, he would have been censurable for not having boats ready for the purpose; as he had not, when the rapid comprehension of Carrington saw the facility with which they could be procured, relieved the situation of the army, exposed to the necessity of a dangerous retreat, or a still more dangerous battle; and demonstrated, that the position of Cornwallis, which appeared to impose this awful alternative, presented in reality the only possible opportunity of escaping it. This is the true character of the suggestion; and while its representation is due to the memory of that excellent man and valu-

able officer, Colonel Carrington, it restores the interest properly belonging to this portion of the campaign, and preserves this example of the clear and active operation of Greene's judgment. These natural and authentic incidents, the learned judge supplants by incredible insinuations, conflicting statements, arguments that are inconclusive, and objects without interest. There is no part of our author's book which, at one and the same time, exposes more completely his literary impotence, his want of comprehension, his standing illiberality towards public enemies, and his injustice to Lee, than the section just examined. Some of its false statements and glaring absurdities, we have endeavoured to hold up to the reader's contempt; more have been left in the bed of oblivion, in which they are destined to sleep; as we hope to refresh the reader, and to close the consideration of the perplexed and erroneous story by the following passage in a letter from Greene to Lee; which shows, that while he was aware of the difficulties of his situation, he was undismayed by them; and that though conscious of the superiority of his own great spirit, he disdained not the communion of other minds.

“*Camp at Guilford, 8th February, 1781.*—You will please to move up into the neighbourhood of the army this evening, or early in the morning; but I wish it this evening, as the enemy will, in all probability, be within thirty miles of us before night. I should be very happy to see you, as I think we are in

a critical situation. But you know I am an independent spirit, and confide in my own resources." After this, can any one suppose that Greene had preconcerted *his critical situation* at Guilford; or that he was uninfluenced by the motions of his enemy or the counsels of his friend?

The route being determined on, the retreat was forthwith prosecuted, and was covered by Colonel Otho Williams, at the head of a select corps under Washington, Howard, and Lee; in the rear of which, and in the immediate front of the enemy, the legion of Lee had the honour to be stationed. In the conduct of this retreat, it has always been considered that Greene displayed infinite ability, and was nobly seconded by Williams. The British commander exerted his utmost diligence and vigour; but the skill and vigilance of his adversary, foiled his keen and consecutive efforts, eluded his grasp, and extorted his admiration.* Mr. Johnson, after filling near thirty pages with invidious and inconsequent discussions upon events of little importance, and conjectures of indecent complexion, passes over the intense and brilliant interest of this operation, with a few brief and vague commendations. He says, in allusion to the circumstantial narrative which Lee has given of

* Stedman, vol. ii. p. 332.

Tarleton's Campaigns, page 229. "Every measure of the Americans during their retreat, was judiciously designed, and vigorously executed."

it, what may be considered as silly, as it appears to be false, (vol. I. p. 431,) "that the general nature of his undertaking confines him," in regard to this transaction, "to such subjects only as are alluded to in the official papers." If restrained, as to this important measure, he must have been equally so in respect to others. But it may be asked, whether he found in General Greene's papers, a history of the settlement of Carolina, any account of its aborigines—of the "Premier, Sir Robert Grenville," new, both to the chivalry and the cabinet of England—any indecent aspersions of Cornwallis, or insinuations against the honour and veracity of Lee? A digest of "official papers," though a poor substitute for the life of Greene, would have been unquestionably better than such a work as the "Sketches." As Mr. Johnson is industrious in hunting for faults in the conduct of Colonel Lee, it is but fair to observe in relation to this arduous retreat, that, by the alertness and audacity, the boldness and precision, the firmness and rapidity of its motions, the legion of Lee broke the torrent of Cornwallis's pursuit; held untouched the American army; vanquished, captured, or drove back,* the insolent dragoons of Tarleton; gave confidence to the pursued, and caution to the pursuers; and, while

* Marshall, vol. iv. p. 356. "On the march, Lieutenant Colonel Lee charged the British advanced cavalry so suddenly and so furiously, as almost to cut a company to pieces. A captain and several privates were made prisoners."

the safety of the south trembled on the issue, enabled Greene to gain, without loss, or even annoyance, the friendly shore of the Dan, and the succour of Virginia—*that powerful and unterrified province*.^{*} Nor ought it to be concealed, that on this occasion, Colonel Lee excited in the generous breast of Williams, sentiments which, ten years afterwards, were conveyed to him in the following fervid and eloquent terms.

“BALTIMORE.

“*Dear Sir:* Henry Lee Williams was born on the 23d day of December, in the first hour of the morning. I name my son with the approbation of his mother, not after the governor of Virginia, but after the man whose merit hath exalted him to that high office. I call him Henry Lee, to perpetuate in my family the remembrance of that friendship which originated at a time when the test of merit could not be mistaken;” (Mr. Johnson thinks otherwise,) “when the exertions for liberty were most necessary, and when the arms of freemen were most effectual. At an early period of our acquaintance you inspired me with esteem, and I have often been happy in occasions to believe that disposition reciprocal. One of those occasions I shall ever remember. The retreat of the southern army to Dan River, though now forgotten, was, in my estimation, one of the most masterly and fortunate manoeu-

* Lord Cornwallis's despatches to Lord George Germain, of the 17th March, and 18th April, 1781.

vres of our beloved Greene.* The ardour, activity, and enterprise with which you conducted the legion, then attached to the light infantry, which covered the retreat, and which I had the honour to command; the readiness with which you aided all my endeavours, and the soldierly sympathy which, in the most critical exigencies, you felt and *expressed* for me, as the responsible officer, left on my mind indelible impressions of gratitude and affection.”

It is impossible not to feel the contrast between these sentiments, and the disparaging evasion and sophistical reserve of our author; not to ask how the man, who, on such an occasion, and in a soul so noble, inspired them, could provoke detraction from the eulogist of Greene and the admirer of Williams—nor to imagine how indignantly their heroic shades must spurn the incense of a mind, intent to poison the reputation—to assassinate the well-earned fame of their friend. How will Mr. Johnson reconcile this generous sympathy, this martial tenderness, so warmly acknowledged by Williams, with that “excessive avidity for distinction”—that odious impatience of the merit of others, even of Williams himself, which he tries to attach to the character of Lee?

Soon after the accomplishment of this operation, Cornwallis, having retired to Hillsborough, and encouraged the loyal inhabitants in its vicinage, General Greene, strengthened by a reinforcement of Virginia

* Mr. Johnson should attend to this prophetic reproach.

volunteers under Stevens, resolved to commit himself again to the fortune of the field. Accordingly, on the 24th of February he repassed the Dan, having been preceded by Pickens and Lee on the 18th, with their respective detachments. These officers were directed to observe and obstruct the enemy, and repress the rising disaffection of the country. For the manner in which the latter performed this particular duty, our author vouchsafes, on one occasion, (vol. i. p. 449,) to commend him, in a passage, which, if taken by itself, is surely fair, if not complimentary. But this is only pluming the shaft, to give it a swifter and surer flight; "*et fraus fidem in parvis sibi præstruit; ut quum operæ precium sit, cum mercede magna fallat.*" Of this praise, though obviously designed to excuse previous injustice, and to recommend future disparagement, Mr. Johnson speedily repents; and accordingly comments injuriously on the letter which he quotes ostensibly to justify his plaudits. It is from Lee to Greene, and in these words:

"Should the enemy move on towards Cross Creek, (the route to Wilmington,) I have determined to get in their front, in order to cause every opposition in my power, with a view of delaying their progress. In this service I must lose men, and rely on your promise for the filling up of the legion." This is the text. The commentary breathes the taste and liberality of our author:

"This was all the boon he asked for exposing

them to loss, and *himself* to the mortification of a diminished command!" Did it not occur to Mr. Johnson that for exposing *himself* to toil and danger, he asked no boon, and that, for the mortification of a diminished "*command*," he could ask no other than to have his loss repaired? He quotes the passage as "strikingly characteristic" of Lee, and then expounds it so as to conceal its only characteristical point!

Of the composition of the advanced corps, which, under Pickens and Lee, operated on the right bank of the Dan, before the main army recrossed that river; as well as of the time at which its movement commenced, Lee gives the following plain and succinct account.* "General Greene, persevering in his determination to risk his army again in North Carolina, the legion of Lee, strengthened by two companies of the veterans of Maryland under Captain Oldham, with the corps of South Carolina militia, under Brigadier Pickens, was ordered on the morning of the 18th, to recross the Dan. This was readily performed." The writer's impression that Pickens passed the Dan with him, is here it would seem, clearly indicated. At any rate, he asserts that Pickens and himself encamped their detachments together that evening. But Mr. Johnson, whose object now appears to be to persuade us, that Lee's account of these events is fallacious and selfish; that in all the operations, up to the battle of Guilford at least, he deserved

* Vol. i. p. 303.

small credit, and arrogates great, with injustice to the "claims both of Williams and Pickens," roundly asserts, (p. 450,) "Colonel Lee is quite mistaken in regard to the time and circumstances of his junction with Pickens." Let us then examine Mr. Johnson's account of these matters, beginning with the return of the army to North Carolina, and, as we must have satisfied the reader, that, from the 25th of January to this time, not a single important measure or design of General Greene is correctly delineated in the sketches of his life; we shall readily prove, that although Lee may have committed a venial error in regard to Pickens' recrossing the Dan with him, Mr. Johnson's narrative of this part of the campaign is singularly confused and imperfect, and calculated to furnish at least as much amusement as instruction.

It opens with a very engaging scene. While the army is yet on the Virginia side of the river, "a female who by concert had stolen (p. 448,) to a recess of the opposite bank." is there discovered "by the waving of a handkerchief, to be under covert." At the sight of this animating spectacle, *the whole camp, pioneers and all*, are in active motion; the obstruction of the river, the perils of the land, are no longer regarded. Major Pierce is described to have been very quickly across, and the alertness of Williams is eager and remarkable. But Lee, whose "avidity" was doubtless as great as ever, had anticipated them,

and when they reach the enchanted bank, we hear no more of the interesting female.

Nor does Mr. Johnson tell us when Lee got over. "On the 23d," he observes, (p. 448,) "Pickens and Lee were already in view of the enemy's camp;" and adds, that "Colonel Otho Williams, at the head of the *same select detachment that had been placed under his command at Guilford*, had been pushed across the river to hang on the enemy's rear;" (p. 449,) "while the infantry of Williams's detachment approached with more cautious steps the rear of the enemy, the legion under Lee, supported by two companies of Marylanders, and the cavalry under Washington, were pushed forward by different routes on his wings." Besides the culpable neglect of dates in this passage,

intimates that, on repassing the Dan, Lee was again incorporated with the light corps of Williams, and crossed that river with him. Whereas, from Mr. Johnson's book, it is clear that Lee was unconnected with any commanding officer, except Pickens, until after the destruction of Pyles. Marshall says,* on the 18th, Lee was pushed across the Dan, and on the 21st the light infantry crossed that river. Gordon gives precisely the same account,†—authorities, which, if Mr. Johnson's story were not absurd, would be sufficient to prove, that at the time the American army re-entered North Carolina, the detachment of Lee composed no part of the corps under Williams.

* Marshall, vol. iv. p. 359. † Gordon, vol. iii. p. 169

Our author, when he wrote the "Sketches," must have determined to show that there were many things "new under the sun," and have deemed it, if not his duty, at least his right, to describe events in any order or aspect, other than that in which they most probably occurred. With this generous abhorrence of the triteness of truth, which actuates and pervades his work, the relation of this part of General Greene's most important campaign, appears to be extravagantly inspired. "On the morning of the 22d," says Mr. Johnson, "Lee resolved to strike a blow at a party of the enemy posted at Hart's mills. Captain Eggleston, with the boldness and *precaution*" (a new military virtue) "which distinguished that officer, approached the position of the picket. But what was his surprise to find himself anticipated, and the whole picket already killed, or in possession of the American party. This service had been performed by a party commanded by Colonel Hugh M-Call, detached for the purpose by General Pickens. That indefatigable officer" (Pickens) "*had advanced upon Cornwallis by the direct route from Guilford to Hillsborough, and without knowing of his near approach to the party under Lee, although apprised of their being on the same service, had anticipated him in the enterprize against the British picket. The two parties immediately after formed a junction, and found themselves in force to brave more hazardous enterprizes.** Colonel Lee is quite

* What could be more hazardous than Pickens, with his militia alone, advancing upon Cornwallis?

mistaken with regard to the *time and circumstances* of his junction with Pickens." It is impossible to say, how much of this passage is true, as history furnishes nothing like it. If Mr. Johnson is to be believed, not a word of it can be relied upon: for, on the same page, he asserts, that, the evening before this dramatic incident, that is to say, the 21st—General Greene repaired, with a small escort, to the camp of Pickens and Lee: passed the greater part of that night in the tent of the former, and in consultation with both, committed the united detachments to the command of Pickens, and exhorted the "two commanders to let nothing disturb their harmony." So that Eggleston and McCall, after having been encamped together the night of the 21st, stand aghast the next morning, at finding themselves in the neighbourhood of each other, and Pickens, after having Lee committed to his care and keeping on the 21st, is amazed the next day to learn his approach or contiguity!

We beg not to be accused of indecorum, and ob-servant of the dignity of Mr. Johnson's station, respectfully ask him to prescribe a proper denomination for this elaborate conflict of assertions. Perhaps he may say that he has only misdated these events, and that a correction of his chronology will render them consistent. This dignified retreat we leave open for him, forbearing ridicule or reproach upon the frustrate presumption of his cavil at Lee's account; and administering justice in mercy, exhort the delinquent biog-

rapher to be careful, in endeavouring to conceal the repugnance of these branches of his narrative, not to betray their mutual incredibility, for as one is clearly incorrect, an agreement with it, might perhaps obstruct the credit of the other.

As to General Greene's having visited the camp of his troops under Pickens and Lee, about this time, being mentioned by Lee,* and intimated by Gordon,† there can be no sufficient reason to doubt it. But it is not probable there is the smallest dependence to be placed in the assertion of his having committed the whole detachment to the "command of Pickens;" because, in the first place, it is contradicted by Judge Johnson, and in the next, by General Pickens. The former affirms, after making this assertion, that Greene "exhorted the *two commanders to harmony*." Now there must have been but *one commander*, if the whole detachment had been committed to the command of Pickens. Nor is it likely that they would have been exhorted to harmony in this case; but Pickens to moderation, and Lee to compliance. On the contrary, this exhortation goes far to prove their independence, and was doubtless the consequence of that fact.

There can be no interested view in exposing this minor misrepresentation. It is clear to us, though to Mr. Johnson it appears otherwise, that the lower the rank of Lee is depressed, the higher his fame must be exalted, inasmuch as the ascendancy of his genius is

* Vol. i. p. 303.

† Vol. iii. p. 169.

to be measured, from the humility of his station, to the eminence of his services. On occasion of his connection with General Pickens, it will be found, that our own writers* scarcely mention the latter, and ascribe the direction and execution of their measures, to Lee alone; and that the British writers† never mention his “*commander*” at all. Nothing but a natural concern in the purity of our country’s annals, and the duty imposed by the direction of his principal misrepresentations of dissipating the unfounded and preposterous claims of Mr. Johnson, to credit or authenticity, would induce us to notice this contemptible fallacy. To put the matter beyond all doubt, and to restore it to its true and natural character, which is, that the detachments were *combined*, not *united*; that, although Pickens held a state commission of Brigadier, and had, consequently, the nominal superiority of rank, yet Lee, from the peculiar organization of his legion, his own reputation and address, his continental commission, the reputed partiality of Washington and Greene, and, more than all, the appearance and prowess of his cavalry, exercised at least, equal command; and that Pickens, though exempt from his authority, was probably not free from his influence; we copy the following letter from him to Lee:

* Gordon, vol. iii. p. 170. Marshall, vol. iv. p. 361. Girard’s history of Virginia, p. 483.

† Stedman, vol. ii. p. 333. Tarleton’s Campaign, p. 232. Botta, also, Otis’s translation, vol. iii. p. 261.

Bowts' Stoney Creek, 10 o'clock, Feb. 26, 1781.

SIR—I wrote you in the morning of the enemy's movement from Hillsborough. About an hour after, I had intelligence of their passing Mabans, with all their baggage, artillery, &c., and a party of horse and foot having taken the direct road for my camp, I concluded they would, of course, send a strong detachment, and as they might easily have been reinforced, I resolved to retire. I marched off in good order, about half an hour before they got to the ground, and retreated as far as Dickey's. I there formed and halted with an intention of staying till morning, but just after dark I received intelligence of their advance, and shortly they fired on my picket. The difficulty of getting riflemen to stand in the night, made me again resolve to retire, and I am retreated to this place. I could wish, sir, to form a junction with you in the morning; if you would fix a spot let me know by the bearer.

I am, sir, yours, &c.

ANDREW PICKENS.

Lt. Col. Comt. Lee, Partisan Legion.

This deferential report, while it indicates significantly, the direction of the virtual command, and the confidence in time of peril, which Pickens felt in the presence of the legion, shows the devouring rapidity with which he was *advancing upon Cornwallis*, and if compared with the liberal and decorous terms in

which, invariably, Lee mentions that excellent and patriotic officer,* will enable the reader the better to estimate the truth and dignity of the following remark (vol. i. p. 457.) "The reader must not be misled by the diminished figure given to his *commander* on the colonel's canvass."

Having thus consigned Lee and his legion to the protecting guidance of Pickens, Mr. Johnson details the attempt to surprise Tarleton; and being still determined to make good his promise of compounding his work of "original materials,"† to relate things "unattempted yet in prose or rhyme," assures us that all was directed, all was done by Pickens. The stratagem by which Pyles and his party were brought into the power of the republicans is suppressed, for that could not be filched from Lee, inasmuch as Pickens could not have been mistaken for Tarleton, although we are told his ragged militia had nothing in their dress to distinguish them from the well-clad British troops; by force of which "original material," the accident that frustrated the principal enterprize is attributed to the infantry of Lee. Even with this fanciful

* Among the biographical sketches annexed to Lee's Memoirs, it was intended to insert one of General Pickens. But the materials, procured chiefly from the venerable warrior himself, came to hand too late for the first edition. Should that not also be the last, occasion will be taken to complete this cherished design of Colonel Lee, and to render a tribute, though imperfect, to the memory of General Pickens.

† Preface circa initium.

disregard of facts, the affair of Pyles is wretchedly related; for the suspense and anxiety felt in reading Lee's narrative, the only compensation being an invidious exclusion of his agency and name.

It can hardly be doubted that Mr. Johnson is the first man who has ascribed that effectual suppression of the loyal spirit in North Carolina, to any one but Lee. Colonel Williams, of whose papers he inauspiciously boasts the possession, and who may be supposed to express the prevailing opinion of the army, thus speaks of it to Lee. "The rebuke *you* gave the North Carolina insurgents, will be a serious caution to their associates, and a disappointment to their friends." But it was considered cruel—"this unresisted slaughter," and the "soul" of our pseudographer "sickens at its recital." Therefore, in apportioning the blame of this "unnecessary bloodshed," to Lee, who, according to his account, had at most but a secondary and irresponsible agency, he seems willing to assign it all. (vol. i. p. 454.) "Yet two things cannot be denied"—(the judge it seems is no pyrrhonist,) "that the humanity of Pickens was proverbial, and that Colonel Lee was never charged with any other instance of unnecessary severity."

As courage and humanity are for the most part inseparable, we have no doubt that Pickens was as remarkable for the one, as he was distinguished for the other virtue; but, as no proverb founded on this part of his character, has ever reached us, we should have

felt grateful to Mr. Johnson, had he recorded in the "Sketches," some one of those to which he alludes. It would have fulfilled, in part at least, his anxiety to assert and adjust the claims of the worthies of the Revolution to merit, and would not have impaired the delight which he professes to experience in doing justice to the "venerable dead." As however, in his eyes, Colonel Lee does not appear to be one of the "worthies of the Revolution," and is considered to have made too good use of "talents and opportunity to take care of his own fame," (Postscript, p. 1,) it was perhaps, but a just reserve, and a wholesome respect to modesty, which prevailed on Mr. Johnson not to refer his readers, in regard to the question of Colonel Lee's humanity, either to the subjoined extract from Ramsay's history, or to the resolutions of Congress to which it relates;* mementos as impressive at

*(Vol. ii. p. 290, 291.) "The successful enterprize of the Americans at Stony Point was speedily followed by another, which equalled it in boldness of design. This was the surprise of the British garrison at Paulus Hook, opposite to New York, which was effected by Major Lee, with about 350 men. Major Sutherland the commandant, with a number of Hessians, got off safe to a small block-house on the left of the fort; but 30 of his men were killed, and 160 taken prisoners. Congress honoured him (Major Lee,) with their thanks, and ordered a medal of gold, emblematical of the affair, to be struck and presented to him as a reward for his "prudence, address, and bravery." They also passed resolutions applauding his *humanity*.

"*Resolved*, That the thanks of Congress be given to Major

least, as a Carolina proverb. Mr. Girardin, who vaunts not “of braving the rugged duties of historical justice,” and whose work, in respect both to sentiment and language, is guiltless of affinity to the production of Mr. Johnson—in relating the affair of Pyles, observes, “Lee has been wrongly charged with inhumanity on this occasion: the conflict was begun by the royal militia; and the American cavalry, had a hot pursuit been ordered, might have annihilated the whole body of routed and fleeing loyalists.”

After plunging through so many romantic adventures, it might be expected that the official habits of our author would both prompt and enable him, to declare the character of this transaction, and to determine whether or in what degree, it deserved censure, or merited praise. He might have reflected that the tories were no less hostile than the British, while their principles were far less respectable. Yet can any one believe he would not have exulted to describe Pickens’s mounted militia, dealing the very same destruction on Tarleton’s dragoons, that the

Lee, for the remarkable prudence, address, and bravery, displayed by him on the occasion; and they approve the *humanity shown in circumstances prompting to severity*, as honourable to the arms of the United States, and correspondent to the noble principles on which they are assumed.

“*Resolved*, That a medal of gold, emblematical of this affair, be struck under the direction of the Board of Treasury, and presented to Major Lee.” Journals of Congress, vol. iv. p. 368.

legion cavalry inflicted upon the tories. Can it be supposed he would have called it *unnecessary bloodshed, unresisted slaughter*, or that he would not have pitched his voice to the highest notes of triumph. If it was unresisted, it was because it could not be resisted; and if it had been successfully, it is probable Greene's superiority in cavalry would have been lost; to preserve which, it would have been proper to cut up, not only the tories, but much more respectable enemies, the British dragoons; who went fairly into the war, and did not put themselves into a situation, where they were likely to salute their enemies as friends.

Sinister and furtive efforts are perseveringly made to discredit this part of Lee's narrative, by comparing it with a convenient extract from his official letter, with which, however, it is not inconsistent, and with that of Pickens, who had but a remote part in the encounter. It is not a little singular that Lee, who is depressed into insignificance on this occasion by Mr. Johnson, should have found it necessary to write a circumstantial and express vindication of himself in reference to it against Stedman's imputation of cruelty.* This sensible and observing writer, who was commissary to Lord Cornwallis's army, and of course conversant with the tories, having been so unlucky as to leave America without discovering that Pickens, "the commander," was present.

* Lee's Memoirs, vol. i. pp. 311-12.

Dilating on the bright prospect of glory, the garlands of "oak and of laurel," that dawned or twined around the temples of Pickens in the pursuit of Tarleton, our author thus expatiates, (p. 455.) "For Pickens to have added to the two fortunate occurrences already related, the third, of conquering the enemy he was pursuing, would have been too much good fortune to have been compassed within a single circle of the sun.* It would have ended in the expulsion, if not complete reduction, of Cornwallis's army." "But, (p. 456,) fate had assigned the fall of Cornwallis to other hands." So that the exploits of Pickens not only outstrip those of Lee, but, had not fate interposed, would have forestalled the greatest of General Washington's! Keeping Lee and his legion as a sort of body guard to this meritorious militiaman, after admitting there were "two commanders," and that both wrote official reports to Greene, Mr. Johnson proceeds to mistake the flattering terms of a letter from the latter to Pickens, in which, for the purpose plainly of engaging and rewarding the services and attachment of his militia, he extols their conduct (and particularly the memorable capture of the picket by M'Call,) in heroic terms, for a strict and literal representation of

* The "two fortunate occurrences" were the capture of the picket by M'Call, according to Mr. Johnson, on the 22d, and the destruction of Pyles on the 25th: of course, by "a single circle of the sun," we are to understand about seventy-two hours.

facts. This blunder will be found one of the least noxious parts of his work. Indeed, the worst effect of magnifying Pickens into unnatural importance, and protruding him into the foreground of the picture, is the danger, with those who may not bear in mind his real excellence and signal modesty, of rendering that brave and active officer ridiculous.

Cornwallis having removed from Hillsborough to Allernance Creek, Greene is placed by Mr. Johnson in a situation equally unexampled and perplexing; in the midst, namely, of three alternatives*—(p. 458.) From among these, however, it is intimated he made a judicious selection: and, as the paragraph is not egregiously absurd for Mr. Johnson, furnishes indeed a fair average of his performance—we shall transcribe and examine it, with a view of showing how defective his most tame and inoffensive affirmations are, and how preposterous and infatuated his undertaking, to describe or to explicate the plainest military operations. “This very skilful movement presented to the American general three alternatives; either to offer battle to his *antagonists*,” (who are they?) “with a certainty of its being accepted—to retreat once more across the Dan, and leave Lord Cornwallis the undisputed master of the state; or to persevere in cutting

* By “three alternatives” Mr. Johnson means an alternative with *three branches*, but inasmuch as custom has extended the application of the word from the *choice* to the *objects of it*, this phrase was thought not reprehensible on that account.

him off from the upper counties by advancing still further on the route by Guilford towards Salisbury. He determined on the latter; but it was a movement of the most critical kind, and a variety of precautions were necessary to strip it of its dangers. Slowly, therefore, he kept pace with the march of his adversary, carefully avoiding whatever could force him to a general action, and equally providing for a forward or retrograde movement, whichever way his adversary should attempt to manœuvre. Proceeding thus, he advanced to the heights between Reedy Fork and Troublesome Creek, having his head quarters at the Speedwell iron works on the latter, and Boyd's mill on the former stream." The remaining sentence is dedicated entirely to Greene's "hovering," "teasing," "pouncing," "interrupting," "beating up," and "wearing out," light troops.

In the first place, it is obvious there could be little or no skill required or displayed, in *executing*, at the head of a superior army, the movement from Hillsborough to Allemance. And it is certain in the next, that the resolution to perform it, was either involuntary or injudicious. Lord Cornwallis, in explaining its causes, observes, "forage and provisions being scarce in the neighbourhood of Hillsborough, as well as the position being too distant, (upon the approach of the rebel army) for the protection of the body of our friends, I judged it expedient to cross the Haw,

and encamped near **Allemance Creek**.^{***} **Stedman**† accounts for it in the same manner, and in assigning its consequences, thus describes the immediate depression of the royal cause. “The bulk of mankind being guided by external appearances, nothing could be more unfavourable to **Lord Cornwallis**’s present views, than this retrograde movement upon the approach of **General Greene**’s army. If the loyalists were before cautious and slow, they now became timid to excess, and dreaded taking any active measures whatsoever in behalf of the king’s government, more especially when they reflected on the disaster that had happened to **Colonel Pyle**.” With this rational observation the remark of **Tarleton** coincides: “If **General Greene** lost the confidence of his friends by quitting **North Carolina** when pursued by a superior force, **Earl Cornwallis** likewise relinquished his claim to the superiority of the **British** arms, by abandoning **Hillsborough** upon the return of the **American** general into the province.” And it was upon perceiving this ill effect of his “very skilful movement,” that the **British** general complained of being “placed between timid friends and inveterate enemies:”‡ and not on any previous occasion, as is asserted by **Mr Johnson**, (p. 448.) The absurdity of this passage is, moreover, infected with an awkward confusion of cause

* Despatch to **Lord George Germain**, 17th March, 1781.

† Vol. ii. p. 334.

‡ **Lord Cornwallis**, **Stedman** ubi supra.

and effect, which is injurious to the military fame of Greene. For while his bold and sagacious resolution to re-enter North Carolina, in reality originated all the subsequent manœuvring, and in a great degree imposed on his adversary the necessity of retiring with such ill grace behind the Haw, he is here represented as previously influenced by this very movement which his skill had compelled. His conduct is deduced from necessity more than from choice, and he is made to suffer not to act, to endure, rather than to determine (as with an inferior force he had the address to do) this important and unfavourable measure of his antagonist—a measure too which fell within the scope of his forethought when he designed the operation by which it was enforced. For it is agreed on all hands that he precipitated his return to North Carolina for the purpose of repressing the rising spirit of her numerous loyalists.*.

The phenomenon of “three alternatives,” we shall not attempt to explain; but how it arose in consequence of “this very skillful movement,” it may be well to inquire. If, as is evident, Greene was not forced to action by the lateral or retiring motion of his adversary, as little was he obliged by it to retreat. These *two* alternatives, (if they *must be counted*,) existed in an equal degree, at least, upon every

* Marshall, vol. iv. p. 359. Ramsay, vol. ii. p. 424. Gordon, vol. iii. p. 169. Lee, vol. i. p. 302. Sketches vol. i. p. 447. Stedman, vol. ii. p. 333. Tarleton, p. 233.

occasion, previous and subsequent, during his warfare with Cornwallis, up to the battle of Guilford.

As to the third alternative, his "persevering in cutting him off from the upper counties"—that operation had never commenced, as Greene was not yet in a condition to fight, and uniformly retired as his enemy approached. But Mr. Johnson, as if there had been a line of fortresses, or a barrier of mountains in the direction from Boyd's ferry to Guilford and Salisbury, tells us "he determined on the latter," (meaning the last, as the latter was to retreat across the Dan,) and describes it, with that brevity and force of style, which give such distinctness and authority to his military disquisitions—as (vol. i. p. 459,) "a movement of the most critical kind, and a variety of precautions were necessary to strip it of its dangers." This sentence, it must be admitted, would as well define the movement of Cornwallis or of any other general, as it does that of Greene. Nor does it convey to the mind of the reader, a single quality of the subject which it professes to explain. What would be thought of the diagnosis of a physician, who should say to his patient, "your situation is critical, and a variety of remedies are necessary to strip it of its dangers"—without telling the sufferer or his friends, what was the character of his disease, or what the remedies to allay or to cure it? General Greene's objects were, to maintain a footing in North Carolina; and to overawe the loyalists, and rouse the republicans. To accomplish the first,

the indication was, by strength and variety of positions to avoid, until adequately reinforced, a general action; and to effect the second, the active detachments of Pickens and Lee, were employed in those operations which terminated in the destruction of Pyles, the restraint of Tarleton, and the embarrassment of Cornwallis. That in this conjuncture, Greene regulated his motions by those of his enemy, it is easy to conceive, and we should suppose, as easy to affirm; but our author has the misfortune to obscure this plain notion, by saying, "he kept pace *slowly* with the march of his adversary." He next tells us at least twice as much as he means; and as the excess is sheer nonsense, it may be well to mark it for future extirpation. Greene, says Mr. Johnson, "equally provided for a forward or retrograde movement, which ever way his adversary should attempt to manœuvre." Now to make any thing sensible or accurate of this remark, it must be limited to something like the following averment. "The American general held himself prepared for a forward or retrograde movement, according to the advance or retreat of his adversary." The absurdity of the author in the next sentence is only laughable, in assigning to his hero, at one and the same time, a double accommodation of head quarters—namely, one establishment on Troublesome Creek, and the other on Reedy Fork. But when it is recollected that the chaotic nothingness of this passage, is confounded into more tumultuous nonsense by the absence

of dates, it will not appear impertinent to ask, what information the general reader, or the military student, is to acquire from this part of Greene's life? The time may come, when the same, or a similar district, may be invaded by as fierce a foe, and some future defender of our country may explore the campaigns of Greene, in order to draw instruction and encouragement, from the skill and perseverance, the caution and boldness, with which, against a consummate general and a superior army, he successfully contended. Can it be said that the ponderous quartos of Mr. Johnson will reward his researches in that regard; or will he not be compelled to resort to Lee's Memoirs? a book which our author has endeavoured to depreciate, by alternate and reciprocal attacks upon its contents and its author.

In that unpretending work, the following reflections occur, upon the very occasion which drew from Mr. Johnson the copious insignificance just noticed: "The last ten days presented a very interesting and edifying scene. Two generals of high talents, ardently supported by their respective armies, contending, by a series of daring manœuvres, for a vast prize, which either might have lost by one false step. Had Cornwallis risked any partial operations against Williams, the destruction of the assailing corps would have led to the capture of the British army; whereas, had Greene, by incorrect intelligence or mistaken calculations, placed himself within reach of the British gene-

ral, our army would have been cut to pieces. The loyalists looked on with anxious solicitude; and finding that all the efforts of the royal leader were unavailing, the American army retaining its ground, and its active cavalry penetrating, in every direction, they recurred to past admonition, and determined to repress their zeal, and to wait in quietude until the British superiority should be manifested by signal success. Thus the American general completely succeeded in his object, adding a new claim to the high confidence already acquired, and leaving it doubtful which most to admire—his sagacity in council, his promptitude in decision, or his boldness and skill in execution.* Here both the mode and the effect of this particular warfare are pointed out; exemplifying more than any other part of Greene's life, the fertile and indefatigable mind, which, in less than a year, and with means so inadequate, raised the south of the union from prostration to independence. Aware that his force would be crushed by collision with the royal army, but resolved from considerations of patriotism and foresight to face it, he contrived, by judiciously dividing his troops, and by excellent dispositions, to reduce the most determined efforts of Cornwallis to frustrate or ineffectual attacks. Availing himself of the superior condition of his cavalry, and the wild and hardy courage of his active mountaineers, he imparted to his advanced division, strength to overpower the

* See Memoirs, vol. i. pp. 275 and 292.

detachments, and swiftness to elude the force of his enemy; and at the same time secured to his main army free communication with his base of operations, the important advantages of time and distance, and the imposing ability of improving success or of repairing disaster in his light corps. Thus his sagacity seconding his spirit, and the energy of his intellect compensating the insufficiency of his reinforcements, he maintained the unequal contest. Want of strength, he supplied by elasticity of arrangement, defect of weight by celerity of motion, and though not firm enough to close with his antagonist, was yet so dexterous as to keep him at arm's length. The disputed allegiance of the state beheld, and seeing the champion of freedom, daring in adversity, formidable while inferior, and vigorous though overmatched, fell off from the royal cause, and received an impulse in his favour, which soon after communicated such powerful re-action to his defeat at Guilford, as ensured the consequences of a complete victory.

Of this, the most interesting part of Greene's campaigns, a perfect sample of the Fabian system—"ut neque omitteret hostem neque congregaretur,"* (which

* Livy, 22. 12.

The system of Fabius, as explained by Polybius, Livy, and Plutarch, consisted in taking strong positions in the neighbourhood of Hannibal, cutting off his detachments, interrupting his supplies, and harassing his marches; rigorously avoiding at the same time a general action, "*neque universo periculo summa*

Mr. Johnson ludicrously enough, thinks was exhibited, (vol. i. p. 432,) in his rapid retreat from Guilford to the Dan,)—our author furnishes no intelligible explanation; and, although he might have copied that left by Lee, he neither unfolds the talents of his hero, nor guides the attention of his reader, through these intricate, skillful, and momentous hostilities; preferring to hazard dispraise of Virginia, and to indulge in defamation of Colonel Lee. Of the latter, who has endeavoured to transmit to posterity, by so many affectionate memorials, such just and discriminating applause, the conduct and glory of his friend and commander; and whose fidelity, in this instance, so far outvalues the misty incense of the “Sketches,” he makes the following remarks, (vol. i. p. 404,) “indeed, the colonel had scarcely ever permitted his general to

rerum committebatur.” By this constancy of judgment and courageous prudence, he restored the fortune, and revived the spirit of his country—“*cunctando restituit rem.*” Whereas it must be evident that if General Greene had imitated the Cunctator, in his retreat from Guilford, had delayed a moment, the “*rem*” restored would have been the royal government, at least to the three southern states. And while it is notorious that the Roman general never attempted nor accomplished a difficult and protracted retreat, it is obvious that the American commander, in effecting one, had not his example in view, and only obeyed, as innumerable officers had done before him, and many have done since, the dictate of common prudence, in endeavouring to escape from a superior foe. His effort, to be sure, was no less skilful than fortunate.

enjoy the reputation of having conceived any of his most prominent measures;" and, (p. 402,) "If the reader will peruse the narrative of this event, as furnished by Colonel Lee, he will find that, as usual, his commander is thrown in the back ground, whilst his own full-length portrait fills up half the canvass." There is neither time nor occasion—indeed the dignity of the state, the ruling force of her counsels, and the well known constancy and vigour of her patriotism in the Revolution, forbid it—to notice more than one of his remarks in respect to Virginia: "Colonel Lee," (he observes, vol. i. p. 438,) "with the laudable feeling of a native Virginian, has asserted, that 'that state may well be denominated the matrix of resistance in the south.' We feel no disposition to derogate from the merits of a state which may have been too much extolled, but which cannot be denied the honour of having done its duty as well as any other."

Whether Colonel Lee's feeling was *laudable* or not in making the assertion, *a native Virginian* would be apt to believe depended on its truth, and would be held to admit the one in praising the other. But in case our southern panegyrist, under whose *laudable feeling* Colonel Lee and truth both suffer, may not deem this virtue a test of historical merit, it may be proper for his satisfaction to support the assertion by a reference to facts; which, though cursory and limited, will be sufficient to convince him that Lee's observation is perfectly correct.

Between the last of October, 1780, and the middle of March, 1781, Virginia was invaded by near 8000 effectives, in three successive divisions, under Generals Leslie, Arnold, and Phillips; and when Lord Cornwallis joined the army of the last at Petersburg, he found it more than 5300 strong.* At the siege of Charleston, she lost more than 1000 men, one-fifth at least of the garrison. She furnished one-third of the army under Gates, at Camden; about the same proportion, and the leader, of the conquerors of King's Mountain; the commander, and a full contingent, at the Cowpens, and more than half the army at Guilford; and of these different contributions, the greater part were militia and volunteers. This, in the stately language of the "Sketches," is called "making a sorry figure in the field." While the three southern states, inaccessible to deep maritime invasions, were either subdued, or lost to the confederacy, changing allegiance with the tide of fortune, and wasting, in sanguinary and rapacious civil broils, the spirit and resources, "*quo graves Persæ melius perirent.*" But the unanimity of Virginia—firm against repeated and destructive incursions of the British; against Indian hostilities, which pierced and agonized her naked frontier—empowered her to continue contributions to the northern army, to conquer, and to bestow the seats of future empire in the west, and still to remain "the fountain of southern resistance." For, even

* Sir H. Clinton to Earl Cornwallis, June 11th, 1781.

while making the great exertion, which eventuated in the acknowledgment of our independence, we find her, true to her federal duties, furnishing one-third of the continental troops, who liberated Carolina at the battle of Eutaw.

Mr. Johnson is indeed willing to admit, that "she did her duty as well as any other." But was such duty done by any other state, at least south of Virginia? Glorious imitations of her spirit, it is true, were afforded by Sumpter, Marion, and Pickens, and by some other patriots, hardly less deserving; examples the more glorious, but the less effectual, because they were so rare. While these heroes contended chiefly for the independence of their native state, and often against their neighbours, the sons of Virginia, unanimous and ardent on the side of liberty, were found in arms, wheresoever her standards flew—on the ramparts of Quebec—on the shores of the Hudson—on the sands of Carolina.

There was no disposition to enter on this subject, nor is there the least to press it, by referring to the difference between the tone of the enemy's reports and proclamations from the Carolinas, and that of their despatches from or concerning Virginia. But it is strange our author, before he instituted this invidious comparison, did not recollect his own account of the *Whigs* of North Carolina, (vol. i. p. 409,) "The whigs of Mecklenburg, through which county the armies must march, had too good an excuse at

this time for remaining at home," (pp. 15, 16,) "most of those, terrified at the fall of their commander, and the retreat of Morgan, made the best of their way directly home; so that of the 500 who had been on duty in the morning, a very small proportion now remained." Hence, it may be concluded, that in the *times that tried men's souls*, a whig on the south side of the Dan, was equivalent to a tory on the north; a *caste* of patriotism, not yet extinct in those realms of the sun; for our author pursues the name of the leader of the tories with less disaffection, evidently, than he does the memory of their destroyer. On the contrary, he tells us, that when General Greene had been chased through North Carolina, and, abandoned of her whigs, had taken refuge in Virginia, General Stevens immediately received orders from the governor* to engage any number of volunteers for six weeks; and that in three days he had embodied near 1000. These, it is known, increased to 1700, under Stevens, Campbell, Lawson, and Lynch, enabled Greene to fight the battle of Guilford, and to drive Cornwallis headlong to the sea.

The defect of dates already alluded to, may be specified at once. The last date given is the 27th of February, when Lord Cornwallis took post on Allamance creek, and as it would seem. the corresponding progression of Greene, brought him to the heights between Reedy fork and Troublesome creek. Upon

* The illustrious Jefferson.

this the following *retrospective* account is given of Colonel Williams (p. 459.) "Colonel Williams in discharge of the duties assigned him, *had ever since the 29th &c.*" This splendid synchronism is as bold almost and striking, as the beautiful surprize of Captain Eggleston, at seeing M-Call in the morning, after sleeping with him all night. Here also Mr. Johnson himself mentions the party of Pickens, (in which he includes the legion) and the light corps of Williams as distinct detachments; "the two detachments threw themselves in front of the enemy" making Lee subordinate to Pickens, and Williams independent of him, both holding nominally inferior commissions. The fact seems to be, that the light troops of every description, became subject to the command of Williams as soon as they were united; an event which he had the delegated authority to effect, whenever he might judge it expedient. On the 27th he writes to Lee, "I have so many reasons to think the major part, if not all the British army have moved westward from Hillsborough, that I propose moving the light troops now with me towards the High Rock ford, in order that a junction may be formed of the whole, if found necessary." A circumstance is next mentioned on the ostensible authority of a letter from Colonel Lee, which, as he himself does not allude to it in his memoirs, he had perhaps forgotten. It is, that Williams having embodied the light troops in the vicinity of the British position on the Allemande, had determined to

attack their whole army in their camp on the morning of the 2d of March, and that he was deterred from this rash and ruinous misconduct only by the earnest remonstrance of Colonel Lee, who advised that the attack if made at all, should be deferred until the enemy were on their march. Of this project no mention is made by Lee, Marshall, Ramsay, or Gordon, the latter having constructed his chronicle on the papers chiefly of Colonel Williams. Nor is it easy to reconcile its reality with the confessed capacity of that officer, whose prudence was esteemed equal to his valour.* But if it was conceived and counteract-

* The following letter from Colonel Williams to Colonel Lee, dated at the very hour specified by our author, alludes, not to a meditated attack on the British camp, for which the *divided situation* of the light troops, and the fatigued condition of their best corps, were not favourable ; but to a *motion*, that *had* been determined on, and which was declined, not at the instance of Lee, but for reasons unknown to him. This inveterate opposition to which the stubborn and uncourtly nature of truth exposes his assertions, Judge Johnson is no doubt prepared both by habit and deliberation, to bear with composure. But whether he will be able to read without displeasure, the subsequent paragraph of the letter ; to tolerate the insensibility of Williams to the superiority of the militia ; his inadvertence to the pre-eminence of their commanders ; or the imbecility of judgment which induced him, where dangerous or delicate operations were to be conducted, to prefer Lee and his legion, it is not easy to conjecture. Should these unpleasant trifles disturb his tranquility, he may fail to perceive the harmony of spirit that animated these officers ; the delicacy with which one could intimate a com-

ed as Mr. Johnson declares, it must be admitted the country owes a large and unacknowledged debt of gratitude to Lee; for there cannot be the smallest doubt, that had this hazardous project been attempted, the light corps, on the superiority of which every thing depended, would have been demolished, and a finishing stroke given to the army of Greene, and to the hope of liberating the southern states. From this opinion, it is probable, no man but Judge Johnson can dissent.

A rencounter between the light troops of the two armies took place on the 2d, which General Greene in a despatch to General Washington thus notices; "on the 2d, Lieutenant Colonel Lee with a detachment of

mand, or hint a design, and the promptness with which the other could execute or fulfil them. This letter was followed immediately by the conflict with Tarleton.

Allemande 3 o'clock A. M. 2d March, 1781.

DEAR SIR.—For reasons which I will communicate when I have the pleasure to see you, I decline the motion I had determined to make this morning.

You will please advance with the legion in time to be here about daybreak, as I wish you to form the van to-morrow. The fatigue your horse has suffered, induced me to employ the mounted militia on detached service, and to obtain intelligence. But I can no longer depend upon their cautious observations, and equivocal intelligence; besides, I want an officer in the front, capable of catching a sudden opportunity, if an advantage can be taken of the enemy. He may make one incautious step.

Yours truly,

O. H. WILLIAMS.

riflemen, attacked the advance of the British army under Tarleton and killed and wounded by report about thirty of them." This our author commemorates (p. 460,) "as a *defence*," (on the part of Lee) "as handsome as could have been desired." New encomiums are bestowed upon the "very skillful movement" of Cornwallis from Hillsborough; which as far as the passage can be penetrated, contains at least the following absurdity; that by increasing his absolute, and compared with Greene, his relative distance from Virginia, he enhanced the probability of being able to cut off the reinforcements which were marching from that state to join Greene.

The skirmish at Wetzell's mills is premised by a multitude of silly and gratuitous assertions, which affect to be a representation of the facts and motives that led to it; and is thus introduced, (p. 462:) "This brought on the skirmish of Wetzell's mills, in which, as usual, Colonel Tarleton has slain his thousands, and which Colonel Lee describes with a variety of amusing little incidents, but with surprising general inaccuracy. It is always a relief to us to be able, on these occasions, to resort to the narrative of Colonel Otho Williams; it is illuminated by the touches of genius, and equally conspicuous for its perspicuity, and for the air of modesty and authenticity with which it is delivered. If the reader will peruse the narrative of this event, as furnished by Colonel Lee, he will find that as usual his commander is thrown in the back

ground, while his own full length portrait fills up half the canvass. The ground of the picture represents a surprise upon Williams, and the retreating army covered by Colonels Lee and Clark. If he will compare it with the subjoined letter, he will find that Clark is substituted for Colonel William Campbell and Colonel Preston, and that Colonel Washington, and not Colonel Lee, covered the rear of the army—that so far was Williams from being surprised, that the enemy were discovered when yet two miles off, and that Colonel Lee's services are not noticed on that day, unless it be under the general observation that the enemy were "awed by the cavalry," an observation in which Colonel Washington, who ranked Colonel Lee, had at least an equal right to participate." "The ground work of *this picture*" represents the egregious ignorance of Mr. Johnson; and while "his canvass is illuminated by touches" of falsehood, it is "conspicuous" for vanity, and for "the air" of arrogance and malice with which it is presented. Before going farther, it may be well to transcribe the report of Colonel Williams.

" *Camp near the Old Bridge on the Haw River,* }
7th March, 1781. }

"DEAR GENERAL: Early yesterday morning I detached an officer with a small party, designing, under cover of the fog, to have surprised and brought off one of the enemy's parties stationed at a mill about a mile

from their camp. Soon after, I was informed by one of my reconnoitring officers, that the enemy had decamped early in the morning, and had taken a route leading to my left. We were instantly in motion. They had approached within two miles of our position, and their intention was manifestly to surprise us. I immediately ordered the troops to march to Wiley's (Wetzell's) mills; and soon after was informed by two prisoners, that the enemy were marching for the same place on a road parallel to that in which we were. We annoyed them by light flanking parties, and moved briskly on to the mill; but were so closely pressed by Colonel Webster's brigade and Colonel Tarleton's legion, that I found it absolutely necessary to leave a covering party under the command of Colonel Preston. The rest of the troops passed the Reedy Fork, and formed on the north side without interruption. Very soon after, a brisk fire began on Colonel Preston's party, which they returned with great spirit. In the mean time Colonel Campbell, who had previously, in concert with Lieutenant Colonel Washington, served as a cover to the retiring troops, passed the creek above the mill. The ground on this side being very unfavourable, I waited only till Colonel Preston crossed, and then ordered the troops to retire; the enemy pursued at some distance; but receiving several severe checks from small covering parties, and being awed by our cavalry, he thought proper to halt. We continued to retire about five miles, where we encamped,

and were refreshing ourselves, when Major Burnet delivered the instructions from you, which induced me to cross the Haw river, and take post here. Our loss is very inconsiderable ; very few were killed, and most of our wounded were brought off."

It is evident that Mr. Johnson, in his injudicious praises of this summary and hasty despatch, was chiefly actuated by a disposition to insinuate that Lee's account of the affair at Wetzell's, is the reverse of authentic, modest, and clear. Passing by the indecency of seizing upon the natural discrepancy between Williams's brief, sudden, and undigested report, and Lee's deliberate detail, in order to draw inferences unfavourable to the veracity of either of these officers; we have to inform the learned judge that although the report is undoubtedly authentic, it by no means follows that it is correct, and that the detail may be perfectly true, without being in the least authentic. The accounts of the action at Guilford by Cornwallis and Greene respectively, are authentic, yet, as they disagree in many points, cannot both be correct. Williams was the only American on the ground at Wetzell's who could give an *authentic* report of the skirmish, while it is very conceivable that Lee, who was more immediately engaged in the detached and fugitive incidents of which it was composed, was more competent to furnish a minute and detailed account of them. But Mr. Johnson says, "that Lee's services are not noticed" by Williams, but in an im-

plied and general way. This is very true, nor indeed is his name mentioned. Yet he will hardly do such injustice to Williams's generalship as to say, that, on this occasion, the legion was not at all employed—and this omission, therefore, instead of operating to affect the credit of Lee's narrative, can only have the opposite consequence of shewing the imperfection of such general reports, and the stupid insecurity of those who rely on them, for a complete account of the transactions they refer to. The only regular American troops which our own or British authorities mention as engaged, are the legion of Lee.* Besides, Colonels Washington and Lee were both in the rear, and the former having been the older officer, is therefore probably named by Williams, without intention to designate the particular services of either. But as has been before observed, our author mistakes the character of Lee's work. We must, therefore, again remark, that it is not a general history of the southern war—still less is it a series of official reports, or a compilation of authentic documents. It contains a minute, familiar, and picturesque description of such events as fell within the writer's observation—connected by historical passages, and interspersed with reflections on the partisan warfare in which he was engaged. Instead of history, it was intended to supply the defects, and to furnish the materials of history. The principal

* Tarleton, p. 237. Marshall, vol. iv. p. 364. Gordon, vol. iii. p. 172.

“touch” of falsehood in the commentary of our author is that Lee has “thrown his commander in the back ground;” for nothing can be more remote from the truth than this assertion. We have not time to transcribe his relation of this skirmish, but if the reader will refer to it,* he will find Colonel Williams mentioned as the commander, and the whole affair described as conducted under the direction of that officer. Another “touch” of falsehood almost as flagrant as the above, is the assertion that Lee’s narrative represents it as a surprise upon Williams. All that he says on this point is, that owing to the bold remissness of the Virginia militia, “the van of Webster’s brigade approached close, before it was discovered; but the alertness of the light troops soon recovered the momentary disadvantage”—expressions which agree with those of Colonel Williams, and convey the idea that the enemy attempted, but failed, to effect a surprise.

The next “touch” of falsehood by which the judge’s “canvass is illuminated,” consists in saying that Lee substitutes Colonel Clark for Colonels William Campbell, and Preston. The fact is, Lee mentions Preston particularly; and any one who reads his book with a view to the discovery of truth, will immediately perceive that when he says Clark he means Campbell; for he calls him “one of the heroes of King’s Moun-

* Lee’s Memoirs, vol. i. pp. 323 to 328.

tain ;” and in his account of that affair, he mentions Campbell *first among them*, and speaks of Clark in contra-distinction, and as recently engaged in another enterprize.* For the sake of these vain and virulent efforts at disparagement, our author overlooks all the most interesting features of this rencounter: the subtilty and adroitness with which Greene eluded Cornwallis, by changing his camp every night, the scarcity of provisions at head quarters, which induced the defender of Carolina to ask his soldiers for bread—the grievous indisposition,† which, added to his professional difficulties, could neither damp his ardour nor abate his activity—the devoted intrepidity and surprising success of Colonel Webster, in forcing the passage of the Reedy Fork—even the brilliant anecdote respecting this officer, related by Lee, is omitted, perhaps because it could not be denied; perhaps, because its suppression was the least responsible and most malicious way of persuading the reader to disbelieve it. It must, however, be conceded, that he makes one important revelation; which, as it is not in substance false, nor in effect defamatory, the reader who has never seen Lee’s or Tarleton’s book,‡ may receive, as it is given, for original information. This broad, palpable, and notorious fact, is thus divulged by our pregnant historian, (p. 470): “It is not generally

* Lee’s Memoirs, vol. i. pp. 208—9.

† See Appendix C.

‡ Lee’s Memoirs, vol. i. p. 365—Tarleton, p. 237.

known, that it was in the midst of the busy scene we have been relating, that the negociation for an exchange of prisoners in the southern department, was carried on!!” In the appendix to the first volume, we find an article of great interest—a narrative of the southern campaign of 1780, composed by Colonel Williams. It is cleverly written, fraught with modesty, candour, good sense, and ennobled by a sentiment of tenderness for the fallen fortunes of General Gates, that must endear the memory of its author to every liberal mind. This notice is sufficient to show how much out of place it is in an appendix to the *Sketches*, and with what inconsiderate confidence and lamentable facility, this ungainly disposition of it has been permitted.

CHAPTER III.

“What if it tempt you toward the flood my lord,
Or to the dreadful summit of the cliff,
That beetles o’er his base into the sea?”

GENERAL GREENE having been joined by considerable reinforcements from North Carolina and Virginia, determined to assert his claim to the allegiance of the former state, and no longer to avoid a field with Cornwallis. With a view of rendering this more speedy and more certain, he advanced at the head of forty-five hundred men from High Rock ford, and on the 14th of March, took a strong position in the neighbourhood of Guilford.

The country to a wide extent around, waste and rolling, was covered with lofty trees and thick shrubby underwood. Narrow tangled glades wound between the hills and desolated spots of forsaken cultivation, and presenting, far as the eye could trace them, somewhat livelier vegetation, dripped their scant rills into a larger stream and a darker valley, that crossed the great Salisbury road, about two miles from the courthouse. The melancholy horror, the wild sterility, and

the lonely aspect of the scene, seemed ready to overawe the rage, and to welcome the fears of men.

Between the stream just mentioned and the courthouse, and fronting the former, the American army was drawn up in three lines; the first and second traversed by the road, and the left of the third resting upon it. The first line composed of North Carolina militia, under Generals Butler and Eaton, was posted on the edge of a field, and covered by its fence, within cannon shot of the stream. Colonel Washington with a body of cavalry, Kirkwood's infantry, and Lynch's riflemen, supported its right flank. The legion of Lee, strengthened by a detachment of riflemen under Colonel Campbell, and of mounted militia under Major Read, covered its left. About three hundred yards in its rear, and altogether in the wood, was stationed the second line, consisting of Virginia volunteers and militia, commanded by Generals Stevens and Lawson. The third line, formed of continentals entirely, occupied the crest of a hill about four hundred yards further back, which, overlooking a field of irregular surface, sloped to the wood held by the second line. Its flanks were not made to dress up with the centre, but were drawn back, so as to conform horizontally with the range of the hill. The Virginia brigade was on the right under General Huger, the Maryland on the left under Colonel Williams. In the road, and in advance of the centre of the first line, Captain Singleton was stationed with two field

pieces, and Captain Finley with two more in the centre of the third line; to the left of which, Singleton had orders to retire, as soon as the action should commence. Here, on this hill, stood the great defender of the south, his thirst for glory forgotten, in generous zeal for his country's good.

Lord Cornwallis, whose impatience for battle had been exasperated by the incessant circumspection and activity of his antagonist, beheld with stern delight this demonstration to receive him. Chafed by repeated disappointments, indignant at the wasting marches and desultory dangers of bold and frequent rencounters, confiding in the discipline and valour of his troops, the skill of his officers; confident from former fortune, and conscious of great talents for war, he resolved to vindicate his superiority in arms, and to dare any strength of numbers or position. Accordingly, having dismissed his baggage to a place of security, under an escort of loyalists, he moved from the quaker meeting-house at the dawn of day on the 15th, and at the head of twenty-two hundred troops, bent his march directly for his enemy.

Not far from the point at which his road fell into that from Salisbury, the dragoons of Tarleton forming his advance, were charged and overpowered by the cavalry of the legion, with the loss of one entire section. Upon their retreat, Lieutenant Colonel Lee, attempting to interpose his cavalry between Tarleton and the British army, was exposed to an unexpected

volley from the guards; and after a sharp skirmish, in which his infantry and riflemen did great execution, and suffered little injury,* feeling the weight of the enemy's column, he fell back towards Guilford, and took the station assigned him in the order of battle.

About ten in the forenoon, the head of their column appeared on the eminence beyond the stream, when Singleton opened a well-directed fire, which the royal artillery quickly returned. In the face of our cannonade, and under cover of their own, the British army steadily advanced, and passing the stream, displayed into line. This evolution, executed with celerity and order, was as imposing as splendid, and impressed the American front line with more awe than admiration. As the moving bodies of the enemy, marshalled by their officers and surveyed by their general, were seen, wading through smoke or glitter-

* Among Lee's wounded, in this rencounter, was Captain Tate, who commanded a company of the Virginia militia in the battle of the Cowpens, was attached to the infantry of Howard, and shared in their memorable and decisive charge. And of him, his former commander has furnished the following honourable statement. "Of this Captain Tate, I think proper to state a fact much to his honour. After the battle of the Cowpens, when his men's times of service expired, he returned to Virginia, (I believe was sent to guard the prisoners,) raised another company, and joined us at Guilford. In the advance in the morning, under Lee, he had his thigh broken."—*Note from Colonel Howard.*

ing in the sun, to the dilated eyes of the Carolinians they appeared too numerous and strong to be resisted. The seventy-first, and the German regiment of Boze, formed their right, led by Major General Leslie; their left was composed of the twenty-third and thirty-third, and commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Webster; Brigadier General O'Hara with the second battalion, and the grenadiers of the guards, supported their left wing; and Lieutenant Colonel Norton, with the first battalion, their right. The light-infantry of the guards, with the yagers and cavalry, under Lieutenant Colonel Tarleton, constituted their reserve; to which the artillery was now attached. These dispositions being completed, the royal army advanced to the attack.

The front line of Greene, although advantageously posted and gallantly flanked, being already intimidated, were struck with a panic at the first fire, and deaf to the exhortations of their officers, insensible to the example of the firm and galling parties under Washington and Lee, threw down their loaded arms, and fled precipitately, scudding round the extremities, or bursting through the intervals of the second line; upon which the enemy fell, exulting in their prowess, and sure of victory. But the Virginians, not dismayed, but indignant, stood firm against the wave of flight and battle that rolled impetuously toward them; and the action here became close and animated. Nothing could surpass the ardour of the British; the resistance

of the Virginians was rude and resolute. Like wild boars that rush upon the spear of the hunter, they received that they might inflict wounds; and being better marksmen than soldiers, their fire, though not regular, was fierce and fatal. Cornwallis felt its effect, and redoubled his exertions. On either wing, a regiment was half wheeled outward, to meet and return the vigorous attacks of Washington and Lee; the guards under O'Hara and Norton were led into action, contention kindled along the whole line, and the battle flourished as the warriors fell. At the head of the first battalion of guards, Lieutenant Colonel Norton threw himself forward upon the American left, but the infantry of Lee held that post, and broke the assailants.* Generals Leslie and O'Hara assailed the centre, where the valour of Stevens exalted the fight, and repelled the most desperate efforts to dislodge him. But on the British left, discipline prevailed over native courage. Lieutenant Colonel Webster, pointing his attack against the right of Lawson, broke its connection with the infantry of Washington, turned the militia, and drove Lynch and Kirkwood back upon the third line. Exposed in flank and pressed hard in front, the brigade of Lawson gave ground; and, though countenanced by the presence of Washington's cavalry, after various efforts, failed to regain it.

* Stedman, in describing this part of the action, says, "at one period of the action, the first battalion of guards was completely broken." Vol. ii. p. 341.

The centre, however, still maintained itself; and the spirit of Stevens seemed to expand, as the battle swelled, like the oak which displays its strength and its volume in proportion as the winds arise. More determined in danger, he saw without shrinking, fragments of the war fall off from his right, and the point of disarray approaching from that quarter; yet feeling the steadiness of his comrades on the left, he maintained the fight with vigour and vivacity. At length, in a furious charge by the enemy, a ball pierced his thigh, and this gallant officer, no longer able to stand foremost in danger, ordered a retreat; leaving his adversaries too much weakened by the conflict to exult in their success.*

As the Virginians retired in squads, the British, in detachments, moved against the third line, and Lieutenant Colonel Webster, with more ardour than prudence, fell again upon Lynch and Kirkwood, and encountered the right of Williams's brigade. His left

* "It was said at the time that Lord Cornwallis, finding Stevens's men fought bravely, and that it was difficult to force them, put himself at the head of the grenadiers and second battalion of guards, and by a vigorous charge broke the line; and that he had two horses shot under him. Colonel Lee rode a large and gay sorrel horse, which, in the action in the morning, was unmanageable, and dismounted his rider, and was taken by the British. Some days after the action, several dead horses were found on the ground; among them this sorrel horse. It was said that Cornwallis's horse being shot, he mounted the sorrel, and he was killed also under him."—*Note from Col. Howard.*

was speedily routed by the Delawares and Virginians; his right, opposed by the first Maryland regiment, under Colonel Gumby, and he was forced to retire to a neighbouring height. The scales of victory now hung balanced, and the hopes of the American commander, which the flight of the Carolinians had depressed, revived at this evidence of firmness and efficiency. These hopes, however, were short-lived. General O'Hara, with the guards, had approached in support of Webster; and the second battalion, under Lieutenant Colonel Stuart, eagerly advanced against the second Maryland regiment. After a disorderly fire, this regiment, which was newly raised, and badly organized, took to flight, and General Greene became again diffident; and being resolved not to risk the loss of his regular troops, prepared to retire, by ordering his strongest regiment into the rear, to serve as a rallying corps. The guards sprang forward and seized Singleton's artillery. In the course of this operation, they had been concealed by a small thicket and a swell of the ground, from the regiment that had encountered Webster; but upon completing it, the intervention ceased. An attack was incontinently ordered by Colonel Gumby, but his horse being killed at the instant, and himself entangled in the fall, the charge was led by Lieutenant Colonel Howard; who, inured to danger, and trained to conquest under Morgan, threw in a quick repeated fire, and fell on with the bayonet. In a few moments, Lieutenant Colonel

Washington, disengaged by the retreat of Lawson's brigade, rushed with his cavalry upon their flank. The throes and gestures of this strife, the *anceps agitatio telorum*, it is impossible to describe; the deadly and determined thrusts of the infantry, the rush and spurning of the chargers, and the murderous slashing of the fierce dragoons. Assailed in flank and front, this bold battalion could not long maintain the conflict, which became broken and disordered, into a tumult of duels; and in one of these, Lieutenant Colonel Stuart was killed by Captain Smith. The guards fell in heaps around the guns they had taken; and their leader slain, were driven back into the open ground; many prostrated by the horse—many killed or captured by the pursuing infantry. The remnant fled for protection to their friends, but received the balls directed at their enemies; for Cornwallis, with furious decision, ordered his artillery to fire, sacrificing the fugitives to check the pursuit. Howard and Washington drew back; the former finding the retreat had commenced, and seeing two regiments advancing towards him. These were the seventy-first and twenty-third, which being at length released by the retreat of the Virginians, had reached the open ground in front of the continentals. To these, O'Hara, though grievously wounded, rallied the routed guards; Webster with the thirty-third, returned into line, and these intrepid troops, faint and diminished with marching, toil, and slaughter, stood again embattled; their Ge-

neral still determined on victory, but now not prompt to engage.

By the flight of one, and the disposition he had made of another regiment, General Greene had now but a brigade of infantry and Washington's covering party, to oppose to this desperate front of the enemy, supported by Tarleton with their cavalry; and not knowing how severely they had been crippled by Stevens, and that the party under Lee, instead of being defeated, had maintained a separate and successful action, he bent his ardent mind to the high dictates of prudence, and persevered in his resolution to retreat. Accordingly, abandoning his artillery, of which the horses had been killed, he retired on the road to the Reedy Fork.

The battle on the left, meanwhile, had raged without intermission, where Lee, with the glowing valour of the legion infantry, and the dangerous courage of Campbell and his riflemen, continued to repel General Leslie, with the right wing of the British army. As one party had disregarded the retreat of their comrades, the other had not followed the advance of their's, and they were left to decide a distinct contest. When the guards under Norton were broken, they were relieved by the regiment of Boze, and as this failed under the fire of the Americans, the guards again came into action; and these alternations brought the combatants almost at right angles to their first formation. At length the

Germans and the riflemen, the guards and the legion were respectively opposed, when Lieutenant Colonel Norton determined to unite with that part of the British line, which by successive detachments had reached and engaged the continentals. He therefore drew off in that direction, and all apprehensions of a defeat in this quarter being removed by his disappearance, Lieutenant Colonel Lee directed his cavalry to repair to the left of the continentals, there to act until further orders; and turning with his infantry upon the regiment of Boze, with which the riflemen were engaged, the Germans fell back, and were pursued by Colonel Campbell; when Lee, with his infantry, and one company of riflemen, pressed forward to join the continentals, and to take his appropriate station on their left. In his progress he again encountered and repelled the guards under Norton, and passing to the right of the British, after Greene had retreated, joined his cavalry near the court-house. Colonel Campbell, the hero of King's Mountain, (who with his hardy riflemen was the last American engaged) still annoyed the regiment of Boze, and the action being terminated elsewhere, Tarleton was detached with a body of dragoons to extricate it. This he readily effected; Campbell deemed further opposition fruitless, and his brave rifleman, after firing a few shots, retired.

In this battle, the victory of the British general was complete, but to himself disastrous; his glory was great, but his loss prodigious. Nearly one third of

his troops were killed or wounded, while the loss of the Americans did not exceed one twelfth—facts which, as soon as they were ascertained, gave predominance to the republicans in North Carolina, and made Greene a conqueror, and Cornwallis a fugitive.

Finding it impossible to furnish an analysis of the multitudinous prolixity, intertwined mistakes, and complicated injustice of Mr. Johnson's account of this unique and important battle, we have endeavoured by consulting and collating the reports of the rival generals, the narratives of Tarleton, Stedman, Ramsay, Gordon, Marshall, Lee, and various manuscript communications to the last, to prepare a fair description of it, which, in so far as it differs from Mr. Johnson, will enable the reader to measure the extent of his departures from historical truth. He has attempted, with superabundant and fabulous minuteness, a description of its parts, but parts in his hands, never make a whole; and on this interesting occasion are eminently incongruous. If loathsome minuteness could be atoned, it would be by superior accuracy; but this humble quality has no place in the pages of our romantic author. For instance, in pursuing the preliminary detail of events from the skirmish at Wetzell's mills, he says, (vol. i. p. 472,) "the order of battle was communicated to the officers on the 14th, whereas, on the 12th it was *formally* delivered to Colonel Lee, and had been in substance, communicated to himself and Colonel Washington two days before."

On the 12th Greene writes to Lee from High Rock ford. "My intention is to seek the enemy. You being informed of our route, and of my intention, as well as of the enemy's situation, will place yourself in such a situation as to act in conjunction with the main army, agreeable to the order of battle which I herewith inclose you. I depend greatly upon you and Washington to give us success. Therefore you must exert yourself; we fight for empire." The generous ardour expressed in this letter, will justify its production, which the error it corrects, would hardly have provoked. It is said too, "as soon as the junction was effected with the detachment under Williams, that *command* was dissolved;" and by reference to page 464, it appears this junction happened on the 7th, but the light corps was not dissolved until the 9th; for until that time, nothing had occurred to enable or incline General Greene to dispense with it. But on the 9th, the arrival or near approach of his reinforcements inspired him with a resolution to give battle, in consequence of which the light corps of Williams was dissolved, and that important officer took his station in the line. By antedating the dissolution of this corps, our author not only discovers the looseness of his narrative, and his ignorance of the object of its institution, but leaves two days unaccounted for, although he insists repeatedly, that "in war days are years." In attempting to explain the motives which

impelled the rival generals to action, he falls, as usual, into direct contradictions; for example, on the last page of the first volume, he avers that Cornwallis, besides being inclined to fight, was compelled to do so, "under the want of supplies of every species;" but he gives us to understand on the previous page, that he had an unexhausted country in his rear, from which he could still draw "considerable supplies;" "had not wasted his resources;" "had even formed magazines." His approach to the battle is, as usual, announced by a number of silly and arrogant flourishes. In estimating the numbers on each side, where he condescends to admit that Colonel Lee's enumeration is "near the truth," he puts forth his habitual and unmanly partiality, by endeavouring to reduce the number of republicans, and to swell that of the British as much as possible, properly rejecting Cornwallis's estimate of Greene's strength, but introducing General Greene's conjecture, as auxiliary authority for his augmented calculation of the force of the enemy.

Neither the conduct of the American army, nor the character of their general, deserve such paltry and odious adulation. His description of the ground and of the position of the Americans is dull, and particular to a disgusting excess, and reminds one of the person who proposed describing a palace to his friend, by telling him the number of bricks in its walls. On one material point, it is provokingly ambiguous. He does not say whether the first line stretched across the road

or not. After mentioning that the second did, he observes, (vol. ii. p. 6,) "The North Carolina line is seen drawn up *also at right angles with the road.*"

His distinction between a reserve, and a force posted to serve as a reserve, is truly refined, and the explication deduced from it quite luminous. But how the third line, though not set apart for a reserve, "acted as a reserve to the whole army," does not appear even in his account of the battle. Technically, the third line is called the reserve; the first being the van, and the second the main body. So that in the order of his battle, Greene had a very strong reserve, while in the conduct of it he had none; for in no instance did the third line perform the duty of a reserve, that is, advance to sustain, to strengthen, or to relieve the main body. However, a very dignified service, it must be confessed, is assigned to it by our author, viz: by its position and angularity, to shape the flight of the army. To this purpose he would have us believe, the courage of Huger, the prowess of Howard, and the knightly and noble valour of Williams, were devoted. His account of the flight of the North Carolina line is disfigured by the grossest affectation, and by a sneer at the brave Virginians. "Let us hurry over the conduct of the North Carolina militia. There were no riflemen placed in their rear;" a plain insinuation that, but for this precaution, the Virginia line would have behaved as ill. He goes on, (p. 8,) "Let no national imputation follow. North-

Carolina contains as stout hearts and sinewy arms as any other state can boast of." It may be presumed, that no state will be flattered by Mr Johnson, into the folly of boasting of "sinewy arms;" nor have we any disposition to predicate of North Carolina, the cowardice of her militia; but exercising this fairness, we think the courage and conduct of the Virginia militia, under the contagion of the panic before them, deserve infinite praise, and afford an example of patriotism and spirit, that would do honour to any state. This is the side of the contrast, on which a liberal writer would delight to dwell. General Morgan, it appears, had recommended to General Greene, the precaution of stationing picked men in the rear of the militia, with orders to shoot down any that might run; and Mr. Johnson concludes and asserts, that it was prescribed to General Stevens, in consequence of Morgan's advice. But if this was the case, why was not the plan a general one; why were not the North Carolina officers made to observe it? Surely Mr. Johnson will not venture to intimate, that the volunteers of Virginia were the most likely to give way.

The probability is, that General Stevens, his invention stimulated by indignant remembrance of Camden, put this measure in practice of his own accord. In a letter to Lee, of December 1809, he says, "To guard against my men breaking, I informed them they must not be alarmed at seeing the Carolinians retreat, as perhaps, after their giving a fire, they would be or-

dered to do so. I posted in my rear a number of riflemen, behind trees, as you know we were formed in a skirt of woods. I informed my men they were placed there to shoot the first man that might run, and at the same time they would serve to cover their retreat in case of necessity. The brigade behaved with the greatest bravery, and stood till I ordered their retreat." The error of Marshall and Lee in saying that, when Webster advanced upon the third line, he was repelled by a fire from the first Maryland regiment, and was then broken by a charge from the same regiment, is aggravated by Mr. Johnson.* Much is to be allowed to his teeming imagination, in his account of the conflict between the second battalion of guards and the first Maryland regiment, supported by Washington's dragoons. He speaks of it as an encounter, voluntary and premeditated on both sides; whereas it is evident from his own book, and established by the authority of respectable writers, that the guards were unexpectedly assailed in flank and

*"When Webster advanced upon our third line, his left and centre engaged, and were worsted by Kirkwood and Lynch, while his right attacked the first Maryland regiment. He did not press us hard; nor did we defeat or charge upon him. We left him, and charged the second battalion of guards which had, unperceived, got into our rear. Washington came up very opportunely, and we drove them into the open ground." *Note from Colonel Howard.* The authority of Colonel Howard, on this point, is as irresistible as his conduct was on the occasion to which it relates.

front.* It is observed, (p. 13,) "In the meantime General Greene, whose anxiety for the fate of the troops engaged in the woods, had drawn his attention that way, was attracted also (as well as Cornwallis) to the place of these interesting occurrences. The seventy-first and twenty-third, had now reached the open ground, and the British commander was again forming his line, while the thirty-third was advancing from its covert to resume its place on the left; and the remains of the routed guards were already up. Such also, had been the apprehensions entertained for the consequences of the defeat of the second battalion of the guards, that the first battalion had been ordered up from the left, and had reached the road on which General Greene was anxiously observing the progress of events. The brush on the road side had so effectually concealed the advance of this corps from view, that General Greene had approached within a few paces of them when they were discovered by one of his aids, and pointed out to him. He had the presence of mind to retire in a walk—a precipitate movement" (anglice, *a run*) "would have drawn upon him a volley of musketry." Upon a part of this passage, Mr. Johnson makes the following note, which affords another proof of the futility of his reiterated efforts to discredit the narrative of Lee. "General Lee has asserted this was Captain Pendleton. We are in possession of an original letter written to Mrs. Greene

* Stedman, vol. ii. p. 340. Tarleton, p. 274.

the day after the battle, in which the General says, it was Captain Morris." Now, in a memoir furnished by Pendleton to Lee, it is observed, "At the battle of Guilford, he had got into the rear of a party of the enemy, and very near them. They were advanced into an open field, and although within thirty paces, concealed by a thicket of bushes. I first discovered them, and the bushes prevented their seeing us." The conclusion formed by Lee, from this statement, would seem natural. In such a situation, the first man to discover the enemy, would probably be the first to point them out. But in regard to the passage from which this note depends; it is to be regretted that the vague and inexpressive style of this writer renders it almost impossible to define the precise quantity of error contained in any given quantity of words. In this extract, it may, however, be affirmed, there is very little correctness. If he means, by *General Greene's attention having been drawn toward the troops engaged in the woods*, that he bestowed his personal attention on the party under Lee, at any time after Webster broke the brigade of Lawson, and attacked that of Williams, according to his own book, he is egregiously wrong. For it does not appear that General Greene was with the second line at all, after it was engaged; and after the retreat of Lawson's brigade, the right centre of the British, whether in pressing on the militia, or in approaching the continentals, interposed, so as to prevent his presence in that quar-

ter. But Mr. Johnson, for a purpose of some depth and obliquity, says, that when Greene reached the road, his person was endangered by the concealed approach of the first battalion of guards, which he affirms, had been ordered up in consequence of the defeat of the second battalion, and had gained this point at the time Obara and Webster were re-forming the British line. The motive of the judge's assertions, is always more manifest than his authority. It will appear that he has great anxiety to antedate the removal of the first battalion from contention with the left wing of the Americans, in order to fix upon Colonel Lee the imputation of having been disengaged from that contest before Greene retreated, and of having remained from that moment an inactive and culpable witness of his general's activity, exposure, and retreat. What authority he has for asserting that the hostile party Greene met on the road, was the first battalion of guards, does not appear; and the reader knows his skill in relating the particulars of events that never happened. General Greene himself says, (p. 22): "I rode full tilt into the midst of the enemy, *in the heat of the action.*" Now, according to Mr. Johnson, (p. 22,) when the first battalion came up, *the action was over.* Pendleton does not venture to say of what corps this party consisted; but the judge can see plainer than eye-witnesses. It was probably a part of Obara's detachment, composed of the second battalion, and the grenadiers of the guards; for just

before their arrival in front of the continentals, Webster was repulsed, and that event would naturally draw Greene forward into the field, the better to observe its progress and effect. After this period, it is not probable he was in the Salisbury road. Colonel Carrington, in a letter before referred to, says: "The second Maryland regiment was commanded by Ford in the action of Guilford, and formed that part of the *regular* line which gave way at the approach of the British, and occasioned the necessity for the retreat. I was with the general, and very near to them, when they broke. They had begun a premature, confused, and scattering fire—the general observing it, sent one of his aids to stop the firing, but before the order could reach them, they broke and run off. Advanced of the centre of the line was the general and his suit. Colonel Green was instantly ordered to retreat as a rallying corps."

It is not probable that after ordering a retreat, General Greene would have ridden *full tilt* against a body of the enemy marching up from the left; particularly when his officers were drawing the men off the ground, and Lord Cornwallis had his line formed in his front, and threatened a renewal of the battle.

However, this question is of little importance, as will be shown in exposing the misrepresentation it is intended to colour, and which is introduced with the following solemn and deceptive assurance, (p. 13): "The contest on the left was too soon decided for the

American cause.” Now the concurrent testimony of two eye-witnesses, whose language is known to Mr. Johnson, and the authority of two most respectable writers, who were not eye-witnesses, proves that the action on the left was continued until after the battle on the right was lost. Tarleton says:* “Earl Cornwallis did not think it advisable for the British cavalry to charge the enemy, who were retreating in good order, but directed Lieutenant Colonel Tarleton to proceed with a body of dragoons to the assistance of Major General Leslie on the right, *where, by the constant fire that was yet maintained*, the affair seemed not to be determined.” Lord Cornwallis, in his report to Sir Henry Clinton,† says, “about this time the thirty-third, and light infantry of the guards, completely routed the corps that was opposed to them, and put an end to the action in this quarter. The twenty-third, and the seventy-first regiments, with part of the cavalry, were ordered to pursue; the remainder of the cavalry was detached, with Lieutenant Colonel Tarleton, to our right, *where a heavy fire still continued*, and where his appearance and spirited attack contributed much to a speedy *termination of the action*.” “The firing heard on the right,” says Stedman,‡ “*after the termination of the action in the centre and on the left*, induced Lord Cornwallis to de-

* Page 275.

† Despatch, 17th March, 1781.

‡ Vol. ii. p. 343.

tach Tarleton," &c. And Marshall observes,* "after the guards had gained the summit of the hill, they found themselves attacked on the right flank by the infantry of Lee's legion and the militia;" and, "the riflemen drew them into a thick wood, *where the action was maintained with great obstinacy on both sides, until the battle was lost on the right.*"

How the "cause of the Americans" was to be promoted by their left wing continuing to maintain the battle, after their right and centre had retreated, and left the whole British force at liberty to fall upon them, it is incumbent on Mr. Johnson to explain. He proceeds—"Soon after the left of the Virginia militia begun to give ground, General Stevens unfortunately received a ball through the thigh, which caused him to be borne from the field. This greatly discouraged the volunteers, who" (p. 14.) "fought under him, and had much effect in hastening the retirement of the whole line. Still, however, the reputation of Campbell," (greatly superior to Lee's no doubt,) "the discipline of the legionary infantry, and the protection of Lee's broadswords, induced a number of Stevens's brigade, to unite themselves to *Lee's covering party, under Campbell*, and continue the conflict; firing and retiring, when approached by the British bayonet. So slow was the progress of the British regiments, and such the superiority of the American fire, that the light troops had greatly the advantage in this kind of

* Vol. iv. p. 377.

warfare. Still, however, the men were dropping off, leaving the ground in small parties, after discharging their pieces.* Yet, even at the time when *the guards were recalled*, there were enough of them present, to follow the enemy on their march; and a number of their wounded, both officers and privates, were picked up and made prisoners. Unfortunately, upon the departure of the guards, Colonel Lee gave orders, first to his cavalry, and afterwards to the infantry of his legion, to retire;† “and,” as he says, “take post on the left of the continentals, and there to act until they received further orders.” “Whatever may have been the intent of this order, it was so executed, that though they did take post on the American left, it was so remote from it, that their presence was neither known nor felt. And that it was not intended to connect this movement with that of the main army, is proved by its having been preparatory to a retreat by a different route from that by which the main army moved off;‡ to wit, first up the road to Boyd’s mill, and then across the country to that on which the main army retreated. The fate of this corps was not known, until its arrival at the rendezvous the next morning.”

So numerous are the misrepresentations in this passage, and so trivial some of them, that it will be difficult to notice them all. The assertion, that “the guards were recalled,” is saved from instant refutation

* “Tarleton.”

† “Lee’s Memoirs, vol. i. p. 349.”

‡ Ibid. p. 352.

only by the vulgar ambiguity of its terms. This battalion never reached the British left wing, as has been already mentioned. It was originally stationed on their right, as Mr. Johnson very carefully states, (p. 18,) and delineates repeatedly in his ingenious plans of the battle. It might, therefore, have been *called* to some other part of the line, but could have been recalled only to a position which it had previously held, that is to the right, whence he here means to assert it was departing, in consequence of being ordered to the British left. In this sense, forgiving the folly of his language, his affirmation is opposed by fact and authority. Tarleton* declares, that when he was detached to the assistance of General Leslie, *after the action with the continentals was over*, he found the guards under Norton still engaged on the British right—“*the guards and the Hessians were ordered to fire a volley at the largest party of the militia, and under the cover of the smoke, Lieutenant Colonel Tarleton doubled round the right flank of the guards, and charged the Americans with considerable effect.*” Stedman,† describing the same operation, says: “Tarleton, rushing forward under cover of a general volley from *the guards*, and the regiment of Boze, quickly performed what was expected from him. Thus ended the hard fought action at Guilford court-house.”

Lord Cornwallis‡ enumerates the several corps of

* Page 276.

† Vol. ii. p. 343.

‡ Despatch, 17th March, 1781

his army that reached the American third line, viz: the thirty-third, seventy-first, and twenty-third regiments; the second battalion, the grenadiers, and the light infantry of the guards; but never mentions the first battalion as having arrived, or been expected in that quarter. Marshall mentions this battalion as engaged with Lee's party after Greene had commenced his retreat; and Lee affirms, that Lieutenant Colonel Norton endeavoured to join the British left wing, but was driven back by the legion infantry upon the regiment of Boze.* And while the preceding authors confirm his statement, they overthrow this assertion of Mr. Johnson, as well as that which was predisposed to recommend it, namely, that the person of Greene was endangered by meeting this battalion in the immediate front of the third line.

The next departure from truth to be exposed, is the falsification of Lee's language, who is made to say, that "he ordered both his cavalry and infantry to retire, and act upon the left of the continentals, until they received further orders." His words express no such meaning, and on the page referred to by our author, are these: "Lieutenant Colonel Lee dispensed with his cavalry, heretofore held in reserve, to cover retreat in case of disaster, ordering it to close with the left of the continental line, and there to act until it should receive further orders. Upon Boze, the riflemen, and the legion infantry now turned with increased

* Memoirs, vol. i. p. 350.

animation, and with confidence of success." And afterwards, "Lee hastened with his infantry, to rejoin his cavalry," &c.; conveying throughout the passage, the affirmation that he gave his infantry no such order as Mr. Johnson attributes to him, and shewing that he himself was never separated from it during the action. Nor is our author less incorrect, in asserting that the infantry did take post on the left of the continentals. It was the intention of Lee to do so, conformably to the order of battle, in obedience to the spirit of which he had receded to the left of the second line, when the first vanished; and now deemed it advisable to reinforce the corresponding section of the third, by all that part of his force, which could be spared from a less important contest. But his intention was not fulfilled; for Greene was already retreating. With his accustomed dignity and candour, Mr. Johnson adds in substance: "although Colonel Lee says he directed his cavalry and infantry to act on the left of the continentals, it is *proved* he had no intention to connect this movement with that of the main army, by its being preparatory to its retreat by a different route from that on which the main army retreated." The abuse of the word *preparatory* here, may be attributed either to malice or ignorance. The birth of Mr. Johnson, was *previous* to his appointment, but does he infer that it was *preparatory*. Does he suppose he was begotten expressly for a judge? Does he conceive that the direction in which a body

of troops retreats, demonstrates the intention of its evolutions on the field of battle, while contending for victory. His inference is as logical as that of the traveller, who resentfully derived the name of "Stony Stratford," from the violence with which he was flea-bitten the night he lay there. The fact is, Lee moved to the right to support Greene, and then retired because Greene had left the field. He took a different road, both because it was at least as much in his direction, and because the enemy before whom Greene thought it prudent to retreat, occupied that on which the main army marched off. He could have no prophetic preference for either route. Although the assertion that the fate of his corps was not known to the army until the next morning is true, as it was left upon the field by Greene, it does not answer the uncandid purpose for which it was evidently made.

In the next paragraph our author insinuates strongly, that Lee's cavalry ought to have been found with the riflemen, and to have been ready to repel the charge of Tarleton. It has been already proved, that General Greene retired before Tarleton was detached from the British left, which he says was a mile from the point which he was ordered to; so that Colonel Lee for the sake of escorting a small party of militia riflemen through the woods, should have exposed his cavalry to the united British army, and maintained with his small detachment, ground from which Greene had been driven! The hopes and cal-

culations of the American general, rested on his superiority of cavalry; a fact which may be collected even from the "Sketches." The superiority of the British cavalry in the peninsula, gave them great advantages. That of Laudohn in the seven years war, impeded the genius of Frederick the Great; and by the weight and rapidity of Murat's squadrons, the victories of Buonaparte in Germany, appear to have been prepared, decided, or improved. Now small as General Greene's force of cavalry was, it was greater than that of Cornwallis; and greatness is comparative. To have hazarded this superiority, for the absurd purpose alluded to, would have been inconsistent with the character and the duty of Colonel Lee. He proceeds: "when the firing ceased on the left, (meaning the American left where Lee was engaged,) and the regiment of Boze accompanied by Tarleton's dragoons, appeared advancing on his exposed wing, General Greene having heard nothing of the party that had been engaged with it, and apprehending the worst, knowing also that the North Carolina and Virginia militia had generally gained his rear, and were proceeding to the rendezvous, ordered Colonel Green to advance with his regiment, and cover the retreat.

The citations from Tarleton, Stedman, Lord Cornwallis's despatch, and from Marshall, need not be recapitulated, to show that Greene had retreated with the continentals, even before Tarleton was *ordered* against the American left. Nor is it necessary to im-

press on the reader's attention the unblushing freedom of the assertion, that Tarleton appeared with the regiment of Boze returning from his detour against our left wing, before Greene ordered a retreat. The fiction is too glaring to be uttered or believed by any one who has a common share of discretion. Colonel Carrington, who declares he heard the order for retreat, says it was delivered when the second Maryland regiment gave way; and Mr. Johnson does not pretend that Tarleton was detached to the assistance of the British right wing, until long after that catastrophe, so that his account amounts to this: "*Tarleton returned from the British right, before he was ordered to its assistance, and completed the defeat of the American left wing before he marched to attack it!*" He ventures to say too that the greater part of the North Carolina militia proceeded to the rendezvous, when he must have known, from the adjutant general's return, drawn up at the rendezvous, that of the thousand men from that state, five hundred and sixty-three were missing—six only having been killed, and five wounded.

In attempting a discriminative recital of the conduct of the several corps of the American army, he devotes equal praise to Washington and Lee; to that officer for retiring from line to line, and to this for standing his ground; allowing no distinction between the conduct of an orderly retreat, and the valour of a persevering resistance, by similar detachments, against

equal forces. In this honest and impartial spirit, he conjectures the prodigious advantages that would have accrued, had Lee, after reaching (as he contends) the rear of the continentals, engaged the first battalion of guards, under Norton, on the ground which the second Maryland regiment had occupied. Having repeatedly shown that this corps was never on the ground here mentioned, the fallacy involved in the implication, it is not necessary to expose by any other evidence than that of our author. He inadvertently testifies against himself, for he proves that Colonel Lee was never in the rear of the third line—censuring him for having retreated by a different route. Now, had he been posted in the rear of the third line, *before* it retreated, he would have been involved in its retreat. His timidity, insinuated by the judge, would have insured this. As then he proceeded by a different route, it is obvious he was not in the situation Mr. Johnson would place him. Were it necessary, it might be shewn that he left the position he had held during the whole day, about the time Tarleton was detached from an opposite quarter of the field toward it; and thus missed a contest, which the experience of the morning could not have taught *him* to avoid.

But let us admit for a moment that the insinuations of Mr. Johnson are fair, and his assertions true—that Lee with his legion, “perhaps the finest corps that figured on the arena of the Revolution;” “expressly

formed for him by General Washington, of officers and men picked from the army," had halted in Greene's rear about the time the first Maryland regiment broke, and had felt disposed to linger an inactive spectator of the fight; is it possible to believe that so prized and spirited a corps, which, with the rising sun, had sabred and scattered the dragoons of Tarleton, had since broke the impetuous attacks of Norton, and repelled the heavy strength of the Germans, would have consented to such inglorious, such ignominious sloth? Would not such shameful conduct have been denounced by the army, and punished by the general—Lee been disgraced, and the legion decimated?

He contrasts the conduct of Washington and Lee, unfavourably, of course, to the latter. "The services rendered by the two corps of cavalry on the day of the battle of Guilford, were of very different natures. No language can do justice to the gallantry with which Washington conducted himself; he was every where where duty called, and indefatigable in searching for opportunities of service." We most heartily unite in praise of Colonel Washington, and cheerfully admit, that no language of Mr. Johnson can do justice to his generous courage. But "*on the day of the battle of Guilford,*" it does not appear, even in the "*Sketches,*" that in point of service, he had the good fortune to perform as much as fell to the share of Colonel Lee. Had he been able to maintain the right of the second line, as Lee did the left, the action

would have been fought and finished on that ground. Supported on either side, with steadiness and ardor, the Virginians would have stood as firmly as the trees around them; General Stevens would have foiled, and General Greene defeated Cornwallis. That he did not withstand, at the head of apparently a stronger party, the attack of Webster, as successfully as Lee did that of Norton, is not to be attributed to any defect of courage or of conduct, but is nevertheless true. That with his dragoons he charged a corps of infantry, already disordered by the shock of Howard, is also true. But the cavalry of the enemy did not feel his on the day of Guilford—and no man who can mount a horse, and draw a sword, will believe there is much more than the pleasure of havoc excited in a body of dragoons, when they rush upon infantry, and that infantry already in confusion. The cavalry of the legion, on the other hand, had early in the morning, charged front to front the British horse; and, on that occasion, inflicted the only injury and defeat, to which it was deemed prudent to expose it during the day. Mr. Johnson adds, (p. 16,) “There cannot be a doubt that the cavalry of the legion would have displayed equal intrepidity,” (equal to Washington’s,) “had they been called upon at any period to engage in the pending conflict. But the only opportunity that the events of the day presented, on the part of the field where they acted, was snatched from them by their removal before the infantry re-

tired. Had they remained, they must have measured swords with the dragoons of Tarleton. As it was, they had no opportunity of distinguishing themselves." And to this he annexes the following note: "One opportunity occurred, which is thus related by the late venerable patriot, General Davie: 'You have no doubt observed that Campbell's regiment of riflemen acted with Lee on the left flank of the army. After the main body of the army had been pushed off the field, these troops remained engaged with the yaugers of the regiment of Boze, near the court-house, some of them covered by the houses, others by a thick wood. In this situation they were charged by the British cavalry, and some of them were cut down. Lee's cavalry was drawn up on the edge of the open ground above the court-house, and as Colonel Campbell asserted, moved as this charge was made on his riflemen. On the day after the action, Colonel Campbell was extremely indignant at this movement, and spoke freely of Lee's conduct. Lee was, however, sent the same day to watch the enemy's movements, and Campbell's regiment was soon after discharged, as we heard no more of it.' " And our conscientious author subjoins: "General Davie seems only to have mistaken the time and place of Tarleton's charge."

The first sentiment likely to be excited by this note, is that of surprise, that even the author of the *Sketches*, should exhibit in an historical work, a statement, affecting character and conduct, deficient by his own

express acknowledgment, in the two cardinal points of *time* and *place*. The constituents that enter into the credible representation of any fact of this class, are three: *time*, *place*, and *manner*; *quando ubi, quomodo*. But we are gravely required, by Judge Johnson, to put faith in a statement, calculated to injure the fame of a dead man; which, by his own confession, is destitute of two out of three of these elements of credibility. Would his honour admit such evidence, on the trial of a sable malefactor? Again, the character of Colonel Lee is so fair a mark for defamation, that we are to admit that part of a statement that bears injuriously upon it, and reject that which tends to his justification. The reader will remember, that in a previous passage, Lee is repeatedly condemned for retreating *before* the main army left the field—while General Davie declares his cavalry was drawn up near the court-house, a position which the judge transfers to the left of the second line, *after* the main army had been *pushed off the field*. Further—in order to inflict this wound upon his memory, we are to assent to an imputation of the gallant officers of his cavalry; for on that day he commanded the infantry in person; and General Davie does not allege that he was with his cavalry. But if the reader is disgusted at the furtive air and dishonest complexion of these practices upon his credulity, and attempts upon the reputation of Colonel Lee, what bounds can be set to his indignation, when he finds, by adverting to the passage from which

this incredible note depends, that at the very time Judge Johnson adopted the story, and attempted to impose it upon his readers, he himself, did not believe one word of it, and knew it to be as false in substance as in circumstances.* In the text, he emphatically affirms, that *at no period of the contest, no point of the action*, had the cavalry of the legion any opportunity to engage the dragoons of Tarleton—blames Colonel Lee for withdrawing them before any opportunity did occur; and declares that, but for his premature and equivocal *retreat from the contest on the left*, they would have measured swords with the British horse. In the note correcting and enforcing

* From the terms of General Davie's communication, it does not appear that he credited the imputation it is here desired to convey. It is, perhaps, true, that Campbell made some complaint of the kind, that is, that the legion was withdrawn from connection with him, to the intended assistance of the continentals. It is certain that his complaint was groundless, and discountenanced, if it was made; as every one saw the propriety of the movement, could perceive the soldiership by which it was prompted, and the folly of requiring cavalry to escort riflemen through "a thick wood." Accordingly, as General Davie observes, "nothing more was heard of the complaint." The probability too, is, that his statement is qualified by remarks not published by the judge, and was not intended to support any remark in disparagement of Colonel Lee; for in a letter to him, in 1810, he speaks of his *military services*, in language of the highest and most unqualified praise, and alludes particularly to the assistance he himself received from him, in endeavouring to rally the North Carolina militia at the battle of Guilford.

the letter of General Davie, he says the cavalry of Lee *had an opportunity to engage, and declined it*, on the left of the second line, when Tarleton made a charge upon the retiring riflemen! To censure Lee in one direction, his cavalry are as brave as lions—to calumniate him in another, they are timid as fawns; and to consummate the injustice, Lee is reproached for not fighting on ground, which, to colour previous misrepresentations, the judge insists he had abandoned, before the opportunity of fighting occurred. As no denomination can be given to this deliberate and complicated slander, without the use of terms as gross as the misrepresentation itself is flagrant, it is proper to forbear its further exposure, and to leave it, a subject for the reader's contempt, and the author's confusion.

Not exhausted by the abortion just noticed, he proceeds, (p. 19.) “But for the last, he need not have feared the return of the regiment of Boze into action.” “How far the conduct of Colonel Lee, in withdrawing from the contest with the regiment of Boze, contributed to the issue of the battle, must ever rest in conjecture. *It is certain that the fire of that regiment, on the rear of the Virginia line, through the opening made by the flight of the second Marylanders, gave the coup de grace to the hopes of the American commander. His letter of the 16th, declares it, and all historians concur in it. But for this, that day might have terminated in a repulse; the next might have even-*

tuated in a surrender of his adversary." The dog, in London, who kills rats for a wager, is observed to be much fatigued by crushing these weak and well-fed vermin. Something like this, is his situation, who undertakes to expose the countless absurdities and misstatements of the *Sketches*. One hardship is, that he has to botch up the crazy sentences in which his honour embarks his pestilential ventures; as the court of Charleston had to translate the lingo of the negro conspirators, in order to show the justice of their sentence. In this passage, the judge talks of the return of the regiment of Boze into action, as if they had ever quitted it, either in fact, or according to his own account; and calls the Virginia brigade of continentals, the *Virginia line*; thus confounding the second line with a part of the third, the militia with the continentals, and two positions which were a mile apart. We need only refer to the authorities already cited, in order to be satisfied that the regiment of Boze never fired on the third line, nor ceased to be confronted and detained by the legion or the riflemen, until after it had retreated. This, our author not only contradicts, but has the temerity to refer to these very authorities, and to Greene's letter of the 16th, to support an assertion which they each and all overthrow;* and gravely argues from this frontless figment, that Lee contributed

* See Tarleton, Stedman, Cornwallis's despatch, and Marshall, *ubi supra*; General Greene's letter of the 16th is as follows :

sensibly to Greene's defeat, and prevented the immediate repulse, if not the speedy surrender of Cornwallis.

The downward torrent of his malice and inaccuracy

Camp at the Iron Works, March 16, 1781.

"SIR—On the 10th, I wrote to his excellency General Washington, from the High Rock ford, on the Haw river, a copy of which I enclosed your excellency, that I had effected a junction with a continental regiment of eighteen months men, and two considerable bodies of militia, belonging to Virginia and North Carolina. After this junction, I took the resolution of attacking the enemy without loss of time, and made the necessary disposition accordingly, being persuaded, that if we were successful, it would prove ruinous to the enemy, and, if otherwise, it would only prove a partial evil to us.

The army marched from the High Rock ford on the 12th, and on the 14th arrived at Guilford. The enemy lay at the Quaker meeting-house, on Deep river, eight miles from our camp. On the morning of the 15th, our reconnoitring party reported the enemy advancing on the great Salisbury road. The army was drawn up in three lines. The first line was composed of North Carolina militia, under the command of Generals Butler and Eaton. The second line of Virginia militia, commanded by Generals Stevens and Lawson, forming two brigades, one of Virginia, and one of Maryland continental troops, commanded by General Huger and Colonel Williams. Lieutenant Colonel Washington, with the dragoons of the first and third regiments, a detachment of light infantry, composed of continental troops, and a regiment of riflemen, under Colonel Lynch, formed a corps of observation for the security of our right flank. Lieutenant Colonel Lee, with his legion, a detachment of light infantry, and a corps of riflemen, under

flows on, (p. 20,) "Colonel Lee has observed, 'had General Greene known how severely his enemy was crippled, and that the corps under Lee had fought their way to the continental line, he would certainly

Colonel Campbell, formed a corps of observation for the security of our left flank.

The greater part of this country is a wilderness, with a few cleared fields interspersed here and there. The army was drawn up on a large hill of ground, surrounded by other hills, the greatest part of which was covered with timber and thick under-brush. The front line was posted with two field pieces, just on the edge of the woods, and the back of a fence which ran parallel with the line, with an open field directly in their front. The second line was in the woods, about three hundred yards in the rear of the first, and the continental troops about four hundred yards in the rear of the second, with a double front, as the hill drew to a point where they were posted; and on the right and left were two old fields. In this position we waited the approach of the enemy, having previously sent off the baggage to this place, appointed for our rendezvous in case of a defeat. Lieutenant Colonel Lee, with his legion, his infantry, and part of his riflemen, met the enemy on their advance, and had a severe skirmish with Lieutenant Colonel Tarleton, in which the enemy suffered greatly. Captain Armstrong charged the British legion, and cut down near thirty of their dragoons; but as the enemy reinforced their party, Lieutenant Colonel Lee was obliged to retire, and take his position in the line.

The action commenced by cannonade, which lasted about twenty minutes; when the enemy advanced in three columns: the Hessians on the right, the guards in the centre, and Lieutenant Colonel Webster's brigade on the left. The whole moved through the old fields to attack the North Carolina bri-

have continued the conflict, and in all probability have made it a drawn day, if not have secured to himself the victory.' Why was not the general informed on these two points? Colonel Lee could not have fore-

gades, who waited the attack until the enemy got within one hundred and forty yards, when part of them began to fire ; but a considerable part left the ground without firing at all. The general and field officers did all they could to induce the men to stand their ground ; but neither the advantages of the position, nor any other consideration could induce them to stay. General Stevens and General Lawson, and the field officers of those brigades were more successful in their exertions. The Virginia militia gave the enemy a warm reception, and kept up a heavy fire for a long time ; but being beat back, the action became general almost every where. The corps of observation, under Washington and Lee, were warmly engaged, and did great execution. In a word, the engagement was long and severe, and the enemy only gained their point by superior discipline.

They having broken the second Maryland regiment and turned our left flank, got into the rear of the Virginia brigade, and appearing to be gaining on our right, which would have encircled the whole of the continental troops, I thought it most advisable to order a retreat. About this time Lieutenant Colonel Washington made a charge with the horse upon a part of the brigade of guards, and the first regiment of Marylanders, commanded by Colonel Gunby, and seconded by Lieutenant Colonel Howard, followed the horse with their bayonets ; near the whole of the party fell a sacrifice. General Huger was the last that was engaged, and gave the enemy a check. We retreated in good order to the Reedy Fork river, and crossed at the ford, about three miles from the field of action, and then halted, and drew up the troops, until we collected most

seen the weight of responsibility which this observation casts on himself. The first would soon have been discovered by the general, had time been allowed to make the necessary observations; and this time was denied by the rapid approach of the regiment of Boze on his exposed wing. Had Colonel Lee, therefore, continued to occupy the regiment of Boze by means of the light corps, it would have allowed the American

of the stragglers. We lost our artillery, and two ammunition wagons, the greater part of the horses being killed before the retreat began, and it being impossible to move the pieces but along the great road. After collecting our stragglers, we retired to this camp, ten miles distant from Guilford.

From the best information I can get, the enemy's loss is very great; not less, in killed and wounded, than six hundred men, besides some few prisoners that we brought off.

Inclosed, I send your excellency a return of our killed, wounded and missing. Most of the latter have gone home, as is but too customary with the militia after an action. I cannot learn that the enemy has got any considerable number of prisoners. Our men are all in good spirits, and in perfect readiness for another field day.

I only lament the loss of several valuable officers, who are killed and wounded in the action. Among the latter are General Stevens, shot through the thigh, and General Huger in the hand; and among the former is Major Anderson, one of the Maryland line.

The firmness of the officers and soldiers, during the whole campaign, has been unparalleled. Amidst innumerable difficulties they have discovered a degree of magnanimity and fortitude that will for ever add a lustre to their military reputation."

commander the time and leisure necessary to reconnoitre the remaining strength of the enemy. And as to the second point, from whom ought the information to have come, but from Colonel Lee himself? There was no want of time on his part, for he informs us that both his cavalry and infantry had been sent off, before the movement of Colonel Tarleton to that quarter;" (again contradicting his virtual declaration, that the cavalry of Lee had, and declined, an opportunity of encountering Tarleton's on the American left,) "and even the riflemen of Campbell, who seem to have been left to shift for themselves, would most probably have reached the vicinity of the American left, sooner than the extricated regiment of Hessians. The cavalry, and Colonel Lee himself, certainly did reach the rear of the American left before the regiment of Boze, and this important piece of information could have been communicated either by a message, or more properly by a junction with the left of the American army. That this was not done, is acknowledged by Colonel Lee, and could be proved if necessary, by other evidence, and its not being done, certainly leaves Colonel Lee exposed to the *charge*, which he attributes to the want of intelligence in the American commander. Nay, the acknowledged and otherwise well known fact, of his having retreated by another route, leaves him also exposed to the charge of separating himself from the possible fate of the army, and thereby adding to its difficulties and exposure."

To the usual qualities of malignity and nonsense, this passage superadds the relief of being ludicrous. Colonel Lee, who is stationed at a given point to resist a certain portion of the enemy, is not only to perform that service, but is to apprise his commander, a mile in his rear, and retreating, that he has discharged the duty assigned him. In the order of battle, Mr. Johnson knows Lee was directed, after the alert and brilliant rencounters of the morning, "to form upon the left flank of the front line, and act agreeably to special orders." If, then, General Greene had wished him to continue the fight after he himself retreated; or, as Mr. Johnson feigns, until he retreated; that wish should have been the subject of *a special order*. But the object assigned for this desired pertinacity in Lee, is as frivolous as the detraction attempted by assigning its absence, is foul. It is neither more nor less than to allow time to General Greene—not to receive reinforcements, to change his dispositions, or to rally his routed men—but to count the loss of Cornwallis, and to perfect a course of deliberation on the expediency of renewing the action! This too it is positively alleged, he was prevented from doing by the rapid approach of the Germans upon his exposed wing; when, as the reader already knows, and as Judge Johnson must have known, this regiment was engaged against the left of the second line, after Greene had retreated, and when the pursuit of him had been discontinued; and, subsequently to these events,

was extricated from that contest by the charge of Tarleton. If General Greene had not time to complete his examination of the enemy's loss, and to determine on the prudence of renewing the action, the complaints and censure of his biographer should be directed against Cornwallis, who, from his account, appears to have conducted himself in a very overbearing and intrusive manner. And it would not have been excessive lenity, had he forgiven Lee for failing to join the left wing of the continentals, since they had changed front, and marched off before he discontinued the maintenance of a position, which he held against a force that attacked him before they were engaged, and was repelled by him until after they had retreated. As to Lee's expression, "*fought their way to the continental line,*" it can only be understood in reference to the period, when, in consequence of the arrival of the seventy-first and twenty-third in front of Greene's third line, and the final repulse of Lieutenant Colonel Norton's battalion, in attempting to follow them, he found himself no longer obstructed by the interposition of any hostile body, and his way open to the post of the continentals, which, however, they had abandoned.

The observation of Lee, which has provoked our author into so many abortive misrepresentations, is in fact intended to shield General Greene, and to show that his retreat, if not justified by the *actual* state of things, was wise and prudent according to their ap-

pearance. And “the *responsibility*,” which the judge pretends it casts upon Lee, can fall only on Major Pendleton, whose information to Lee on the subject, is in these words: “During the action, General Greene at one time hesitated, whether he would not risk the continental troops, by ordering Lieutenant Colonel Hawes and Green, with their regiments, to advance and attack the enemy. He called me to him, and deliberated some minutes, *but not knowing how much the enemy had been crippled by the militia*, particularly by the brigade of Virginia militia under General Stevens, and influenced by the motives that originally determined him, he sent me to direct them to cover the retreat, and adhered to his first plan.” So that Colonel Lee is not exposed to the *charge*, “which, (to use our author’s solecism) “he attributes to the want of intelligence in the American commander.” The fact is, by the retreat of Stevens and the advance of Webster and Ohara, Lee was separated completely from the continentals; and, therefore, when Greene ordered a retreat, he did not apprise Lee of it: an omission which could hardly be justified, had a communication between them existed. To this circumstance too it was owing, that when the legion joined the army at the iron-works, the next morning, “every heart was relieved,” as our author observes; for they were rejoiced to see this valiant and useful corps return, elate from the long and unequal conflict in which they had been left, ready to

cover their further retreat, or to lead the way to another battle.

The judge (p. 5,) speaks of his "panorama of the battle," but fails to represent its most interesting and important feature—namely, this singular and steady resistance of the left wing of the Americans.

But his account of the battle, chimerical as it is, is not more so, than his reflections are ridiculous. We have time to notice one only, which will confirm the impression already made in regard to the exquisite adjustment of his moral sentiments, and the beautiful propriety of his language, (p. 23.) "Next to the approbation of one's own conscience, that of those whom we honour and esteem, is the *legitimate* consolation of the ingenuous, in the hour of humiliation. Although General Greene had nothing to reproach himself for in the *affair* of Guilford, *and had succeeded almost to the utmost of what he had suffered his hopes to aspire to*, it was natural for him to covet the praise of the wise and good." The liberal scale upon which this reflection is constructed, must strike the attention of every reader. The idea of consoling a man *for succeeding almost to the utmost of what he had suffered his hopes to aspire to*, is certainly a reach of benevolence, that transcends even christian charity. The decorous absence of egotism too, distinctly implied by the author, in referring to the case of persons endowed with the faculty of conscience, is an instance of dignified concinnity that cannot be too highly praised.

Whether it be *legitimate*, to call a hard fought and sanguinary battle between two chief armies, *an affair*, is a question submitted to Mr. Johnson's further reflection; while we hazard one or two observations of our own.

In the battle of Guilford, of the two commanders, each displayed a great military virtue; Cornwallis that of enterprize, Greene that of prudence; which, by each, were carried respectively to excess. Without disputing the dogmas of the peripatetics which maintain, that vice consists in the extreme of virtue, it may be said the peculiar situation of these generals, readily explains, if it does not fully justify, this extremity of their several measures. The provoking timidity and ambiguous shyness of his adherents, together with other circumstances already alluded to, as actuating the royal commander, were sufficient to disturb the poise of the firmest mind; and operating through the recollection of previous success, upon his lofty and adventurous nature, impelled him, with something of impetuosity, to battle.

The situation of the American general was very different. The fate of his predecessor inspired caution, while the unsteady magnitude and unsafe composition of his force, forbade sanguine hopes. With the best of his troops, retreat was habitual, and to most of them, battle was new, and probably terrific. Thus influenced, he engaged Cornwallis, not with ardor for victory, but with a subdued though magnanimous

resolution to resist, and to wound him. One was resolved to conquer, the other careful not to be destroyed; and the natural operation of these motives produced the very issue that befel. Cornwallis sacrificed too much for victory, and by risking little, Greene consented to a defeat.

Upon any other view of the battle, it is impossible to assent to the praise which has been bestowed, both by enemies and friends, upon the formation of the American army. Admitting the prudence of composing any one line, of such despicable materials as the North Carolina contingent, and not inquiring, whether the probability of their panic, and of its contagious effect, did not outweigh the likelihood of advantage from their interposition, it may be asked what relation was established or maintained between the second and third lines? We are told the third line acted as a reserve, and of this the duty has always been held to consist, in enforcing the attack, supporting the resistance, or ensuring the retreat of the main body. But the third line at Guilford, neither attempted nor performed either of these functions. The second line resisted the enemy with spirit and effect, even after its right had been forced. Had it been supported by the continentals, there can be no question that, with Washington and Kirkwood on one wing, Lee and Campbell on the other, together with the prodigious efforts of Stevens in the centre, the British army must have perished on the field, or been driven from it.

But abandoning this position—had the right of the third line, instead of being kept conforming to the shape of the hill, been thrown forward upon the advance of Webster, its enfilading fire, in conjunction with the successful opposition of Williams's brigade, must have annihilated that corps of the enemy, and would, at least, have rendered Webster unable to return into action, or to rally his troops in the face of four field pieces and fourteen hundred continentals, take post on a neighbouring height; and there, like a ruffled falcon, whet his beak and plume his wing for bolder flight and fresh havock. As it was, the brigade of Huger, with the exception of a light and desultory fire from the regiment of Hawes, was unable to co-operate; and appears to have had its rear partially exposed to a perpendicular fire upon the front of Williams. But if it was prudent to disregard the gallantry, and permit the defeat of the Virginia line, it should certainly have been enabled to retire behind the third line, where its fragments would have added strength to the continentals. To provide for this, the third line should have been posted directly in its rear, and nearer to the woods. Through this, the followers of Stevens and Lawson, would have found their way readily to the rear of Greene; who, with their accession, would have renewed the action under favourable auspices, and would have been able to co-operate with that part of the second line which still held its ground. Being stationed so far on the right, it hap-

pened that when the second line gave way, the position necessarily gained by the British, in advancing against the third line, or pushing back the second, severed Lee from the main army completely, and left him to maintain a separate action against a superior force, without intelligence, and without succour; and in a situation where his exertions and success could confer no advantage on his commander, except the limited one of occupying a formidable part of the British force, until he retreated. Moreover the character of the third line, not steeled by discipline, had not firmness enough for passive resistance; while, from its *esprit du corps*, and the prowess of a part of it, it was highly susceptible of the alacrity of attack. The greatest man, and the greatest captain of antiquity declared, "*Est quædam animi incitatio atque alacritas, naturaliter innata omnibus, quæ studio pugne incenditur. Hanc non reprimere sed augere, imperatores debent.*"

Greene's army united, was rather more than two to one to that of the enemy; and upon this numerical superiority he ventured to engage. By separating it into three insulated lines, it was attacked, with a force of about twenty-two to fifteen against each division, and Lord Cornwallis, instead of meeting an army of forty-five hundred men, defeated successively, three detachments of fifteen hundred; and in each action had a superiority or, at least, an equality of force.

If it is the lot of all men to fail somewhere; it is the

part of a great man to turn his failings to account. Accordingly we find General Greene grew bolder even from his defeat, and no longer diffident of his power to conquer, was more earnest for battle after being vanquished, than he was before he had engaged. On the 19th he writes to Lee: "It is my intention to fight the enemy the moment I can get into their neighbourhood. I beg you will follow their rear, and give me the earliest intelligence of their route." Colonel Lee accordingly followed close upon their rear, and with a view of retarding their progress, and augmenting the effect of their retreat, issued a spirited address to the commanding officers of the North Carolina militia.* On the 22d Greene writes to him: "It is my intention to attack the enemy the moment I can get up with them. I am agreed in opinion with you, that Lord Cornwallis dont wish to fight us. But you may depend upon it, he will not refuse to fight, if we push him. You will push their rear all you can. Colonel Washington has the same directions. We shall force a march, in order to get up with the enemy at Deep river." In obedience to these orders, the brave and active legion, with the riflemen of Campbell, pressed the pursuit with the utmost ardour. But in spite of their celerity, and of a well designed project for destroying the bridge, the enemy passed Deep river, on the morning of the 28th; General Greene on the same day halted at Ramsay's mills.

* See Appendix F.

CHAPTER IV.

A VERY interesting subject now occurs, and one on which our feeling is the greater, that by reason of the disingenuous and short-sighted manner in which it is treated by Mr. Johnson, its discussion may have the appearance of bringing into opposition the reputation of Lee and the fame of Greene. While they lived, each loved the other, and sensible of the value of truth, and to the charms of real glory, would have spurned the touch of spurious renown. Nor have the friends of Colonel Lee been so dishonest to his memory, as to approach irreverently the great name of Greene. To be the friend and follower of Greene, was the pride of his youth; to have fought by his side, and flourished in his heart, was a reflection that comforted his age; and when approached that state which rendered him unable to hear, or to repel detraction, it was his consolation and his latest hope to have his pillow smoothed, and his obsequies honoured by the tenderest offspring of that hero. Bitter even then was the pang of his departure; and he must have looked in vain for those that were dearer. But neither dear nor welcome would they have been, even in that deso-

late hour, had he believed them capable of injustice to Greene. Let not then the real friends of that great man infer, that because we denounce the defamation of Lee, we dissent from the admiration of Greene; and let not the insidious and abortive disquisitions of Mr. Johnson, blight the integrity of an attachment, which had its beginning in the glory of Greene, its end in the charity of his daughter.

It will be at once understood, that allusion is made to the attempt of our author, to settle the question as to the origin of the resolution taken by Greene, of leaving Lord Cornwallis to penetrate (if so he should determine) into Virginia, and of descending suddenly from Deep river upon South Carolina.

If Colonel Lee is to be credited, this capital measure was suggested to, and not conceived by, Greene. In his *Memoirs*,* this statement appears, and the arguments for and against the measure, are described with energy and clearness; and it is affirmed, that Greene determined on it some short time previous to the 6th of April. As Colonel Lee did not set up his claim to the invention of this design, we shall not be forward to do it. But we undertake to prove three points at least, in relation to it, which, although they may not settle the question, will show that our author has only disturbed it, and that he is incompetent to discuss this or any other subject, that requires the application of a candid and luminous mind. We shall prove

* Vol. ii. pp. 31 to 40.

that he is guilty of great injustice to the character of Colonel Lee, that the arguments he employs to show that General Greene was the originator of this measure, are, in themselves, unsound; and that, if sound, they would be insufficient for the purpose to which he applies them. He premises his discussion with these remarks, (pp. 33 and 34): "Colonel Lee has represented this plan of operations, as the suggestion of some other mind, ingeniously pressed upon the general's consideration, while he was meditating another of a very different character. He does not expressly allege that the project was his own, but a subsequent writer, influenced by what he supposes an obvious inuendo, pointing to a fact, only suppressed by the colonel's modesty, has ventured on the assertion, that it was a suggestion of Colonel Lee's own. From the active part assigned to Colonel Lee in the execution of the plan, his reputed intimacy with General Greene, and supposed participation in his secret councils; and, above all, from the utter impossibility of admitting the supposition, that Colonel Lee would pluck the wreath from the brow of his dead friend, to ornament his own, or that of any other with it, the authority of the Colonel is certainly respectable; and as the movement has ever been considered as the *chef d'œuvre* of our hero, it claims our serious attention to inquire with whom it originated." Here, it may be worth while to observe the earnest afforded of a candid and impartial inquiry, by the cautious texture of the language. "An

active part," we are told, "was *assigned* to Colonel Lee;" though it is not intimated that it was *performed*; his *intimacy* is described as *reputed*, because this reserved and philosophical writer could not admit that it was *actual*, and his participation in the councils of Greene is, for the same reason, doubtless, mentioned as *supposed*: our scrupulous author, wishing the reader to infer, that Colonel Lee was not actually intimate with General Greene, nor really in the habit of sharing his secret counsels. He proceeds—"The first observation that presents itself on the account given of this event by Colonel Lee, is suggested by a comparison of dates. His words are, 'no sooner had he decided, than he commenced operations. The legion of Lee, with Captain Oldham's detachment, was ordered to move on the subsequent morning, (6th of April,) and the army was put in motion the following day.' Although in ordinary cases, time is not material to the point in issue," (and he might have said consistently, 'if the character of Colonel Lee is to be defamed, I dispense with both time and place,' see page 17,) "yet whenever an historian attempts precision as to dates, it is laying claim to a degree of authenticity not attributable to events, related upon mere memory or ordinary sources of information. In so minute a detail of the arguments used in a discussion, as Colonel Lee furnishes, a positive reference to dates, is holding out the idea of resting upon some written memorial of the transaction." Whether the full force of this passage

can be comprehended by any degree of attention, is very doubtful; but as moonshine has been weighed, we shall attempt to discover and expose it.

It would seem to be the impression of Mr. Johnson, that if he were to recite to a friend in Charleston an opinion he had pronounced in Savannah, mentioning even the case and the term, but were to say it had been delivered on a Saturday, when in fact it was delivered on Wednesday, his friend would be bound to disbelieve every word he said, and to suppose the opinion had come from another judge. However just the incredulity of Mr. Johnson's friends may be upon such occasions, particularly of those who may have read the "*Sketches*," the remark which he quotes from Lee is not calculated to provoke similar caution. For without pretending to precision of dates, as is alleged, he fixes the time of the suggestion with sufficient accuracy. Dates may be marked either directly or indirectly. In the first case they are referred to the calendar; in the second, to their appropriate place in the series of events to which they belong. Thus we say, Bonaparte entered Moscow *on the 14th of September*, and determined to retreat *as soon as Kutousoff refused to negotiate*. The first mode is conventional, and calculated for facts that have a sensible and external existence; the second is natural, and adapted to circumstances of intellectual occurrence. One proceeds on philosophical connection, the other adopts an arbitrary relation. We have no reason to

suppose *a priori*, that a battle will be fought on the first or the tenth day of the month, rather than on any other day; but when we know that two nations have declared war, and observe that their armies approach near each other, we have good reason at that time to expect an action, upon the principle of cause and effect. This principle we observe to connect events with each other, and we require the historian carefully to trace it in recording the transactions of the period, or the country he describes; and it is with a view to facilitate the accomplishment of this important duty, that he resorts to the factitious relation between the course of events and the figures of the calendar. The more firm and distinct the mutual dependance he establishes between the incidents of his narrative, the less occasion exists for recourse to the assistance of chronology, especially if he has settled the great points near which his history is to commence and to terminate. In Xenophon or Livy, for instance, not one reader in ten thinks of referring to dates, so clearly is the order of events preserved and exhibited. For the same reason, in Lee's Memoirs, little attention to dates is either observed or required; and for a different one, in the "Sketches," the most diligent and exact notation of time would fail to impart order, or to unwind the involutions of the circumambient and tangled story.

These remarks will show not only that Colonel Lee did not affect precision of dates in this case, as

Our author undertakes to assert, but that neither the structure of his narrative, nor the nature of the subject required it. And that when he says, the proposition was made while the army was at Ramsay's mills, and "very soon" after the inexpediency of prosecuting the pursuit of Cornwallis induced General Greene to consult upon a future plan of operations, he points out the time and occasion in a manner, which, being natural and proper, indicates that he wrote without intention to deceive, or apprehension of offending; an earnest that would not have been given by an affected precision of dates.

Our author continues—"But if, as Colonel Lee relates, this suggestion was not made until the 5th of April, we can confidently assure the reader that he is mistaken; or that it came too late; for we have letters before us to Generals Washington and Sumpter, of the date of the 29th and 30th of March, in which the resolution to pursue this plan of operations is distinctly communicated, and the reasons for adopting it as distinctly set forth." The aim of this attempt at an argument, fails from the falsehood of the assertion upon which it is founded. Colonel Lee neither relates nor intimates that the suggestion was not made until the 5th of April, as his language, quoted by Mr. Johnson, very distinctly shows. It is as follows: "No sooner had he *decided*, than he commenced operations. The legion of Lee, with Captain Oldham's detachment, was ordered to move on the subsequent morning,"

(6th of April,) &c. Nothing can be plainer than the reference of this remark, viz: to the time the proposition was decided on, and not to that at which it was suggested. On the contrary, Colonel Lee places an interval between the two facts. He says, "From the first moment the substitute was presented to the mind of Greene, it received his decided preference. There was a splendour in the plan, which will always attract the mind of a hero. General Greene gave to the subject that *full and critical investigation* which it merited, and which, by long habit, had become familiar to his mind." As to his remark, that *Greene had no sooner decided, than he commenced operations*, its terms exclude, obviously, the idea of precision, and of course admit of no exact inference as to dates, and with this qualification, it must be understood in reference to the time at which he became acquainted with Greene's decision; the earliest manifestation of which that reached him, was, doubtless, the order he received to march for the Santee. He was absent from head quarters, as our author affirms, with his indefatigable legion, being employed in foraging for the army, and observing the enemy.

The only allowable inference then from Lee's language, is, that no sooner was he apprized of the decision taken by General Greene, than he was ordered to commence his march the next day; that is, the 6th of April. Now it seems, from the letters to Generals Washington and Sumpter referred to by our

author, General Greene had decided as early as the 29th of March. And therefore, there is a mistake of six or seven days in Colonel Lee's just conclusion as to the immaterial point of the time at which Greene *decided*. "We will not deny," adds our author, "that the measure may have been recommended, and the arguments used; and if so, no doubt they were silently and complacently listened to, but they had been previously considered and decided on; and it is not to be wondered at, that the 'proposer' may have supposed that the measure was of his suggestion, since such was the profound secrecy observed on the subject, and so important was secrecy to its success, that there is great reason to believe, that before the 3d, it was communicated to none but the general officers, if even to them." Here this fair and philosophical enquiry is obviously closed, by the positive declaration of the author, that the arguments had been considered, and the measure decided on, before the proposition was made by Colonel Lee, if, indeed, it was ever made. This assertion is the more conclusive, as it is made evidently upon Mr. Johnson's own authority, and distinctly implies his intimate personal acquaintance with the transaction, by the fact which he mentions of secrecy; the profoundness of which, he particularly describes. But there is one circumstance in his *testimony*, which evinces a mistake, that will enable and indeed require us without indecorum to continue the examination of the subject somewhat longer. It is

this: he says the plan was communicated to the general officers, when in fact, there were no general officers in the camp. General Huger may have continued with the army, although he was wounded; but the militia generals all went home from Guilford, Stevens disabled by a severe wound. The verisimilitude of the supposition that Greene, after having considered and decided on a plan of operations, would hear the same plan proposed, explained, and discussed, without hinting to any one but our martial and venerable author himself, that he had ever thought of it before, must satisfy every reader, that the felicity of Mr. Johnson's conjectures, is in exact proportion to the truth of his assertions. It is next inferred, that because General Greene communicated his plan to General Washington, before he did to Baron Steuben, his letters on the subject, were written with reference to the distance of his several correspondents; not that the commander in chief had a right to receive instant notice of this important resolution, and that the inferior officers of General Greene were informed of it only as occasions of service, moments of leisure, or other incidents might render expedient. If the absurdity of this inference did not confute it, the following observation would: He says that the letters to Steuben and Lafayette, are dated on the 2nd of April, when one was in Richmond, and the other in Maryland; and that to Sumpter on the 30th March, when as late as the 17th of April, Lafayette was in Baltimore. It is insinuated

too, that because the letter to Sumpter inculcates secrecy, and that the design of Greene be communicated only to the generals, the probability of Colonel Lee's being out of the secret until he was ordered to march, is the greater; the judge not adverting to the importance of concealing the movement from Lord Rawdon, against whom the movement was intended to operate, and in the neighbourhood of whom Sumpter was. The next observation being perfectly unintelligible, we forbear to quote it, and shall only say that it appears first; to recognize the probability, that as Colonel Lee does not mention the name of the proposer, where it is natural to suppose he might have done so, he designed to have it understood that he himself was; and then to insist that it would be unjust to adopt this supposition, as it would involve the suspicion that Colonel Lee would practise this mode of deceiving. Nor is there any conclusion drawn between these opposite inferences, while the latter is attempted to be substantiated by the fact, that he was absent from head quarters on the 30th of April. Into this reasoning we cannot see, and therefore shall not look. But the judge is mistaken in saying that Colonel Lee's order to move was dated the 3d of April; the autograph order he received was dated the 4th, and by a letter of the 6th, the date of which, he appears to have inadvertently transferred to his order, General Greene tells him, "Captain Oldham shall march in the morning to the point you mention;" so

that Colonel Lee did not "proceed on his march on the 5th," as our author declares, he gathers from the official files.

"From the same source also," he adds, "we derive the information, that Colonel Lee was no stranger to the fact, that General Greene had long meditated the descent upon South Carolina, whenever the state and position of the two armies would sanction it. We have before mentioned, that this design had been communicated to General Marion, in January, with a request to confer with no one upon it, except Colonel Lee. It appears that the day after the date of this letter to Marion, the communication was also made to Colonel Lee; for on the 30th January, he writes from Port's Ferry—'In your letter of the 26th, you suggest an idea of a very extensive movement, and intimate a desire for a correspondent movement in me at the proper moment, if practicable. My part of the game can be played; and in my opinion, will be of the most durable and comprehensive service. I pray to hear from you fully; and beg you to cherish the movement suggested in your letter of the 26th.'"

In this passage, besides the deception of endeavouring to impose upon the reader, the outlines of a plan of his own imagination, for one really entertained by General Greene, there are no less than three unfounded assertions. There is no authority for saying, that a descent upon Carolina had long been meditated by General Greene; or that such a design had ever been

communicated to General Marion or to Colonel Lee. And the declaration, that Colonel Lee, while he was describing the descent from Deep River, as an original resolution, taken by General Greene at his suggestion, was perfectly aware that General Greene had long before, meditated a similar, or identical measure, is a falsehood, the insolence and illiberality of which, might excite indignation, but for the atoning stupidity with which it is confessed. We are told, in one page, that "he derived from the official files," the fact that the plan of a descent upon South Carolina, was communicated to Colonel Lee, in a letter of the 26th of January; and our honest impostor begins the next page with these words: "The copy of this letter of the 26th, from what cause, or by what accident, we know not, *is not among the official files!*" and then has the discreet effrontery to infer and describe the subject of this important letter from one written by Colonel Lee, in which no reference whatever is expressed or implied to Greene's letter of the 26th, either in the extracts made from it by our author, or in the letter itself, as Judge Johnson well knows! The absurdity of supposing that because, in his letter of the 30th January, Lee calls the idea suggested by General Greene, in his letter of the 26th, "an extensive movement," it was a plan for a descent upon South Carolina, is only surpassed by the folly of imagining, that when Greene was actually encamped in that state, and had two detachments in the heart of

it, he could be said to meditate a descent upon it—seeing he was already in the bowels of the land. But to proceed with the Sketches—(p. 35.) “The copy of this letter of the 26th, from what cause, or by what accident, we know not, is not among the official files; but a subsequent letter from Colonel Lee, of the date of the 3d of February, sufficiently points out the leading features of the movements suggested by General Greene’s communication of the 26th. This letter was written from Culp’s ferry, on the Pedee, on the march to overtake the army then proceeding to join the troops under Morgan. The following passages are extracted from it. ‘The invitation which the posture of affairs on the other side of the Santee, and in the state of Georgia, held out to a proper attempt, was so pleasing, that I regret exceedingly, my recall from that country. I regret it, not only as a soldier, anxious to acquire honour, but as a citizen. A party of horse and foot from your army, equal to breaking down all the outposts in the two states, and confining the enemy to Charleston, Georgetown, Ninety Six, Camden, and Augusta, would increase daily; from three hundred, they would grow to as many thousands.’ He then goes on with a most brilliant anticipation of the services that might have been performed, extending, even to the liberation of the continental prisoners, then perishing in the prison-ships.” If it were possible to suppose the substance of a letter, written by one person on the 26th of January, upon a parti-

cular subject, could be gathered from that written on the 3d of February, by another person, and on another subject; it is plain, nevertheless, that the supposition could not apply to the extract here quoted from the letter of Colonel Lee, as it expresses no reference to General Greene's letter of the 26th, and bears no similitude to the interpretation given of that letter by Mr. Johnson. Mutilated as it is, it conveys the idea of an original proposition, an impression which it could not have failed distinctly to make, had Mr. Johnson given either the entire letter, or any other passages of equal length with the two which he has here uncivilly associated. The letter entire,* when compared with Greene's letter of the 26th,† will complete the exposure of our author's folly, in declaring the meaning of one to be contained in the expressions of the other. After deprecating, as premature, the notion of operating in front of Cornwallis, and of leaving the militia of the two southern states unsupported, Lee says, "Whether an adequate force can be spared, you best know, as it depends on the circumstances of the two armies. I must presume General Morgan's victory was so complete, as to put it out of the power of Cornwallis to effect a junction with his North Carolina detachment, even if General Dundas has arrived from Virginia, unless the people of North Carolina are generally in the interest of the enemy. *But should his*

* See Appendix F.

† See Appendix C.

force promise a junction, I think the recovery of the two southern states would blast every advantage which his most sanguine success could produce." This passage, as it stands just between the two which our author has united in his quotation, it is, *perhaps, possible* to imagine, was accidentally overlooked by him.

"Aliquando bonus dormitat Homerus."

But Mr. Johnson insists that the plan of January, which Greene designed, is to be found in this letter of Colonel Lee, and then demonstrates, that this letter of Lee's contains the exact type of the plan adopted in April, and concludes, therefore, that the original idea was Greene's. Having shown by the production of Greene's letter of the 26th of January, that the project described in it bears no resemblance to the plan proposed by Lee, in his letter of the 3d of February, it follows from our author's own argument, that the original idea was Lee's. But without taking the advantage given by the fallacious temerity of his assertions, it will not be unfair to counteract his feeble endeavour to impress the probability, that as Greene did propose a plan in January, he conceived this in April; by requesting the reader to compare the proposition in Lee's letter of the 3d of February, with the plan which was adopted in April, and then compare the project in Greene's letter of the 26th of January, or even Mr. Johnson's false description of it, with the same plan of April, and see to whose claim the pro-

bability inclines; and also determine whether our author was more culpable in asserting, that General Greene originated the plan, than he was in forbearing to quote the pertinent passage of Lee's letter, and declining to confess the likelihood it suggests, that he first proposed it. When Pythagoras ascertained the stature of Hercules, he reasoned in this way—the olympic stadium was measured by Hercules, and was six hundred times the length of his foot. The other stadiums of Greene, are six hundred times the length of the foot of an ordinary man, and are shorter than the olympic stadium. The foot of Hercules then, was as much longer than that of an ordinary man, as one hundredth part of the olympic stadium is longer than the same part of another stadium. But the length of an ordinary man's foot bears a certain proportion to his height, and the foot of Hercules must bear the same to his stature. Applying this rule of *ex pede Herculem*, to the respective plans of Greene and Lee, as described in their several letters, and to the minds that conceived them, we shall scarcely find that of Lee the less capacious of the great plan of descending from Deep river upon South Carolina.

But here let every advantage that can avail be conceded to Mr. Johnson, and let his false description of Greene's proposition of January, his wilful mutilation of Lee's of February, be forgotten, and it will not only be fair, but liberal to conclude, that the project of returning from Deep river to South Carolina, when

Lord Cornwallis retreated to Wilmington, no matter whether proposed by Lee, or conceived by Greene, was a distinct and original one—no more typified by any previous design of Greene, than Scipio's invasion of Africa, was by the meditated descent of the consul Sulpitius upon the coast of Carthage, in the first Punic war; and that the discussion is properly limited to the question, Who did, on or about the 1st of April, suggest that measure?

It may again be noted how unfit our author is for a fair examination of any subject, and how little his historical assertions are to be trusted. He says, (p. 35,) that Greene, in marching to Camden, “practised a deception on Cornwallis;” and to prove it, says: “See Lord Cornwallis's letter,” without specifying when or to whom it was written. We have looked over all the published letters of Lord Cornwallis, written about that period, and can find no authority for the assertion, but authority directly against it; for he observes, both to Lord George Germain and to General Philips, that he had anticipated the movement, and had endeavoured to warn Lord Rawdon of its possibility.*

Floundering along in this giddy and illogical manner, Mr. Johnson pretends that Lee, in his account of the proposal and consideration of this measure, represents it as the subject of open and iterated discussion; the common talk of the camp; and infers, that as se-

* Despatches to Lord George Germain and to General Philips, 24th April, 1781.

crecy was not only indispensable, but actually observed, Lee's account, false in that particular, is fallacious altogether. But his premises, as usual, are groundless. Lee does not speak to the fact either of secrecy or publicity at all—makes no intimation of its having been submitted to a council of war, but only that opposite opinions were expressed and supported by the different advisers of Greene—such as Williams, Carlington, and himself, probably.*

Upon examining the letter of the 29th of March, to General Washington, it will be found to convey two impressions very distinctly, each of which, is at variance with the opinions of our author. The first is, that Greene himself considered the projected march to South Carolina, an original manœuvre; and the second is, that he was extremely doubtful as to its consequences, and considered himself operated upon by necessity, rather than by choice in adopting it. "In this critical and distressing situation, I am determined to carry the war immediately into South Carolina. The manœuvre will be critical and dangerous. I shall take every measure to avoid misfortune, but necessity obliges me to commit myself to chance; and I trust my friends will do justice to my reputation, if any accident attends me." Even after the numerous specimens we have given of our author's mode of interpretation, it may surprise the reader to learn that he prefaces his extract from this letter, with the fol-

* *Memoirs*, vol. ii. p. 31, and seq.

lowing words: (p. 37.) “ *In all the letters written on the subject, there is not a shadow of doubt exhibited as to the course he ought to pursue, nor the least anxiety expressed for the approbation of his friends. He confidently expresses his reasons for the measure, and uniformly writes upon the presumption, that no one can disapprove it.*” This string of erroneous statements, inconclusive reasoning, and illiberal insinuations, is thus, for the present, wound up, (p. 39.) “ We have thus given the vindication of this celebrated movement of General Greene’s in his *own words*, uniformly preferring this method wherever practicable, from a firm conviction of our incompetence to do the same justice to his military merit in language of our own. If *further proof* on the subject can be required, we can give it in a letter of General Greene to the President of Congress, of the 22d April, in which he mentions, that from the time of the battle of Guilford, he had the movement into Carolina in contemplation; and the positive declaration of Captain Pendleton, that it never was surmised in the army, that it had proceeded from any other source than the General himself.” A consideration of this statement will enable the reader to determine what degree of accuracy he is to expect in the least eager and malignant of Mr. Johnson’s affirmations, and might, but for the application we already made, in behalf of his insolvent credit, produce disbelief of all his subsequent declarations. He says he has vindicated “ this move-

ment of General Greene's," in Greene's own words. We all agree the *movement* was Greene's, if the suggestion of it was Lee's; but does there appear the smallest conformity with truth, in the declaration, that General Greene's words have been employed in conveying to the world Mr. Johnson's bungling and abortive *vindication*. *General Greene's words* are not used even in describing his project of January, upon the supposed affinity with which our author so strongly relies. Nor do the few quotations from General Greene's letters, which, "*apparent rari nantes in gurgite vasto*," contain any thing like a vindication of this measure, as his own, or one single expression that might be supposed applicable to the question of its origin.

As to the letter of the 22d of April to the President of Congress, in which, it is alleged, General Greene declares he had this movement in contemplation immediately after the battle of Guilford—the allegation of the judge is physically true, but logically, if not morally false. It is true that after the battle of Guilford, as soon as Greene found Cornwallis retreating, and dreadfully crippled, he contemplated marching to South Carolina, because he determined to pursue Cornwallis, who would retreat, he thought at that time, to South Carolina. This Mr. Johnson might have found in his letter to Colonel Lee of the 19th of March, and knew very well when he wrote this pas-

sage: for, in another part of his work, (P. S. p. 7,) he observes: “Before General Greene *removed* from Guilford, he had called out a militia force *in the event of Lord Cornwallis’s return to Camden,*” &c. So that the letter of the 2d of April, instead of proving that the march from Deep river to Camden was a measure preconceived, has exactly the contrary tendency. It was, therefore, true in General Greene to say, that soon after the battle of Guilford, he had the movement to Camden in contemplation; but it is false in our author to reason, that this intention presupposed or anticipated the resolution taken afterwards at Ramsay’s mills. On the contrary, this letter and several others to Lee, evince that, from his last advance from Troublesome creek, up to his arrival at Ramsay’s mills, General Greene’s views were converged to the single point of renewing the battle with his adversary, whithersoever the latter might move. Upon his arrival at Ramsay’s mills, new and unforeseen events engaged his attention. His enemy had foiled his pursuit, and escaped beyond immediate overtaking; and the departure of the Virginia militia left him too weak for another encounter. His mind was called upon incontinently for the invention of measures adapted to this new state of things. No prophetic dreams, which as our author would have it, had clouded his meditations in January and October, were to be invoked or consulted now. No schemes that had been devised

for other occasions, were to be empirically transferred to this emergency. He had been descending with the strength and swiftness of an eagle on his prey; and its sudden escape, and his unlooked for inferiority, demanded a prompt resource. The force of these circumstances, striking on his mind or on Lee's, evolved the splendid plan of transferring the war instantly to South Carolina. We call it splendid, because the conception was great, both as to intellectual vigour and military consequences. And no man, whose mind was not equal to the fabrication of the "*Sketches*," could possibly resemble it to the circumscribed plan of Greene in January—could compare a floating, transitory, limited notion, with a bold and comprehensive design, advanced through the labours of thought, and the ardours of invention; endued with the energies of action, and shaped into the proportions of practice.

But the positive assertion of Captain Pendleton, that it was never surmised in the army that any person but General Greene was the author of the plan, is offered (not produced) to prove that such was the fact. Here, however, Mr. Johnson reasons on the ingenious plan of *obscurum per obscurius*; attempts to prove the unknown by the inconceivable. The fact of profound secrecy he discloses with the apparent sincerity of a witness, and insists on with the fondness of a devotee: and of course establishes the ignorance of

the army as to the origin of this design; and this being admitted, it is not conceivable it can prove any thing as to that origin, of which Captain Pendleton himself, no doubt, was not informed. Even Colonel Howard, in a letter to Colonel Lee of the 21st of February, 1810, observes, "I had no knowledge of the move from Ramsay's mills to the southward, until called upon for a draft of men, who marched with you under Captain Oldham." And after it was resolved on, the prevalence of the surmise that it originated in the mind of the general, rather than in that of a lieutenant colonel of twenty-five, was highly expedient, and would doubtless be cultivated, for the double purpose of rendering it more acceptable to the army, and of stronger influence upon the adherents of both parties.*

It may be supposed that the reader is now enabled to perceive the injustice of our author's observations, in so far as they respect the military, literary, and personal character of Colonel Lee; the fallacy of his arguments in support of them; the erroneous and inapplicable direction of those arguments; the intrinsic

* Major Eggleston, in a letter to Colonel Lee, dated 10th June, 1810, writes: "I well recollect that I felt great reluctance to the movement from Deep river to South Carolina, as I thought it leaving our own state exposed to Cornwallis's army, although the event proved so fortunate to the cause of America."

difference between the two designs which he attempts to identify, one being to recal or divert Cornwallis from his views on Virginia, in January, and the other to take advantage of his invasion of that state, in April; the distinction created between them by time, place, and circumstance; the absurdity of the notion, that the great design of April had been prepared and pocketed by General Greene six months before; and the folly as well as the unfairness of impressing upon the base metal of Mr. Johnson's conjecture, the stamp of General Greene's official files. It appears probable too, that up to this period of the discussion, the claim set up for Lee by his friends, for the honour of originating the brilliant movement from Deep river, so far from having been weakened, is rather fortified by the malicious efforts of Mr. Johnson to destroy it; and is strengthened particularly by a fair reference to the documents, of which he undertook to give a counterfeited interpretation, and a mutilated extract. For in these it appears Greene's project is meagre, insulated, and transient, while that of Lee is bold, varied, and expansive; earnestly urged and reluctantly abandoned; showing not only that his mind was capacious of the grand design of April, but that it was actually enamoured of it; having but recently meditated one of almost equal splendour, and of the same ample horizon—*Italix suæ clades in Africam vindicare*.

But our author renders remarks on this point almost unnecessary; for he confesses the march from

Camden was an original, substantive measure. (p. 30.) "The departure of the militia once more reduced the American commander to a decided inferiority; and it became necessary to cast about him, and determine on the course next to be pursued." Here, certainly, is room for Lee's suggestion. In spite of this though, he proceeds, "He never doubted that if the enemy continued to retreat, the interests of the service required, that he should move secretly and rapidly on the British posts at Camden and Ninety Six; while a corps, lightly equipped, should be despatched to pierce through the heart of the state, and aim a similar blow at the chain of minor posts which extended up the Santee and Savannah rivers." So that General Greene had not only preconceived the outlines of the plan, but all the details incident to its execution! This evidently implies, not forecast, but prophecy, and may not only agitate annalists, but alarm theologians. The prophetic age of the christians terminated, it is believed, some time before General Greene, and Juvenal, who wrote in the age of Domitian, says, "*Delphis oracula cessant.*"

In commencing a relation of the measures now about to be pursued, the small and desultory resistance of the whigs, under Sumpter and Marion, is adverted to, and it is affirmed, upon what authority we know not, that the former, in an attempt on Fort Granby, a British post on the Congaree, had, before the return of Greene's army to South Carolina, erect-

ed a log-built tower for his marksmen, an invention ascribed by Lee and others to Colonel Mayham, in a subsequent and successful enterprize against Fort Watson. Of Colonel Hampton, it is said, in that wordy style which often delights the judge, and almost suffocates his readers, and which resembles what the Greek rhetoricians stigmatized *Μακρολογία*, "he made his way good to join Sumpter." Indeed, Mr. Johnson's narrative throughout, is conducted with a noble freedom from the rules of ordinary composition—"Nume-risque fertua lege solutis," (p. 31.) "alternative," is used for *consequence*; and to absorb the supernumerary designated on a former occasion, there is but one mentioned on this. It is inconceivable to what difficulty the loose and corrupt language, and chronology of this writer subject a critical reader. If it is hard to correct his misstatements, it is from no other reason than that it is impossible to find out precisely what they are; and it is difficult to examine the progress which he assigns to the undisputed events of the war, because he seldom permits the reader to discover in what relation to each other he himself considers them. For example, in a detail of the embarrassments by which Greene was perplexed, about the time (we suppose) he resolved to return to South Carolina; such as that serious disturbances were created by the practice of impressing stallions for the service, and that he received something like a remonstrance on the subject from the executive of Virginia, dated the 5th of April—he

proceeds, (p. 41,) "Long before that day, General Greene had taken steps to check the evil complained of." "The following extract of a letter to Colonel Lee, of the date of the 17th July, will best explain, both the nature of the injury, and the *prompt* measures of the general to put a stop to it." Thus we are told, that the remonstrance from the executive of Virginia, on the subject of impressing—or, in the rueful eloquence of our author's phrase, "of laying violent hands on the *pet* that occupied the best stall in the stable of the Virginian," was dated the 5th of April; that *long before* its date, Greene had taken measures to check the practice of which it complained; and as a proof of this *prompt* and *preventive* attention to the subject, his letter of the 17th of July, which contains no retrospect whatever, is referred to. Why he should select the letter to Lee, might be curious to inquire, since it does not appear, from the terms of it, that the officers of the legion had transgressed in this way, while those of Colonel Washington's cavalry had; especially too, as Mr. Johnson is uniformly shy of quoting complimentary or familiar letters to Lee; and sometimes transcribes passages from letters to him of this description, under the vague reference of "a letter to a friend," as at page 40; and refers to letters addressed to other officers for the representation of General Greene's sentiments on occasions, when he might have exhibited a more full and particular expression of them, by referring to his correspon-

dence with Colonel Lee; an instance of which occurs at page 220. On the 6th, Colonel Lee was put in motion, and pushing forward with celerity, inclined toward Cross Creek, joined General Marion, and appeared before Fort Watson on the 15th. On the 7th, General Greene decamped, and marching with expedition, on the 19th reached the neighbourhood of Camden. Having already noticed, incidentally, the terms of respect and apprehension in which Lord Cornwallis never fails to clothe his observations regarding Virginia, we pass over the continued attempts of our author to depreciate her revolutionary efforts, and set them down to the credit of his disposition to pervert the history of the republic, and his propensity to detract from superior merit.

The military operations in that state are brought down, in the 12th chapter, to the surrender of York; an event which is ennobled by a figure which a fourth of July orator might envy. (p. 66.) "The hunted lion, roused from his lair on the west of the Catawba, alternately eluded and evaded, or goaded and pursued until he rested his panting sides on the shores of the Chesapeake, here finally cowered to the American eagle; but, his expiring efforts were maintained by a noble constancy;" so that Mr. Johnson's eagle actually kills his lion!* Had such a juvenile flourish

* "Colley Cibber, sir, was by no means a blockhead—he was a poor creature. It is wonderful that a man who had for forty years lived with the great and the witty, should have acquired

been shown to Hume, on one of his pages, would all his philosophy have saved him from distraction? It would be like pointing out a rainbow to a blind man, to refer our author to the remark of Quintilian, "*ne quid adversum nature dicatur.*" Resting his panting sides after the exhibition of his tame lion, Mr. Johnson returns to the campaigns, by assuring us, that "the commander was playing a painful part," and through a variety of ponderous and unmeaning sentences, the reader is led blindfold between two opposing statements, to the junction of Lee with Marion, on the Black river. The contradiction alluded to, stands on opposite pages: (p. 68): "It has been seen that General Sumpter was the only officer in the southern country, to whom General Greene confided his intention of penetrating into South Carolina, *prior to his actual movement.*" (p. 69.) "Here General Marion was found by the officer," (Captain Conyers) "who was despatched by General Greene *from Ramsay's mills, on Deep River*, to apprise him of his *intended descent* into South Carolina." If any thing could surpass the idle repugnance of these statements,

so ill, the talents of conversation. His friends gave out, that he *intended* his birth-day odes to be bad. He abused Pindar to me, and then showed me an ode of his own, with an absurd couplet, making a wren soar on an eagle's wing. I told him that when the ancients made a simile, they always made it like something real." Boswel's life of Johnson.

it is the confidence with which they are thrown out, and the air of buoyant assurance with which, in the face of glaring inconsistencies, Mr. Johnson's pretensions to *accuracy* are maintained. Indeed he appears to deem his quartos, "*rich with the spoils of time*;" for on page 68, he begins three sentences with the words, "*It has been seen*," and one with, "*It will be recollected*;" when probably his reader's vision and memory have been nearly extinguished. He insists, that Lee was under the command of Marion, from the time of their junction, until they separated, for the sinister and silly purposes, perhaps, of diminishing the reputation, and eroding the veracity of the former. We descanted a little on a previous excursion of our author, in this walk of dignified detraction, and referring to the observations then submitted, have to add our surprise, that this notion did not occur to the judge, when these officers were co-operating against Georgetown. Has the judge no idea of such a thing as the co-operation of officers commissioned by different sovereigns, combined in the same enterprize, and acting without any comparison of rank; and when its superiority would confer precedence merely, and not command? Has he no conception of the common breeding, and ordinary address, which would suppress such idle, disgusting, and injudicious rivalry, or pretensions. To compare small things with great, did he ever learn that Marlborough or Eugene exerted or endured any such pretensions, at Blenheim or Oudenarde; Wel-

lington or Blucher, at Waterloo? And is it not probable that the essential superiority of the commander of the legion, outweighed the nominal pre-eminence of the militia general? It would be idle to say, that in name, the rank of Marion derived, during the republican interregnum of Carolina, from Governor Rutledge, was not superior to the commission with which the Congress of the United States honoured Colonel Lee, as it would be to deny, that in consideration and efficiency, the brigadier and his corps were inferior to the legion. Accordingly, it appears that a formal correspondence was maintained with Marion, and a close and confidential one with Lee. Besides, any one but Mr. Johnson would discover that General Greene had to conciliate and engage these irregular state corps, and therefore concessions were, no doubt, yielded by him, and compliances consented to, by Colonel Lee, which, while they ensure the zeal of this, and the judgment of that officer, furnish no scale by which to fix the comparative command of Marion and Lee. It will be well to finish the exposure of this attempt of our author, to distort the true history of affairs, and knowingly to deceive the reader, by perverting appearances, and concealing facts. In another part of his work, he quotes a letter from Colonel Lee to Greene, in which the writer expresses his surprise, at having his conduct, in preferring to co-operate with Marion, compared to the reluctance of General Sumpter to join General

Greene, and in order, obviously, to evade the force of Greene's reproach, adds, "*when, by my own request, I am under General Marion, and next to the commander in chief, the commanding officer of the expedition has praise.*" Mr. J. declares, the letter to which this is an answer, is not on the official files; but even if it be true, that he never saw this letter, the answer which he publishes, put in a fair light, would convince any man, that if Colonel Lee chose to say he was under the command of General Marion, General Greene knew very well he was not actually, but nominally so; and considered his anxiety to prosecute the reduction of the posts on the Santee and Congaree, in conjunction with Marion, as evidence of his wish to be exempt from the command of any officer; a disposition, of which he had felt the bad effects in the conduct of General Sumpter. Thus it is that the judge weighs and expounds historical evidence. We shall have occasion to gratify our author, by publishing the letters that fill up the chasm in the correspondence with Lee, which he alleges exists among his 4000 documents. They will probably satisfy him on some other points, as well as on the subordinate one now under consideration. It is easy to disembarass it at once, of all injurious connection with the military reputation of Lee; and therefore we may appear to devote excessive attention to it, especially as the denial of his rank is but a confession of his superior services; which, if thus obstructed, must have been the more brilliant to

fix on him the eyes, both of his friends and his enemies,* as the prominent man; as well as the regard of historians, who all (previous to the judge) mention him as the principal officer.† But it is obviously the drift of Mr. Johnson, in this and similar passages of his book, to undermine the reputation of Lee for literary veracity, and to make him appear arrogant and usurping in his character, and selfish and vain in his work. And that impression being made, our author, though *dim as a mole*, is sagacious enough to foresee, that the general consequence of his character, the reputation of his book, and the claim advanced for him by his surviving comrades, to the credit of planning the most eventful portion of the campaign, will be assailed in two directions, and in both weakened.

It was no doubt right on general principles, and prudent from particular considerations, that in matters of mere form, Greene should pay a flattering regard to the nominal rank of Marion, a cheap price for important services, useful co-operations; even at the risk of encroaching on the rights of Lee and his detachment. Lee stood related to him in direct subordination and inviolable friendship, and he knew the legion was trusty as steel. Marion held a state commission, and however zealous and patriotic himself, commanded followers who might be disgusted, and were often

* See Appendix G.

† See particularly, Stedman, vol. ii. p. 360, and Marshall, vol. iv. p. 536.

dispersed. But this prudence of Greene, should not be converted into detraction by his biographer. If, at any time, that great man lamented the necessity that obliged him to swerve from the distinction due to Colonel Lee, his mind surely did not misgive him, that this unkind constraint would be wrought into an instrument of cool historical malice, or that Lee's acquiescence would be insidiously perverted into an evidence of his demerit, or a proof of his arrogance. Let it be recollected, too, that in his memoirs, Lee on all occasions, assigns due precedence to General Marion, and describes him of the most spotless virtue—disinterested, modest, brave, patriotic, and indefatigable. Indeed if the name of Marion ever reaches posterity, adorned with half the honours it deserves, the candid pages of his comrade, will afford this small justice to his worth. In one of his letters, General Greene says to Lee, “your combined (not subordinate) operations with the militia, did not put it in my power to do justice to your exertions.” How far his biographer, who has read this very passage, is disposed to supply the involuntary omission, the preceding remarks may serve to determine.

To Marion and Lee, however, fort Watson surrendered, its reduction having been facilitated by a novel device on the part of the besiegers. This was a tower constructed of logs, piled upon each other in a square or parallelogram, and raised to such an elevation as to expose the garrison to marksmen stationed

in it. Lee and all former writers on the subject, describe it as an original contrivance of Colonel Maham. But our radical reformer of history, says (p. 31,) it had before been used by General Sumpter in his recent attempt upon fort Granby; tracing it back to Cæsar's wars in Gaul. And with a felicity of reference which displays at once the precision of his analysis, and the extent of his erudition, denominates it (p. 70) "a mode of attack truly antique, the *turribusque constitutis* of Cæsar." The learning of Mr. Johnson it must be confessed is not equal to his invention, nor does his knowledge overpower his vanity; and nothing can exceed in deformity his grotesque and ill-bred appearance, when he bears his unlettered front into the bright and lofty regions of classical literature. His pretensions in this regard, incongruous with the whole texture of his work, are absolutely forfeited by every direct attempt to sustain them. We shall perhaps amuse some of our readers, who may have discontinued for more important avocations, the study of their boyhood, while we show that Mr. Johnson has not the least acquaintance with the passage he here ventures to cite. Indeed, one of the few biographical facts to be derived from the study of "these Sketches," is, that their author is acquainted with no tongue whatever. And we are inclined to infer, that if his head were submitted to a phrenologist, the response would be, *that as for the head, it was a soft and*

*a sappy one, but as for the party that owed * it, he was destitute of the faculty of language, and every sort of literary development. In short, it is melancholy to think how his best friends must tremble, at seeing him flirt, even with an ablative absolute in Cæsar. It is possible, a little latin may have been whipped into him in his youth, and it is probable he draws upon this inflicted fund for the quotation alluded to. The passage of the original from which it is taken, is in these words: "Celeriter vineis ad oppidum actis, aggere jacto turribusque constitutis, magnitudine operum quæ neque viderant ante Galli, neque audierant, et celeritate Romanorum permoti, legatos ad Cæsarem de deditione mittunt."* To be fair with Judge Johnson, we subjoin a literal translation: "But our mantelets being quickly advanced up to the town, our mount raised, and battering towers planted, the Gauls astonished by the greatness of the work, as they had never seen nor heard of such before, and by the despatch of the Romans, send deputies to Cæsar to treat about a surrender." It is well known, that the towers of which Cæsar speaks, with other engines, constituted the artillery of the Roman armies—that their frames were

* We have the strongest reason to believe that our author is of a hypercritical disposition, and lest he should cavil at the application of the word *owed*, it is proper to refer at once to authority for the use here made of it. Second part of Henry IV. A. I. Sc. II.

prepared and adapted at the arsenals, and transported along with the legions, as cannon are with modern armies; were compacted when a siege, and disjointed when a march required. It was a vast and complicated machine—was placed on wheels, and therefore called *mobilis, ambulatoria*—was forty feet square—higher than the loftiest walls—ranged often into ten stories—furnished with a hundred men—armed with auxiliar machines—and was in short, one of the most powerful mechanical contrivances that can be conceived, both for military offence, and security. How this regular and recognized machine of the Romans, came to be associated in the mind of Mr. Johnson, with the prompt and homespun contrivance of Maham, it is not easy to conjecture. To discover a resemblance between them, it is plain, his research into military antiquities, must have extended beyond Polybius, Vegetius, or Josephus, and to sieges more complicated and important, than those of Jerusalem, Numantia, or Syracuse. It is strange it did not occur to his reflection, that if they were so much alike, as to be described by the same terms, they would probably answer the same practical purposes. Yet it would make even a *judge* smile, to imagine a century of triarii, stiff with steel, and armed to the teeth, the helmet with its formidable crest, the cuirass rigid with rings and hooks, the brace of long and ponderous javelins, the sword on the right side, attempting with stately

strides the escalade of one of Maham's pens, which had been designed in the simplicity of its invention, for a score perhaps of Marion's limber and alert militia.

It is an imagination not less original and brilliant, than the idea of identity between Greene's momentary design in January, of concentrating his forces in the neighbourhood of Ninety Six, and his great and daring resolution in April, of transferring the war from Deep River to the Santee.

Our author errs in fact, as well as in language, in asserting (p. 71,) that, "By his orders of the 4th of April, Lee is to proceed immediately to act upon fort Watson with his own *command*." He has before (p. 31,) misdated this order the 3d of April, with no just intention; and he now proceeds to misinfer its import for a very illiberal purpose, viz. to make it appear that the junction with Marion, was indispensable to the safety of the legion! The order of the 4th of April, instead of requiring Lee to proceed immediately against Fort Watson with his own detachment, is extremely discretionary, and is evidently addressed to an officer, who was thoroughly conversant with the general's plan, and in full possession of his confidence. The only part of it which alludes to Fort Watson, is as follows: "The post garrisoned by Watson's corps, is the only one which I think you will have a chance to strike at." "But," it is added, "you must govern yourself by the intelligence you may get." And cer-

tainly, self-preservation, was not the most obvious reason for Lee's joining Marion. Our author will not deny, that the object of Lee's expedition was to carry the British posts on the Santee and Congaree, or that the co-operation of Marion was desirable, with a view to his success. Surely then, this was a sufficient motive for his junction with Marion, as the latter lay directly on his route from Port's ferry to Fort Watson. But there is no doubt it was contemplated by Greene, when Lee was detached from Ramsay's mills, for Mr. Johnson informs us, (p. 69,) that Captain Conyers was sent all the way from Deep River to apprise Marion "of his intended descent into South Carolina, and of the approach of Colonel Lee's detachment to co-operate in an attempt on the chain of British posts extending up the Santee and Congaree rivers." Now, as a combination was essential to the most effectual co-operation, it follows, that according to Mr. Johnson's book, Lee was expected to join Marion, when he marched from Deep River; and that he did not join him from views of self-preservation. In his *Memoirs*,* he declares he was instructed to join Marion; and it is probable the only authority Mr. Johnson has to reject his statement, is the inveterate desire he has to differ from him.

Marion and Lee, after the reduction of Fort Watson, betook themselves to the task of intercepting Colonel

* Vol. ii. p. 40.

Watson, who was on his march from Georgetown, with a detachment of four or five hundred men, and endeavouring to elude them, that he might throw himself into Camden: they were engaged in this service when the battle of Hobkirk's hill was fought. This disastrous event, our author approaches with querulous allusions to the injustice done to his hero, by American and British writers, who, from a malicious or imperfect view of it, are alleged to have amerced him of fame. These, it is said, charge Greene with having been surprised, while those "feebly, and perhaps, affectedly, deny it." This complaint appears to us to be totally groundless—nothing better than a stratagem, common with little country attornies, who, in order to produce an argument on one side of a question, undertake to fabricate a statement on the other. This fighting with his own shadow, is probably in respect to our author, "an old trick of his youth." The only British accounts we have been able to find, are those of Stedman and Bisset. The former says, * "The driving in of the pickets, gave them the first alarm of the advance of the British army;" and, "the enemy, though *apparently* surprised, and at first in some confusion, formed with great expedition, and met the attack with resolution and bravery." Bisset observes, "At ten in the morning, the British troops marched to the enemy round this swamp undiscovered." These

* Vol. ii. pp. 324-25.

authors it appears share the fate of their countryman, Oldmixon.

Ramsay, in his account,* does not intimate that it was a surprise; he only says, that Lord Rawdon sallied out with great spirit, and that an engagement ensued. Gordon† does not relate it as a surprise; and Marshall‡ observes: “Lord Rawdon gained the left of the American army without being perceived;” and, “his approach was announced by the fire of the advanced pickets.” Lee says:§ “His advance was never discovered until his van fell upon our pickets;” and, “although the army of Greene was *not surprised*, yet it was very suddenly assailed; no notice of the attack having been given until our pickets fired.” Here then are two British and four American authors, by none of whom is it termed a surprise. They appear to concur in describing it, as it really was, a sudden onset, which, though not unprepared for, was at that moment unexpected. Now, so far from discountenancing this idea, our author confirms it, (p. 71,) confessing that the troops were preparing their breakfasts, and drinking their rum; that the officers had retired to breakfast, and the general, (he is positive) “*to a dish of coffee.*” And he not only admits, that the approach of the enemy was first

* Vol. ii. p. 379.

† Vol. ii. p. 430.

‡ Vol. iv. p. 462.

§ Vol. ii. pp. 51 and 61.

announced by the firing of the videttes, (by a desperate salvo, called *distant*,) but avers, that from the nature of the ground; and the contiguity of the centinels, it could not happen otherwise. So that after all his jeremiads for the injustice exercised against his hero by preceding writers, he makes the very same statement that they do. What was fair in them was mean in him—the unpleasantness of justice, being very different from the awkwardness of flattery, or the blunders of insolence—and all we have to admire in this part of the Sketches, is the hapless dexterity with which their author makes his candour a sin, and his truth a deformity.

Marshall and Lee both allege, that the object of Greene was to draw Lord Rawdon out to attack him, and they only infer, as every body else of common sense must, that had his attack been apprehended at the moment it was made, he would not have found the American troops washing, cooking, and draming, nor their gallant general over his tea things.

It seems then, that Greene has neither been said nor admitted to have suffered a surprise on this occasion, and that its most remarkable characteristic was the spirited sagacity with which the attack was made by Lord Rawdon. That it was at least sudden and unexpected, as Marshall and Lee describe, and perhaps more so, may be gathered from the following passage of a letter from Greene himself; and from one from Colo-

nel Howard. Greene says,* "The enemy was discovered by a fire upon our pickets. The line was formed in a few minutes ready for their reception." Colonel Howard, in a letter to Lee of the 30th December, 1809, observes, "A drummer deserted in the night, and informed Rawdon of our situation. About nine or ten o'clock our stores arrived, and the men were dispersed, cooking and washing, when the attack commenced on our pickets, so that our men were never properly formed." In another letter, January 19th, 1810, he observes, "Your readers may judge as to our being surprised, but certainly the sudden manner in which the enemy came upon us, had the effect of a surprise, though it may not excuse the conduct of our men."

Now, what will the reader think of the modest assurance of this preliminary censure upon the narrative of Lee? (p. 72.) "That writers, who had not an opportunity of acquiring either official, *nor* contemporaneous information on the subject, should have been ignorant of many important explanatory facts, is not to be wondered at. But that Colonel Lee, who was so near the scene of action, and so soon after joined the army, should have given so inaccurate an explanation of the conduct of his friend and commander, can only be accounted for from a failure of memory," &c. With equal confidence he goes on, (p. 73,) "One of this writer's critiques upon the battle of Camden,

* Appendix C.

is, 'that hearing of the advance of Watson, his (General Greene's) artillery was sent in his rear, that he might be able to make a rapid and vigorous movement against this formidable reinforcement.' "

To this observation, there are at least two objections, that it is not the exact language of Lee, nor precisely his meaning; and that the remark it professes to repeat, is in no sense a criticism upon the battle. Lee does assert, before he describes the battle, that one of the objects of Greene in changing his position from the north to the east side of Camden, was to intercept Watson. This, our author denies and refers to, in the following indulgent language: "Now it ought to have been recollected by Colonel Lee, that General Greene had confided the care of Watson altogether to Marion and Sumpter; that he never doubted the sufficiency of either to cope with him, and that the true cause of a separation from his artillery, was his desire to equip Marion with artillery: a request for which had been pressingly urged upon him both by Marion and Colonel Lee himself, while they lay before Fort Watson, and at a time when they despaired of carrying the fort without it. Nor was the intelligence of Watson's advance, such as to create any serious alarm about his success in reaching Camden. He was still low down the country, near Monk's corner, and did not, in fact, cross the Congaree until after twelve days after. Marion knew General Greene could hold him in check on the east side of the Wa-

teree, and flattered himself with the hope, that General Sumpter would do the same in the west; nor is there a doubt that it might have been done. But a movement of General Greene's to the south of Camden, *which no one could explain*, has given rise to conjectures, explanations, and imputations, all equally groundless." This passage, it is true, abounds with evidences of ignorance, folly, and arrogance; but it is unusual to find one, even "in these Sketches," so completely destitute of truth. To demolish this baseless fabric at a blow, we have only to refer to the following letter from Greene to Lee, of the 22d: "Dear Sir, Last night I was informed that Colonel Watson was on his march by unfrequented ways from Pedee, with a view of throwing himself and party into Camden. We made a sudden movement this morning from the upper to the lower side of Camden, by a circuitous route, *with an intention to intercept the colonel and his party*, and have sent out parties in all directions, to see if we can learn any thing of them. We shall continue in this position, until we get intelligence whether Colonel Watson is on his march for this place or not. Our march was so sudden this morning, that Captain Pierce forgot to take the book of cyphers with him, which obliges me to write without them, and the baggage is ordered to Lynch's creek, too far to send for it; and our artillery is there also. They are both twenty miles from us; and I

have no way of either sending you a field-piece or ammunition. General Sumpter I have not heard of." This extract appears to furnish a pretty clear explanation of the movement, from the north to the south or east of Camden, of the cause of the cannon being sent into the rear, a full confirmation of Lee's statement; and seems likely to effect a complete explosion of Mr. Johnson's fabrication. It proves that the change of position was made for the purpose of intercepting Colonel Watson; that the artillery was sent into the rear for the double object of giving expedition to the movement, and security to the artillery; that, instead of its having been so disposed of, with a view (as Mr. Johnson affirms, and proceeds to explain, at a prodigious expense of invention and labour) of equipping Marion with artillery, General Greene deemed himself unable to expedite the field-piece, and considered this removal of the artillery to his rear, as an impediment to sending it; and that it was not designed for Marion at all, but for Lee, as this and other letters demonstrate, and as should have occurred to Mr. Johnson, from the inexperienced character of Marion's people, (half of whom would have mistaken it for an alligator,) and from the fact, that when these officers separated, Lee had possession of the field-piece; that the intelligence of Watson's advance was at that time sufficiently alarming to induce this inconvenient movement of the whole army; that so far from Greene's having confided the care of Watson to Ge-

neral Sumpter, he had not at that time heard of Sumpter; and that the statements, inferences, and explanations of our author, which affect to be drawn from the papers of General Greene, are the chimerical offspring of his own brain. As to Watson's not crossing the Congaree, "until after twelve days after," the truth is, that in the course of the expedition now referred to, he did not cross that river at all. Mr. Johnson himself, at the bottom of the page, contradicts the only remaining assertion in the passage, viz. "that General Greene never doubted the sufficiency of either Marion or Sumpter, to cope with Watson;" for he observes, "It was all important to send the field-piece to Marion, *in order to enable him to cross the Santee and meet Watson in the field*; the latter, he knew, was provided with artillery, and without it, the species of troops which Marion commanded, might be exposed to *alarm*," (Marion's men were terribly brave, if the enemy were not so rude as to alarm them,) "or disadvantage in the open field." This analysis of our author's *critique* upon the remark of Lee, shows how reasonable is the monitory observation with which he introduces it, "that Colonel Lee should have recollected" this series of fallacies—in short, that his recollection should have been as pregnant of error, as the judge's assertions are inconsistent with fact, and his speculations repugnant to reason.

Our author certainly has a right to expose himself as much as he pleases, and has a claim no doubt to

the gratitude of the mercurial part of his readers, for his self devotion to their amusement; but whether the dignity of this purpose will justify his liberties, not to say with the memory of Colonel Lee, but with that of Colonel Carrington, is a question he ought to have considered maturely before he consummated the falsification just exposed, by the following unfounded and injurious allegation respecting the conduct of this sage and excellent person, (p. 75): "An unfortunate measure that had been adopted by Colonel Carrington, now involved his commander in very embarrassing circumstances. The orders Carrington received, *ought to have detained him at Rugeley's mill*; and Colonel Harrison, who had now joined him with his artillery, *ought to have been halted* at the same point. This being but ten miles distant, General Greene was confident of being joined by them on the evening of the 24th." The exercise of invention is generally supposed to warm and elevate the mind, and we are accustomed to image to ourselves, the man who is animated by an abundance of this noble faculty, as rapt in a trance of meditation, or agitated by the intensity and elation of conceptions, new, vivid, and grand. Far different is the case with Mr. Johnson. The flatness of his language, is in direct proportion to the hugeness of his fiction; and from the tameness of his manner on the present occasion, his reader might be apt to suppose, he was conning a homely and confused, but a true account. A moment's consider-

ation however, of a passage just transcribed from Greene's letter of the 22d, will remove this inconsiderate confidence. The General, it will be found, informs Lee, that "the baggage is ordered to Lynch's creek, too far to send for it, and our artillery is there also. They are both distant twenty miles from us." On the same day that Carrington was left to conduct the artillery to Lynch's creek, General Greene conceived it was there, and twenty miles, not ten miles from him. He says too, it was ordered with the baggage to that place, and of course by himself. As Lee was the scape-goat at Guilford, Carrington is to atone the disaster at Camden. But the declaration of General Greene, will save from violation, the memory of this able and faithful officer. It is obvious, that after separating from the main army, he could not have reached Lynch's creek with the baggage and artillery, time enough to inform Greene, the same day, then twenty miles from him, of his arrival there. Nor is it probable such intelligence was required of him; General Greene having directed the movement, justly calculated when he wrote to Lee in the evening, on its having been accomplished; and as he ordered it, any consequent disaster is imputable, least of all, to Carrington, who executed it; not fairly to the general who enjoined it; but to the chance of war, which appears to have produced it by means of false intelligence, conveyed to him by accident or art. Colonel Carrington, though it seems should not

only have halted at Rugeley's mill, which was not on his route to Lynch's creek, but in violation of military language and subordination, should *have halted* Colonel Harrison there, who was his superior officer. And the judge, whose invention never fails him, declares that Greene was "*confident Carrington would join him the evening of the 24th!*" This observation, which probably has no foundation in fact, as the letters of General Greene indicate, shows another disadvantage under which the reader of the "*Sketches*" labours; for the author proclaims his possession of General Greene's papers, and affecting to be his biographer, is supposed to express his sentiments, when in fact, as on this occasion, he is uttering his own. His error in accounting for Greene's movement to the south of Camden, is not greater than the reasons he assigns for his return. These, it may be collected, from his language, are (p. 14,) "his despair of enticing Lord Rawdon to march out and attack him, and his consequent determination to invest Camden, by ordering up Marion, (with Lee and the legion in his pocket) and recalling Carrington. These reasons are absurd in themselves, and totally unfounded. The plain reasons were, that he found the intelligence of Watson's approach, which prompted his change of position, incorrect, and that a separation from his baggage and provisions was very inconvenient. On the 22d he tells Lee, "We shall continue in this position until we get intelligence, whether Colonel Wat-

son is on his march for this place, or not;" and on the 24th: "Camp before Camden—Dear sir, I wrote you by an express, night before last, on the south side of Camden, and soon after Doctor Irvine and Mr. Winstead set off to join you, and I desired Dr. Irvine to give you a particular account of things in this quarter, which I did not think proper to write. I informed you of the object of our movement, and of the situation of our baggage. Last night I got intelligence that Watson had gone to Georgetown; the moment I received it, I sent an express to Colonel Carrington, who is with the baggage, to send you a field piece, and a hundred pounds of powder, and four hundred pounds of lead, for the use of General Marion's corps, all of which, I hope will arrive safe, and I depend upon *your* taking such measures as will secure it in future." So much for the object of the movement, and the principal cause of the return; as for the concomitant one, Colonel Howard thus details it to Colonel Lee, in his letter of the 26th September 1810. "We were before Camden when we heard that Watson had passed you, and was pushing up the river to reinforce that place. To prevent his joining Rawdon, our baggage, provisions, and artillery, were sent off to Lynch's creek; and we moved round the town in the night, through the swamp to the east side, where we remained three or four days without provisions, except some trifling supplies, collected in the neighbourhood. We were obliged by the want of provi-

sions, to move to the west side of the town." So that the field officers, and it is probable, even the subalterns knew the object of Greene's change of position, and the cause of his return; both which, are so industriously obscured, or ignorantly mistated by his biographer.

His account of the engagement that ensued, is premised by a laudatory enlistment of the late General Davie, in his fatuous endeavour to disprove the "*surprise*," and by an industrious recurrence to the mischievous, painful, and dispiriting effects produced by the removal of the baggage to Lynch's creek, (falsely and directly attributed to Carrington, p. 75,) by a dark description of the ground, and an unfair estimate of the forces.

In regard to the strength of Greene, he reduces it below the account of Marshall and Lee, who make it about fifteen hundred. Mr. Johnson's enumeration makes it not more than twelve hundred, and although Marshall avouches the accuracy of his estimate* and demonstrates the error of Gordon by a distinct and explanatory reference to the official return of the 26th, our author, true to the training of an attorney, and inveterate in his desire to *compound*, rather than to describe General Greene, after advertising the "*escape*" of the official return of the 25th, adheres to the erroneous statement of Gordon, and attempts to corroborate it by this declaration, (p. 78,) "General Greene

* Vol. iv. p. 515.

repeatedly asserts that the force of the combatants was nearly equal;" and "that Lord Rawdon's is generally estimated at nine hundred men." When a judge of the Supreme Court deliberately and strenuously makes an affirmation, however incredulous, we dare not contradict him, unless when backed by his own authority, or that of General Greene; that of some respectable eye-witness, or of some accredited historian. In this case of very flagrant deviation from probability, we might do it on the credit of the following extract from Greene's letter describing the action to Colonel Lee. "At the commencement of the action, I was almost certain it would prove the enemy's ruin, *as well from the superiority of our force*, as from the advantages of the ground." We are not disposed to triumph at this *slip* of the judge; and shall, therefore, direct the attention of the reader from his disagreement with General Greene to his inconsistency with himself. At page 72, it is declared, (and in the face of every thing like common sense,) "Marion's advance towards Camden, *brought on the affair of Hobkirk's Hill*." P. 78. "This belief," (in Lord Rawdon, that Greene had no artillery on the 25th,) "was founded upon intelligence from a deserter, who had found his way into Camden the night before, and this intelligence *is known to have produced his resolution to attack*."

Lord Rawdon advanced in one line, having his wings supported by columns of chosen troops, with a

small reserve of cavalry and recruits. His van consisted of a few American riflemen, or sharpshooters, a disposition, for which our author, who seems to be under the impression that gunpowder was invented in Carolina, affirms, he was indebted to a "*hint* from Morgan." The latter, it seems, had, at the Cowpens, stationed marksmen in his front, and was so treasonable as to inform Lord Rawdon of it, who, without this *hint*, could never have formed such an original plan. After all, the judge, who is himself great at a *hint*, does not say that his lordship ordered them to aim at officers; and expressly affirms, that Morgan did not at the Cowpens. (vol. i. p. 378.) He insinuates, however, that Lord Rawdon, on this occasion, did order his marksmen to aim at American officers; and upon the strength of it treats his readers with the following farrago of sentiment, logic, and language, all in his happiest style. (p. 79.) "The fall of two of the best American officers," (Washington and Howard?) "in the very commencement of the battle, was the acknowledged origin of the disorder which followed." This has already been imputed to Carrington's misconduct. (p. 75.) "Happy it is for man, since wars enter into the dispensations of Providence, that measures, exceptionable in the eyes of humanity, must ultimately recoil upon him who uses them. Under the consciousness of this truth, the advanced centinel paces his ground with little apprehension, though he knows his life to be in his adversary's power; and under this

consciousness, the soldier quenches his thirst from the stream that flows by his enemy's feet." This is too much for us—and we confess ourselves at a loss to discover the least glimpse of fact, feeling, or reason, in the whole passage; nor any object for its being thrust into the way of important events, but as a convenient addition to the bulk of the volume. It may be asked, however, what exemplification the life of Morgan, who is represented as the founder of this abstruse system of warfare, afforded of its retributive inhumanity; or whether it has ever recoiled on Lord Rawdon; and in what manner the consciences of the soldier and of the centinel, are concerned in the operations of pacing or drinking, particularly the latter, even according to his new metaphysics, if the enemy is posted down stream. The judge might have prolonged this effusion by adding, that under the *consciousness* that Lord Rawdon was quiet in Camden, General Greene was drinking his coffee, and his men washing their clothes, when in fact the enemy were upon them. Our author's description of this fight is not worse, as might be supposed, than his previous performances. In so far as it differs from other writers, as to matters of fact, it consists mostly of the addition of particulars, related without reference to authority, respecting the personal conduct of General Greene, of which some are incredible, and the rest doubtful. The first one affords a farther illustration of the inconvenience of Mr. Johnson's custom, of affecting to

express the sentiments of Greene, when he is probably furnishing the reader with his own, and stating them too, as motives for Greene's conduct—as for instance, (p. 80,) “Greene conjecturing that the enemy was unapprized of the arrival of his artillery,” (in justice, Carrington ought to have the credit of this,) “had closed the two centre regiments upon the road, so that the artillery was completely masked.” No other author knew or heard of this stratagem, nor is it probable Greene ever thought of it. But Mr. Johnson is determined to have a design in every thing, and will not let us believe that General Greene crooked his finger or curled his lip, without a deep plan. His three pieces though, when unmasked, “vomit showers of grape,” and the enemy are thrown into “*conspicuous* confusion.” “The orders that followed,” we are told, “were delivered” precisely “in one breath,” and that is the only possible way of accounting for their absurdity; as General Greene never could have deliberately uttered such nonsense; the grossness of which was so striking, that Colonel Washington, instead of “*making for their rear*,” in disgust, no doubt, “disappeared among the trees.” The orders thus ejaculated in one breath by Greene, are repeated in four by his trusty biographer. “Let the cavalry *make for their rear*; Colonel Campbell *wheel* upon *their* left, and Colonel Ford upon *their* right, and the *whole* centre charge with *trailed* arms.” Not to mention the blunder of directing one body of

men to *wheel* upon the right or left of *another* body, the *charge with trailed arms*, is enough to prove that no general ever uttered this absurd order, but that it must have proceeded from a judge; and silly and romantic as it is, it could not be exceptionable in such a work as the “Sketches,” had it not been dotted as a repetition of Greene’s words. We are next induced to suppose, that the wings of an army *may* sustain themselves, even if they are outflanked; for our author lays it down as indisputable, that when *the wings of the wings* “are enfiladed, disorder necessarily follows.” There are some remarks unfavourable to Colonel Washington’s conduct after he “disappeared among the trees,” derived, it appears, from the late General Davie, which are at variance with General Greene’s account of it.

Lord Rawdon’s force being small, and a considerable part of it absorbed in forming the supporting columns and the reserve, his front of necessity was very narrow; of which Greene, quickly perceiving it, essayed to take advantage. Accordingly he ordered the regiments under Colonels Ford and Campbell on the extremities of his line, to turn the enemy’s flanks, and the two centre regiments, under Gunby and Hawes, to advance with trailed arms, and charge him in front; while Washington was directed to make a detour to the left, and attack his rear. The fire of the artillery seemed likely to ensure and augment the success of these evolutions. But Rawdon, to counteract the im-

pression on his flanks, suddenly displayed his supporting columns, and continued to press forward. At this moment, Gunby's regiment exhibited some irregularity; manifestly, in returning the enemy's fire; some companies moved forward with more animation than the rest, and Captain Beatty leading one of those, a fine officer, was killed. Gunby, for the just purpose of restoring the requisite order to his regiment, instead of pushing on the lingering, unfortunately drew back the forward companies; when the entire regiment, either dispirited by the backward motion, or misled by the order directing it, gave way in trepidation, unmindful of its former fame, forgetful of its acknowledged prowess, and regardless of the reproaches and exertions of Williams, Gunby, and Howard.

The second Maryland regiment under Colonel Ford, checked in their attempt to outflank the British right, by the prompt and powerful extension given to it by Lord Rawdon, fell into disorder upon seeing the veteran first retreat, and leave them severed from the line; and fairly gave way, upon the fall of their colonel, in his attempt to rally them. On the right also Campbell's regiment had recoiled, upon the advance of the supporting party, on the enemy's left. Yet the second Virginia regiment under Hawes, was still advancing with spirit and order, and the artillery was doing great execution. But the British, availing themselves of the retreat of Gunby's regiment, and the confusion of those of Ford and Campbell, threatened

to take Hawes in flank, and to capture the artillery. Upon observing this, General Greene, always collected in danger, perceived and submitted to the mortifying necessity of ordering a retreat. Gunby's regiment having been re-formed below the hill, those of Ford and Campbell were brought to rally upon it, the whole covered by the regiment of Hawes, which retired firing. The artillery, rescued by the gallantry of the light infantry under Captain Smith, and a bold and seasonable charge by Colonel Washington, was brought off.

General Greene ascribed his defeat to the order of Gunby, for his advancing companies to retire. At the colonel's request, a court of inquiry investigated his conduct. They reported, that his spirit and activity in the action were unexceptionable, but that the obnoxious order was improper and unmilitary, and probably occasioned the loss of the day.

It is hardly worth while to notice the frothy heroics in which our author relates the "acts of Greene;" that "he seized the drag-ropes of the artillery;" that "he stood almost alone, amid a shower of bullets, issuing orders;" (soliloquies chiefly, we should imagine,) "sometimes with Campbell's regiment," sometimes with Captain Smith's light infantry, "dragging off the artillery."

In his letter to Lee of the 28th, the general assigns himself a different station, and other employment. "The first Maryland regiment being a little disorder-

ed, had orders to retire a few rods: this threw them into disorder. The second Maryland regiment, seeing them fall back, soon got into disorder also, and the whole retired off the ground. This encouraged the enemy, who before were retiring, and they pushed on and gained the top of the hill; and the artillery was obliged to retreat. Colonel Hawes' regiment was then advancing in tolerable order, within forty yards of the enemy, and they in confusion in front, but from the enemy having gained their flank by the retreat of the Marylanders, I was obliged to order them to retire also, to save them from being cut to pieces. *I was with this regiment myself*, and they suffered more than all the rest. Colonel Campbell's regiment got disordered about the same time that the Maryland troops did, but *by his exertions, and Captain Pierce's, my aid*, they were soon rallied, and the whole of the troops rallied at different times, but not in such order, or with such spirit, as to recover the misfortunes of the day." We have already alluded to the pomp and power of language, with which our author describes the opening of the battle, and the terrible destruction occasioned by the cracking off of Greene's three field pieces—and previously, it was attempted to illustrate the inexperience of Marion's artillerists, by intimating the probability of their mistaking a field piece for an alligator. This conjecture might appear extravagant, perhaps irreverent, if it were not observed, that their distinguished compatriot, the judge himself, evidently considers

a cannon a quadruped; for in speaking of the fugitives from Camden, he says, (p. 85,) they "made off on the *artillery, or other horses*," an assurance which sheds a very satisfactory light on the worthy author's notion of *flying artillery*.

It is asserted, upon the authority of the late General Davie, that Colonel Washington, instead of assailing the enemy's rear, charged a mixed multitude of "doctors, surgeons, waiters, and the loose trumpery of an army," and paroling and bearing off these, lost the opportunity of charging the British rear, and "in fact could do nothing." Yet General Greene, in his letter to Lee, three days after the battle, remarks, "Colonel Washington never shone upon any occasion more than this. He got into the enemy's rear, and took upwards of two hundred prisoners, whom he found retreating, and in the course of the day made several charges, and cut to pieces their dragoons." And Captain Pierce, on the day of the battle, writes, "Colonel Washington made a timely charge, and cut down a number of them.*"

* Colonel Howard, who yet survives to assert the fame of his companions in arms, has furnished the following observations in regard to this passage of the Sketches, (p. 82.) "General Greene, in his official communication, asserts, 'that Colonel Washington penetrated into the enemy's rear, found them flying in confusion, and made two hundred prisoners'—yet there is every reason to believe it was founded in error." "What authority," says Colonel Howard, "the judge had for his belief, is best known to himself; but I assert, upon the authority of

Our author, besides giving us some of his own *english* in his account, favours us with a new military idea, and a cause of ovation, unknown to the Romans. It appears, that when a defeated general happens to save his own artillery and ammunition waggons, they are to be styled "the trophies of victory." It is further contended on the same authority, that Lee's *critique* upon this action, is "perfectly unfounded." It is to this effect*—That Greene exhibited an imprudent confidence, in detaching Washington before the course

Washington himself, that Greene's statement is correct. No officer was less liable to boast than Washington, nor was there one whose veracity could be less doubted. He did penetrate into the enemy's rear, and found them flying in confusion. The judge endeavours to contradict this, by observing, "there is no cause to conclude that any one of the British corps was broken *entirely*." They however were partially broken, and Washington found some wounded, and others without wounds, making their escape. They said, in excuse, that their army was beaten. When he found that Greene had retreated, he had to take care of himself, and as the prisoners could not be brought off, he was under the necessity of putting them to death or releasing them : he chose the latter, only paroling the officers. As to Washington's having made a circuit too extensive, it is evident from the nature of the ground between Hobkirk's and Logtown, it being covered with thick underwood, that cavalry could not act in it with effect. Washington was therefore obliged to move round to the commons. The absurdity of cavalry charging infantry in a thick underwood, was shown at Eutaw. The judge has not given the whole of Greene's letter, which is to be found in Tarleton. He only refers to a part, to contradict it."

* Memoirs, vol. ii. p. 66.

of the action began to develop itself, from the support of his own army, upon an extensive circuit against the British rear. That had this formidable officer been at hand, when Gunby's regiment failed, the consequent advance of the enemy would have been checked, the rallying of that regiment facilitated, and the victory secured.

Notwithstanding the opinion of General Davie, we cannot help thinking these observations justifiable, as well upon general principles, as by the case to which they are applied. It is by no means certain, that had Washington reached the rear of the British line, as soon as General Davie thinks he should have done, an impression of great magnitude could have been made upon it; as he would have been at once encountered, if not repelled by Coffin with the reserve, which being composed partly of infantry, would have given a superiority in woods. Had he even been resisted and delayed, it would seem, that the want of immediate support to Gunby's regiment, and to those affected by its panic, (to afford which, the presence of Washington, in whom our author elsewhere properly observes, "the confidence of the soldiery ran so high, that they were fearless under his protection," would have been sufficient,) was a greater misfortune in the critical and decisive evolutions, then in execution against the enemy's front, than any partial discomfiture of their rear could have balanced. And, indeed, the cavalry might have charged with no less success, the front

of the enemy, advancing with confidence and in some disorder, than their rear, at least partially protected by the reserve under Coffin. It may also be observed, that much precious time was necessarily consumed in accomplishing the movement Washington was directed to make, and that his absence, left the American line entirely unsupported. So much for the particular case; as to the general principle, it is obviously sound, is founded on the broadest maxims of prudence, and happens to coincide with the reflection of Polybius on the defeat of Asdrubal the son of Amilcar. "The greatest part of generals and princes," says that wise historian, "when they are ready to engage in a decisive action, place continually before their eyes, the honour and advantages that may result from victory; and consider only how they may best improve each circumstance, and in what manner they shall use the fruits of their success; but never turn their view upon the consequences of a defeat. Now, hence it happens, that commanders, through the want of this attention, have often been defeated with disgrace and shame." He even extends the duty of this providence, to the regulation of the general's personal demeanour, in case of disaster. General Greene on this occasion, Lee considered, thought too much of improving victory, and too little of preventing defeat.

It would be hard to find, except in the work we are considering, a bolder contradiction than exists between the two following reflections: one justifying

Greene's caution at Guilford, the other palliating his temerity at Camden. Tarleton had observed, that if, after the rout of the second battalion of guards, at Guilford, Greene had advanced with a brigade of continentals, he would probably have gained the victory; upon which Mr. Johnson exclaims, (p. 19,) "But how could the American commander venture with untried troops, upon so hazardous an enterprize? If it succeeded, victory would certainly follow; but if it failed, his own destruction was certain. This was a misfortune which he was resolved no prospect of advantage should expose him to. His firm adherence to this resolution, as well at this point of time, as on the repulse of Webster, is not the least honourable trait of his character exhibited on this memorable day." "He that governeth his own spirit, is more honourable than he that taketh a city." At page 95, he affirms, "*But an officer must count on the courage and promptness of his troops, and with these united, in carrying these movements into effect, they could scarcely have failed.*" This doctrine, it is not improbable, would have succeeded at Guilford—at Camden, it was pressed rather too far.

Captain Smith, demonstrated by Mr. Johnson, (p. 96,) "so altogether the soldier"—but probably better known as the officer who killed Colonel Stuart, of the guards, at Guilford, was taken in the action at Camden, and the British commander having been informed that he was guilty of murdering an officer and three

privates, had him imprisoned. But as soon as this information was contradicted by the American officers, Washington and Howard for example, Smith was released. This, it would seem, was all as it should be. Lord Rawdon was right in confining, and right in releasing him. But the transaction has a very different appearance to our author, and is represented with his usual illiberality, and almost in his worst style; and at the same time, General Greene's hanging five militia deserters, is strenuously defended. We have not the smallest doubt that General Greene, who was as humane as he was gallant, was perfectly justifiable in the exemplary punishment of these unhappy men; yet we cannot help noticing the sudden change of temperament which his biographer undergoes.

But we are again reluctantly led to a more tedious and important question—the contested invention of the plan of transferring the war from Deep river to the Santee. It was before observed, we should not be the first to affirm, that Lee actually did originate the plan alluded to, but that our remarks on that occasion, would be directed to prove that the claim respecting it, which had been advanced in his behalf, was rather strengthened than weakened by the disquisition of Mr. Johnson. In prosecuting, and it is hoped concluding, the discussion, we shall not be permitted similar reserve, or a renewal of the subject under the same limitation. Trusting that the principal

mistakes and misstatements of our author, which are likely to bear upon it, up to the departure of Greene from Deep river, have already been sufficiently exposed, we shall abstain, as much as possible, from reconsidering them; and shall take up the discussion from the point at which he recurs to it—first advising the reader, that he is not to expect either method or succinctness; and that the difficulty of attaining even perspicuity, will be by no means slight. For the positions of our author, though not strong, are hard to be got at—are so abattied by a confusion of expletive and unmeaning words, of statements, not connected but entangled, exclamatory, and yet ambiguous—of insinuations instead of assertions, assertions instead of arguments, and arguments instead of facts, that even an able disputant would probably expend the greater part of his force and diligence, in bringing his observations to bear. The discussion is renewed by an attack upon the following passage of Lee's Memoirs: "General Greene, heretofore soured by the failure of his expected succour from Sumpter, now deeply chagrined by the inglorious behaviour of his favourite regiment, converting his splendid prospects into a renewal of toil and difficulty, became, for a while, discontented with his advance to the south. He sent orders to Lieutenant Colonel Lee, to join him forthwith, and indicated by other measures, a disposition to depart from his adopted system. As soon as the capitulation for the surrender of Fort Watson was

signed, Lee, followed by his infantry, hastened **to the cavalry, still in front of Watson*, and on the subsequent morning, was joined by Brigadier Marion, who had been necessarily delayed until the prisoners and stores were disposed of." Then follows (p. 100.) this modest denunciation of every affirmation in the passage, and in those connected with it. "In these passages, as well as *in all the subsequent narrative*, of the causes which led to Watson's successful evasion, the official documents are before us to prove, that Colonel Lee is altogether incorrect, not only as to the conduct and views of Sumpter, but even as to his own movements and those of Marion."

After an insidious disavowal of the charge of wilful misrepresentation, he thus hugely exaggerates and distorts the substance of the passage so formally denounced: "Errors, which represent himself as actually keeping up the conflict, while his commander was meditating flight, or exhibiting an indecision which led to the most unfortunate consequences." It would not be worth while to point out the fairness both of temper and argument, indicated by connecting the contested accuracy of Colonel Lee's remark respecting the indecision of General Greene, with his own activity at the time; if it did not illustrate the dignity and discrimination of the author's mind. To substantiate this reprobation, a letter from Greene to Marion of the 27th. is given, in which, among other things, the

* Italicised by Mr. Johnson.

latter is told, (p. 103,) "What has happened will make no alteration in our plan of operations;" and "you will cross the Santee, or detach Colonel Lee, and direct your force as information or circumstances may direct," &c. to which Mr. Johnson annexes this formidable conclusion, (p. 104,) "this letter needs no comment. It proves Colonel Lee's mistake, as to General Greene's views, his error as to his own movements, and his subordination to Marion." To embrace, in the present examination, all the less important observations of our author, connected with it, we shall here introduce extracts from his postscript, in which he industriously reverts to this subject. After admitting (P. S. p. 5,) that Lee did communicate the plan of the descent upon South Carolina, while the army was at Ramsay's mills, through Dr. Irvine to General Greene, he reaffirms that Lee was then apprized it had been previously conceived and resolved on by the General; adding, as a new proof of this old and exploded assertion, "This he expressly avows in a letter written subsequent to the battle of Camden." "This letter purports to be an answer to one, which if it could now be produced, would effectually clear up this mystery." So that after affirming positively, repeatedly, and throughout his book, that it is clear to demonstration, General Greene did originate the plan, and relying on a letter from Lee to confirm the demonstration; in the next breath, he confesses it is *yet a mystery*, which the recovery of a do-

ument that he professes to consider irrecoverable, alone can clear up! In this progressive vacillation, he continues, "General Greene, who had nothing but the good of the service in view, was very indifferent about arrogating to himself the *merit of measures*," (a new species of merit.) "It was enough for him, that they tended to the good of the service, and were executed with vigour. To this end, *he frequently availed himself of the stimulus given to the exertions of men, by the responsibility of having originated the measures they were called upon to execute.*"

This last assertion has the advantage of resting exclusively on the authority of Mr. Johnson; and however worthy of regard, especially at the *end* of the *Sketches*, is hardly admissible in a description, which could have no existence, if that assertion were of any weight. It has the further advantage of displaying the dialectical skill and candour with which our author can reason from a general to a particular assertion, and then back again from a particular to a general assertion, without the expense of a single fact, or the smallest disbursement of truth. The reader is convinced that Colonel Lee did not really suggest the return of the army to South Carolina, in spite of all Dr. Irvine or Colonel Lee may have declared or witnessed, by the assurance that it was the habit of General Greene to induce his officers to believe he was indebted to them for plans, which he himself had previously resolved on; and should he be diffident of the existence

of this shrewd and singular habit of the general, the case of Colonel Lee is a case in point to exemplify it. Our author proceeds, "It is more than probable that at this time, when Lee was ordered across the Santee, under Marion, to pursue Watson and the attack on the posts, that part of the plan of the descent into South Carolina, (or perhaps the whole of it,) was called from its having been so ably and warmly (though injudiciously as to time) pressed by him in his letter of the 3d of February. But it appears that, on this occasion at least, he understood his commander;" (when did he not understand him?) Then follows the letter from Lee—"Swamps of Black River—Dear General, General Marion has determined his route towards Santee. From hence we march to Benbow's ferry, on the Black river, thence to Wright's Bluff, near Fort Watson, where we cross the Santee. Whether we move down that river, or up the Congaree, future intelligence will determine. *You do me great honour in calling the adopted plan mine. I have no pretence to such distinction. It gave me great pleasure to know that my sentiments coincided with your intentions, and this honour I claim.** I am so convinced of the wisdom of the operation, that no disaster can affect my opinion. Hitherto all is well, and nobody to blame but General Sumpter. I do not conceive how you can assimilate any part of my conduct to this gentleman's, especially when you recollect, that

* Italicised by Mr. Johnson.

by my own request, I am under General Marion; and that next to the commander in chief, the commanding officer of the expedition has praise. If we are baffled in our schemes, it will be owing to the delay in execution. General Marion has wrote you the report concerning Cornwallis." In a note on this letter, it is observed—"In another letter of the 20th, Colonel Lee writes, may fortune be propitious to your bold enterprize."

In passing, it is but justice to point out the extreme ardor with which the judge investigates truth, and the unbiassed view with which he regards this subject. He here makes use of a conformity of phrase, perfectly fortuitous, to enforce his interpretation of the writer's opinions on another point. But the reference to the date of Lee's letter, intentionally vague as it is, will enable the reader to detect the imposition attempted on him. This 20th must have been the 20th of April, or the 20th of May. If the former, Lee certainly had allusion, not to the general plan which had been adopted at Ramsay's mill, but to the *particular enterprize* springing out of it, viz. the siege of Camden, which General Greene was then conducting. If the latter, which is probable, he undoubtedly had reference to the siege of Ninety Six, against which Greene was at that time moving.

Mr. Johnson continues, (P. S. p. 9,) "There is another remark which this letter suggests on this subject. It appears that Greene had complimented Lee.

by a comparison with Sumpter. But would such an idea have occurred to him, had he been at the time as Colonel Lee asserts, 'soured by the failure of his expected succour from Sumpter.' The truth is, General Greene's feelings towards that officer at that time, have been wholly misrepresented. General Greene, instead of being 'soured with him,' *actually viewed with great admiration*, the vigour of the measures which Sumpter was then prosecuting on the Congaree, and hence the compliment tendered to Colonel Lee by the comparison." We have thus placed before the reader, the obnoxious passages of Lee's Memoirs, and all the positive and intelligible statements by which Mr. Johnson has assailed them, at the same time, detaching certain makeweights, by which the latter appeared to be encumbered. And as it may probably conduce to perspicuity, we shall consider the subject in three aspects, and shall examine *whether our author has correctly interpreted the remarks he excepts to; whether in their fair and unperverted meaning, they are not entitled to full credit; and whether his opposing statements, are supported by fact, reason, truth, or probability.* In regard to the first point, it will be at once perceived, that he has given a very inaccurate version of Lee's language, by alleging, that he "represents his commander as meditating flight, or exhibiting an indecision which led to the most unfortunate consequences." Lee observes,*

* Vol. ii. p. 67, and 68.

“General Greene became *for a while discontented* with his advance to the south—*indicated a disposition to depart* from his *adopted system*—sorely as he felt the severe disappointment, *he did not long permit his accustomed equanimity* to be disturbed, nor could his *strong mind, long entertain suggestions, growing out of adverse fortune.* Persuaded that his movement upon South Carolina was, under all the circumstances of his situation, the most promising of good to his country, he determined to adhere to his plan of operations with firmness, and to obliterate his late repulse, by subsequent success. *Fixed in his purpose,* he despatched an officer to meet Lee, countermanding his orders.” These expressions, so far from representing Greene as *meditating flight, or exhibiting a disastrous indecision,* appear to be modulated with singular care, to indicate the slightest and most transient state of mental hesitation, controlled by the reflections of a prompt and vigorous judgment, and succeeded by a firm and generous resolution to overcome adversity by decision, and to repair disappointment by perseverance. The reasons assigned for this momentary uncertainty, if consistent with the real state of things, are fully adequate to produce it in the firmest mind; and if consonant to Lee’s sincere impressions, are sufficient, clearly, to exempt him from exposure to the imputation, of having injuriously and selfishly misrepresented his general.

This remark leads to the second point. That Ge-

neral Greene was *soured* by the failure of Sumpter to join him before Camden, and to succour him with more promptness and vigour than Greene now conceived he had done, it will be difficult even for Mr. Johnson to deny, after reading the following extracts from his letters to Colonel Lee. In his letter from the mouth of Rocky river, on his march to Camden, supposed to be dated the 10th of April, he says, "General Sumpter will have a thousand men to join us by the 20th." On the 20th, the day after he had reached the vicinity of Camden, "I have heard nothing from General Sumpter;" on the 22d, "General Sumpter I have not heard of. I wish you could learn where he is, and inform me;" on the 24th, "General Sumpter has not joined the operations as early by above a week, as he promised, which lays me under great disadvantages. Had he been down as early as was expected, the garrison of the Congaree's could not have escaped."

This party got into Camden three days after Greene had set down before it, and without this accession to his force, Lord Rawdon, bold as he was, could not have ventured to sally, and must have surrendered. Again, after his defeat, "General Sumpter has got but few men. He has taken the field, and is pushing after little parties of tories, towards Ninety Six. Major Hyrne is gone to him, if possible, to get him to join us. But this, I know he will avoid, if he can with decency." If it be possible still to believe that the

state of Greene's mind at this time, in relation to General Sumpter, is odiously depicted in the passage quoted from Lee, let it be recollected that its terms do not express a direct displeasure with that officer, but are limited with, perhaps, excessive strictness, to the indication of discontent at his conduct—excluding any unfavourable construction of it. “Soured by the failure of his expected succour from Sumpter,” does not determine whether, in the contemplation of Greene, Sumpter's failure proceeded from improper motives, or from uncontrollable events. But the tenor of his letters just referred to, conveys disapproving solicitude and specificated censure, a disapprobation of what he did, as well as of what he failed to do; and disrespect of the motives by which he was influenced. So that Lee has, in reality, used language softer than Greene's, in regard to Sumpter, as it will be found he fell short of the terms of decided reprehension in which his inquiries on this subject were answered by Greene's most intelligent and confidential officers. Colonel Howard writes to Colonel Lee, 26th September, 1809—“Greene always attributed his defeat near Camden, to Sumpter's failure in joining him. I have perhaps given an unnecessary detail of facts to show, that General Greene had much cause to complain of Sumpter.” January 15th, 1810: “Sumpter certainly had great merit; and I shall, upon all occasions, freely acknowledge it; but he might have done more. His not joining us at Camden, was

a great fault. He would not act in a subordinate station. Again—If he had joined us, Camden might have been completely invested, and must soon have fallen. Reinforcements got in that way, which would have been prevented, if Sumpter had been there.” And Colonel Carrington, who Mr. Johnson declares, stood higher in the confidence of General Greene than Colonel Lee, and who, as well as Colonel Howard, was in the defeat at Camden, writes to Lee, March the 10th, 1810—“As to Sumpter’s failing to join Greene, I can only say that he did not to my knowledge; and that Greene constantly complained of it.” General Davie, who was also at Camden, observes, in a letter of the 20th February, 1810—“As to the ‘*cause*’ of General Sumpter’s not joining General Greene while he lay before Camden, I can only give *my opinion*, viz. that it was owing to his dislike or unwillingness to be under the command of any man, and his preference to a wandering desultory sort of warfare.” That Greene was deeply chagrined by the inglorious behaviour of Gunby’s regiment, as well as its immediate consequences, would, it is presumed, be indisputable, even if he himself had not declared it. It may then be asked if the establishment of these propositions, to wit, that Greene was “soured at the failure of his expected succour from Sumpter,” and “deeply chagrined by the inglorious behaviour of his favourite regiment converting his splendid projects into a renewal of toil and difficulty, of doubt and dis-

grace," does not, *of itself*, render the succeeding one, if not certain, at least highly probable. Was it not the natural and almost inevitable consequence of this unexpected state of things, that General Greene should become, "for a while, discontented with his advance to the south"—a measure, whose adoption was influenced, if not decided, by a calculation upon Sumpter's instant and powerful co-operation?

To fortify, however, the internal evidence of accuracy in the observation just recited, the following extracts from two of General Greene's letters to Colonel Lee are relied on. The letters are without date, but are supposed to have been written about the 28th and 29th of April,* although these dates do not concur with the ostensible date of a letter to Marion, published by our author. While they answer the immediate purpose for which they are introduced, it is probable, that taken in connexion with Lee's letter in reply to them from the Swamps of Black River, they will settle, though not to Mr. Johnson's entire satisfaction, the great question to which the present discussion relates. In the first letter, General Greene says, "Dear Sir, I have just received your letter of the 19th, two of the 23d, and two of the 27th—I note all their contents. You know best your own situation and your own wishes, but you are not well informed of mine. I have run every hazard to promote your plan of operations, as well to oblige you, as from a persuasion the

* Appendix C

public service would be benefited by it." In the second—"Dear Sir, Your letter of the 28th has just been received. You write as if you thought I had an army of fifty thousand men. Surely you cannot be unacquainted with our real situation. I have run every risk to favour your operations, more perhaps than I ought—clearly so, if I had not my own reputation less at heart than the public service in general, and the glory of my friends in particular. I wrote you an account of the affair of the 25th last evening. I am as strongly impressed with the necessity of pushing our operations on the west side of the Santee as you can be, but the means are wanting—we want reinforcements—you want detachments. I beg you not to think of running great hazards; our situation will not warrant it. If we cannot accomplish great things, we must content ourselves with having avoided a misfortune. General Sumpter has got but few men; he has taken the field, and is pushing after little parties of tories towards Ninety Six. Major Hyrne is gone to him, if possible, to get him to join us, but this I know he will avoid, if he can do it with decency, for the same reasons that you wish to act separately from the army. Should he join us, we shall be strong, and go on with our blockade with security. I cannot agree with you, that the farther south we go the better. The posts on the Santee and Congaree should be our great object. I am still afraid whether the Earl will quit his footing in North Carolina to come to the aid of his posts here. Once more let me warn you to be cautious."

In his answer to these letters, Colonel Lee observes, "You do me great honour in calling *the adopted* plan of operations mine. I have no pretence to such distinction. It gave me great pleasure to perceive that my sentiments coincided with your instructions, and this honour I claim. I am so convinced of the wisdom of the operations, that no disaster can affect my opinion. Hitherto all is well, and nobody to blame but General Sumpter. I do not conceive how you can assimilate any part of my conduct to this gentleman's, especially when you recollect that by my own request I am under General Marion, and that next to the commander in chief, the commanding officer of an expedition has praise. If we are baffled in our schemes, it will be owing to the delay in execution."

These letters from General Greene, it is first to be observed, must impress every reader that they were dictated by a mind ill at ease—were written by a man far from being contented with his situation—and who felt a querulous aversion to the course of measures he had undertaken, and an impatient distaste to the counsels by which his correspondent was inciting him to its prosecution. That course of measures, the plan resolved on at Deep river, is clearly described by Lee in his *Memoirs*; and the dimensions and features with which he invests it, are either expressly recognized, or not disputed by Mr. Johnson, (vol. ii. p. 35, et passim). By reference to the *Memoirs*,* it will be found

* Vol. ii. p. 31 to 36.

that the base of the plan was to break up all the enemy's field-posts in South Carolina; confine all his forces to Charleston, Camden, and Ninety Six; and by cutting them off from mutual communication, and from supplies of all kinds, to accomplish the surrender of the two last at least; and that one of its principal objects was the recovery of Georgia.

From this view of the plan, it must at once appear that Greene was discontented with it, and indicated a disposition to abandon it; as well from the prevailing tone of his letters, as from the following passages in particular. "You know best your own situation and your own wishes, but you are not well informed of mine." Now, Mr. Johnson does not deny that Colonel Lee was well acquainted with the object and design of General Greene, from the time he marched from Deep river, until after his defeat at Camden. For him to be ignorant of them, they must have varied—therefore, when General Greene now tells Lee that he is not well informed of his (General Greene's) wishes, Lee must have understood him to say, *My wishes have changed, and you are no longer so well acquainted with my plan as you imagine. It is now different from your's.* He goes on: "I am as strongly impressed with the necessity of pushing our operations on the west side of the Santee as you can be, but the means are wanting." That is—*I am still convinced the plan was a wise one, if we had the means of prosecuting it; and am sensible of the expediency of*

extending immediately our operations in conformity to the first design, to the west side of Santee, against the enemy's garrisons at Fort Motte, Fort Granby, and Ninety Six—which last, it must be remembered, was one of the three fundamental points of it. In the same tone he adds: "If we cannot accomplish great things, we must content ourselves in having avoided a misfortune." "I cannot agree with you the farther south we go, the better. The posts on the Santee and Congaree should be our great object." That is—*We must give up all thoughts of wresting Georgia from the enemy, as we once proposed, and limit our UTMOST HOPES to the conquest of the posts on the Santee and Congaree, and make their reduction our GREAT OBJECT.* "I am still afraid whether the Earl will quit his footing in North Carolina, to come to the aid of his posts here." The meaning of this sentence is somewhat obscured by the extreme carelessness of the writer, but it certainly amounts to this: *I am still afraid Lord Cornwallis will return upon us, although we have not yet heard of his approach, and therefore am the more inclined to limited and cautious measures.* And he concludes: *Let me warn you once more to be cautious* Now, one of the hypotheses involved in the plan was the return of Cornwallis to the south; and it was said by General Greene, three days before his defeat at Camden, to have been that consequence of his movement, which he preferred; and the apprehension with which he now speaks of it, indicates unequivocally a

change in his views. In consequence of this alteration in his intentions, Colonel Lee mentions that he was ordered to join the army forthwith, an assertion having all the marks of verisimilitude; for it is to be observed, that the letters we are now considering, do not explain the *utmost extent* of General Greene's mental departure from his original plan, but only the doubt and deviation remaining after he had read, and as he says, "noted all the contents" of Lee's two letters of the 27th, and one of the 28th.

Having formed opinions still more at variance with the original plan, it is incredible that a man of his diligence and decision, should not begin to reduce them to practice, in which operation the first step necessarily was to call in Lee's detachment.

But as our author not only denies and reprobates this declaration of Lee's, but in his zeal to controvert it, refuses the smallest credit to two surviving officers* of the legion, to relieve him from the necessity of thus transferring his indignities from the dead to the living, and to place the subject in a still clearer light, we must detain the attention of the reader yet longer on these extracts. After complaining of Sumpter's delay, he says, "Major Hyrne has gone, if possible, to get him to join us; but this I know he will avoid, if he can with decency, for the same reasons that you wish to act separately from the army." Thus reproaching

* Dr. Matthew Irvine, of Charleston, and Judge Johnston, of Clarendon, Va. See Charleston City Gazette, May 1822.

Lee for his disinclination to comply with the order he had sent him, "to join the army forthwith;" and even satirizing the reasons he had urged for persevering in the plan, and promoting, in conformity with it, his operations against the posts below; by referring them to such irregular motives as he supposed influenced General Sumpter. This plain construction of General Greene's expressions will be confirmed, by considering the import of Lee's reply to them. His letter is without date, but our author, by a very abstruse computation of time, and a delicate balance of probabilities, (P. S. p. 6,) *determines*, that it was written on or about *the 31st of April!* His ingenuity in ascertaining its sense is not less striking. The mild but irresistible terms in which Lee rejects the comparison made between his conduct and that of Sumpter, Mr. Johnson conceives, acknowledge a compliment in the comparison, and express the pleasure which it conveyed. But when he comes to the passage which he has marked in italics, it appears he can look into a mirror without seeing its reflection. In answer to Greene's remark, "*I have run every hazard to promote your plan* of operations," &c. Lee observes, "You do me great honour in calling *the adopted plan* of operations mine; I have no pretence to such distinction." Any man but Mr. Johnson, in expounding this letter, even without those to which it answers, would have remarked at the first view, that if Lee modestly disclaimed the honour of the plan, General Greene

had candidly acknowledged his right to it. But our author, wanting the sagacity to discover, or the dignity to comprehend, these liberal sentiments, considers the expressions alluded to as an incautious confession, or as an unqualified statement of the fact, and, as such, proceeds to reason triumphantly upon them; not perceiving, that his injustice to Lee involves the most dangerous slander upon Greene, viz. the false and pusillanimous cruelty of palming upon his inferior officer, at a moment of chagrin and disappointment, the odious responsibility of having proposed and inculcated a disastrous plan of operations, which he himself had originally and spontaneously projected. To save the memory of General Greene from the foul partiality of his biographer, and to defend the reputation of Lee from his feeble malice, it will be proper to furnish a more detailed and accurate explanation of this letter. It speaks of the plan as the one which Greene had *adopted*, but not *conceived*, and may thus be interpreted: *You do me great honour in calling the plan of the campaign mine; the suggestion was mine, but from the moment you adopted it, the plan became yours; and you are not consistent in relinquishing it as a project of mine, when you must remember that at the time I proposed it, you acknowledged it coincided with your great design of liberating the three southern states—appeared to hold out the surest means for effecting your purpose—and fell in with the preparations you had made for pursuing Cornwallis into this state, when you apprehended*

he would return to Camden. The plan then being clearly yours, it behoves you the more to adhere to it. I am so convinced of its wisdom, that no disaster can affect my opinion, as your defeat appears to have affected yours. But in spite of that misfortune all is yet well, and nobody to blame but General Sumpter. You have no right to say that my conduct is influenced by selfish or lawless ambition, since by my own request I am under General Marion, and whatever my service or good fortune may be, he and you will reap all the glory. If we fail, it will be owing not to any defect in the plan, but to delay in its execution.

This is evidently the true meaning of Lee's expressions, and while it corresponds with the letters of Greene, it shows clearly that the plan was proposed by Lee, and *adopted* by Greene; that the latter became naturally enough discontented with it, after his defeat at Camden, and was reassured by counsels, which appear to have been so communicated, as to satisfy the obligations of truth, the duties of patriotism, and the arts of address, without violating the privileges of rank, the claims of friendship, or the charms of modesty.

But it is possible, Mr. Johnson, whose book shows that he can assert or deny any thing, may insist that the expressions in Greene's letters, "*I have run every hazard to promote your plan of operations*"—and "*I have run every risk to favour your operations*"—relate exclusively to the particular operations of Marion and

Lee. If this construction were even plausible, after reading Lee's reply, Mr. Johnson would be debarred the benefit of it, by his own book; for he insists that Lee was in strict subordination, and actual inferiority to Marion, and in detailing their operations, represents them altogether as Marion's. And further, he says very emphatically in his postscript, that when Colonel Lee wrote this letter, "he understood his commander." But Colonel Lee's letter proves, that General Greene alluded to the great plan upon which they were then proceeding. Independently, however, of the construction derived from Lee's letter, what meaning would there be in the words, "*I have run every hazard to promote your plan of operations, every risk to favour your operations, more perhaps, than I ought,*" &c. if the application be restrained to the particular enterprizes in which Lee was then engaged? General Greene had done nothing to favour *them*, except to send one field piece, and one hundred pounds of powder, and four hundred pounds of lead. He had even been unable to despatch a party of recruits belonging to the legion, from his inability to arm them. His biographer, indeed, does declare, that he moved to the south of Camden, in order to facilitate and secure the conveyance of this field piece *to Marion*; but that declaration, we proved by General Greene's letters, to be a most outrageous misstatement; the enormity, temerity, and desperation of which, bespeak a motive much more deep and involved, than the

general propensity to defame Lee. Our author declares, (p. 69,) as we have already noticed, that from the 14th of April, until the siege of Fort Motte, Colonel Lee acted under the command of General Marion. The substance of this assertion, has been disproved by General Greene's letters; but Mr. Johnson is so conscientious, as to confess its falsehood in his postscript, (p. 6.) He there says, "the letter also, in which Lee requests to *be put under Marion, bearing date on the 23d,*" &c. Considering this and other wilful departures from fact, the careful suppression of the material and striking parts of Lee's letter of the 3d of February, the provident and extraordinary effort made to connect Greene's unfortunate movement to the south of Camden, with his endeavour to furnish Lee and Marion with a field piece, the vague unfairness with which Lee's letter of the 20th is referred to as evidence on a subject, to which Mr. Johnson knew it could not relate, and other insidious or flagrant practices against Lee, which have been already exposed, we shall be entitled to the credit of forbearance and courtesy, when we refrain from charging Mr. Johnson with being in possession of the letters now produced, and to which Lee's from the swamps of Black river is the answer.

Our claim, on this score, will be not a little strengthened, when the reader observes, that Mr. Johnson has also asserted, (p. 69,) that no copies exist among General Greene's papers, of letters to Lee, from the

14th of April until the siege of Fort Motte, which was commenced on the 8th of May;* and yet afterwards confesses, (p. 104,) the existence of a letter to Lee of the 4th of May, requiring him to join the army. Again—the improbability of this assertion militates grievously against its small remaining pretensions to credit. Among the papers of Colonel Lee, there are found no less than eight autograph letters from General Greene, and two official ones from his aid, Captain Pierce, between the 19th of April and the 6th of May; several of them, besides their intrinsic importance, are marked on the envelope, “*public service;*” and of one duplicate was received. Of these it is strange that no copies are preserved, especially as our author declares in his preface, the papers of General Greene, both official and private, had been *preserved* and *husbanded* with the greatest care, and expresses (p. 35.) astonishment at the loss of the single letter of the 26th of January; while here he is not in the slightest degree surprised at the disappearance of ten, and both the one and the ten written when Lee was co-operating with Marion. When we forbear to accuse him of fraud upon the world, and of injustice to Lee, in suppressing these letters, and arguing against their existence, and in opposition to their spirit, we hope to satisfy the obligations of discretion and propriety, and to observe a dignity of literary deportment, of which the scope and design of his book affords no

* Gordon, vol. iii. p. 194

example, and with which his weak and wily attack upon Lee stands in hideous contrast.

To return from this digression—It is probable the reader is now convinced that our second point is made out, viz. that the description given by Lee of the state of General Greene's mind, immediately after the battle of Camden, is entitled to full credit; and, moreover, that Lee did suggest, and General Greene adopt the plan of transferring the war from Deep river to the Santee. As to the honour of originating this design, it will appear, that Lee, instead of setting up a false claim to it, as our conscientious author would have the world believe, has actually declined preferring a true one—has disavowed the distinction, as far as a sense of historical truth would allow. He observes *it was proposed* to General Greene, but does not claim it as his own. Truth did not permit him to say less, nor modesty suffer him to say more—but Mr. Johnson seems to think, that justice to Greene required, a neglect or violation of both these virtues.

Before quitting this subject, it may not be improper to remark, how exactly the conduct and dispositions of General Greene and Colonel Lee corresponded to their respective characters, of natural and fosterfather, to this plan. The fervour of Lee's conviction of its efficacy, rises almost to instinctive assurance. General Greene's persuasion of its expediency, is the delicate result of anxious deliberation, obnoxious to events, subject to doubt, and liable to modification. "I am

so convinced," says the former, "of its wisdom, that no disaster can affect my opinion." "I am still afraid," says the latter, "Lord Cornwallis will return upon us. I have risked more than I ought, already, in promoting your plan of operations. I believe it was a wise one, but we have not means to execute it. We must relinquish the hope of great successes, and be content with avoiding misfortunes." Again, admitting, what is more than improbable, that both simultaneously or independently conceived the plan, it was natural, as has been already intimated, that General Greene, acting upon higher responsibility, upon a more extensive course of care, duty, confidence, and reputation, should be affected by despondency and irresolution; to which Colonel Lee, from the limited range of his official accountability, would not be exposed. The man who risks a large stake, cannot be expected to endure a run of ill luck, with as much calmness as he who ventures a small one. Besides, General Greene had suffered an unexpected and mortifying defeat; while Colonel Lee was receiving daily congratulations on his success.* Under these circumstances, it is not to be wondered that the confidence of Lee was lively and buoyant, and the mind of General Greene anxious and troubled. In consequence of this state of despondency and dissatisfaction, he sent orders for Colonel Lee to join him forth-

* Letters from Colonels Williams and Carrington, Captains Pierce and Pendleton, and from General Greene.

with, either apprehending a second defeat, or proposing an immediate departure from his *adopted plan*.

The third point remains to be considered—and of Mr. Johnson's observations upon it, there will be no difficulty in showing, that not one is supported by reason, fact, truth, or probability. He first undertakes to disprove the assertion, that General Greene *indicated a disposition* to change his plan, by adducing a letter from General Greene to Marion, in which the latter is told, *what has happened will make no alteration in our plan of operations*. Even if this expression did not admit of a different interpretation, and did not imply, that previously to its date, Greene *had intended* an alteration in his plan, yet granting the construction desired by Mr. Johnson, it is liable to this fundamental objection, viz. that a letter from Greene to Marion, cannot, with any show of reason, be admitted as a fair exponent of his real designs on the occasion alluded to. To suppose otherwise, would involve the opinion, that General Greene was as destitute of sagacity and prudence, as, in reality, he was distinguished for these qualities. Is it to be imagined that an officer of his judgment and experience, his patience, equanimity, and fortitude, upon apprehending that he had committed a momentous military fault, the consequences of which seemed likely to be dangerous, and sure to be disreputable, would, upon the instant, reveal to the commander of a fugitive, fluctuating, and uncontrollable body of allies, the alarming impression? Would he not studiously conceal it from

him, until the measures of reparation or security, which he might devise, should be in the course of execution; and disguise it from him, even then, if possible? And would not his reserve and concealment be the more strenuously practised, in order to keep the militia in heart and in the field; the greater the peril, and more mortifying the pressure of his embarrassment? This argument then, might be dismissed as unreasonable, because it is inconsistent with the actual and necessary relation between Greene and Marion; and because its very enunciation is in the nature of a *petitio principii*—incompatible with the proposition which it professes to examine, and is intended to refute. It is liable, however, to other exceptions. It appears to be dated the 27th of April, and begins thus: "Captain Conyers has just arrived in camp, and says that reports are below, that we were routed and dispersed;" and continues to correct the exaggerated account which Marion *had received* of the defeat.

Now there is probably some error in the date of this letter as given by our author, for in his postscript, (p. 6,) in pursuing the very refined calculation by which he adjusts the date of Lee's letter to *the 31st of April*, he declares Marion and Lee did not get intelligence of Greene's defeat until the 28th, while on the 27th, Greene is correcting the intelligence which a messenger from their camp, says they *had* then received. Again, in the first of the two important letters from

Greene to Lee, which were replied to by his letter from the swamps of Black river, General Greene acknowledges the receipt of his letters of the 27th, and in the second, that of the 28th. In this last, he says, "In my letter to General Marion of last evening, I desired him *either to detach you,*" &c. Now this letter must have been written after the 28th. for General Greene says he had received the letter of the 28th from Lee, and it is probable, had he received and answered it the same day it was written, he would have said, *I have received your letter of to-day.* Nor is it probable, that the interchange of letters was as quick as this supposition would require; for in his letter of the 2d of May, Lee observes, "I have the honour of your letter of *yesterday.* It is the first that ever arrived in time—the express has done his duty." Therefore when Greene says "in my letter of *last evening to Marion,*" he means of a date subsequent to the 27th, probably the 28th, after he had received Lee's remonstrance against a change of measures. In addition to these exceptions, there is a radical defect in all this part of Mr. Johnson's work as to dates. Both in his book, (p. 104,) and his *nota bene*, he makes, and reasons on the assertion, that Lee did not hear of the defeat before the 28th, when it appears, that Major Pierce, by direction of General Greene. informed him of it by a letter of the 25th, in order to put him on his guard against any attempt Lord Rawdon might make to relieve fort Watson.

It is hardly probable, this communication would be more than two days on the way—at least, it is inconsistent with the supposition, that the letters from and to Lee, while on Black river, should be received on the same days on which they were respectively written. It is possible, but the probability is against our author. He next observes, (p. 103,) “*The immediate cause assigned by Colonel Lee for the successful evasion of Watson, was the execution of the order sent to him, requiring him to join the army forthwith.*”

Here we have nothing stronger than truth, to oppose to Mr. Johnson's assertion. Colonel Lee *does not assign* his recall to the main army, as the immediate cause of Watson's successful evasion; but only as the *conjectural cause* for his being able to cross the Santee the first time, without being attacked. His words are: “Drawing off on the night of the 24th, he” (Watson) “placed himself at a considerable distance from his enemy, before the change of plan was discovered. Nevertheless, he would have been pursued, with the expectation of falling upon him, before he could make good his passage of the river, had not the general's orders, directing the junction of the corps under Lee, arrived, which necessarily arrested the proposed attempt upon Watson.”

In reference to this extract, of which he first distorts the meaning, and to Lee's previous assertion, that his cavalry under Rudolph, was kept in front of Watson during the siege of the fort of that name, our

author thus continues: "This account is wholly irreconcilable with time and place; for when Watson crossed the Santee at the lower ferry, Fort Watson had not yet surrendered; *this*" (he means *that*,) "was on the 21st, and it is on the 23d that the capitulation bears date. Nor would *distance have admitted of the rapid movement* necessary to throw the cavalry in front of Watson, since the ferry at which the British colonel *crossed it*, is not less than sixty miles from the place where the American detachment lay. It is unnecessary however, to refer to circumstances, to detect the error of Colonel Lee, since we have positive evidence, that on the day after the surrender of the fort, Colonel Lee's cavalry was with Marion at the High Hills, and his infantry ten miles in their rear;" (here in a note he says, "Marion's letter of the 24th April, ante,") "at this period, Watson was on his march from Georgetown to Monk's corner, (a post on the same road with that to Charleston,) and forty miles below Fort Watson."

There is so much contradiction and absurdity in this passage, that it will be consulting the ease of the reader to examine short sections at a time, and to point out in the first place a contradiction, which, although it renders the whole extract incredible, embarrasses the application of any strictures upon it. Marion's letter to Greene from the High Hills, informing him that "Colonel Lee's cavalry is here," is dated in the note, the 24th of April; but in looking

back, as the note directs, to page 100, it is dated the 25th; and although dates appear to be very much in the judge's power, it is less difficult to suppose the letter was dated on neither of these days, than on both. Let us suppose, however, it was dated the 25th. He says, at this time Watson was on his march from Georgetown to Monk's Corner, and that he crossed the Santee, at the lower ferry, on the 21st. Now, by his own map, the distance from Georgetown to Monk's Corner, by the lowest ferry, cannot exceed forty-five miles; and of this distance, the road from Georgetown to the ferry is the greater part. So that Watson, who was moving with the utmost possible expedition, in order to succour Lord Rawdon, crosses the Santee on the 21st, and on the 25th, that is, four days after, he had not reached Monk's Corner, a distance, at the utmost, not exceeding thirty miles. This is not to be believed, and the whole account may be assumed to be fabulous.

In four days of April, Watson no doubt marched at least seventy miles. His solecism, in saying "*distance* would not have admitted of the rapid movement of throwing the cavalry in front of Watson," is exposed, by the obvious truth, that the greater the *distance*, the more rapid the movement required. But certainly no particular distance is determined, when we predicate of one body of troops, that it is in front of another, marching towards a certain point. When Watson pushed up the east bank of the Santee, to

get into Camden, a hostile detachment, occupying any point on his line of march, was in his front—so that the objection from calculation of distance, does not apply; the attempt to enforce it, denotes a strange ignorance of Lee's meaning, and as we have seen, is conducted upon a plan, itself inconsistent with both time and distance.

But our author says, that the day after the surrender of the fort, Lee's cavalry was with Marion at the High Hills, and his infantry ten miles in the rear. Independently of the falsified date, which destroys this assertion, either by supporting or opposing it, it is inconsistent with reason; for Marion wrote his letter in the morning, and says, "I left Colonel Lee's infantry ten miles in the rear, last evening, and expect them up this morning;" which would require the infantry of Lee to march thirty miles, according to Mr. Johnson's map, between the evening of the 23d and the morning of the 24th, while the corps of Watson could not accomplish, a distance of thirty miles, in four or five days.

It is observable in the whole of this disquisition, that our author maintains his original inadvertence to the character of Lee's Memoirs—its expression mostly of contemporaneous conclusions, as they were formed by the mind of the writer at the time the transactions he refers to occurred. With his usual logical weight and vigour, he proceeds: "If any further evidence of the colonel's inaccuracy on this point be necessary, it

is to be found in two letters from him, dated the day of the surrender—the one before, the other after that event—in one of which he says: ‘Watson is in Georgetown, and dare not venture towards Camden;’ and, in the other, ‘to-morrow we march for the High Hills of Santee.’” The purpose which these extracts are intended to answer, is not discernible from their effect. The first proves only that Lee was liable to receive false intelligence; and the fact is, that in addition to his own peculiar share of that incommmodity, General Greene kept him regularly supplied from head quarters—he himself being overstocked with it by Lord Rawdon, doubtless, and the tories. In other respects, both these extracts militate against the judge, for he has already affirmed, that Watson, after leaving Georgetown, crossed the Santee on the 21st.

Now the first of Lee’s assertions in these extracts is, Mr. Johnson must have known, either erroneous or true. If true, it proves the fallacy of his whole account of Watson’s movements, up to this time, as well as of his dependent and collateral statements. If incorrect, as it no doubt was, it exposes the deceptive readiness of our author, to reason from positions that he knows to be false. By the second assertion, which is not disputed, the doubt in regard to the date of Marion’s letter is heightened, and a diversity established in the movements of himself and Lee, greater than Mr. Johnson can account for, unless he will admit that Lee was ordered to join the army about this time,

and proceeded consequently toward head quarters. As two different dates are assigned to this letter, it is probable both are wrong, and that it was written on the 26th; that at the time it was written, Lee was absent, and on his way to head quarters; for Marion says, "Lieutenant Colonel Lee's cavalry is here. His infantry I left ten miles below;" intimating strongly, by not mentioning Lee, that he was absent, and implying also, that Greene knew where he was. Marion certainly would have said *Colonel Lee is here with his cavalry*; or even if he had been with his infantry, that would have been mentioned; and if he had been absent for any object other than to repair to head-quarters, or in obedience to an order from Greene, General Marion would not have failed to inform Greene of it. In his letter of the 23d, Lee says, "to-morrow we march for the High Hills of Santee;" and adding this general expression of an intention to the paragraph first recited from Marion's letter, our author is impressed with this conclusion,—“that Colonel Lee marched with Marion for the hills, and there continued with him, until he received advice and orders from Greene,” (of the 1st of May,) “is therefore incontestible”—whereas, Colonel Lee only declares the general intention of moving the whole detachment in a certain direction, the next morning, and Marion intimates, in the strongest manner, that he was not at the High Hills when his letter was written; circumstances which, instead of invalidating, corroborate

the account in the *Memoirs*; from which it appears that, in the evening of the 23d, as soon as the capitulation for the surrender of Fort Watson was signed, Lee departed to join his cavalry, posted on the direct route to Camden; and that Marion marched the next morning toward the hills; that some time on the 26th, while Lee was either waiting the approach, or preparing for the pursuit of Watson, he received orders to join the army; that he hastened forward immediately, in obedience to them, and that night, after proceeding thirty-two miles, met an officer bearing General Greene's revocation of the order. That Marion had proceeded in the mean time to the High Hills of Santee, and troubled by the absence of Lee, and the gloomy report of his messenger, plunged, on the 27th, into the swamps of Black river; that then, either in consequence of hearing from Greene, or from motives of persevering attention to Watson, who it was apprehended might pass the Santee near to its head, he returned with his amphibious followers toward that point, and was rejoined by Colonel Lee, on his way from the vicinity of head quarters. That apprehensive, and awed by the prowess of Lord Rawdon, they repaired again to the swamp of Black river, where Lee received and answered General Greene's letters of the 28th and 29th, having previously dissuaded any departure from the plan, urged its vigorous execution, and provoked the reproachful comparison, ("compliment,"

says our author,) with the haughty distance of Sumpter.

There is nothing inconsistent with this hypothesis, even in the "Sketches," except the following remark, (p. 104,) "A letter on the files from Colonel Lee, of the date of the 27th, proves that he had not on that day, heard of the battle." The uncertainty at what point our author's conclusions from any given premises, will terminate, having been already repeatedly exemplified, we shall not be expected to place the smallest reliance on this assertion; as it is very probable, the letter, if produced, would prove, that the writer had heard of the battle, both by rumour, and from Captain Pierce; but had not received a detailed account of it. For Greene's letter of the 28th, as was before observed, presupposes that Marion had heard of his defeat. The danger of depending on Mr. Johnson's confused and distorted summaries; of trusting to his unconst and disastrous endeavours to convey in his own dialect, the meaning of another person, is signally manifested by the succeeding passage. After mentioning Lee's letter of the 27th, he continues, "and another of the day following, acknowledged that he had," (heard of the battle.) "But the latter contains a positive acknowledgment that he had then received no such order;" that is, the order to join the main army. Now, let the reader attend to this positive acknowledgment—"I am with General Marion, who has moved to this place, thirty miles from you.

in consequence of your orders. I am ignorant whether you mean to comprehend me in your orders or not. I have my hopes that you will order me and Major Eaton to pass the Santee, and pursue the conquest of every post and detachment in that country. I think such a line of conduct necessary, or the storming of Camden unavoidable. If you prefer the latter, I wish to be with you." It is needless to ask if there is a possibility of collecting from this passage, even the slightest acknowledgment, that the writer had not received, a day or two before, an order to repair to head quarters, which had been countermanded?

On the other hand it implies, by the words, "I am with General Marion, who has moved to this place," that Greene was aware of Lee's having been recently separated from Marion, and that Marion had made a movement during that separation. If Mr. Johnson will include Lee's letters in the number he threatens to publish,* particularly those previous and subsequent to the 28th, beginning with the siege Fort Watson, and ending with that of Fort Motte, it will probably be found, that not one of them, except this, informs General Greene that *Lee is with Marion*. The ardent solicitation to prosecute the original plan, shows too, that the writer was impressed with a lively persuasion that the mind of Greene had regained the purpose from which, firm as it was, an unexpected defeat, and the distance of Sumpter, had caused it to swerve; and that

* See National Intelligencer, 22d February, 1823.

it was susceptible of its former high and generous resolution. Accordingly, the most vigorous measures—such as the storming of Camden—are proposed; which an officer, of the prudence and address attributed to Lee by Mr. Johnson, never would have suggested to Greene, at a moment when he had simply, and for the first time, heard of his disheartening defeat. “But,” adds our author, “letters from Colonel Lee of the 2d and 4th of May, explain this mystery.” It is not worth while to swell the list of detected absurdities and contradictions, by reminding the reader of the admission in the postscript, that the mystery here to be explained remained even then a mystery. His explanation, as might be expected, is calculated only to darken and perplex—by confounding, or attempting to identify, a conditional order of the 1st of May, for Lee to join the army, and a positive one of the 4th, with the previous and peremptory order issued just after Greene’s defeat. The attempt, in regard to the former of these orders, proceeds upon a total and open disregard of Lee’s assertions, and instead of explaining or refuting them, rudely contradicts them; and the latter is encumbered with a false statement that would disable it, if it had force or application. He says, when Lee received it, Watson had actually passed the Wateree—when it is evident, from the concurring declarations of Colonel Lee who opposed, and of Lord Rawdon who desired, his arrival at Camden, that he did not cross the Wa-

teree at all. The manner, too, in which these orders of the 1st and 4th of May are alluded to, recalls to mind a collateral point of no little importance and curiosity. We have already noted the sudden disappearance from the official files of General Greene's letters to Lee, at the moment when their exhibition might have frustrated the happy and connected designs of subjecting him to the control of a provincial brigadier, of excluding him from the high and supereminent place he held in the councils of his general, of discrediting his book, perverting his candour into envy, his modesty into arrogance, and of defrauding his memory of the glory of having projected a campaign, which the genius of Scipio could not have disdained. Here it is said, that the order of the 1st of May is acknowledged by Colonel Lee, and is known to have been issued by that acknowledgment, and a letter to Marion; and then it is admitted that a copy of the order of the 4th is preserved. The suspicions of inaccuracy on this point increase as we reflect, that Mr. Johnson copies Greene's order to Lee of the 4th of April, (p. 36,) under which the legion led the way to Carolina, and in which Greene says, "I will transmit you a copy of figures to write to me by, and shall write to you by the same table." And in his notable *nota bene*, (p. 3,) he observes, "We have the most satisfactory evidence, that as soon as Colonel Lee received his orders from General Greene to penetrate into South Carolina, Dr. Irvine

was the messenger" (this barbarism is put for officer or gentleman) "despatched to General Greene to receive a cipher for their future correspondence."

Now it would seem passing strange, that after so much preparation for a correspondence, General Greene should have deviated from his uniform custom of retaining copies of his military and even private letters, at the very moment, when those to Lee were becoming more than ever important. It is fortunate for our author, that in his postscript, he should have been able to divine the meaning of a material part of this lost correspondence, and to provide against its recovery, by admitting the probability that from Lee's activity and zeal, in the campaign, that part of it which he conducted, or even "the whole of it" (P. S. p. 5,) was called his. And it is no less fortunate, that having determined the re-appearance of the correspondence, for a period not earlier than the order of the 4th of May, he should have been able to refer to a letter to General Marion, for the exact import of the one of the 1st, at both which periods Lee was with Marion; particularly as Lee, in acknowledging this order of the 1st, does not intimate that it was communicated by General Marion; but replies to it directly as a letter from Greene, and especially, as the terms of the letter indicate the probability, that Marion knew nothing about it; and as the tone of trust, affection, and reliance, which it breathes, while it would have been at variance with the idea inculcat-

ed throughout the *Sketches*, of Lee's inferior standing in his general's confidence, might have persuaded most readers to believe, that this affection and reliance were habitual, and had been warmed and strengthened by very recent experiments. This opportune abolition, and subservient restoration of "our official files," we cannot help admiring as most lucky management on the part of the author of the *Sketches*, and connecting them with other evidences of similar dexterity, we forbear not to crown our praise of his felicity, by an encomium borrowed from his own bright pages; and to confess that we esteem it "a concoction in design." It is recorded of Cæsar, with whom, "under covert" of Morgan's pine log pen, it will be remembered, our author tried to scrape an acquaintance, that when he found a man was fortunate in his affairs, he set him down at once as prudent; deeming the success of every one's designs, the effect not of choice, but of judgment. We shall not then act unadvisedly, when we acknowledge, that in the conduct of this nice and dangerous attack upon the reputation of Lee, our author has been indebted more to prudence than fortune, more to discretion than chance.

It has been already intimated, that for the purpose of defeating the scheme of the judge, it was enough to prove that Lee originated the great plan of returning to South Carolina; and that in order to overthrow his subsidiary argument, it was not necessary to

prove, or even to suppose the existence of the order for Lee to join the army immediately after Greene's defeat at Camden. The argument is, that he never became dissatisfied with the plan, nor indicated a disposition to depart from it, having conceived it himself, and being of course disposed to adhere to it invariably, both from judgment and predilection, before the 10th of May. To this point we recur, and now proceed to establish it.

It is admitted, (p. 104,) that upon receiving a report that Lord Cornwallis was moving from Wilmington to the upper country of North Carolina, or directly toward South Carolina, General Greene sent orders to Colonel Lee to abandon his operations against the posts below, and to join the main army. On the 1st of May, he writes to Lee a letter, which we quote for the very reason that our author overlooked it. "Camp near Rughley's—My dear Colonel—This is a most critical moment. The movements of Lord Cornwallis, and the detachment from below, place us in a disagreeable predicament. Colonel Washington's horse is exceeding weak; therefore, the moment you get intelligence that Tarleton can reach Camden, begin your march to join us. We have fallen back about fourteen miles from Camden, and I have it in contemplation to cross the Wateree, where subsistence can be had in greater plenty than on this side," &c. To this anxious, fluctuating letter. Lee replies with his customary energy and per-

suasion. “Benbow’s ferry, on Black river”—My dear general. “Be assured that no difficulties and prospects, shall prevent my joining you on the first notice of his lordship’s approach, or the arrival of the cavalry. It appears dubious what his lordship intends; his pride will urge him to continue the prosecution of his plan for the campaign, however repugnant to the interest of his king. If he adopts this conduct, we must prove to the world, how feeble British conquests are, and force mankind to admire the vigour of your operations. Much will depend on us, and no human exertion shall be wanting. I feel an assurance of brilliant success, which will be pleasing in every point of view, but especially as it must tend to make happy, a general struggling, without materials, against a well appointed veteran army. The movement you have in contemplation, I hope may be carried into execution. It will countenance our proceedings, give a face of vigour to your operations, and will render my junction much more easy,” &c. The writer, it is to be observed, besides the encouraging spirit of his letter, evinces strong approbation of General Greene’s intention to pass to the west side of the Wateree, inasmuch as that comported with his own urgent desire to penetrate further south, seemed more conformable to the original plan, than falling back from Camden, and less like retreating. On the 4th, General Greene having received further information of the approach of Cornwallis. despatched a positive order to Lee to

join the army with his whole detachment, and to bring the field piece; leaving the way open for Watson, abandoning the plan of reducing Camden, and of demolishing the posts below it—at a time too, when Cornwallis must have been six or eight days march from him; and when he says, it was doubtful, according to the report, whether he was advancing toward Camden, or pushing for the American magazines, on the upper route. But in either case, he directs Lee to join him. With this order, which involves a total departure from the original plan, caused, no doubt, by the repulse from Camden, our author says, Colonel Lee did not comply. If he had, it is certain Fort Motte would not have been reduced, and the campaign would have eventuated very differently.

The statement here given and corroborated, is frequently implied in the "Sketches," and particularly in the postscript, (p. 8,) where the following confusion of unfounded assertions and glaring inconsistencies, occurs. "The approach of Lord Cornwallis, so far from rendering Greene discontented with his advance to the south, was the very event which he anticipated and wished to bring about. *His retreat before him was indispensable*, as he had not succeeded in his *coup de main* against Camden, and to retreat and leave Lee's *command* behind him would have been equally hazardous to himself and that detachment." If any one could be persuaded, by this naked assertion, to believe that Greene desiderated the return of

Cornwallis upon him, at the very time he found himself unable to make head against Rawdon, the solicitous and troubled terms in which his apprehensions of that event are expressed, would undeceive him. On the 29th of April, "I am still afraid whether the earl will quit his footing in North Carolina, to come to the aid of his posts here." 1st of May—"My dear Colonel, this is a most critical moment; the movements of Cornwallis, and the detachments from below, place us in a disagreeable predicament. Colonel Washington's horse is exceeding weak." If more proof on this matter were required, it would be supplied by the judge himself, who confesses that the consequences would have been an immediate retreat. General Greene had marched then from Deep river, dared, toiled, and suffered before Camden, for the inestimable reward of being encompassed by superior enemies, and forced to a disgraceful and hazardous retreat; leaving no vestige of the republic behind him, but a deeper crimson on the field of Camden, Lord Cornwallis more absolute than ever south of Virginia, and the outworks thus demolished, liberty assailed in her very citadel. It is true, that when Greene undertook the expedition to South Carolina, the project was likely to be attended by one or the other of two consequences, either of which, was then deemed desirable; one, that Cornwallis would follow Greene to Carolina; the other, that he would prosecute his meditated invasion of Virginia. But even then, the

second was preferred, and after the defeat at Camden, which was certainly not calculated on, and the non-appearance of Sumpter with his thousand men, who were calculated on, the first was deprecated with sincere apprehension and concern.

On the other hand, the second event—Cornwallis's invasion of Virginia, was viewed as the more probable, and the more advantageous consequence; and by it, the force and lustre of the movement were to be unfolded. It substituted Lord Rawdon's detachments, for Lord Cornwallis's army and these detachments; converting the former into the standard of British power in the three southern states. The means of Greene having been calculated to match Cornwallis, rose into imposing preponderance, when thus brought into opposition with Rawdon; a preponderance which, of itself, discouraged and disconcerted the enemy, alarmed their adherents, intimidated their well-wishers, gave an air of superior fortune and generalship to the American commander, spread submission before him to the Santee, and gleamed conquest, popularity, and awe, to the farthest limits of Georgia. And so irresistible was the design, that although its execution was defeated in two cardinal points, by the wonderful spirit and vigour of Lord Rawdon; although Greene, with the main army, did not succeed in a single effort incident to it, yet the enemy, twice demonstrated to be masters of the field, were rebuked by its genius, and vanquished by its

strength. They drove Greene from Camden with disgrace and slaughter—they offered, and he declined battle; but the power of the plan, aided only by the swift, though subordinate successes of Lee, either combined with Marion or alone; forced Lord Rawdon to yield the upper district, and leave Ninety Six and Augusta to their fate. And when fortuitously reinforced, he marched with his characteristic boldness and celerity, to the relief of Ninety Six, Greene, repulsed in his assault, was obliged to confess his inferiority, and to retire; the paramount energy of the plan could not be resisted; and combined with the successes of Pickens and Lee at Augusta, forced Lord Rawdon *medio in triumpho*, to acknowledge the fate of royalty, and precipitately to abandon all the upper country. While Greene's base of operations, instead of being the distant frontier of Virginia, became translated to the strong western district of the three southern states. From a misconception of the outlines and spirit of this design, our author is persuaded that a resolution to pursue a new course of measures, founded upon the conjectured return of Cornwallis, is no deviation from the original plan; when his return had been deemed and reasoned upon, as one of the two consequences, against the effect of which its execution was modified to provide. So it still remains clear, that even if Greene did not, immediately after his defeat, order Lee to join the army, he felt *a disposition to depart from his adopted system*, in consequence of that event.

If he had prospered in that battle, Camden and the British must have fallen into his possession; master of Camden, with Lord Rawdon defeated, cut to pieces, or taken, the return of Cornwallis would not have produced the smallest depression of hope or deflection of purpose. Crowned with the honours of success, Greene would have leaped with generous elation into the lists with his great antagonist, the conquest of whom was the happiest conclusion, as his capture was the natural consequence, of the splendid enterprize resolved upon at Deep river.

CHAPTER V.

HAVING thus fully considered the three points which this tedious question presented; having shown, perhaps, with superfluous care, that Mr. Johnson has misinterpreted the meaning of Lee's remarks; that in their fair and unpervverted sense they are entitled to full credit; and that his opposing statements are supported neither by fact, reason, truth, nor probability—we shall proceed to his account of Watson's evasion of Marion and Lee, and junction with Lord Rawdon.

An effort is first made to show, that the success of Watson was owing to Major Eaton's halt with the field piece, upon learning that Fort Watson was already taken, to assist in the capture of which it had been especially despatched. That gallant young man, who was soon to fall, in arms for his country before the walls of Augusta, learning this fact, and that Marion had marched up to the High Hills, with the apparent intention to join General Greene, or to sink into his swamps, and probably hearing that Lee had repaired with celerity to head quarters, formed the natural and laudable determination to rejoin the main army, now in a weak and dispirited condition. The remote cause

of Watson's escape was the defeat at Camden, which terrified Marion from the line of his advance, and induced him to approach and cross the Santee, at a point so low, that Watson had passed above him, when he reached the west side of that river. Had he remained at the High Hills, or marched to the confluence of the Congaree and Wateree, and, upon Eaton's arrival, pushed over the Santee, he would have intercepted the British colonel, whether he prepared to march by the road across the Congaree, or that crossing the Santee at its head; for as he only entered Camden on the 7th,* (our author says 6th,) and as Marion would have reached the west side of the river by this route on the 3d, he would have been above Watson, and directly in his front.

If a writer's fame were to depend on the extent and multiplicity of his blunders, Mr. Johnson's account of the simple matter of Watson's march, from the sea coast of South Carolina to Camden, would suffice for his immortality. He discountenances, of course, Lee's narration of it, who was actively and earnestly endeavouring to obstruct Watson, and disregards the plain and distinct one of Marshall. He fails to mention his having first pushed up the east side of the Santee, in the direct route from Georgetown, and that finding his road obstructed in the neighbourhood of Wright's

* Marshall, vol. iv. p. 520. Lee, vol. ii. p. 71. Tarleton, p. 476. Stedman, vol. ii. p. 361. Ramsay, vol. ii. p. 431. Gordon, vol. iii. p. 193.

Bluff by Lee's cavalry, he retrograded, and *then* crossed the Santee near its mouth. When he does get him to the west side of the river, his story cannot be adequately admired, unless the reader will bear in mind that Camden is on the left bank of the Wateree—that this river from the north, and the Congaree from the west, unite about thirty miles below it, and form the Santee, which, after a course of about eighty miles, falls into the sea half that distance east of Charleston. (P. 105.) “Marion accordingly lost no time in pressing across the Santee, after his junction with Major Eaton; but he *came* too late. The day before he reached the road, *which crosses the river* above the confluence of the Wateree and Congaree, Colonel Watson *had succeeded in passing him*. In the mean time, Greene had thrown himself across the river also above Camden ferry, to cut him off; but Watson skilfully eluded the main army by recrossing the Wateree, some distance below Camden, and succeeded in throwing himself into that place on the 6th of the month.” To reduce this passage to any thing in the shape of common sense, is evidently impossible. It teems with a superfetation of nonsense. A road is spoken of, that has the peculiar advantage of crossing the Santee above the head of that river—upon this road, it is intimated, that Colonel Watson passed it. By the skilful position of *also*, we are to understand that General Greene crossed the Santee where the Wateree actually flows; that Watson, like

Greene, crossed it above Camden ferry, and that Greene crossed it *above* the ferry, for the purpose of cutting off Watson, who was approaching Camden from *below* the ferry! *Also*, never imparted so much absurdity before. If the *river* here means the Santee, it is an elongation of the first blunder; if the Wateree, an exaggeration of the last; that is, it implies that Watson, after getting on the Camden bank of the Wateree, and finding Greene had crossed to the opposite one, *recrossed* the Wateree to get on the same side with Greene, in order to elude him, and on the side opposite to the place he was exerting himself to reach. How he arrived at Camden by this route, or re-crossed a river, that, during the whole campaign, he had never crossed, must be left for our author to show. Hitherto it had been supposed, that after crossing from the east to the west bank of the Santee, near its mouth, he recrossed it just below its bifurcation, and marched unmolested to Camden. Nor is it true, that Greene passed to the right bank of the Wateree, for the purpose of cutting off Watson. It was of course an object with him, while lying in the neighbourhood of Camden, at any and every position, to prevent the arrival of reinforcements to the garrison. Of these, Watson's corps was a formidable and designated body, and he exerted himself to intercept his advance, or hinder his junction. For that purpose, it would have been absurd to move to the opposite bank of the river, inasmuch as

it necessarily diminished his ability to keep him out, unless he had marched directly to meet him. The apprehension of Cornwallis's approach, and the scarcity of provisions, induced Greene to withdraw to the west bank of the Wateree, as may be collected from his letter to Lee, of the 4th of May, in which he advises Lee to the same measure; and says, that in addition to the advantage of abundance, it enabled him to keep out supplies of every description from the enemy "near as well as before he crossed the river."

After this absurd statement of his own, Mr. Johnson attacks a fair and just one of Lee's; which, as usual, he endeavours to render vulnerable, by misrepresenting it. "Nor is Colonel Lee less incorrect in his *charges* against General Sumpter, than in those *preferred against* Greene!" This, like the countenance of Sir Hudson Lowe, is *enough to poison coffee*. Lee has been all along praising Greene, has given a mitigated and favourable account of Sumpter, never prefers a charge against either, makes Greene the hero of his book, and gives to Sumpter a character of prodigious force and splendour.*

But our modest and veracious author, proceeds quoting Lee: "Brigadier Sumpter held off much to the surprise, regret, and dissatisfaction of the American general, and very much to the detriment of his plans and measures." "This," he adds, "taken in connection with the passage before cited, makes out

* Lee's Memoirs, vol. i. p. 165.

against General Sumpter, the *charge* of having neglected or refused, towards the support of Greene, the reinforcements he had promised"—“and the fact is, that officer had never received an order to join the southern commander, but expressly otherwise; for in every communication from that of the 29th April,* in which the descent was first announced, he is uniformly instructed, to direct his operations against the country lying west of Camden, and endeavour to break up communication between Ninety Six and Camden.” In his postscript, (p. 9,) after confessing that if Sumpter had co-operated with Greene before Camden, “the happiest result must have followed,” he swells his fiction into the enormity of asserting that Greene, “instead of being *soured* with Sumpter, actually viewed with *great admiration*, the vigour of the measures he was then prosecuting on the Congaree, and hence the *compliment* tendered to Colonel Lee by this comparison.” Mr. Johnson’s grace at a compliment cannot be sufficiently admired, and must excite the applause of Colonel Lee’s acquaintances and the gratitude of his friends; but the one which he here generously confers, is as original as elegant, and certainly outstrips

* From the frequency of Mr. Johnson’s deviations from our chronology, it may be supposed that he has invented a *newer* style. Hence, when he says the 29th of April, according to the vulgar computation he means the 30th March; that being the date of Greene’s letter to Sumpter, communicating his intention to move upon Camden, as he tells us, p. 34.

the sincerity of General Greene, who never thought a comparison with Sumpter, would be a compliment to Lee, either as a friend or an officer. It is probable, General Sumpter himself will not coincide in opinion with Mr. Johnson, that Lee's remarks contain any charge against him. They contain merely the statement of a fact, which no body can deny, *that General Sumpter held off*—and the impression made by that fact, upon General Greene's mind, and upon his plans, which is proved by his letters, and is obvious to every body; for no one can doubt, that had Sumpter joined Greene with one thousand men by the 20th, or before the 25th, or even before Watson reached Camden, Lord Rawdon must have surrendered. Now it is possible, General Sumpter may have been unable to join him, but that has not been shown, and it was Greene's opinion as well as that of all his intelligent officers, that Sumpter did not fail from want of ability, but from want of inclination; the fire, and wildness of his indomitable character, which rendered him the most formidable of the state brigadiers to the enemy, making him impatient of subordination, incapable of obedience, and perhaps, averse even to concert. But our sagacious author never dreams that the characters of men, like their countenances, are composed of certain qualities and features which are essential to their true representation; undertakes to create, not to portray; and instinct with venom against Lee, contradicts both the declarations of Greene, and the opi-

nions of Colonels Howard, Carrington, and Davie, to the exclusion too, of views of character, interesting, consistent, and probable.

At p. 110, a Major M'Arthur is described as a very active, and we should think a very *strong* officer, for he throws a "wall piece into Fort Motte," and with as little ceremony, "throws a colonel into Camden;" by which we learn, that the major commanded the colonel.

As if one page of the *Sketches* were indited for the express purpose of falsifying another, we are told, (p. 111,) that Greene's movement to the west side of the Wateree, was "*not made solely* with a view to co-operate against Watson, but *expressly* to guard against the consequences that might *follow from* his junction with Rawdon." "Information had also been received of the advance of the Virginia militia, and he resolved, until reinforced, to remain *in covert*, whilst his detachments were overrunning the state."

This paragraph affords an opportunity of pointing out one of the prevailing beauties of the *Sketches*, which it would be unjust to our author to "*pretermit*." We have here converged upon one small event, three causes, viz. *an express* cause, (which might be thought a sufficient one,) *an imperfect* cause, and *an additional* cause; and, what is still more characteristic of this philosophical writer, neither of them is the *true cause*. Nor is he less free in assigning consequences to every incident he notices, as may be

observed throughout his book, but particularly when he endeavours to demonstrate Greene's prophetic determination to retreat into Virginia by the lower route. So that the "body of the times," when grasped by his powerful intellect, presents the figure of an hour-glass; an immense bulk of causes above—an enormous train of consequences below—connected by an immediate effect, or a *modus operandi*, not bigger than the waist of a dandy or a wasp. Here, too, there is a detailed admission, that but for Lord Rawdon's victory, Watson's escape into Camden "*would not have happened*," and a complete removal of the imputation with which he had wantonly loaded the blameless memory of Major Eaton, without authority from Lee or from Greene, who sorely regretted Watson's success.

The first effect of this accession to Lord Rawdon's force, was the retreat of his adversary to a stronger and more remote position. It is matter of curiosity to observe, with what implicit obscurity this simple fact is enveloped by Mr. Johnson, (p. 111.) "An order of the 6th, that the roll be called every hour, was the consequence of the receipt of the intelligence of Watson's success. And another of the 7th, that the army shall march by the left in one hour, followed upon the news General Greene had anticipated, that Lord Rawdon was advancing upon him, the moment Watson had arrived." To the solution of this enigma, we acknowledge ourselves unequal, and propose to the reader to conjecture—after assuring him upon

the authorities already referred to, and upon that of Lord Rawdon himself, that Watson did not reach Camden until the 7th—whether it means, *information was received by Greene, that Lord Rawdon was preparing to advance upon him, in consequence of Watson's arrival—or, that under the conjecture, as Watson had arrived, Lord Rawdon would advance upon him, he retreated—or that, foreseeing Watson's arrival, he anticipated the immediate preparation of Lord Rawdon to advance upon him, and in consequence retreated.* The movement is then detailed in substance, as follows, (p. 112.) On the 7th, Greene retired in the evening, from Twenty-five miles Creek, beyond Sarney's Creek, five miles higher up the river; and early on the 8th, to Colonel's creek, where, it is said, he drew up his army in order of battle, soon after which, Lord Rawdon appeared, drove in the pickets, reconnoitred, and respectfully withdrew. This is very different from the accounts given by Lord Rawdon and General Greene. The former says,* “I found Greene posted behind Sawney's creek. Having driven in his pickets, I examined every point of his situation: I found it every where so strong, that I could not hope to force it, without suffering such loss as must have crippled my force for any future enterprize.” Greene, in his letter of the 9th of May, to Lee, from Colonel's creek, says, “We moved our camp night before last, from Twenty-five Miles creek

* Tarleton, p. 477.

to Sandy's creek, five miles higher up the river. Lord Rawdon came out yesterday morning, as I expected he would, and I suppose, with an expectation of finding us at the old encampment. I did not like our new position to risk an action in, and ordered the troop to take a new position at this place, four miles higher up the river, leaving on the ground the horse, the pickets, and the light infantry. The enemy came up in front of our encampment, and drew up in order of battle, but did not dare to attempt to cross the creek, and after waiting an hour or two, retired suddenly towards Camden." Mr. Johnson, therefore, is wrong in saying, that Lord Rawdon appeared in front of Greene's position, at Colonel's creek, as he really advanced no further than in view of that at Sawney, or Sarney, or Sandy creek; and grievously wrong and romantic, in describing Greene as drawing up his army in order of battle, in face of Lord Rawdon, as if willing to hazard an action, when in fact he retired from Sawney's creek at the approach of Lord Rawdon, for the express purpose of avoiding one, and without intention of fighting, even at Colonel's creek; or else he would have drawn off his whole army. Lord Rawdon appears to have mistaken the corps of observation left at Sawney's creek, for the whole army. Greene had no idea of fighting, unless joined by Lee's detachment, as he wrote him on the 1st of May, before Watson's arrival at Camden was apprehended.

still less would he be inclined to risk such a measure after Watson's junction with Lord Rawdon.

The next subject we shall notice is, a remark connected with Colonel Lee, which is introduced by lamenting speculations upon the weakness of Greene in cavalry, and his great want of horses. In endeavouring to procure them, it appears he had given orders to Sumpter, Marion, and other officers; and as we know to Lee, in a series of letters, from the 26th of January to the 4th of May, directing them, and particularly the last, in the most urgent terms, to impress all that could be found, for the service of the army. Having been thus repeatedly pressed on this subject, and sympathizing warmly with his commander, Lee, it seems, wrote to him that General Marion could supply him with 150 good dragoon horses. Here a letter from Lee, is quoted, which from some accident at its date, or in its passage under the cimmerian contemplation of the judge, is impressed with a feature of *incognoscibility*, (p. 115.) "General Marion can supply you, if he will, *with one hundred and fifty* good dragoon horses, most of them impressed horses. He might, in my opinion, spare *sixty*, which would be a happy supply." This extract is introduced by Mr. Johnson, with the following observations: "At length, an unfortunate communication of Colonel Lee's, inspired him with a belief that he had been ill used," (by Marion,) "and had nearly terminated in the loss of Marion's invaluable services. It was contained in a let-

ter of the 23d May.” After giving the above extract, he continues—“That Marion, knowing his necessities, and possessing the power to relieve them, though urgently pressed, should yet have withheld this supply, excited in Greene *sensations*, which there was no effort made to conceal or suppress, in his next communication. But Marion was too pure a man to fear reproach, and too firm a man to experience, even the semblance of it, and dissemble his feelings. He repels the *charge* of ever having had it in his power to relieve the wants of Greene, and requests leave to resign: *firmly*, but respectfully intimating his resolution to retire from the service, as soon as he shall have seen Fort Motte reduced, before which he was then lying.” Here Lee’s fair and faithful communication to his general, is called *unfortunate*; its purport, a *charge* upon a man, whose firm and irreproachable purity are described as naturally and properly resentful of it. Greene’s offensive letter to Marion, is represented as the first consequence of it; and the whole mischief is traced evasively to Lee, who is artfully *sketched* as a false and pragmatistical informer.

But neither Marion nor Mr. Johnson deny, that Lee’s information and opinion were correct—for, from Greene’s reply to Marion’s vindictory letter, (p. 116,) it is plain Marion admitted he had the horses, and power to furnish them, but forbore to exercise it, from a just desire to retain his men around him. From all this, it is clear Lee was not to blame;

nor is it probable any one ever thought so before Mr. Johnson. His communication was fair and proper, and conveyed nothing like *a charge*, while his silence would have been disloyal and unfriendly to his general, ungenerous to his valiant rival, Colonel Washington, and unjust to the service in which he was engaged. Whether General Greene was inconsiderate or unfortunate in his expressions to Marion, or Marion hasty and over-sensitive in regard to them, is a question in the solution of which, Lee's reputation is nowise concerned—whether Judge Johnson will escape as fortunately from it, is yet to be determined. In constructing this invidious attack upon Lee—and attempting to convert an act of public and private justice, fidelity, and honour in that officer, into one at which the purity of Marion's feelings revolted, his prudence is fairly overpowered by his malice, and he is so rash as to fix on his own front the brand of falsehood. This is the order he assigns to the origin and progress of this alleged indignation of Marion. That by a letter of the 23d of May, Lee *unfortunately* and falsely inspired the mind of Greene with displeasure at the conduct of Marion; this displeasure Greene strongly expressed in a letter to that officer; whose resentment thereat operated so forcibly, as to cause him to tender his resignation—*firmly intimating* his resolution to retire from the service, *as soon as the siege of Fort Motte should be concluded*—and though he never made good this *firm intimation*, yet separat-

ing from Colonel Lee after the siege, in consequence of his unfair or unfortunate communication to Greene. Now Judge Johnson himself assures us, (p. 120,) that Fort Motte surrendered on the 12th of May—so that in order equivocally to criminate Lee, he declares with all the solemnity of an historian, and the affected regret of hypocritical impartiality, that Marion's resignation was tendered, in consequence of a grievance, the remote cause of which did not happen until a fortnight after he offered to resign! The whole story is doubtless a fabrication as to Marion, who could never have hazarded his well-earned reputation for patriotism, or deviated so far from the modest regularity of his conduct, by such idle and indecorous resentment. It is probable he had other and sound motives for wishing to resign, and presented the handsome charger to General Greene as a preventive evidence of personal respect, and a theme of continued official cordiality. Nor is it to be believed that this virtuous patriot was dissatisfied with Lee. They parted, but for purposes of public duty, a motive not deemed sufficient by the judge.

It is now announced that Greene meditated a retreat, (p. 116,) one cause of which is Lord Rawdon's "acknowledged mastery of the field," although we were just before assured (p. 112) that he selected a position to fight Rawdon, drew up his army in order of battle upon his approach, and that his lordship retired with very expressive military precautions. Ano-

ther reason assigned for this intention to retreat, is the want of horses to mount his cavalry, and if correct, certainly inculpates both Greene and Marion, the latter for failing at such an important crisis to furnish horses, and the former for declining to extort them—while it places in a fair and becoming light the vigilant zeal and seasonable suggestion of Lee. A contribution from the late General Davie is next given in these words: “This evening (the 9th) the general sent for me earlier than usual; I found the map on the table, and he introduced the business of the night with the following striking observations—‘ You see that we must again renew the partisan war. Rawdon has now a decided superiority of force; he has pushed us to a sufficient distance to leave him free to act on any object within his reach. He will strike at Lee and Marion, reinforce himself by all the troops that can be spared from the several garrisons, and push me back to the mountains. You acted in this quarter in the last campaign—I wish you to point out the military positions on both sides the river, ascending it to the mountains, and give me the necessary information as to the prospect of subsistence. You observe our dangerous and critical situation. The regular troops are now reduced to a handful, and I am without militia to perform the convoy or detachment service, or any immediate prospect of receiving any reinforcement * * * * *

North Carolina. dispirited by the loss of her regular

troops in Charleston, stunned into a kind of stupor by the defeat of General Gates, and held in check by Major Craig and the loyalists, makes no effort of any kind. Congress seems to have lost sight of the southern states, and have abandoned them to their fate; so much so, that I am even as much distressed for ammunition as for men. We must always calculate on the maxim *that your enemy will do what he ought to do*. We will dispute every inch of ground, in the best manner we can, but Lord Rawdon will push me back to the mountains. Lord Cornwallis will establish a chain of posts along James River, and the southern states, thus cut off, will die like the tail of a snake.' These are his very words; they made a deep and melancholy impression, and I shall never forget them. After expressing an anxious desire to remain as near as possible, to cover the retreat of Lee from Fort Motte, we recurred again to the map, where I had it in my power to assure him, from personal knowledge, that the country abounded in strong military positions; and as to subsistence, there would be no difficulty, as we should be falling back on our depots and magazines in North Carolina; that if he was obliged to retreat further, he must permit me to resume my original plan, as I was morally certain a respectable force could be raised in the western districts of that state. The interview concluded by his informing me, that he would despatch an express to Philadelphia the next morning, requesting me to write to members of con-

gress with whom I was acquainted, painting in the strongest colours our situation and gloomy prospects. General Greene possessed, in an eminent degree, those high energies requisite to conquer appalling difficulties, united with that cool and moral courage which resists the anguish of disappointment and the pressure of misfortune. I never observed his mind yield but at this gloomy moment, when he conceived himself not only abandoned by all the constituted authorities of the confederacy, but even by that portion of the population of the southern states, who had every thing to hope from his success, and every thing to fear from his failure. I employed the whole night in writing, until an orderly sergeant summoned me to head quarters. On entering the General's tent, I soon perceived some important change had taken place. 'I have sent for you,' said he, with a countenance expressing the most lively pleasure, 'to inform you that Lord Rawdon is preparing to evacuate Camden—that place was the key of the enemy's line of posts—they will now all fall or be evacuated; all will now go well. Burn your letters; I shall march immediately to the Congaree. Arrange your convoys to follow me, and let me know what expresses and detachments you want.' ”

If this conversation has been correctly remembered by General Davie, and what is more doubtful, accurately recorded by our author, it will show a surprising mutability of mind in General Greene, and a va-

riation of views on the same day, which cannot be accounted for. It is our decided opinion, from nothing like distrust of General Davie's veracity, that General Greene did not express on the 9th of May, the sentiments here attributed to him—for two reasons, one that the record presented of them, bears upon its face proofs of inconsistency; and the other, that his written declarations to Colonel Lee on the same day, are of an opposite description. In regard to the first reason, it is to be observed that General Greene is here represented as confessedly inferior to Rawdon, and preparing, in consequence, to retreat before him to the mountains. For this purpose he applies to Davie, to point out on the map the several military positions and strong points in the country above, and along the river. This is very natural, as Davie was acquainted with that district; but instead of designating the several positions as desired by Greene, he takes the map, and *assures him on his personal knowledge*, that the region alluded to, abounded with military positions. Now this appears to be absurd and unnatural, and incompatible with the well-known zeal and intelligence of General Davie. General Greene *knew* that the country up the Wateree to the mountains, abounded, like all other mountain tracts, with military positions, but he wished the strongest and best pointed out to him on the map, by a person familiar with the country, that he might project the course and stations of his retreat. Sir John Moore, doubtless,

knew very well that the mountains of Galicia *abounded with military positions*, but he probably had some of them designated on his map by intelligent inhabitants. General Davie never could have communicated, nor General Greene received, such information; and the probability is, that for this part of the dialogue, we are indebted to the shrewd and indefatigable invention of our author. Again, General Greene declares, that he has *but a handful of regular troops*, is without militia for the convoy or detachment service, and as much distressed for ammunition as for men—that Congress appears to *have deserted the southern states, and abandoned them to their fate*; and after expressing his determination to despatch, the next morning, an account of his gloomy situation and prospects, by an express to *Philadelphia*, he requests Davie to write to members of Congress, and to paint his want of their support in the strongest colours. This is natural enough. But then, as soon as he hears that Lord Rawdon is preparing to evacuate Camden; a measure, which, even if it held out any prospect of his being left undisturbed in the position he then occupied, or of enabling him to collect militia from the surrounding country, yet certainly was not likely to increase the number of his regular troops, or his stock of ammunition, or to attract the patronage and support of Congress—he tells Davie to “burn his letters, all will go well; arrange your convoys, and tell me what detachments you want.” This is unnatural and in-

credible, for the evacuation of Camden must have assured him of the immediate commencement of active operations, in consequence of the advance or retreat of Lord Rawdon; and according to his own maxim, "he counted on his enemy doing what he ought to do." His want of ammunition and reinforcements, therefore, must have increased, and with it, the expediency of writing to Philadelphia, the moment he found Camden was to be evacuated. Other inconsistencies might be pointed out. However, that this narrative ascribed to General Davie is in some points correct, cannot be disputed, since they are at variance with the favourite positions of our author. For instance, Greene tells Davie, "*you see our dangerous and critical situation. Rawdon will push me back to the mountains—he will strike at Lee and Marion—Lord Cornwallis will establish a chain of posts along James River. We must again renew the partisan war. I must prepare for another retreat. Poor Lee! I wish I could wait for him.*" All this *before* the evacuation of Camden, and yet our author maintains, *pugnis atque calcibus*, in his Sketches, in his postscript, and in various other tracts, that *before* the evacuation of Camden, General Greene never thought of a retreat, or of ordering Lee to join the main army, except upon the occasion when he was led to expect the immediate return of Lord Cornwallis. While he is here represented as about to retreat, under the apprehension of Lord Cornwallis's being on his way to

James River; and with such precipitation as not to be able to wait long enough for Lee to join him. The truth is, General Greene, if his own letter contains his sentiments, the day before the evacuation of Camden, was engaged in far different meditations from those ascribed to him here—and as this will tend to satisfy Judge Johnson more completely in respect to the degree of confidence with which Colonel Lee was regarded by General Greene, the value of the counsels by which it was returned, and the care and zeal with which the former endeavoured to secure for his general the co-operation and support of the militia officers, it is here transcribed at length.

Colonel's Creek, May 9th, 1781.

“ Dear Sir—I have not time to write in cyphers.—Yours of the 8th, by Captain Davis, was delivered me last evening. We have no further intelligence from Lord Cornwallis, and therefore I am persuaded he has gone northerly. General Philips is at Petersburg, and our army beaten back; but whether the Marquis or the Pennsylvania line has arrived, I am not informed. Keep this a secret, as it is not known here. We moved our camp night before last, from Twenty-five Miles creek to Sandy creek, five miles higher up the river. Lord Rawdon came out yesterday morning as I expected he would, and I suppose, with an expectation of finding us at the old encampment. I did not like our new position to risk an action in, and ordered

the troops to take a new position at this place, four miles still higher up the river, leaving on the ground the horse, the pickets, and light infantry. The enemy came up in front of our encampment, and drew up in order of battle, but did not dare to attempt to cross the creek; and after waiting an hour or two, retired suddenly towards Camden. Major Hyrne having made you fully acquainted with my general plan of operations, it will be unnecessary for me to be more explicit on that head. It gives me pleasure to find that your sentiments so perfectly corresponds with mine, in all the points except the duty of 310, (General Greene). This, I suppose you mean as a compliment upon your general principles, that all men are fond of flattery. But you will give me leave to tell you that if 306 (Lord Cornwallis) is gone to the northward, that great abilities will not be wanted here. The plan being laid, and a position taken, the rest will be a war of posts, and the most that will be left to be performed by the commanding officer until we come to Camden, is to make proper detachments, and give the command of them to proper officers. The plan being laid, the glory will belong to the executive officers executing the business. The benefit resulting from our operations will, in a great measure, depend upon the proper management of affairs in Virginia. If the principal officer in the enemy's interest is there, who should be opposed to him? Which will be more honourable, to be active there, or laying, as it were, idle

here? From whence comes our supplies to this quarter, and who is most likely to give timely and necessary support to all parts of the department; one that has but a partial interest, or one that is interested equally in all the parts? I am confident nothing would come to this army, and all things be in confusion, if 310 (General Greene) was not to go to the northward. Therefore, whether taken up in a military, personal, or public point of view, I am decided it is his interest and duty to go; nor can I conceive the great inconveniences will arise from it here you mention. I am confident B——s will arrange matters very well, and 310 (General Greene) will take care to direct him to the proper objects to employ. Much is to be done in Virginia, and without great prudence on our part, matters may be reduced to great extremity there; and depend upon it, the enemy's great push will be against that state, as it may be said in some sort to sever the continental interest asunder. More advantage will result from 310's (General Greene) going than staying; for he can serve them more effectually yonder than here; and vanity will lead him to think that he can oppose the enemy more effectually there than those that will command if he dont go. I perceive that 312 (General Marion) is not satisfied, and I think you are not mistaken respecting 311, (General Sumpter). However be careful, be cautious, be prudent, and above all attentive; this, with men as well as with ladies, goes a great way. It will give me great pleasure

to render Major Mayum every service in my power; and if he will repair to head quarters and lay his plan before me of raising a legion, I will give him all the authority I am vested with, and recommend any thing further that may be necessary to give it proper arrangement. I have a very high opinion of Major Mayum from his general character; but that opinion is increased from his late exertions. You have got a new mode of reducing posts, which I think will be no less honourable to the projectors than the mode is new and singular. A general exchange of prisoners is agreed upon; and all our officers in captivity, that cannot be exchanged, are to be paroled. This will be a great relief to the unfortunate captives. God bless you with success, and may your reputation keep pace with your merit is the wish of yours.*

Augusta and the posts below it, are closely besieged, and in all probability will be reduced. At Ninety Six there are symptoms of an evacuation, which I think will take place, if you succeed in the reduction of the posts on the Congaree."

This letter reveals a disposition of mind, and a direction of views, not only at variance, but incompatible with the sentiments contained in the statement given from General Davie. In the latter General Greene is desponding, intent upon projecting his retreat, and solicitous for the safety of Lee. In the

* Here the judge disagrees with the general.

former, his mind is buoyant and lively, his views ambitious and extensive; he considers the war in Carolina, whose prospective magnificence had tempted him from Deep river, as curtailed in extent, limited in consequences, pale in reputation, and subordinate in dignity—deems the field which was soon to wave with the laurels of Eutaw, as destitute alike of danger and glory, no longer worthy of his abilities; and is *decided* in spite of the remonstrances of Lee, always attentive to his general's fame, to seek a more splendid theatre in Virginia, to leave the army under the command of an inferior officer, to delineate the plan, and designate the place of his contracted operations, to confront Cornwallis in Virginia, and support and direct his lieutenant in Carolina; and as he says, to satisfy in so doing, his "interest and duty in a military, personal, and public point of view." This state of mind, our author does not permit to appear in his "Sketches," until the last of May, when Greene was besieging Ninety Six. He excludes it even from his postscript; and when his attention is subsequently called to it by a letter from Colonel Howard in the Charleston papers, containing a distinct and circumstantial assertion, that Greene did not only meditate, but determine on—not only determine on, but make preparations for repairing to Virginia, *before* the evacuation of Camden; this model of urbanity declares the colonel has "inverted cause and effect," has put it *before*, instead of *after* the evacuation of Camden—and that the accurate repre-

sentation which this distinguished veteran gives of his commander's intentions, is not worthy of belief, because it would cast upon the memory of Greene "a reflection, which his worst enemies would blush to maintain," and would represent him as not only meditating "*a retreat from Camden*," which Mr. Johnson himself attempts to prove by the testimony of General Davie, "but infinitely worse"—as designing "to move off in safety himself, and abandon his faithful little army to inevitable destruction."* Here it is in proof upon Greene's own letter, that *before* the evacuation of Camden he had *decided* on this measure, to which his judicious biographer attaches such disastrous consequences, and chooses to assign such a disgraceful motive. As he professes to admire the character, and to cherish with pious fondness the memory of Greene, he ought to raise an altar of praise and gratitude to Lee, for the effort he made to dissuade this inglorious and ruinous measure. Fortunately, the fame of Greene will survive the slanders of his flatterer, and live in the honest accounts of his valiant follower and of his devoted friend.

Mr. Johnson's inconsistency, after adopting General Davie's statement, in saying (p. 118) that Greene learned, with "*sensations of regret*," Lord Rawdon's resolution to evacuate Camden, would be passed over, but from respect to the memory of General Davie. It is impossible to doubt that the desponding sentiments

* See Charleston City Gazette, June 12th, 1822.

which he mentions, were expressed to him by Greene at some time or other; and it is impossible to believe that they were entertained or communicated on the 9th of May. It is, therefore, certain that General Davie was, on this occasion, as he was *not* at Guilford, “mistaken as to time and place,” and that the substance of some former conversation was referred in his memory to an interview on the 9th of May. Now from the time Greene sat down before Camden, to the 10th of May, when Rawdon evacuated it, only three occasions have ever been indicated as periods at which he exhibited “*a disposition to depart from his adopted system*”—one just after his defeat on the 25th of April; one on the 4th of May, when he apprehended the return of Cornwallis; and one on the 9th, as explained by his letter of that date to Lee. It has been shown, in his own words, that the intention he communicated to Davie, could not have been entertained on the last of these occasions. It is clear it could not have been expressed on the second, because that arose out of the apprehension of Cornwallis’s instant return, while the intention reported by Davie involved the belief that he would invade Virginia, and establish a chain of posts along James River. It was then on the first of these occasions, just after his defeat, that General Greene held this impressive and desponding language to Davie. Referring it to this period, it is reconciled to the narrative of Lee, to the positive and irrefragable declarations of his surviving

officers, and to the letters of Greene up to the 30th of April—is relieved from collision with his letter of the 9th of May, and from incongruity with the confessed and undeniable state of affairs.

It will be observed, that when Greene communicated to Lee his plan of operations on the 9th of May, that officer had submitted one for his consideration, coinciding with his own, except in the essential and awful particular of contemplating his personal action in the south—a suggestion pregnant with more value to the fame of Greene, and to the liberation of that part of the union, than any counsel he received during the war.

It is impossible to foresee the extent, or to be blind to the magnitude of the mischief, which the execution of Greene's project would have produced. Had he proceeded to Virginia, and abdicated the honours of the scene before him, however fine and generous his motive, the spirit and organization of his army, already greatly impaired, would have been abolished; the comparative strength of the enemy doubled; the loyalists encouraged to a fearful preponderance; the desultory ardour and dangerous activity of Marion and Pickens would have subsided; the three southern states been lost without a blow; and the issue of the struggle, if not changed, at least grievously protracted. Recent from a *defeat at Camden*, he would have appeared in Virginia with the disgrace, but without the grandeur of Gates's reverse—would soon have been superseded

by Washington, and either retained as an inferior in command, or ordered back to the south, with less reputation and worse prospects than he had left behind him. It is needless, after the numerous evidences already given of the intimate and boundless confidence which Greene reposed in Lee, to revert to the striking proof of it afforded by this letter of the 9th of May. It would seem incumbent on our author to furnish examples of closer intimacy, or else to withdraw the ridiculous falsifications he has promulgated on this subject. It would also become him to reform the date, and to complete and correct the texture of the anecdote, which he gives on the authority of General Davie, and breaks into fallacy and nonsense by a convenient chasm, and by subservient connexion with assertions and speculations of his own, often romantic, and always preposterous.

In his narrative of the operations in the neighbourhood of Camden, our author ingeniously substitutes "the absence of the Virginia militia for *the failure of Sumpter*, as the operative cause of Greene's ill success. This notion General Greene never intimates in any of his letters to Lee, but repeatedly and querulously refers (as has been already shown) to the failure of Sumpter, as the cause of his miscarriage. To what period, or what correspondence, allusion is made, when it is asserted, (p. 119,) that "in all the correspondence of this day, General Greene positively maintains, that if the Virginia militia

had come up prior to the evacuation, Camden must have fallen into his hands," it is naturally the object of the reader to discover, and of Mr. Johnson to conceal. It appears he has a trick of denoting, by the vulgarism "*of this day*," the whole extent of a period, within the several subdivisions of which, it should have been the aim of his book, to distribute properly the events belonging to it. General Greene may no doubt have observed, that had he been joined by the Virginia militia, he would have taken Camden, inasmuch as from their gallantry at Guilford, he had reason to count upon good effect from their presence. But he did not say that he calculated on their arrival, or was disappointed by their absence. This calculation, and such complaints, we know he made in relation to Sumpter, and have little doubt he expressed them in that part of his conversation with Davie, which our trusty historian has withheld, as well as "*in all the correspondence of this day*."

From his account of the evacuation of Camden, it might be supposed that the sack of Troy, and the conflagration of Moscow, were squibs to it. But he is never sublime, except on little subjects. Lord Rawdon, on leaving this small village, set fire to the fort, the mill, the jail, and perhaps to some private houses, and destroyed such stores as he could not remove. The thing is thus described, (p. 118)—"*Volumes of flame and smoke* announced the meditated retreat of the British commander; *immense* quantities of stores

and baggage were committed to the fire, and the jail, court-house, and even many private buildings, shared the same fate"—that is, were snatched up and pitched into the fire! Our remarks would be more voluminous than this *immense* conflagration, or even than a more shocking object, the "*Sketches*," if notice were taken of half Mr. Johnson's blunders and follies. At page 119, we are told, that "*immediately as* Marion heard of the advance of Greene toward the Congaree, Harden, one of his majors, with seventy followers," took the enemy "*at a surprise every where*"—that is, if we may judge by the event, neither lost nor shed a drop of blood. With equal elegance, the evacuation of Camden is called the "*fall*" of that post, and the notion conveyed that Greene actually reduced it.

As it is easy, it is amusing to detect the efforts of our author, where he cannot calumniate, to disparage Colonel Lee, and to observe how awkwardly he tries to reconcile this scheme with his protestations of impartiality, to a just sense of the importance of Lee's services, to the value ascribed to them by Greene, and to the occasional liability of the latter, to the animadversions levelled at his lieutenant. The first step of Lord Rawdon, after the evacuation of Camden, was an attempt to relieve the post at Motte's; but being compelled, in consequence of the ill contrived failure of its works to command the direct passes of the river, to take the circuitous route by Nelson's ferry, he could not reach it in time to prevent its surrender. Marion

and Lee then separated, the former proceeding toward Georgetown, the latter toward Fort Granby (P. 120.) “The quick reduction of that place was now a most interesting object,” says our author, “as from it he (General Greene) expected to draw supplies for more important operations.” To this point he gives other weighty and sufficient reasons. Lee invested it on the 14th, and on the 15th it surrendered. But Mr. Johnson has two or three purposes to accomplish, which leave him no opportunity to allow Colonel Lee credit either for vigour or address, although the situation of the army, and the orders of Greene, required the utmost celerity in his proceedings; and although the garrison consisted of three hundred and fifty men, and although the apprehended advance of Lord Rawdon to its relief, rendered it probable that the least delay would eventuate in disappointment to the besiegers. Of these purposes, one is to show, that the plan by which he operated on the reputed weakness of the commander of the garrison, was not original, but suggested by General Greene, who in all probability never enquired into the character of Maxwell. Another is, that his celerity, so far from being commendable, was stimulated by very ungenerous motives, to culpable precipitancy; and the third is, that it subjected him to the necessity of making not a very glorious explanation to General Sumpter. The first point is essayed in the following words: “The orders given to Colonel Lee on this occasion are obviously calculated to ope-

rate on the fears of Maxwell, the commandant at Fort Granby, who was represented as a notorious plunderer, and very naturally considered as a poltroon. They conclude with requesting him to announce to Maxwell, that 'the army will be near the fort by twelve o'clock on the 15th, and if he shall obstinately persist in holding the post, he must abide the consequences, as he will never receive but one summons for its surrender.' "

Now, to us it appears that this order does not presuppose in the American general, a particular apprehension of the character of Maxwell, and so far from having been designed to operate on any imbecility peculiar to him, that it was calculated to affect the prudence, and to influence the conduct of the commandant, whatever his character; and might have been prepared for a Syburg, an Elliot, a Palafax, or a Carnot. That it fails to forestal the adroitness and dexterity of Lee in ascertaining and using the prevailing and concurrent faults in Maxwell's disposition, is therefore obvious. In his *Memoirs*,* he relates the manner in which the affair was conducted, and it appears he displayed address in the management of it, comely enough in a young partisan, but altogether unsuitable to the place and port of a commander in chief. Yet such is the taste of Mr. Johnson. His fears misgive him, that the mind of Lee had, in some important measures, happily influenced the conduct

* Vol. ii. p. 82.

of Greene, and that his own earnest endeavours to obscure or to extirpate this just and general impression, are vain, and he now labours to prove this kind of assistance reciprocal. That if Lee did shape and suggest the movement from Deep river, and reassure the momentary uncertainty of his general at Camden, the latter preconceived the mighty scheme of scaring Major Maxwell out of the little post called Granby! This silly attempt to disparage Lee, besides exposing his unrelenting malice towards that officer, betrays the most wretched parsimony of intellect, inasmuch as it proceeds upon the apprehension, that Lee's character was so slender as to suffer by the detraction of this trivial credit, and Greene's merit so minute as to feel the advantage of this slight addition.

The second point is thus presented. Sumpter had, it seems, some time before, laid siege to Fort Granby, but for some cause or other suspended it, and attacked a smaller post at Orangeburg. This he reduced with little difficulty, and then directed his course to Fort Motte, with a view, as our author asserts, of uniting with Marion and Lee, and opposing the march of Lord Rawdon towards Charleston. But when he came up, Fort Motte had surrendered, and Lee was besieging Fort Granby. He still had time, that is, we have the assurance of Mr. Johnson for it, to supersede Lee, and to secure the envied glory of this enterprise, but an opportunity for service more tempting, appeared in the direction of Dorchester and Wassmasaw,

and thitherward the roving brigadier proceeded. Thence he returned to his *punctum saliens*, Orangeburg, and fearing that Lee would succeed against Granby—where, on two occasions, he himself had failed, he addressed an expostulation to the commander in chief, the tender or the tolerance of which, nothing but policy on the part of Greene, and ignorance on that of Sumpter, could possibly excuse. He required no less than that Lee should be recalled, when in the act of completing the reduction of Granby, for no other reason than that he and his band of militia might have the credit and satisfaction of taking it! Instead of reprehending this impertinent departure from the duty of a soldier, and the spirit of a gentleman, exaggerated as it was to insolence and folly, by the rude tender of his commission; and referring it to the leonine and indomitable temperament of Sumpter, which rendered him sometimes equally inconvenient to his friends and his enemies, our impartial judge of military decorum and patriotic duty—after confessing once or twice, that in accelerating the surrender by moderating the terms, Lee was justified by the apprehended, reported, and admitted approach of Lord Rawdon to its relief, by the spirit and the letter of his orders, and by a just regard to the wants and objects of his general, asserts that Greene was mean enough to request him to make a conciliatory explanation to Sumpter, intimates that he condescended to do it; representing his hero in a light as

ignominious as the deportment of Sumpter, if his account can be credited, was odious and intolerable. For the sake of Greene, as well as of Sumpter, it is to be hoped that this story is as baseless as the rest of our author's narration. In regard to Colonel Lee, we must say, that if indeed he did bow to this turbulent injustice of Sumpter, and ungrateful pusillanimity of Greene, he lost sight of his own dignity in a manner, which not even generosity of friendship, nor ardour of patriotism could justify.

This much in reference to the tale of Mr. Johnson. The probability is, that in compliance with the urgent solicitude expressed by General Greene, in his letter of the 9th of May, to prevent the alienation of Sumpter and Marion, Colonel Lee exerted his influence with both. The calm and constant disposition of Marion, no doubt, removed every difficulty, as we find him earnestly co-operating with Greene, throughout the campaign. Fierce and insurgent as Sumpter was, it is probable Colonel Lee pointed out his error, explained to him his duty, and in some degree soothed and reclaimed him; for our author says, (p. 123,) "Lee's martial appearance, courteous manners, and insinuating address, could not have failed to produce the desired effect." The third point is directed against the propriety of Lee's conduct, in hastening the surrender of the fort, by granting to the officers of the garrison, all their private property; and is barbed with certain indistinct slanders, respecting his conduct to-

ward a small detachment of militia, that had been left by Sumpter to make that sort of military impression on the fortress, which a fox is supposed to exercise, on grapes that he cannot reach. Our sage historian affirms, with a view of reprehending the expedition, and liberality of Lee's proceedings, and palliating the insubordinate indiscretion of Sumpter, "that when facts came to be known, there was unquestionably no pressing necessity for hurrying through the negotiation from the approach of Rawdon." As if the orders of General Greene were to be disregarded, upon the presumption of a state of facts, which could not of necessity be known, until the execution of those orders had been successfully completed. With his customary disregard of common sense and consistency, he then proceeds to justify Colonel Lee fully, by reference to his orders, the state of his intelligence, and the absolute necessity of furnishing Greene with the supplies which the fort contained, and of which the amount would be diminished, and his want increased, by every moment of delay. Upon this defence of Colonel Lee, he will no doubt attempt to claim the credit of justice and impartiality; but what right has he to bring into question, the conduct of an officer, which had been approved by his commander, and had passed uncensured by all preceding writers on the subject, when he knew all the time, that his conduct was not only proper, but judicious, not only judicious, but meritorious. If he chose to mention that General Sumpter

was despatched with it, his duty was to declare, distinctly and honestly, that Lee deserved applause, and that Sumpter permitted himself to be discontented with conduct, which a just mind could but commend, and a gallant officer should have been proud to emulate. But this is not all—our author, whose faculty of assertion is as vigorous, as his defiance of fact, and disdain of proof, are remarkable, declares, (p. 122,) “Colonel Lee represents the militia as loudly complaining against the conditions of the capitulation, and charging him with granting them unnecessarily.” For this statement, no reference is made to any authority. Nothing of the kind is to be found in the account of the affair contained in the *Memoirs*;^{*} where no mention is made of this deedless party of militia. Neither Colonel Taylor nor his detachment is noticed at Fort Granby, by Ramsay, Stedman, Tarleton, or Marshall. Gordon† gives the following account of their behaviour. “The American militia were much disgusted that the garrison were so favoured. They indicated an inclination for breaking the capitulation and killing the prisoners. When Greene heard of it, he solemnly declared that he would put to death any one that would be guilty of so doing.” This statement, Mr. Johnson himself, cannot question, for it accords exactly with the description given of them, both by the hero and the author of the *Sketches*. At page 88, the former, in a letter to Governor Read, says, “The

^{*} Vol. ii. pp. 81–86.

[†] Vol. iii. p. 194.

whigs are so fond of ease, that they have but little relish for the rugged business of war. They will do nothing unless the tories are made to do equal duty, and this cannot be effected—so neither aids the army. You frequently hear of great things from Generals Marion and Sumpter. These are brave, good officers; but the *people* who are with them, just come and go as they please. These parties rather serve to keep the dispute alive, than lay a foundation for the recovery of the country.” And the judge himself, (note, p. 437,) after quoting and avouching a letter of Greene, which gives a still more unfavourable description of these irregulars, declares, “The soldiers of Sumpter’s brigade were little superior to mere mercenaries.* Even *some of his officers*, we have seen from the ge-

* It has been frequently observed, that the expressions of Mr. Johnson have to be fixed and interpreted, before his misrepresentations can be conclusively exposed—as without this extra labour in his confutation, he might lurk in the corner of an ambiguity, skulk behind a skreen of equivocation, or escape in the vagueness of nonsense. By the word “mercenaries,” he is not to be understood to refer to soldiers of fortune, that shed their blood for glory and for pay—your Hepburns, Leslies, and Dalghethys, who led the best troops of their age, and during the first half of the seventeenth century, were the terror of Europe—but to bands of men, whose motive was selfish, and whose object was plunder. Into a cloud of these predaceous patriots, he plunges all the stars of the legion; and thus irradiating the nebulous mass, calls it a constellation of his native sky, the leading orbs of which are Sumpter, Marion, &c.!

neral's own communications, had been made prisoners in the prosecution of disgraceful enterprizes."

But it seemed these "*mercenaries*" complained, and were incensed at seeing the legionary soldiers (note, p. 123,) "the next morning equipped in new clothing, while the rest of the army were left to prosecute the war in rags; and then they blamed his motives for precipitating the surrender." Whether Colonel Lee did give his men these clothes or not, does not appear either in the text or the note of Mr. Johnson; but the loose and probably false declaration of the militia to that effect, is countenanced as far as possible. Now, admitting it to be true; if the army were to have these clothes, did any corps deserve them as well as that, of whose toil and valour they were the prize? Were they to be given to the plundering mercenaries of Sumpter? and by whom was Colonel Lee's conduct to be judged, by General Greene, or one of Sumpter's officers?

The even-handed justice of our author next recurs to the surrender. "There cannot be a doubt that the surrender of the fort was unnecessarily hurried through. For the approach of Lord Rawdon, the *justification* assigned by Colonel Lee, was rather to be wished for than deprecated. Colonel Lee has incurred the charge of hastening the capitulation, in order to anticipate Sumpter and the *grand* army. One of his motives is discovered in the use he made of his conquest. No officer was ever more devoted to the

interests of his own corps, or his own fame." Thus after confessing that in hastening the surrender, he was acting in the letter and spirit of his orders—orders too which he takes great pains to persuade us, were devised by the general himself, for the purpose of producing the immediate surrender of the place; after mentioning the rumoured advance of Lord Rawdon to its relief, as "advice" upon which Colonel Lee was *obliged* to act as he did—and after declaring that it was scarcely "possible for Greene to prosecute his ulterior views," without getting possession of the supplies deposited in this post, he declares his conduct was precipitate, inglorious, and selfish. It is evident, therefore, that Lee cannot possibly escape the honour of the judge's malediction. Had he not hastened the surrender, he would have violated the letter and spirit of his orders. By obeying these, and satisfying with his usual energy and address, the exigencies of the moment, he excites the wrath of Sumpter, and the clamour of his mercenaries, (who, in the opinion of General Greene, were more intent upon pillage than war; and, according to our author, note p. 123, were so keen for booty, that they could see through covered waggons) and is culpable in the eyes of Mr. Johnson. It would be well for him to point out, for the instruction of future executive officers, the precise line of conduct that Colonel Lee should have pursued. Nor would it be amiss for him at the same time to explain, by whom and in what terms the *charge* he

mentions, as having been incurred by Colonel Lee on this occasion, was preferred—whether by any one but the author of the Sketches himself. General Greene thanked Colonel Lee and his detachment for the vigour and rapidity of their operations. General Sumpter, it is true, and a Colonel Thomas Taylor, refused to decorate this reward with their approbation—avow that Lee, commanding the van of the army, now engaged in the most eventful movements, should have suspended the arduous course of his general's operations, should have refrained from reducing the fort or securing its supplies, in order that Sumpter and his followers might secure the one and anticipate the other. That Lee was devoted to the comfort and honour of his legion, no friend to his memory will be so silly as to deny—although our author is so indiscreet as to urge the fact reproachfully. This honourable care, this martial justice, was a strong ingredient in his character; and surely no officer ever commanded a corps, which better deserved its liberal exercise. These gay, daring, high-mettled fellows, of whom an observer would have “counted heroes where he counted men,” reserved, as our author admits, (p. 18,) for critical services—picked man by man from the army, by General Washington; with such an officer as Lee at its head, he labours to persuade us, were incessantly subjected, by General Greene, to the command of some provincial brigadier, who happened to collect an ephemeral band of predatory followers.

When, even after Lee, for purposes of patriotic policy, had requested Greene *to put him under* Marion, our author confesses, in the words of General Sumpter, that Lee actually commanded Marion. These are Sumpter's words: "I hope it may not be disagreeable to recall Colonel Lee," (from Fort Granby,) "as his services cannot be wanted at that place; and as to his taking command as at the post at Motte's," (*anglice*—as to his commanding me as he did Marion at Motte's, which he will be sure to do if I join him,) "I cannot believe it would be your wish." And in a style of simple elegance and irresistible logic, he enforces his magnanimous application for Lee's recall, by the overpowering declaration, that his taking Fort Granby was a circumstance "which he" (the brigadier) "had never thought of!" Our author insists that Lee was egregiously covetous of distinction, and devoted to "the interests of his own fame." When the reader recollects that he declines taking the credit of suggesting the movement from Deep river—of confirming the wavering mind of Greene after his defeat at Camden—of suggesting the expedition against Augusta, or the proper mode of reducing Ninety Six, this slander will appear as impotent as it is vile.

But the exploits of General Sumpter are as memorable as his deportment, according to the description given of them by our author. Starting from Motte's, he scoured the country from Wassmasaw to Dorchester, and returned to Orangeburg in ten days. On the

judge's map, the horizontal distance from Motte's to Dorchester is seventy miles at least; and although Wassmasaw does not appear, from Dorchester to Orangeburg is sixty miles, so that without the slightest vertical or lateral deviation, Sumpter must have scoured a country of one hundred and thirty miles in the space of two days!

It is really hard to determine, whether the judge is more ridiculous in lauding Sumpter, or in defaming Lee. The declaration of Sumpter, that united with Marion and Lee he could have destroyed the baggage, and perhaps the army of Lord Rawdon, is announced (p. 124) as the offspring of a mind "ever delighting in vigorous enterprize;" and a deprecatory dissertation in favour of Greene's caution, bright as the spears of the tenth legion with military knowledge, is concluded by the following sample of vigorous logic: "Whenever the loss of the British baggage became inevitable, its destruction would have followed." The judge does not perceive, that if Sumpter's assertion was even plausible, Greene's conduct was in the highest degree inglorious. For if Sumpter, Marion and Lee could have cut off the baggage, and perhaps the army of the enemy, Greene, with the main army, in conjunction with these parties, ought not to have suffered a Briton to escape. That Sumpter did make this assertion there is some reason to believe; as in his speech in congress, on the 10th of January 1792,* upon the

* See United States' Gazette.

petition of Mrs. Greene, he makes a declaration, which, if true, would leave room for surprise, that all the British forces in Carolina out of Charleston, had not been taken or destroyed, before Greene returned from Deep river. "It is a notorious fact," (says General Sumpter,) "that the greatest collected force of the British at Camden, was not more than one thousand men, or twelve hundred going to the extent."— "Against this force we had collected, in the vicinity of Camden, more than three thousand five hundred effective men, well appointed, and most happily disposed for cutting off Lord Rawdon's retreat to Charleston, which could have been, and ought to have been effected." According to our author's estimate, taken from Gordon, Greene's force, before the battle of Camden, did not reach twelve hundred men, militia and all. After his defeat, its effective force was probably not much more than one thousand; add to this Lee's detachment, say three hundred men, and Generals Sumpter and Marion, (besides the corps of militia under Pickens, which must have amounted to at least five hundred men, as our author says, (p. 110,) he closely besieged Augusta, which was garrisoned by more than four hundred,) must have commanded about two thousand two hundred men: a force with which Camden, the posts below, and Augusta, should have been reduced, without the assistance of Greene's army. Of this numerous and formidable corps, five hundred being under General Pickens, and less than

four hundred (p. 69) under General Marion, General Sumpter must have led about eighteen hundred men; and yet with this strong party, and his own approved prowess, all that he did was to take the trifling post at Orangeburg, held by about eighty men, twelve of whom only were regulars.* The truth is, this daring and desperate warrior, before the beginning of the campaign of '81, had surpassed in enterprize and efficiency all his competitors; but from the time General Greene took the command of the southern army—from the moment Morgan passed the lawless limits, which bounded the terrors of his wild career, he seems to have lost all his zeal and energy, to have conceived a dislike to Greene, and to have become a prey to discontent, jealousy, and resentment. On the other hand, the patient and indefatigable zeal of Marion, and the cordial and blameless ardor of Pickens, continued daily to increase their influence and merit, and by the end of the campaign of '81, they equalled Sumpter in power and in fame.

* Ramsay, vol. ii. p. 431.

CHAPTER VI.

ON the 16th, Colonel Lee moved against Augusta; and here our author gives him credit for the subordinate merit of celerity, (p. 126.) “The distance from Fort Motte to Augusta exceeds one hundred miles. On the 16th he received his orders to proceed to Augusta, and on the 19th, cavalry, infantry and artillery were before the town.” This, while it diversifies, in some degree, the monotony of his injustice, serves to auspicate, with a semblance of candour, subsequent slanders, and prepares the mind of the reader for their ready admission. That this is the object, no one who reads his work can doubt, especially if the account of a former expedition of Colonel Lee be remembered. When that officer was ordered to move from Deep river to the Santee, he performed a march of about two hundred miles in eight days, and rousing Marion from his swampy lair, appeared before Fort Watson on the 9th. This Mr. Johnson describes with “the laudable feeling of a native” *Carolinian*, as follows, (pp. 69, 70.) “Lee’s detachment effected a junction with Marion’s party on the 14th, and such was the rapidity with which *their motions* were characterized, that on the 15th, the day after their junction, they were already before Fort Watson.”

On the 17th, Greene commenced his march for Ninety Six, and reached it on the 22d. Our author has forborne to hint, either in his *Sketches*, his *notabene*, or his controversial essays in the Charleston papers, that Colonel Lee suggested to General Greene, the expediency of these expeditions against Augusta and Ninety Six. The authority of Dr. Irvine, who was on the spot, and was in the confidence of both Lee and Greene, will satisfy all *reasonable* men on this point.* But for the benefit of our author, we refer to the extract which he publishes (p. 104,) from Lee's letter of the 28th of April, in which he says, "I have my hopes that you will order me and Major Eaton to pass the Santee, and to pursue the conquest of every post and detachment, in that country;" &c.—to Greene's reply,† in which he says, "I cannot agree with you in opinion, that the farther south we go the better. The posts on the Santee and Congaree should be our great object;" to his letter of the 9th of May, in which he considers Augusta and Ninety Six as likely to be reduced or evacuated without the employment of the regular army; and proposes going to Virginia; and to his letter of the 29th of May, in which he declines consenting to Lee's proposal, of attacking Savannah, after reducing Augusta. Taking all these circumstances into consideration, without adverting to the

* See Charleston City Gazette, May 11th, 1782.

† See Appendix C.

testimony of Dr. Irvine, it is impossible to doubt that Lee prevailed on General Greene to move against Ninety Six, and to detach him against Augusta. Nor is it less certain, that General Greene considered these fortresses as points of great importance and utility to the enemy; for in his letter to the President of Congress, (p. 92,) he observes, "The enemy have got a firmer footing in the southern states than is generally expected. Camden, *Ninety Six*, and *Augusta*, cover all the fertile parts of South Carolina and Georgia." On his arrival at Ninety Six, three great objects occupied the attention of General Greene, and they are memorable, if for nothing else, for the remarkable affection, (p. 127,) "of being all practicable, had he possessed sufficient means." Then we have Marion "commanding his command." (p. 128.) "The zeal with which certain parishes *shown* in the American cause"—that from the "*command*" of the loyalist Colonel Ball, "*hints were sent off*" to neighbours to *look out*"—and (p. 128,) that Marion anticipated the desolation, with which the enemy intended to visit the property of his friends, by inflicting it himself. To crown all, we are favoured with a sample of our author's wit, in which he appears in his true character; for while his logic has all the levity of a buffoon, his wit wears all the gravity of a judge. His pun (p. 129,) being at once dull, impious, and of course detestable, he will excuse us for "pretermittig" it. It was Prince Eugene, we believe, who said, "the affecta-

tion of irreligion, is, besides its foolish impiety, a mark of bad taste."

Nothing is more abhorrent to historical integrity, than the attempts of this writer to speak in the character of his hero, or to impart his own sentiments as those of General Greene. In point of moral propriety, it would be a dangerous undertaking, even for a wise and candid author, and in regard to literary virtue, a very delicate task. The prerequisites of this species of composition, are rare and numerous; a perfect acquaintance with the character represented, a clear comprehension of the circumstances affecting him, a sagacious insight into human nature, views unwarped and unclouded by prejudice or partiality, and elevated by reverence for justice, and ardour for truth; ability to segregate real and apparent causes, to distinguish final from occasional ones; to graduate their force and adjust their application; and a command of language, if not elegant, at least distinct. Without all these qualities and advantages, even in the hands of a man of talent and learning, history is apt to degenerate into fable, or to extravagate into romance. Influenced by considerations of this sort, sincere and unpretending writers, where the sentiment attributed, does not obviously spring up from the subject, is not supported by unquestionable evidence, or was not derived from undoubted authority or personal communication, are sure to accompany its introduction with some phrase of probability, some confession of doubt,

or intention of its being their own. That Mr. Johnson is gifted with any of the properties above mentioned, we cannot undertake to say: nor fail to be amused at the assurance, with which he professes to declare, the inmost thoughts of his hero. One example of his ventriloquism lies before us, (p. 126.) "The reduction of Ninety Six was now become to Greene an object of the greatest interest. Of Augusta, he had no doubt that it would soon fall." The object of this fiction is, doubtless, to diminish the credit of Lee, whose success against Augusta it represents, on the ostensible authority of General Greene, as certain, in order to prove that it was easy. But however this may be, General Greene's real opinions were very different; for while, on his march for Ninety Six, he expresses sanguine hopes of carrying it immediately; and in his orders to Lee of the 16th, is far from intimating that the enterprize committed to him was likely to be one of speedy success. On the contrary, his plan was, after reducing Ninety Six, to direct his whole force against Augusta. He thus instructs Lee: "You will march immediately for Augusta, as the advance of the army, which will move by the way of Ninety Six, and demand the surrender of those posts. General Pickens is at that place. You will report to him your arrival, and co-operate with him until the army arrives. Perform the march as soon as you can, without injury to your troops; and make vigorous exertions for the reduction of those posts, after your ar-

rival." On the 21st, he writes to Lee, "we shall be within ten miles of Ninety Six to-night, and am in hopes, if the garrison is not gone, it will fall into our hands." So that the judge has only inverted the opinion of General Greene, and should, in truth, have used the following language: "*The reduction of Augusta* was now become to Greene an object of the greatest interest. Of *Ninety Six*, he had no doubt that it would soon fall." Our author proceeds, (p. 129,) "During these transactions in other quarters, the sieges of Augusta and Ninety Six were advancing, but with a tardiness which put to trial the utmost patience of the American commander." Whether this is a fair distribution of blame for the vexation occasioned by delay, may be determined by reference to the following facts: While General Greene was lying before Camden, or was repelled from it by Lord Rawdon, Lee was co-operating with Marion in the effort to intercept Colonel Watson, in the reduction of Forts Motte and Watson, and was effecting himself, the capture of Fort Granby. On the 16th of May, he marched for Augusta. On the 21st took, with a detachment of the legion, Fort Galphin, stronger, and far more valuable than that at Orangeburg, and in combination with Pickens, compelled Augusta to surrender on the 5th of June, after a brave, obstinate, and skilful defence, by Colonel Browne, with a garrison exceeding four hundred men, more than three hundred of whom were regular troops. General Greene, with the main

army, on the 22d May, reached Ninety Six, garrisoned by five hundred and fifty men,* and was compelled to retreat from it, after a fruitless and expensive siege of four weeks.

In about six weeks, Lee, with his small party, assisted by Marion and Pickens, had wrested from the enemy three comparatively strong fortified posts, and taken or destroyed more than seven hundred men, and had alone reduced two other posts, and taken more than four hundred prisoners.† Yet still our author having just reproached him for precipitancy at Fort Granby, says his tardiness put to trial the utmost patience of his commander! Let his commander, instead of his defamer, speak. On the 22d, he writes to Lee, "My dear Sir, your early arrival at Augusta astonishes me. For rapid marches, *you exceed Lord Cornwallis*, and every body else. We performed our march in as short a time as we could, but our exertions, when compared with yours, have no merit." And after the capture of Augusta, the detachments which took it, were thanked in general orders, for the vigour of the operation. "Colonel Lee," continues our author, "who had recently been embroiled with two out of three of the South Carolina generals, was now entering upon a service, which brought him into contact, without bringing him under command of a

* Gordon, vol. iii. p. 194. Ramsay, vol. ii. p. 434. Marshall, vol. iv. p. 524.

† Marshall, vol. iv. p. 536.

third." Here is the assertion of a falsehood, which has no other pretension to credibility, than what it may acquire by appearing in the preterpluperfect tense—a guise under which, many of our ingenious author's fictions endeavour to personate facts. No writer upon the Revolution, not even Mr. Johnson, has shown that Lee was embroiled with either Marion or Sumpter. He has declared that Marion was offended (p. 115,) "by the mischief Greene had done," and tendered to him his commission. He has shown that Sumpter, while he was bearding Greene with the offer of his commission, expressed (p. 122,) "the greatest respect for Colonel Lee;" but even he has never directly affirmed, that Lee had any disagreement with either of them. Had he aggrieved them, or overstepped the bounds of privilege and duty, there is no doubt that instead of tendering their commissions, in unmanly resentment to Greene, they would have had Lee arrested as an officer, or made him accountable as a gentleman. According to Mr. Johnson himself, co-operation with these irregular bands and sensitive chiefs, was no very easy task; and instead of insinuating accusations of arrogance and presumption against Lee, and endeavouring to persuade us that Greene had to exercise his authority and persuasion in order to restrain his offensive disposition and illiberal carriage, in common justice he should have commended the power of mind, the suavity of manners, and the exhaustless address, by which Lee

moderated their resentment against Greene, controlled their reluctance, and engaged their hearty and harmonious co-operation. We are now told, (p. 130,) in genuine pettifogging phrase, of the "*case of Coriolanus*," and that Colonel Clarke, (p. 131,) by an original application of military stratagem, "had waylaid the river Savannah;" and "was carefully guarding this invaluable prize," when Lee reached Augusta. This "*prize*," was a rich collection of Indian presents, at the time Mr. Johnson speaks of, the property of the British, and safely deposited in Fort Galphin. It appears to have been the object of Colonel Clarke's desire, but soon became the *prize* of the legion.

When Lee reached Augusta, General Pickens and Colonel Clarke lay in its neighbourhood, at points of observation, preventing at once the escape or increase of its garrison. It stands on the right or Georgia bank of the Savannah, and below it about twelve miles, on the opposite bank, was a fortified post, denominated by the British Fort Dreadnought. This, as has before been observed, was immediately carried by a detachment of the legion under Captain Rudolph—as Lee says, before he had joined Pickens*—as likewise does Marshall.† But he has the misfortune to differ with our author, who avers that he was *complimented* by Pickens *with a request* to reduce it. There is some plausibility in this declaration, since on such

* Memoirs, vol. ii. pp. 90-1-2.

† Vol. iv. p. 525.

occasions, until the spoils were to be divided, the militia were very civil to the legion. He also alleges, that although Colonel Lee describes the affair "as a *coup de main*, executed in his presence," the place "surrendered on capitulation," and Lee was not present. Now, if the reader will take the trouble to examine Lee's account of the affair, he will observe that it does not exclude the fact of a capitulation, that it gives Rudolph due credit, and only reserves the stratagem, by which a part of the garrison were decoyed from the post, so as to facilitate the success of Rudolph. It expressly mentions that Lee did not appear before the post, and involves no difficulty in believing that there might have been a hasty capitulation. And it appears that Lee was so disposed to cherish the merit of Captain Rudolph, that his report to General Greene produced these flattering expressions—"Your report of the 22d, with Captain Rudolph's, of the surrender of Fort Dreadnought, I have had the pleasure to receive. Your exertions merit my warmest approbation, and Captain Rudolph, and the officers and men under his command, my particular thanks, which I beg you to communicate to them." Mr. Johnson gives (p. 132) an extract from a letter of the 25th, from Colonel Lee, which appears to contradict the idea, held out casually in his memoirs, that Fort Dreadnought was taken before he had an interview with Pickens. But this is an immaterial point, upon which the most careful and sincere writer might be mistaken

in his recollection, and is not important to the credit of the author, or the fidelity and interest of his narrative. It would seem strange, too, that Colonel Lee, after having reported to Greene the capture of the place, and all the circumstances attending it, on the 22d, should recapitulate it in a despatch dated the 25th. The operations of the siege, which were various and interesting in the highest degree, and were designed and conducted on the part of the besiegers chiefly by Lee, are despatched by our author in regard to the main work, which according to Ramsay and Gordon,* was garrisoned by more than three hundred soldiers, and, as Mr. Johnson says, (p. 133,) about two hundred negroes; in three lines; a style of brevity, which to the distress of his readers he abhors, except on occasions like the present, where Lee happened to be distinguished.

Stedman, in his very fair and interesting history, relates (through misinformation) a story of Lee's having marched the prisoners taken at Augusta, with circumstances of idle and ungenerous triumph, in sight of the garrison of Ninety Six. Lee, in a very clear and satisfactory manner, explains it to have arisen from a misapprehension on the part of the commandant at Ninety Six, provoked by an error in the route taken by the officer of the escort, which exposed his party to unexpected peril, and the garrison to undesigned indignity. He declares that he himself had previously

* Ramsay, vol. ii. p. 433. Gordon, vol. iii. p. 195.

reached Ninety Six, and was surprised and incensed at the circumstance.* To the discussion of this settled question, our author devotes a long paragraph, admits the *alibi* and other facts exculpatory of Lee, but slides in expressions, conjoined with emphatical and exclusive praise of the delicate humanity of Greene and Pickens, which almost conjure the reader not to acquit him. Thus, (p. 134,) "The assertion could hardly have been made without some authority; but we must express our extreme surprise, that men so unostentatious, delicate, and humane, as Greene and Pickens, could have incurred the charge of having tolerated an idle display;" still insinuating that Pickens commanded Lee. Now this charge never was incurred by Greene or Pickens, and is not intimated by either of them against Stedman, who does not even mention their names in connexion with it.† The vindication is therefore gratuitous, if not mischievous, in regard to them, as it is invidious in relation to Colonel Lee. This temper is fully exposed in the next page, where he quotes a letter completely exculpating that officer, and corroborating his explanation. With a full knowledge of all these circumstances, and possession of this very letter from Pickens, had Mr. Johnson been actuated by sentiments even of the coldest justice towards the character of Colonel Lee, is it to be supposed, that after reviving this injurious story, he would have hesitated to con-

* Memoirs, vol. ii. p. 119.

† Stedman, vol. ii. p. 369.

tradict it decisively; or that he would have suspended it through a slow and tedious discussion to the gaze of his readers, in opprobrious colours, rendered darker in reflection upon the fame of Lee, by being artfully contrasted with intrusive encomiums upon the humanity of Greene and Pickens. This attempt at defamation being finished, a few *rhapsodico-prosaical* exhortations to humanity in triumph, and moderation in power, conclude the thirteenth chapter.

An account of the siege of **NINETY SIX** is introduced, with a history of the place, and a derivation of its name, almost as unintelligible in its substance, as in its recital. "A name the district derived from a *fanciful* allusion to the uniform excellence of its soil. The two numbers which compose its name, viewed on any side, will express the same quantity." Colonel Lee, whose *fancy* was evidently less lively than our author's, says, "**NINETY SIX** derives its name from the circumstance, of its being ninety-six miles distant from the principal village of the Cherokee Indians."* Situated on the western frontier of South Carolina, this place had been fixed on as the scite of one of those rude fortifications, by which the European settlers forced back and overawed the roving natives. This frequent precaution, which studded throughout the colonies, the advancing line of civilized population, our author designates as peculiar to **NINETY SIX**, and

* Memoirs, vol. ii. p. 96.

acutely discovers that it was the scene "*perhaps*," of the first revolutionary contest. Colonel Cruger, an American by birth, commanded the garrison, composed of five hundred and fifty men, all of whom had been recruited in this country: a circumstance from which it is difficult to conceive how the following magnificent reflection springs, (p. 139.) "Such is the progress of conquest. The Romans conquered Italy, and *with Italy* conquered Europe—*with Europe* they overran Asia and Africa, and with troops drawn from her conquests, her ambitious consuls conquered the liberties of their country." Mr. Johnson's southern readers may, for aught we know, be extremely grateful for this profound glance into history; but they must be puzzled to *imagine*, how its exhibition could be required here, unless, indeed, for the sake of contrast. Great Britain claimed ancient possession of the country, and up to a very recent period, had enjoyed its acknowledged sovereignty. Her armies had been recruited from its British population, (never from the aborigines,) as from that of her European dominions. A large and increasing portion of this population, for sound and stimulating reasons, had first determined to resist her oppression, and then resolved to revolt from her sway. For five years they had maintained a severe and sanguinary struggle for freedom, and were daily gaining strength, confidence, and consideration. The southern states had been held down in the course of the contest, but were, at

this time, almost wrested from British power; and the fortress of Ninety Six now stood in the path of American success. Its defence was therefore identified with the effort of the ancient rulers of the land, aided by a fragment of adhering population, to resist the progress of conquest. An object of an opposite character, to that embraced in the "*fanciful allusion*" to the Romans: which, as might be expected, is incorrect; showing, not what the judge designed, abundance of knowledge, but dearth of information. The exploits of the Scipios appear not to have reached Mr. Johnson. He seems ignorant that Carthaginian Africa was subdued, Antiochus the Great overthrown, and Asia, this side Mount Taurus, reduced, before the north of Italy had submitted to the Romans. That Lucullus passed the Euphrates and the Tigris, and Pompey reduced the kingdom of Syria to a Roman province, before Gaul was conquered, or Britain invaded.

A speculation follows, in which it is conjectured that had Colonel Cruger received the orders of Lord Rawdon, and in obedience to them evacuated Ninety Six, and effected a junction with Colonel Browne at Augusta, and then attempted a retreat to Savannah, he would have been pursued by the South Carolina militia, and murdered by their perfidy rather than subdued by their valour. (P. 140.) "Colonel Lee," it is said, "has copied the narrative of Mr. Steedman,*

* This writer calls himself *Stedman*.

with the addition of a few incidents, probably introduced from his own recollection. Mr. Stedman has worked up the British account of the affair into a very brilliant story. We shall confine ourselves to such facts as we find authentic intelligence to establish." So that Stedman's account, neither acquiring nor imparting confirmation, by its concurrence with Lee's, is a mere *story*, and Lee's at least as destitute of truth; while the judge's own is the only true one. To make good his modest pretensions on this score, he observes, (p. 141,) "on the first reconnoitring of this post General Greene predicted his failure;" and to verify this assertion, quotes a letter to Lafayette, in which the general observes, his "success is very doubtful." "If we are successful, I shall move northwardly immediately, with a part of our force, if not all." Without adverting to the wisdom and dignity of a commander's conduct, in persisting in the sacrifice of time and men, upon an undertaking, in which, from the first, he seriously and avowedly calculated upon failure, we shall only say, that fortunately for the reputation of General Greene, the disparaging assertion of his biographer, is disproved by the very document he attempts to rest it on—We say *fortunately*—for if the case here stated had been made out against Greene, there could be no censure or derision too strong to apply to him. A man profoundly conversant with nations and with men, has remarked, that there cannot be a stronger proof of greatness of soul,

than is exhibited by a general when he perseveres in the devotion of his toil, his talents, and his life, to the prosecution of a plan of operations, which his sovereign has directed him to pursue, but which his own judgment had always disapproved. But what would this great man have said of an officer, who should *voluntarily* persevere in an enterprize, the execution of which he had from the first deemed hopeless? To place in another light—one in which most of our author's *positive* declarations appear to peculiar advantage—the folly of this unfounded assertion, let it be compared with his affirmation that about this time Greene had *determined* to repair to Virginia, and to throw himself in front of Cornwallis; and this latter assertion will appear to be almost demolished; for the performance of this *determination*, is here made to depend upon the prosperous issue of the siege, a contingency, according to our author, in General Greene's view, in the highest degree fortuitous and unexpected. "For the besiegers to have operated against any other part of the works but the star, it was immediately perceived would be nugatory; that entirely commanded the whole, and an enemy would have been swept from within the stockade in an hour. How to operate against the star was the question. Greene resolved to adopt measures to get under it and over it." The technical elegance of this language must delight every military reader; but the statement that operations against the left of the w^{or}ks, would

have been nugatory, does not appear to be consistent with the progress of the siege, or made out by the assertion that the star commanded the stockade on the left, and would have "swept an enemy from it in an hour." According to the judge's plan, a straight line from the centre of the star to that of the stockade, passed nearly through the centre of the village, and according to his book, (p. 150,) Colonel Lee held undisputed possession of the stockade on the 18th, from about one P. M. until night, that is, about seven hours. "Colonel Lee, however, who cannot resist the temptation of hinting, that nothing went right until Achilles reappeared before the walls of Troy, very confidently asserts that, towards the close of the siege, the besiegers began to deplore the early inattention of the chief engineer to the enemy's left, persuaded that had he been deprived of the use of the rivulet in the beginning of the siege, he must have been forced to surrender."

This language, vague and tasteless as it is, can have no other interpretation than that Colonel Lee hints, in his *Memoirs*, that the besiegers proceeded without skill or judgment, until he arrived from Augusta, and pointed out to them the plan they ought to pursue. The passage must have been intended by our author, for the benefit exclusively of those of his readers, who either never had read, or never would read, *Lee's Memoirs*; for we cannot deem so lightly of his "*coëccotion in design*," as to suppose he would

hazard an assertion, which a recollection of, or reference to, the Memoirs, would at once disprove. Colonel Lee studiously *forbears to hint*, that he suggested to General Greene the expediency of operating against the work, which secured the garrison's communication with the rivulet; and before the publication of the Sketches, Mr. Johnson learned, from a work of much higher interest and authority, that General Greene was really indebted to him for this advice.*

* *Garden's Anecdotes*, page 63. "Lee has not hinted in the slightest degree, that the grand scheme for the recovery of the two (three) southern states, when Lord Cornwallis, after the battle of Guilford, retired to Wilmington, was first suggested to General Greene by him." (p. 65.) Had *he* directed the operations of the besiegers at Ninety Six, instead of *Kosciusko*, different indeed would have been the result. On his arrival at the post immediately after the capture of Fort Cornwallis, he, with the eye of a soldier, at once perceived that the plan of operations, and point of attack, adopted and pursued by General Greene, had not been advantageously chosen. With that exquisite military sagacity which cannot be denied him, he immediately satisfied the commander in chief, that the place would be easily carried by obtaining possession of the western redoubt," &c. The difference between the style of Major Garden and Judge Johnson, is too striking to be insisted on. Every reader will at once perceive that the former wrote in the language of a gentleman, and with the spirit of a soldier. He founds these assertions respecting Colonel Lee, on letters from Dr. Irvine, of Charleston, and from Judge Johnson, of Virginia, who were both officers in the legion. In a subsequent controversy with our author, respecting the advice of the movement from Deep river to Camden, he again refers to these two

Modesty in Colonel Lee, appears to the jaundiced eyes of the judge, to be vanity, and his sagacity and service are represented as folly and inefficiency. Lee alleges that the general was thought, not without rea-

gentlemen, who corroborate and amplify their former statements; and as their letters have been alluded to in the body of this work, we here subjoin pertinent extracts from them. They are addressed to Major Garden, and were published in the Charleston City Gazette, of the 11th May, 1822.

“In a letter dated Abingdon, November 11th, 1821, Judge Johnston, of Virginia, thus expresses himself :—Lee’s Memoirs of the War in the Southern Department of the United States, is a work, in some respects, admirably executed. The writer has evinced military talents as well while managing his command in the field, as when occupied in this performance. But although he has rendered a just tribute of applause to some of his officers for their deeds of gallantry, he has, for reasons, to which I am a stranger, omitted to mention others equally meritorious. Nor has he always *done justice to himself*. *I am perfectly satisfied that the grand enterprize for the recovery of South Carolina and Georgia, by marching into those states when Lord Cornwallis retreated to Wilmington after the action at Guilford Court-house, was suggested by Colonel Lee.* Accident afforded me the view of a letter written by General Greene to Colonel Lee, immediately after the second battle of Camden, fought on the 25th of April, 1781, in which the General expressed a determination to abandon the scheme of continuing his progress southwardly, and directed Lee to join him immediately with his corps, which had about that time reduced a post of the enemy at Wright’s Bluff, on the Santee river. I shall never forget one expression in that letter, which goes far to prove that I am right in the opinion which I have ever since entertained. ‘*I fear, my friend,*’ says the general, ‘*that I*

son, to have been indiscreet, in confiding the mode and direction of his operations, implicitly to Kosciusko, that the readiest way of succeeding, would have been, to cut off the communication of the garrison

have pursued your advice too far. I have resolved to march back with the army towards Virginia, and desire you will join me with your command as soon as possible.' The Colonel left the legion in the neighbourhood of Fort Watson, and repaired to head quarters, but very quickly returned, countermanded the orders to unite with the main army, crossed the Santee river at Wright's Bluff, and marched rapidly to Mrs. Motte's, where another post was occupied by a body of British troops, who surrendered themselves prisoners of war after a siege of about nine days. The events of the Revolutionary War, particularly in the southern states, afford conclusive evidence, that no officer of his rank belonging to the American army, was the instrument of so much mischief to the enemy, as Colonel Lee. Without his aid and that of his corps, General Greene would have found it impossible to accomplish the recovery of South Carolina and Georgia. By his enterprize and address, the tories in North Carolina were either cut to pieces, or prevented from assembling, and uniting themselves to the army of Lord Cornwallis. He reduced all the British posts established from the neighbourhood of Nelson's ferry on the Santee, to Augusta on the Savannah, except Ninety Six; and if the plan of operations which he suggested on his arrival at that place, had been adopted at the commencement of the siege, it is unquestionable, that Colonel Cruger would have been compelled to surrender with his garrison, before Lord Rawdon could have marched to his relief. It is idle to suppose that the services which he performed, with extraordinary vigour and rapidity, could have been effected by Generals Marion and Pickens with their militia. It is true, they were valuable auxiliaries, but incompe-

with the water; that Kosciusko did not advert to this object; and that although this officer possessed skill as an engineer, yet he was “moderate in talent; not a spark of the etherial in his composition.” These

tent to the purposes which he accomplished with his regulars. At what stage of the war did any officer but Lee, wrest from the foe five or six fortified positions, and capture prisoners to an amount of four, or perhaps, five times as great as the number of troops which composed his command. He never did, indeed, rush upon the enemy with one of those tremendous and daring onsets to which Colonel Washington was indebted for his fame as a commander of cavalry; but neither was he ever surprised, nor did he ever suffer the enemy to obtain any great advantage over him, while they were constantly feeling him. These facts, fairly and freely stated, must counteract any unfavourable impressions against our commandant that the judge’s writings may possibly produce.”

The extracts from Dr. Irvine’s letter are—“Dear Sir, The article in your work respecting Colonel Henry Lee, does ample justice to that gallant officer, and contains but one unimportant inaccuracy. You state that my communications to General Greene, from Colonel Lee, were *altogether* verbal. This is a mistake; there was one letter conveyed, which disclosed to the general the purport of my visit. I saw him twice afterwards, upon the same subject, but without bearing to him any written communication. You must know, and Judge Johnson must also know, that I would not have undertaken the office of a mere letter carrier on this occasion. As I engaged the friendship, I also shared the confidence of Colonel Lee, and was made acquainted with the nature of the despatch he entrusted to me, and was put in full possession of his views, in order to develope them more fully in conferring with General Greene.

“The letter in question, contained a proposition or sugges-

observations, which appear to be neither arrogant nor incredible, give great offence to our author. The vanity of Lee, he intimates, induces him to swell the effect of his presence, into equal importance with the

tion, that the war should be carried into the enemy's territory. for Carolina was at this time, in effect, a conquered country; being in full possession of the English forces.

“ Judge Johnson may rely upon the accuracy of these facts. And I may add, that the movement from Fort Granby into Georgia, was also undertaken at the suggestion of Colonel Lee. That the idea of the southern campaign, worthy the genius of Scipio Africanus, originated with Colonel Lee, may be *denied*, but never without eliciting contradiction, while any of his friends survive to vindicate his fame. If Colonel Lee was not the author of this plan, whence the letter of General Greene to him on that subject, in which he regretted having *followed Lee's advice*, expressing himself satisfied that the latter had given him the most friendly counsel; but that he had for ever committed his military reputation by pursuing it? Owing to the known carelessness of Colonel Lee, this letter has been lost, but your respectable Virginia correspondent and myself, could not have simultaneously dreamed that we saw such a document.

“ Judge Johnson refers to the good spirits with which General Greene wrote at this period, and his different communications on the subject of his operations; but it was not to be expected that so cautious a commander would express to every correspondent, the doubts and despondencies which the flying clouds of the moment, or even the more settled gloom of disaster, might naturally infuse into his mind. He did, however, to one intimate breast confide these feelings, and desired reassurance from the same friendly source. If Judge Johnson would view this matter in its true light, the credit here given to Colo-

“re-appearance of Achilles before the walls of Troy;” and he insinuates that the presumption of a person so inferior to Kosciusko in talent and fame, to doubt the genius, or to define the ability of the Polish patriot, is calculated to expose his own destitution of modesty and judgment. That as to Greene’s having entrusted the direction of the operations to Kosciusko, the allegation of Lee to that effect is not to be credited, inasmuch as a nameless member of the general’s family, is said to have assured our author it was the impression in the camp, that General Greene directed the operations himself—preferring, with his usual comity, any evidence, however vague and doubtful, to the positive averment of Lee. It is obvious, that the *member of the family* here relied on, must have been the cook or the groom, as no one of rank would have duped the judge with the floating rumours of the camp.

Of Kosciusko, the world is yet to learn, that his fame depended on the gift of genius. He acquired glory in the best of all characters, that of a brave and enthusiastic patriot; and is, in that heroic aspect, like
nel Lee, in nothing detracts from the glory of Greene. Though the advice was Lee’s, the responsibility of acting upon it, rested wholly with Greene. The merit also of carrying it into vigorous and successful effect, was chiefly his. The adoption of the course that was thus pointed out to him, displayed the finest military discernment, and evinced also the highest magnanimity. These circumstances illustrate the great qualities of the hero, who, on the field of Eutaw, ‘purpled o’er his name with deathless glory.’ ”

to be immortalized in the very worst couplet of Campbell. Since '94, in this hemisphere, his celebrity has not exceeded that of the white bear in Paris, where it appears he was naturalized to every climate of oppression. The cause of liberty is deeply indebted to him, for the courage and ardour with which he espoused it in our country; and Poland will long remember, with sorrow, but with pride, the gallantry and devotion with which he fought and failed, in defending her own. But there exists no monument of his extraordinary talents, no evidence of his genius. If it be true, however, as must be inferred from the Sketches, that he was a man of genius, as well as an engineer of skill, surely General Greene was very imprudent in *not* confiding to him the direction of his approaches. The judge has fixed himself on the horns of a dilemma. If Greene was right in directing the operations of the siege, Kosciusko must be surrendered to the opinion of Lee. If Lee was unjust to Kosciusko, Greene was wrong in prescribing the direction of the approaches. The truth is, Mr. Johnson has aimed at too much. He will find it impossible *always* to praise Greene and contradict Lee; for the bearing of Lee's work is to give renown to Greene. His praise, to be sure, is not vile and loathsome, but manly and sincere. In the particular passage alluded to, he intended nothing less than to disparage the Polish or American hero; but designed to do justice to the one, by telling truth respecting the other. He

was personally acquainted with both, and deemed the former a man of moderate talent. That this opinion was honest, will not be doubted, if it was correct; and that it was correct, the history of its subject gives reason to believe. It was therefore at least blameless, and shows that Lee was a man of just observation so far, while the uncivil exception of Mr. Johnson proves, that he considers a celebrated man, and a man of genius, one and the same thing—ignorant of the high place of those,

“*Qui ob patriam pugnando vulnera passi.*”

His classical excursions are bold and blind. It is hard to conjecture how the suggestion of Lee, to deprive the garrison of water, could have reminded him of Achilles. Against the towers of Troy, we never hear of that most poetical of all heroes directing operations, devising plans, or forming stratagems.

The remaining absurdities of our author, on this particular subject, may be divided into unfounded assertions, immediate contradictions, and remote ones; of each of which, we proceed to give examples. (P. 142,) “The project of cutting off the water had been well weighed and considered, and rejected on mature deliberation.” For this assertion no authority is given, nor can any be produced; for if this project had been rejected on mature deliberation, it would not afterwards have been adopted by General Greene, as soon as he was joined by Colonel Lee, more espe-

cially if it be true, as Mr. Johnson adds, that "it would have been worse than a waste of labour to operate against the works that commanded the water." An immediate contradiction occurs in the following paragraph—"Thus circumstanced, as the star commanded the other works, and the approaches against the water would be useless against the star," (naked assertions)—"it would have been a waste of labour, and worse than a waste of labour to operate against the works that commanded the water; *for by the effort to defend the rivulet, the enemy weakened himself at the principal point.*"

Here the conclusion and the premises of the judge are at variance. If the enemy was weakened at the main point, by his effort to defend the works which commanded the rivulet, an attack on these works should have been diligently kept up by the besiegers, and as long as it succeeded in occasioning the diversion alluded to, it might have been prudent not to terminate it even successfully.

As an example of remote contradictions, the following passage, compared with the preceding ones, will serve. "It cannot be doubted that if Greene could have commanded a sufficient force, the two operations would have been carried on concurrently." The reader will remember that it has already been asserted, that one of these operations had been "considered and rejected on mature deliberation," because, "there was not a doubt entertained" that water could be pro-

cured “by digging in almost any part of the enemy’s works;”—and also that it would have been “worse than a waste of labour to operate against works that commanded the water.” The permutations of his narrative continue. He admits the assertion of Stedman, that the garrison suffered severely for water, as soon as they were cut off by Lee from the rivulet, and endeavoured in vain to obtain it by sinking a well; then half desires the truth of it, and justifies the early inattention of the besiegers to this point, upon the ground that they could not have *known* this consequence would follow an attack on the left. As if the operations and stratagems of war, from the *Dolus Sinon* down to the peace of Paris, were not founded on combinations of slight but sagacious conjectures. As if the essence of the martial art, did not consist, not in mustering hundreds and thousands, and directing them by positive information, and ascertained facts; but in hurling the force and courage of armies along these quick and dangerous glances of thought. Cæsar did not *know* that the cavalry of Pompey would dread a scratch in the face, more than a wound in the body; yet he operated on that shrewd conjecture, and, by the force of it, became master of the world. General Jackson did not *know* that he should gain any signal advantage over the British, when he attacked them on the night of the 23d of December; but he *inferred*, that by a prompt and vigorous assault, he should intercept their advance, inspire them with caution, in-

duce hesitation, and gain time to increase his force, and prepare his defences. This sound and brilliant resolution, like all others founded on the insight of genius into the nature of man, succeeded, and enabled the hero who formed it, to save our western republics.

In the case before us, the suffering of the garrison, and the failure of their efforts to procure water by wells, demonstrated, that had the plan suggested by Lee been adopted at the first, Greene must have mastered the place, before Lord Rawdon could march to its relief. The expedient of sending out naked negroes in the night, whose sooty bodies were undistinguishable in the darkness, procured a scanty supply, and enabled Cruger to hold out until the approach of Lord Rawdon compelled the Americans to retreat.

The judge's manner of weighing testimony, is nowhere more remarkable than where he says, (pp. 142-3,) "It appears, however, notwithstanding the reasons to think otherwise, that cutting off the water effectually, might have produced some serious inconveniences to the besiegers, (besieged). This inference is drawn from a paragraph of Mr. *Steedman's*, in which he asserts that a well had been sunk with great labour in the star, but no water obtained. How this comports with the positive fact of its having been found in the neighbouring stockade, five years before, we are at a loss to determine. And this *positive fact* he affirms was "historically known." Now, the fact mentioned by Stedman is *historically known*, on the

credit of a respectable writer, and an excellent work. What history records the *positive fact*, which he alludes to, Mr. Johnson has neglected to tell us, and until he does show that it is to be found in one of authority equal to Stedman's, he should make the declaration of the latter in regard to these facts, which he represents as incompatible, prevail.

After the 8th of June, the siege was conducted on our left by General Greene, on our right by Colonel Lee; and when Rawdon's advance became imminent, an assault was hazarded. On the side of Greene, the assailants, under Colonel Campbell, displayed and encountered desperate gallantry, and failed. On the side of Lee, with equal courage, there was less resistance, and much success.* The enemy were driven from their work, which was occupied by Rudolph, of the legion infantry, when the further success of Lee was suspended, by the failure of Colonel Campbell's heroic efforts with the left column. But to the conduct or narrative of Lee, our author appears to think little credit is due. The latter, because it confirms generally the account of Stedman, he insists is copied from it, and reprobates as untrue and ridiculous, without condescending to tell the reader why Judge Johnson, who was not present, should have better knowledge of the occurrences of the siege than Lee or Stedman, one of whom at least was an eye witness.

* Marshall, vol. iv. p. 529.

and, as he will have it, in the disguise of Achilles. The agreement of these two authors, upon most points, which would satisfy the incredulity of common minds, provokes the suspicion and obloquy of our author. There is one incident related circumstantially by Lee, that we shall remark upon; not because it is invidiously noticed by the judge, but because it seems to have been inaccurately represented by a respectable writer, to whose interesting work we have already alluded. "It was deemed practicable," says Lee,* "to set fire to the stockade. In the succeeding day, a dark violent storm came on from the west, without rain. Lieutenant Colonel Lee proposed to General Greene to permit him to make the attempt. This being granted, a sergeant, with nine privates of the legion infantry, furnished with combustible matter, was directed to approach the stockade in the most concealed direction, under cover of the storm, while the batteries in every quarter opened upon the enemy, and demonstrations of striking at the star redoubt were made, with the expectation of diverting his attention from the intrepid party, which with alacrity undertook the hazardous enterprize. The sergeant conducted his band in the best manner, concealing it whenever the ground permitted, and, when exposed to view, moving along upon their bellies. At length he reached the ditch with three others—the whole close behind. Here unluckily he was discovered, while in

* Memoirs, vol. ii. p. 122.

the act of applying his fire. Himself and five were killed—the remaining four escaped unhurt.” This unsuccessful project is thus described by Major Garden, in his *Anecdotes*.* “When the importance of wresting the possession of the stockade fort at Ninety Six, from the enemy, was clearly ascertained, Lieutenant Colonel Lee, to whom the charge of conducting all operations against it was entrusted by General Greene, adopted (it must be acknowledged too hastily) the opinion that it might be effected by fire. Accordingly Sergeant Whaling, a gallant non-commissioned officer, who had served with zeal and fidelity from the commencement of the war, and whose period of enlistment would have expired in a few days, with *twelve* privates, were sent forward in *open day*, and over level ground, that afforded *no cover* to facilitate their approaches, to accomplish this hazardous enterprise. Whaling saw with certainty the death on which he was about to rush, but by the prospect of which he was unappalled. He dressed himself neatly, took an affectionate and cheerful leave of his friends, and with his musket over his shoulder, and a bundle of blazing pine torches in his hand, *sprung forward* for the object of his attack. His alacrity inspired the little band with courage. They followed him closely up to the building, around which the stockade was erected, before the troops within fired a shot. Their aim was deliberate and deadly. But *one individual*

* Pp. 149-50

escaped. Whaling fell, deeply lamented. Instead of the *rash* and unavailing exposure to which he was subjected, all admitted his just claim to promotion."

In this account, all the preparatory circumstances, enumerated by Lee, are omitted, and several material facts, either neglected or misrepresented. As to the facts; it is neither repeated nor denied, that the attempt was sanctioned by General Greene; which, of itself, is enough to convince every one, that it was not a project so rash and blind as it is here represented. Colonel Lee says, the party consisted of a sergeant and nine men; Major Garden affirms, it was composed of a sergeant and twelve men. Of these, he affirms, only one escaped with life; of the smaller number mentioned by Lee, he declares four escaped and came running over the field, through a thick fire. The dark western cloud, and the storm of wind, the general fire of our batteries, the demonstrations against the opposite quarter of the works, were all propitious and preparatory circumstances, and are all excluded from Major Garden's remarks. The fact of some protecting inequalities in the ground of approach, alleged by Lee, is denied by Major Garden; and Whaling he describes as *springing forward to the object of his attack*; while Lee very naturally relates, that he advanced in the most stealthy, secret, and concealed manner. The circumstance of *open day* is mentioned by this amiable writer, as if he deemed it a proof of the rashness of the enterprize; and Whaling,

it is said, *held his blazing pine torch in his hand*, as he sprang forward. It is not probable that the sergeant would have been so fool-hardy: and it is probable the mid-day was the only period of the twenty-four hours, in which it was possible the attempt could succeed. By that time, the sun would have heated almost to ignition, every combustible substance; and fire being applied, would instantly catch and extend. The damps of night, and the dews of evening and morning, would have been unfavourable to this process, and therefore no prudent or judicious officer, would have attempted the enterprize at any time but the *open day*. Besides, delay in this case was fatal; for already General Greene had been informed by Sumpter, that Lord Rawdon was advancing to release the place. But independently of these considerations, the idea that a project of this kind is to be always attempted, under the most favourable aspect of physical circumstances, appears to be more plausible than sound. The condition of moral circumstances is much more closely to be regarded; and a wise commander is not distinguished from the meanest soldier, not in knowing that night is the most likely season for concealment; but in reflecting that his adversary's conduct will be regulated by a knowledge of this obvious truth; and that therefore, mid-day may be the most propitious hour to surprise him. Polybius, in his account of the battle of Trebia, mentions, that Hannibal placed an ambuscade to surprise the Ro-

mans in the *open plain*; and observes, "This stratagem was such, indeed, as might well be carried into execution, without the fear of discovery. For though the Romans always were prepared to expect this kind of fraud, in woods and covered place, because the Gauls were accustomed to hide themselves in these, they had never any apprehension of it in a flat and open country."*

* In another part of his book, this polite and liberal author inadvertently misrepresents Colonel Lee. He observes, (p. 125,) "Lieutenant Colonel Lee was certainly a man of *strong prejudices*; but where admiration was excited towards a gallant enemy, his generosity was unbounded." The first part of this remark appeared so very unsuitable to the real character of Colonel Lee, that a friend of his called the attention of Major Garden to the subject, who explained it, as being designed to portray the strength of his *principles*, rather than his *prejudices*—his resolution to support the cause of the United States, and the energy of his conduct in giving effect to this resolve. That he was remarkably free from prejudices, all who knew him will at once remember. And though he lived, and was active in the most violent political contests, which have ever agitated the union, his private friendships were unaffected by the rancour of habitual contention, or the coldness of party animosity. An old circular, which he addressed to his constituents, upon the first election of Mr. Jefferson to the presidency, is before us; and while it affords an apt illustration of the liberality, forbearance, and urbanity of his sentiments, would serve to contradict the aggravated and fearful reflections, which the political sciolists of the present day, love to cast upon the contending parties on that occasion, and at the same time to leave room for hope, that a similar constitutional process is not likely

In the Sketches, (pp. 147-8,) it appears to be objected that the time was open day, and the men *brave*, and our learned Theban, although he does not deny that General Greene sanctioned the project, derides it by affirming, that "the fire could neither have extended itself, nor the garrison been prevented from extinguishing it." An observation which does not appear to have occurred to Stedman or to any American spectator or authority.

Lee mentions, that previously to his retreat, Greene proposed a truce for the purpose of burying the dead, which our author observes, "could not have been done by the Americans without the consent of the British; but then appearing to bethink him, of Lee's saying the proposition was rejected by Cruger, upon the ground, that this affecting ceremonial of right devolv-

to be attended by such prodigious evils as these wisacres profess to apprehend. "The late election of president," (says Colonel Lee,) "produced a new and interesting scene. Two gentlemen being presented equal by the electors, the choice devolved on the House of Representatives. A difference of sentiment prevailing in the house, every fair effort was made to give success to these opposite opinions. After four days struggle, the contest terminated, and Mr. Jefferson was elected. I was among those who supported the pretensions of Mr. Burr. My decision was the result of deliberate consideration, regarding, as my sole object, the good of the United States. A majority of the House of Representatives, with the same end in view, came to the opposite decision. To their decree I sincerely accede, it being the bounden duty of all to obey, without murmur, the will of the majority."

ed on the victor, with his usual dexterity, he contradicts Lee; and then with his usual inconsistency, himself, by confessing that although Greene proposed no *general truce*, he did propose that parties might be sent from both sides, to bury their respective dead, and that Cruger answered, that the slain of the Americans, who fell within the abbatis of the British, should be sent to the camp of General Greene—of course that he should not be permitted to send a party to remove them; confirming substantially the account of Lee.

Lord Rawdon, having pursued Greene a short distance, returned to Ninety Six: in conformity with his plan of contracting the territory to be covered by his forces, and of preparing for an apprehended descent of the French at Beaufort, ordered Colonel Cruger to evacuate and demolish the fortifications he had so gloriously defended; left half the troops to convey the stores and baggage, and to escort the obnoxious loyalists, south of the right branch of the Edisto, to Orangeburg; and with the other division proceeded directly to that place, with a view of meeting Colonel Stewart, who had been ordered to bring up a reinforcement from Charleston. Mr. Johnson, in pretending to describe these operations, as usual falsifies their history. He says, Lord Rawdon reached Ninety Six on the afternoon of the 21st, but did not march in pursuit of Greene until the morning of the 24th, (p. 155,) “ Lord Rawdon did not, *in fact*, move from

Ninety Six until the morning of the 24th." Lee, who was actively employed in watching and obstructing his motions, affirms,* that he reached Ninety Six in the morning of the 21st, and left it in pursuit of Greene the same evening; and is supported in the assertion by every respectable writer on the subject.† But Mr. Johnson *may* be supposed to be the organ of the official papers of General Greene, and to derive from them information at variance with these authorities. This, however, independently of his well-earned discredit in that regard, is not probable, is indeed incredible. On the 24th, General Greene writes to Lee from Broad river, "It is next to impossible to draw the militia of this country from the different parts of the state to which they belong. Marion is below, Pickens I can get no account of, and Sumpter wants to make a tour to Monk's Corner, and all I can say to either is insufficient to induce them to join us." "If the British army is in the distress you represent, they cannot, they will not follow us far this morning, nor am I of opinion they will *pursue us farther*. Our army is on the march for Sandy River, towards the Cross roads, on the route to the Catawba nation." On the 22d also, Major Burnet, by command of General Greene, communicated by letter intelligence, and pro-

* Vol. ii. pp. 131-2.

† Tarleton, p. 498. Stedman, vol. ii. p. 373. Marshall, vol. iv. p. 531.

posed inquiries to Colonel Lee. But upon turning over the leaf, we find these references, and farther observations on them, unnecessary, as Mr. Johnson himself there asserts Lord Rawdon discontinued the pursuit, and retraced his march toward Ninety Six, on the 24th, and of course marched more than forty miles, and commenced his return in one day! For this, he assigns as a reason, the great distress of the British army for provisions, averring that they had to subsist chiefly on beef and Indian bread—diet which a prince, or even a judge, might relish. Another misstatement of the same kind may be worth noticing. “Washington and Lee had sullenly preceded the march of the enemy, *presenting a precaution against venturing too far* with his foraging parties. With these, *in person*, was the American general,” &c. The propriety, clearness, and felicity of the phrase in italics, need not be adverted to; but General Greene was not with Colonel Lee’s detachment on the 22d, and on the 24th, was certainly beyond Broad River with the main army, and on the march for Sandy River.

As soon as Greene discovered that the force of the enemy was divided, he determined, with his accustomed activity and resolution, to move into the neighbourhood of the principal body, and if a good opportunity could be gained, to attack it. Lee was detached as usual to feel, harass, and observe them. For the same purpose, Washington was pushed forward

toward Granby, and was, from that point, to co-operate with Lee, in obstructing Lord Rawdon's march for Orangeburg: and Greene, strengthened by reinforcements, and the partial concentration of the state militia, advanced toward the Congaree, with the hope of being able to engage his adversary before he got to Orangeburg—a position of strength, and as has been mentioned, the point of junction for his army. The duty assigned to the legion was executed with considerable success. A detachment of the cavalry under Eggleston, cut off a party of fifty dragoons in the face of the British army. Our author describes these operations minutely, adorns his narrative with an ingenious personification of Fortune, (p. 161,) “acting the *Will o' whisp*” toward “poor Greene,” which gives as much dignity and splendour to the work, as the goodly images of Peace, Plenty, and Charity, used to do an hundred years since, to the apartments of our ancestors. For euphony, syntax, and sense, the following sentence is somewhat remarkable, (p. 160.) “Notwithstanding some unfortunate incidents, which attended his accelerated movements, *it* proved exceedingly fortunate for the safety of himself and his detachments.” This *exceedingly unfortunate good fortune* it seems, from the judge's account, enabled him to escape being destroyed by Greene's army—a catastrophe naturally to be apprehended from their contact, as recent occurrences at Camden and Ninety Six too

plainly testified. Lord Rawdon's march too is said to have been accelerated by *alarm*. If, however, he reached Granby, as our author declares, two days before the time appointed for his arrival at Orangeburg, neither alarm nor acceleration could have happened, for Orangeburg, by the judge's map, is two days' march at least from Granby, and his reaching the latter two days sooner than he had proposed to arrive at the former, is pregnant proof that his march was steadily regulated by regard to its original object. From Granby he proceeded to Orangeburg.

Meanwhile Greene had combined with his effort to come up with Lord Rawdon before he could reach Orangeburg, an attempt to intercept Colonel Stewart, who was advancing with a detachment of four hundred and forty men. The measures devised for this object are related by Mr. Johnson, but the character of Greene's letter to Lee and the conduct of the latter, are not fairly represented. Instead of conveying an order, this and previous letters leave him perfectly at his own discretion, and the latter, in place of *requiring* him to join Colonel Washington, suggests that it may be expedient for him to do so; but relying on Lee's discretion and intelligence, leaves him at liberty either to join Washington at Ancram's, or to point out to him a more advantageous point of junction; dissuades him from attempting the enterprize alone; and is imperative only in directing him to inform Colonel Wash-

ington "what route you will move, and what you would wish him to do."* It turned out that Washington and Marion attempted this service with a force sufficient to effect it; and though attended by the general himself, an accident frustrated their efforts, and Stewart, with his convoy, reached Orangeburg in safety. From Lee's account of this affair,† it appears, that in conformity with Greene's letter of the 29th of June, he gained the front of Lord Rawdon in the neighbourhood of Ancram's, in order to co-operate with Washington and Sumpter, in the desired attempt upon Stewart—at the same time continuing his incessant annoyance of the British army. As neither Sumpter nor Middleton ever joined Washington, it is fair to infer that he waited for them too long to render the proposed junction with Lee practicable, or as judicious as that he effected with Marion, and as Lee in compliance with the general's request, did repair to the most favourable point for meeting with Washington, it is evident he conducted himself with the strictest propriety. Yet Mr. Johnson confounds him with Sumpter, who, he says, (p. 162,) "was found, after three day's search, at the Hanging Rock, on the Catawba river," pursuing some trivial independent object. He previously observes, "Neither Middleton nor Lee ever joined Washington, and the latter, (Lee,) instead of directing his views against Stewart, thought proper to throw

* Appendix C.

† Vol. ii. p. 139 and seq

himself in front of Rawdon, in prosecution of a feeble and fatal effort to embarrass his march." The efforts of this learned person, to defame Colonel Lee, with a perverseness which might discompose the complacency even of a *salaried officer*, always furnish reason to extol the colonel, and to condemn the judge. When Lee received the letter of the 29th, communicating intelligence of the advance of Stewart toward Orangeburg, and the project of cutting him off, he was, in obedience to orders, as Mr. Johnson himself declares, hanging on the rear, darting at the flanks, impeding and reporting the progress of Lord Rawdon; who, moving in a direction opposite to the approach of Stewart, was proceeding to meet him at Orangeburg. In order to execute the object of General Greene, it obviously became necessary that he should gain the front of Lord Rawdon, or in other words, should place himself between his Lordship and Colonel Stewart, so as to be able to move against the latter, as soon as he should be joined by Sumpter and Washington; at the same time he appears, in compliance with his previous orders, to have meditated a combined effort, to check the advance of Lord Rawdon; an attempt, which, if successful, exclusive of its direct effects, would have facilitated the execution of the special enterprize against Stewart. So that what our author is pleased to term a "feeble and fatal effort to embarrass Lord Rawdon's march," and "throwing himself in his front, *instead* of directing his views against Stewart," turns out to have been

a prompt and zealous effort to accomplish the objects of General Greene, viz. to retard the advance of the British army, and to intercept the detachment coming up to its relief. In the vicinity of Orangeburg General Greene offered the enemy battle, which being declined, he returned to summer quarters on the High Hills of Santee; having previously formed a detachment of one thousand men, (militia chiefly,) under Sumpter, Marion, and Lee.

These officers were instructed, either separately, combined, or united, to scour the country between Orangeburg and Charleston, to inspirit the republicans, and intimidate the loyalists; to intercept the communication between the enemy's posts and detachments; and to effect every species of injury or annoyance to the enemy, that might be found practicable. Our author says, the command was given to Sumpter; other writers—Marshall, Ramsay, Gordon, Tarleton, and Stedman, consider it as a combined expedition, conducted by Sumpter, Marion, and Lee; and a letter from Greene to Sumpter of the 14th, quoted by Mr. Johnson, (p. 166,) serves to confirm this impression. "Keep Colonel Lee and General Marion advised of all matters from above; and *tell* Colonel Lee to thunder, even at the gates of Charleston. I have great hopes from their force and enterprise." It is not easy to determine, whether Mr. Johnson means to exclude Lee from subjection to Sumpter, or to reproach him with disobedience, when

in describing the plan of operations, and the objects assigned to the several corps, he says, (p. 167,) "Lee still acted the independent partisan." The probability is, that, as usual, there exists a disagreement between the facts and the disposition of the judge, those eagerly tending to censure, this obstinately continuing to justify Colonel Lee. This officer was required, with his ever active legion, to carry the enemy's post at Dorchester, which it was apprehended would offer serious resistance; and Colonel Wade Hampton, with a party of mounted militia, was directed to support him. The post at Dorchester had been weakened, and was easily broken up, with no other consequence of utility, but the seizure of one hundred and fifty horses, and a small supply of ammunition. Lee, in his Memoirs, ascribes the chief success in this quarter, to Colonel Wade Hampton, who dispersed a body of mounted refugees, of whom he captured about fifty. Our tumid author magnifies this trivial operation into great importance—as so overshadowing and forestalling the enterprize and reputation of Lee, as to excite his jealousy and ill-will. There is something truly ludicrous, in his account of Hampton's glorious gallop toward Charleston; his capturing a patrol—his safe and triumphant return. Nor is the irony of the following passage to be matched or resisted. (p. 168.) "The next day, Colonel Lee approached, and made his charge over the same ground. In his Memoirs, he expresses his dis-

appointment at finding every thing in solitude; without adverting to the fact, that Hampton had gleaned the field before him." Colonel Lee never could have used such a solecism as "finding every thing in solitude;" nor would his knowledge of service and language permit him to abuse the word *charge*, by applying it with the vulgar extravagance of our author. It is evident that no absurdity of fact or expression can be stronger, than that involved in the assertion, of the legion dragoons *charging* over ground upon which Hampton and his party had capered in safety.*

* As Mr. Johnson appears inclined to be magniloquent about the exploits of Hampton on this expedition, it may assist the reader in estimating the verity of the *Sketches*, to furnish the following extract of a letter from Captain O'Neale, of the legion, to Colonel Lee, when the latter was composing his Memoirs.

"Georgia, M^cIntosh county, March 1st, 1810.—Dear Sir, I received your letters of the 4th and 13th December, on the 20th of February. I recollect when you went to Dorchester with our legion, to attack the fort at Dorchester, that Colonel Hampton went down what they call the Goose creek road, and took a few horses from some tories, about the Quarter House. I do not recollect any men being taken except a few tories, but no British soldiers. To refresh your memory, it was the time I borrowed Mrs. Wright's coach to bring up some sick soldiers, which coach, General Sumpter demanded, and sold at Camden. Respecting the attack we made at Shubricks, Colonel Wade Hampton was in the rear seven or eight miles, with General Sumpter. Colonel Richard Hampton was a volunteer with us at Shubricks."

With such trash as the following, the judge, who professes (p. 166,) to speak from official correspondence, treats his readers, instead of a life of Greene. "The two parties then moved on to join Sumpter, *probably* in no very good humour with each other." Sumpter, it is said, by an indiscreet collateral movement, had lost an opportunity of effecting the principal object without their assistance; which object our author, although he premises his narrative with a promise of giving a particular account "of this piece of domestic history, never fully related before," forgets to point out. We are not told what purpose Sumpter, who commanded the principal detachment at least, was expected to accomplish; and his collateral attempt against a hostile party at Murray's ferry, is reprobated without designating his main object; which Lee says was the capture of the 19th regiment, understood to be posted at Monk's corner. It is said too, "accordingly the enemy received reinforcements;" but we are not informed when, where, or in what numbers.

The junction of Lee with Sumpter, was soon followed by the rencounter at Quinby bridge, in which it seems impossible that more courage could have been displayed, than was exhibited by the legion cavalry, especially by Captain Armstrong and Lieutenant Carrington. To Armstrong, our author gives due praise; Carrington he does not discommend; but Lee is left encumbered with the censure, which it is asserted

without authority, fell upon him, "for leaving his brave men to their fate."

This is a convenient mode of detraction, often resorted to by our author. He has either heard or imagined, the whispers of some ignorant or envious militiaman against Lee—which no writer, impressed with a proper sense of the purity and dignity of history, would repeat, and which the least just reflection would inform him were at once the effect and proof of Lee's merit—and finding the facts too strong in favour of that officer, to venture a direct attack upon his fame, merely mentions that he was censured at the time, allows us to *hope* the censure might have been unfounded, and so leaves him. Colonel Coates, upon finding a superior body of Americans in his neighbourhood, abandoned his position, and resolved to retreat to Charleston. The legion of Lee, supported by Hampton with the state cavalry, pursued him. Coates had to pass a creek falling into Cooper river, near the mouth of which creek was a ferry, near the head a bridge. To reach these points, the road of pursuit divided, and it was perceived that Coates had pushed his cavalry toward the ferry, and led his infantry to the bridge. Hampton was detached in pursuit of the former, while the legion hastened to overtake the latter. The enemy's cavalry had crossed the ferry and secured the boats, so that Hampton was foiled. The rear guard of infantry, consisting of one hundred men, were charged with such sudden fury by the legion horse,

that they laid down their arms, and surrendered the military chest and baggage, without firing a gun. This left Coates unapprized of Lee's approach, and leisurely superintending preparations for destroying the bridge. The cavalry of the legion, joined as our author says by that of Marion, pressing forward with rapidity, came up just as the main body of the enemy had passed the bridge, and were wedged into a causeway and lane leading from it. The planks had been loosened from the beams; a howitzer was placed on the British side, to cover the party stationed there to throw off the planks, as soon as the rear guard, every moment expected, should have passed. Lee says,* and our author does not contradict the assertion, that the cavalry had proceeded but a short distance after capturing the rear guard, when its commander, repenting his tame submission, ordered his men to resume their arms; information of which recalled him for a few minutes, so that two of his cavalry reached the bridge, found to be nearer than the guides had reported it, before him. Captain Armstrong, with the leading section, perceiving the enemy on the other side of the creek, which he knew to be contrary to his commander's calculation, halted and sent back for orders; reporting merely that he had come up with the enemy, but unfortunately omitting the very fact which occasioned the reference. Of this Colonel Lee was neither apprized nor apprehensive, and being incens-

* Vol. ii. p. 151.

ed at the apparent slackness of Armstrong, reminded him warmly of the standing order to fall upon the enemy the instant he reached him. This high-spirited officer, who feared nothing but reproach, already impatient of delay, was stung into fury at this unmerited rebuke. Burning with resentment and valour, he sprang upon the bridge, led his section to the mouth of the howitzer, received its fire, and dispersed its men. With equal spirit Carrington followed, and joined Armstrong, whose desperate sabre cuts Colonel Coates, assisted by a few of his officers, was resolutely parrying against the side of a waggon.

The spring of Armstrong's horses had thrown off several of the planks, which were loose; and the chasm thus occasioned had been enlarged by the bound of Carrington's, so that the horses of the third section under Captain O'Neale refused to take the leap; when, our author affirms, a Captain M-Cauley, of Marion's dragoons, cleared the interposing gap. This we consider a slander upon the legion horses, and venture to suggest, that if Captain M-Cauley passed the bridge at all, it must have been before or with Carrington, for it is not to be supposed that the militia nags would dare a leap at which the noble chargers of O'Neale, impatient to close with their fellows, trembled and recoiled. At this time Lee got up, and assisted by Major Mayham and Doctor Irvine, set about replacing the planks, in doing which, the gallant surgeon was wounded. Colonel Coates and his officers continuing to de-

send themselves from Armstrong and Carrington, his men, either recalled or encouraged, returned to his relief. The howitzer was speedily manned and charged; when the two American officers, seeing themselves cut off from their friends, with a presence of mind equal to their courage, relying on their interposition between the troops and officers of the British, rushed forward through the former, and darting into the woods, escaped with the loss of several of their brave dragoons, two of whom fell dead at the mouth of the enemy's piece. It is obvious that Lee, having no other force than cavalry at the bridge, could not possibly afford any assistance to Armstrong, after Coates had time to recall his men to their gun; and this inability is admitted by Mr. Johnson, for he says only one section of the militia cavalry was able to cross, and that before Lee had come up. Of course, as he could neither reach his enemy, nor rescue his friends, he drew off his troops from further exposure, and hastened up the creek to ford it. This was done, but Colonel Coates finally escaped, in consequence of Sumpter's having injudiciously left his artillery in the rear.

But we are told, (p. 171,) "General Sumpter, in his official communication, says, if the whole party had charged across the bridge, the enemy must have laid down their arms;" that is, if the party had done what Mr. Johnson admits was impossible. This indirect censure, as illiberal as its was unmilitary, and coming with special ill-grace from Sumpter, who is

confessed to have committed two irretrievable blunders in the course of the day, our author forbears to denounce, and implying a disposition to confirm rather than to expose it, adds, (p. 172,) "It is certain Colonel Lee was very much censured at the time, for leaving these brave men to their fate; but he has given his reasons to the world, and it would be a folly to censure him for not performing that which he asserts was impracticable." Now every reader must perceive, that this justification is so studiously contrived to censure Lee, that it terminates in an absurdity. How can it be considered *a folly*, to censure a military officer, for not doing what his commander intimates he ought to have done, merely because he himself asserts it was impracticable? Even the learned judge would not, in plain terms, support such doctrine. If he wishes to distinguish this passage by sense and justice, he must strike out the words *he asserts*, and let it read *which was impracticable*; and then, in spite of his wish to the contrary, Lee must be vindicated. Throughout his account, he speaks of Lee and Hampton as equal in command, although he must know, that the commission of the former was superior.

When the latter was pushed after the cavalry of Coates, it is intimated that had he not been separated from Lee, the infantry would not have escaped! (p. 170.) "He had then to measure back his way, to witness the escape of the remaining object of pursuit, the enemy's infantry: lost, perhaps, because the first

had divided the attention of the pursuers." It may be asked what could Hampton have done, that the cavalry of the legion was not able to perform? Nor would the following question be impertinent—Why, if Hampton was present, and witnessed the escape of Coates at the bridge, did he use no exertion to prevent it? His absence is indicated as the probable cause of that event, while his presence is intimated without being assigned as an obstruction to it. Lee, in his Memoirs, mentions, that Marion and himself passed the creek, and found Coates strongly posted in a house, after reconnoitring which, and perceiving it to be impregnable without artillery, they retired: and upon burying the dead, and collecting the wounded, the prisoners and stores that had been taken, were forwarded to General Sumpter, and the legion, by easy marches, rejoined the main army on the High Hills of Santee. However, it must be allowed, this branch of his narrative is defective—that an attack was made by Sumpter and Marion on the house, and that owing to the neglect of Sumpter to bring up the artillery, it proved ineffectual, after the assailants had lost, according to Gordon, upwards of forty in killed and wounded. This abortive affair, which our author denominates "the battle of Quinby," and describes as having lasted *three hours by Shrewsberry's clock*, Lee does not mention at all, having, we suppose, forgotten it; and yet Mr. Johnson observes, (p. 173,) "It is a very remarkable fact, that in the *account which this author has given of the*

battle of Quinby, he represents it as having been fought by himself and Marion, without the presence of Sumpter; when every thing shows it was altogether fought under the command of Sumpter; and in none of the official accounts, does Colonel Lee's name appear, except where the fact (p. 174,) of his separating himself from Sumpter, the morning after the battle, is mentioned. From the letters, both of Marion and Sumpter, now before us, we are led to the conclusion, that Colonel Lee's legion must have been posted with the cavalry, which it is well known were not and could not be engaged; and that the legion infantry were held in reserve. We will not assert (anglice—*we wish it to be believed*) that it was in the spirit of retaliation, that Sumpter's name is not mentioned; for we would impeach Colonel Lee's recollection, not his veracity; but it is certain that this expedition must have terminated in great irritation between these distinguished officers, since Sumpter directly charges Lee with having failed in every thing he undertook during the expedition." Lee is here blamed, not for omitting "the battle of Quinby," but for failing to record that General Sumpter commanded in it, and for the sake of getting up this apparent injustice, the judge has the hardihood to assert, that Lee has given an account of this battle, and the temerity to refer the reader to a particular page of his *Memoirs*, as containing this account. He transcends, in this case, his usual vehemence of misrepresentation,

since Lee never speaks of his troops having drawn a sword or fired a shot, in the expedition, after the conflict at **Quinby's** bridge, where it is not pretended that **Sumpter** was present. How it can be imagined that a spirit of retaliation could have induced him to suppress "the battle of **Quinby**," and the name of **Sumpter** as the unsuccessful commander, it is difficult to conceive, since the reputation, even of a militia officer, could gain nothing from an attack conducted without judgment, and terminated without success. The assertion, that irritation between **Sumpter** and **Lee**, arose out of this expedition, is founded on an inference as honourable, at least to **Mr. Johnson**, as to **General Sumpter**, since it imputes to the latter the infamy of preferring a charge against a brother officer, which our author is indiscreet enough himself to disprove. In the particular duty assigned to **Lee** at the outset of the expedition, that is to break up the British post at **Dorchester**, it appears from the *Sketches* (p. 167,) he succeeded. From the same sort of authority, it seems he pushed down into the vicinity of **Charleston**, as he was directed; that he there joined **Sumpter**, as had been concerted; that he pursued **Coates**, captured his rear guard and military chest; and that, with the exception of a few Tories taken by **Colonel Hampton**, he effected all the success that was gained in the expedition.

As **Mr. Johnson** has failed to reprehend **Sumpter's** resentful misrepresentation of this part of **Lee's** con-

duct, it is incumbent on him to reconcile it with military fairness and moral propriety. That in common with General Greene, Colonel Lee disapproved the conduct of Sumpter about this time, there is much reason to believe, nor is it probable he disagreed in respect to it, with any officer of rank in the army. The sentiments of Greene are disclosed to Lee in several letters at and before the conjuncture alluded to. In one of the 29th of July, four days after the date of that in which Sumpter represented Lee so unfavourably, he observes, "I have already recommended to General Sumpter to form all the state troops into two regiments; I wish it was practicable to get the state troops to join the army; but be assured it would prove so fully my opinion of a certain person, to give such an order, as not only to prevent further exertion, but even opposition; and it is uncertain how far disappointed ambition may carry a man. General Sumpter's taking the goods at Georgetown was certainly wrong, but it is now too late to prevent it." This letter, besides establishing the fact for which it was adduced, namely, Greene's disesteem of Sumpter's views and conduct, evinces the singular and infinite confidence he reposed in Lee, and the incessant and productive ardour with which the latter devoted himself to the cause of his country, and the fame of his general; that he was continually stimulating Greene to measures more bold, more diversified and comprehensive; and that the mind of that hero was often in-

debted to him for original suggestions or acceptable advice. "I see the necessity of what you mention in Georgia.—Your advice is very proper that I should depend on my own measures," &c. Lee's inconsiderate reproach of Armstrong is more to be lamented than blamed, especially as the false estimate of the distance by the guides, and the defective report of Armstrong, left him no room to apprehend the difficulty which produced hesitation in that intrepid officer. His candid account of this incident and its consequences, which imparts such high moral interest to the courage of Armstrong, and elevates it from the bravery of a dragoon, to the valour of a knight, our author, without deigning to assign any reason, disregards, and indeed contradicts, (p. 171.) "*Nor did the American Codes hesitate on his duty. Armstrong, followed alone by his section, dashed over the bridge,*" &c. In comparing the narrative of Lee with this part of the "*Sketches,*" the reader cannot fail to perceive and to admire the positive language and peremptory assertion of the judge; who, while Lee was engaged in this very toilsome and perilous duty, for aught the world knows, was asleep. How he has since discovered that Armstrong *did not hesitate*, did not communicate with his colonel, before he rushed across the bridge, this luminous writer does not inform us, being more intent upon a characteristic reference to the Roman history. If the enemy had been endeavouring to pass the bridge, Armstrong to defend it, and

Lee and Irvine engaged in destroying it behind him; that is, if the circumstances had been precisely the reverse of what they actually were, the application of the Roman agnomen to Armstrong would not, like the rest of the judge's classical efforts, have betrayed his lamentable destitution of that elegant knowledge.

To show how differently from Mr. Johnson, Greene estimated the services of Lee and his legion, and how far he was from being influenced by the prejudicial reports of General Sumpter, on which the judge so complacently relies, a few sentences from his letter to Lee, of the 9th of August, which appears to relate, in some degree, to operations connected with the projected expedition of the latter against Wilmington, (omitted altogether by our author,) are transcribed. "The officers and men of the legion behave so well upon all occasions, and are so repeatedly successful, and have rendered such essential service to the public, from which they have justly had so many public and private acknowledgments, that it hardly remains in the power of language, to add to their glory. For when I say that Captain *Rudolph*, (Armstrong,) and Lieutenant Carrington displayed great spirit, address, and good conduct in the two rencounters, I only repeat what has been frequently said to them, either in particular, or in general with others of the legion. The services of the corps so multiplies my obligations, and increases the confidence of the army, that I fear I shall never be able to discharge the obligations, or

to support the spirits of the army, should any misfortune attend you at a critical hour." Could any praise be more flattering to the corps, or delightful to their commander? Delightful as it was, it must have given bitterness to his regret for having exposed such officers as Armstrong and Carrington, to the critical and unavailing peril they had lately encountered, and such men as followed them to the glorious, but bootless fate by which they perished. The address with which Greene blends allusion to this misfortune, with his compliment to Lee, is refined and elegant.

We come now to that part of the "*Sketches*," in which the execution of Colonel Hayne, considered a traitor by the British, and a martyr by the Americans, is noticed. It is known that this event produced the greatest exasperation among his countrymen, and that General Greene, and the officers of his army, resented it not only as an atrocious murder, but as an outrageous indignity; that he denounced severe retaliation, and that they, to give full effect to his menace, entered into a formal engagement to abide the consequences of this retro-active measure, and addressed it to him in the shape of a remonstrance. So strong was the excitement, and such the sympathy for this unfortunate gentleman, that General Greene, mild and forbearing as his sentiments habitually were, not only credited the aggravated barbarity which was imputed to the temper and motives that inflicted this severity, but under the erroneous impression, common on our side,

that Lord Rawdon was the commanding officer in Carolina after the departure of Lord Cornwallis, applied expressions of reproachful animadversion to the conduct of that nobleman, and charged him, in his public and private letters, with "being the principal instigator of Hayne's execution; with having left other and numerous monuments of savage barbarity;" with being pusillanimous as well as cruel, perpetrating this atrocity at a time when his immediate embarkation for England, was to preserve him from the danger of its consequences. Colonel Lee too, relates this melancholy transaction in language glowing with indignation against the instruments of the outrage, and with sympathy for its magnanimous victim, and influenced by the prevalent impression that Lord Rawdon held power to save, and abused it to destroy, applies to that eminent and renowned individual, terms of forcible reprehension.* When such men were indignant in their sentiments, and accusatory in their language, towards an officer whose valour and capacity they had felt and respected, it is matter neither of censure nor surprise, that Mr. Johnson should give a loose to his arrogance and rancour. His invective, however, is rather vulgar than severe, while his sympathy for Hayne is frigid to congelation, and so affected as to appear counterfeit. There can be no doubt, that if the predicament in which Colonel Hayne was placed appeared to the commanding officer of the enemy in

* Vol. ii. p. 252, and seq.

the same light in which it was viewed by the Americans, his execution was an act of the most flagitious barbarity. And had Lord Rawdon, as was believed, enforced by his personal influence, this rigorous and sanguinary act, the most unfavourable aspect of Hayne's case could not save his lordship from the charge of inhumanity, nor the most candid admiration of his character reconcile this industrious cruelty to that generosity which is considered congenial with superior courage and abilities. But, if a very clear explanation of his conduct, written by Lord Rawdon more than thirty years after the deplorable occurrence,* is to be credited, he not only had not the official direction of this measure, but, although he looked upon Hayne to be a traitor, freely exerted his personal influence to save him. Colonel Lee, with a proper respect for the fame and feelings of that distinguished personage, sent him soon after its publication a copy of his work, with a letter expressive of regret at being constrained, by a sense of historical justice, to depict in such dark colours the conduct of a man, for whose character in other respects he had conceived sincere admiration. This letter drew from his lordship a strong and temperate reply, which, in justice to his reputation, to the candour of Colonel Lee, who scarcely lived to receive it, and the interest of the subject, is submitted to the reader.† Its calm

* Then Earl of Moira, and since created Marquess of Hastings.

† See Appendix G.

and elevated tone, its lucid and modest statements, its mild sensibility and noble moderation, cannot fail to inspire regret, that the liberal and enlightened were induced to entertain opinions so injurious to the character of its author, nor to produce the conviction that he never could have deigned to notice the ribaldry and rancour of Mr. Johnson. As this letter may be supposed to exhibit the construction, which the counter-view of the enemy attached to the conduct of Colonel Hayne, it will afford a fair opportunity to such of his surviving friends as may be best acquainted with the facts, to give a definite and categorical refutation, of whatever incorrect opinions or inaccurate statements it may contain; and to satisfy not their countrymen, but the world, that the doom of this lamented patriot was as unmerited, as the fortitude with which he met it was touching and heroic.

It is plain, from this document, that many of the circumstances, previous to his execution, have been misunderstood in this country, and that, in so far as the resentment and abhorrence which the calamity occasioned, received aggravation from them, it was unfounded. Our author, with the nature of whose public duties, a clear and lofty explication of the rights pertaining, and the laws applicable to the course and the characters of this distressing transaction, would so well have comported, re-echoes, amplifies, and distorts the prevailing misapprehensions regarding it, and furnishes an account, elaborate, yet jejune and impertinent. It possesses neither the pathos, cogency, nor

decorum of Lee's, and fails to impart knowledge, to excite indignation, or to inspire sorrow. It is impossible to imagine a more loathsome and ferocious instance of ignorance and vulgarity, than occurs in his attempt to influence our conception of the cruelty under which Hayne suffered, by alluding to the affliction with which his family were visited, at the time he made the terms with the royal government, that in the end brought him to the scaffold. (p. 201.) "A wife and lovely family, all festering with the small-pox!" The gymnotus electricus cannot dart a severer shock through the nerves, than such indelicacy and bad taste must inflict on the reader; and if the family of that amiable and intrepid man yet live to deplore his fate, and to honour his memory, they must experience a bitterness of grief, at being exposed to such barbarous affectation.*

* It is neither unprofitable nor unpleasant, to compare the works of the great masters of eloquence, and to mark the distinction of style that prevails in their respective productions. Were the present occasion of applying this illustrative process to the *Sketches* to be neglected, the judge, who has placed himself in the front of American writers, might suspect us of fearing a parallel between his manner and that of the leading genius of Europe. Scott, who has contributed more to the delight and inspiration of English readers than any other author since Shakspeare and Milton, in one of his earliest compositions, alludes to a case of private distress, which, like that of Colonel Hayne, was the occasion of public excitement. The resemblance between these two incidents, so remarkable in the

Intent, however, as Mr. Johnson is upon vilifying Lord Rawdon and signalizing, by "sound and fury," his own patriotism, he relents not of his injustice to Lee, at whom he aims an envenomed but harmless side blow. The association and remonstrance of Greene's officers, in consequence of the execution of Colonel Hayne, have been mentioned. This harmless effervescence of commendable spirit, our author lauds as an act of "noble self-devotion." It will not be supposed that the exalted merit of these officers could be enhanced by declarations or engagements of any kind, or that we meditate the folly of supporting undeniable excellence, by reference to an equivocal

histories of Scotland and America, is not greater than the contrast between the descriptions of Johnson and Scott. The latter, incapable of moulding into subjects of sympathy and pathos, objects in themselves revolting, in referring to the delicate debility of Bothwellhaugh's wife, appears to avoid, with the utmost care, those concomitants of indisposition which fastidious readers might except to; as if conscious of his own inability to warp the principles of human nature, or to destroy the influence of social habits.

The Regent Murray is recorded to have lost his life, in consequence of cruelty to a family, the mistress of which is thus described:

"There, wan from her maternal throes,
His Margaret, beautiful and mild,
Sate in her bower, a pallid rose,
And peaceful nursed her new-born child."

How different in taste and power from Mr. Johnson! "A wife and lovely family, *all festering with the small-pox.*"

test. Our wish is merely to call the reader's attention to the manner in which Colonel Lee is treated on the occasion; not to extol the patriotism and fortitude of the officers, but to exemplify the spirit and candour of the judge. After reciting the remonstrance, this impartial writer proceeds, (p. 193,) "at the head of this list of self-devoted soldiers, is the name of *General Huger: William Washington*, signing for himself and his officers, brought up the rear. The only known name of the army, not upon it, is Colonel Lee; and in justice to his reputation, it is proper to remark, that he had for some days previous been detached to the banks of the Congaree."

Of such a frivolous affair, it is not probable that a more invidious account could have been contrived. It suggests a reflection upon the dangerous energy which the smallest spark of intellect can communicate to malice. If it was necessary to mention that Colonel Lee's name was not attached to this paper, seeing that he was absent, it was proper to remark that Colonel Carrington's was not, who was likewise absent; and certainly untrue to affirm that Colonel Lee's was the only exception. Again, the non-appearance of his name is emphatically mentioned, and the fact of his absence is adduced as the *only excuse* which *justice* can furnish for his ostensible want of feeling for Hayne, and of participation in the indignation of his brother officers. Now, the reader has been repeatedly and importunately assured of the abundance of our

author's materials—that he possesses the copies or originals complete of Greene's correspondence—astonishment is frequently expressed at the loss even of a single letter—an alleged chasm in his correspondence with Lee accounted for by the hardy assertion that the latter had been placed under the special command of General Marion; and it is observed, that even from the depth of that hopeless subordination he continued to write, and repeatedly his letters are quoted. It is thus made impossible, not only for the reader to *ascertain*, but even to *imagine*, the truth in such cases as the present, by the study of the Sketches; for he must suppose, that if Lee had made any communication to General Greene, in regard to the fate of Colonel Hayne, Mr. Johnson would be in possession of it, and professing to be guided by scrupulous justice, would not fail to declare its existence and tenour. Here the honest judge is obviously in danger of being transfixed by the horn of a dilemma. If he has been just to Colonel Lee, his claim to authenticity and credit is false; if his work be really derived from the papers of General Greene, “in the highest state of preservation and arrangement,” he is guilty of injustice to Lee on this as well as on other occasions. For we are in possession of a copy of one of his letters to Greene,* which attests the promptness and sensibility with which he shared, in what our author is pleased to denominate, an act of noble self-devotion. We are sen-

* Supposed to be in Captain Eggleton's hand-writing.

sible that there was no real glory, more show than substance, in the thing; yet it afforded one of those occasions in which nothing could be gained, but much might be lost. And to insinuate, in the most distant manner, that an officer of rank and consideration, was so insensible to the hardship of Hayne's fate, or so sensitive to his own safety, as to shrink from the light peril of this association, encompassed too as Lee was by a band of heroes, is to affix endless infamy to his name. As Judge Johnson has thought fit, in conformity with the spirit of his book, to open a furnace of blasting insinuations on the fame of Lee, and to interpose but a remark of gauze to defend him, we lay before the reader the letter alluded to. It will be found to vindicate him in the present instance, to disprove the assertion of our author, and that reinforced by an argument, (p. 189,) that Greene's resolution to retaliate was not communicated to any one but Marion, until the 26th of August; it explodes, if that has not been already done, the alleged inferiority of Lee in the confidence of Greene, and demonstrates that his counsels were no less bold and prevailing in regard to the approaching division of the campaign, than they are proved to have been in reference to that which had just passed.

*" Congaree river, south of Howell's ferry,
20th August, 1781.*

" Dear General—Since my despatch of this date, I have received your letter of the 19th. Not being near

Colonel Henderson, it is not in my power to consult with him concerning the relief of our friends below. I have no doubt of its practicability, and will take Colonel Henderson's opinion without loss of time; though I consider no attempt so easy and so ready as the ruining Stewart's army, provided you can get a force, in your opinion, adequate to the effort. A division will delay this important operation. Was you at your old ground on Beaver creek, you would be in an abundant country, you would be convenient for action, and would weaken your enemy by their desertion. Indeed were you here, Colonel Stewart must fight or retire. I am inclined to believe he would do the last. As it is almost reduced to a certainty that General Leslie has brought no infantry with him, I would not allow his arrival and the reports of the reinforcement to delay any movement. It is more than probable the horses have been thrown overboard in the hurricane, if the fleet should be safe. General Marion might easily join you, and leave a small party to watch M'Arthur; and on your getting here, it will be very convenient to prevent Leslie, M'Arthur, or any other party from joining Stewart. I am decidedly of opinion that it is both justice and good policy to retaliate in the case of our murdered colonel, and *I answer for myself and my officers, that the measure meets our approbation, and will receive our firmest support in the field.* It would be well to confine the retaliation to these armies, as, for aught you know, a measure bene-

ficial in this country, may be the very reverse in the other states where the enemy are operating. They may have a number of officers prisoners on Long Island, and perhaps Sir Henry Clinton might take vengeance on them. If Balfour has committed an outrage on the cartel, Lord Cornwallis will, no doubt, conceive his honour obligated to give you satisfaction. I would, nevertheless, retaliate in the present instance, and act afterwards as his lordship's decision on your remonstrance and communication may render necessary. I would not condescend to write Mr. Balfour, but rather hang first; then inform General Leslie with what you have done, making some remarks on General Washington's politeness to Sir Henry Clinton, in an execution justified by the usage of nations, and the conduct of Mr. Balfour in the hanging an officer where he cannot produce colour of justice or precedent for it. A victory on the plains of Colonel Thompson will put all right, and will be more important, if possible, than the glory of Saratoga. You cannot be defeated, if your troops will fight; and if you are defeated, your loss will be partial only; indeed your loss will ultimately be a gain. I intend, if you approve, to burn the jail at Orangeburg, and destroy the bridge over Edisto. This shall be deferred to a proper moment. Should Colonel Stuart incline to run, he may seek that strong post; this dismantling will render it weak.

Such has been the management of the state troops, that they are really injurious. They are not a whit

better disciplined than the militia, and you get no aid from either class. The militia conceiving the state brigade adequate to your purposes, have got dispersed and languid. The policy of General Sumpter has sent three-fourths of the state troops out of the field in the heat of a campaign; thus you lose greatly. If the governor would adopt the troops, promise that the compact made with the soldiers should be honestly performed, arrange them into two other regiments, and put them under Henderson, they would become respectable and useful. The exigence of the hour will apologize for any innovation, and the consequences which will be experienced, will amply defend his excellency's conduct. General Sumpter is become almost universally odious, as far as I can discover. I lament that a man of his turn was ever useful, or being once deservedly great, should want the wisdom necessary to continue so, and to preserve his reputation. I hope to hear from you fully, and, &c. &c.

H. LEE, Jr.

To General Greene."

The alleged reserve of Greene respecting his intention to retaliate, this letter shows did not exist in regard to Lee; and it proves that on the very day the remonstrance and association were signed by the officers at the High Hills of Santee, he recommended the most vigorous retaliation, and pledged himself and his officers to its support. But the fact is that as early as the 12th of August, this intention was confided to him;

so that if Mr. Johnson be really of opinion, that it was communicated to Marion alone, previously to the 26th, he must have lost or overlooked both Lee's letter of the 20th, and Greene's of the 12th. In the latter, after acquiescing in the propriety of the opinion then urged by Lee, in relation to the vulnerable position of the British army, and assigning as a cause of forbearance, his need and hope of reinforcements, particularly of a body of riflemen under Colonel Shelby, General Greene says, "Colonel Balfour has lately hung Colonel Hayne, a gentleman who headed the British in that quarter of the country where Colonel Harden commands. He was a gentleman of great fortune, one of the members of the senate, a man of good sense, and universally beloved. Should you take any militia officers, detain them close prisoners until you hear further from me. I have not written to the gentleman yet on the subject. I am waiting to give time to our friends at St. Augustine to get off. After which I will avow my intention of giving no quarter to British officers, if they persist in this practice, and mean to retaliate on the first person I take. The ladies of Charleston petitioned Mr. Balfour to spare the Colonel; he wrote on the back of the petition—*Major Andre*—and sent it back without deigning to take farther notice of it."

It appears that Lee had proposed, should the attack on the enemy be declined or suspended, making an irruption upon their line of posts in the lower country.

In this letter Greene directs him to forbear—to hold himself prepared to succour or to substitute Marion, in an expedition intended to cover the rich rice country of Ponpon, against an apprehended maritime inroad from Charleston. On the 14th, he tells Lee that he believes his account of the 13th, of the strength and temper of the British army, “is pretty just;” and expresses a “good mind” to wait no longer for reinforcements, but with his regular troops to “put all to the hazard;” and greater impatience for an immediate battle, because of advice of General Leslie’s being on the sea with a reinforcement from Virginia, advice which he professes himself inclined to credit, from a conviction that it is the enemy’s interest to secure Carolina, rather than to attempt further conquest in Virginia. To these letters, and to one of the 17th, which has not been preserved, Lee’s of the 20th, acknowledged by Greene on the 22d, is a reply. On the 19th, Greene had occasion to write to him on an incidental subject, and as his letter exhibits an amiable example of his sense of justice and delicacy of feeling, with considerable tact and power of persuasion, its perusal cannot fail to be agreeable.*

About the time that Governor Rutledge determined to impress and sell indigo, for the purpose of supplying the southern army with clothes, Colonel Lee, it seems, directed his legionary quarter-master to secure a portion of that commodity for the benefit of his

* See Appendix.

corps, and was likely to be very successful in his expectations. He however took the precaution of apprising General Greene of this measure, with a hope, doubtless, of propitiating his sanction, or of averting his interdict. But he was disappointed, as will be seen by the letter just referred to.

On the 22d, Greene answers Lee's letter of the 20th, in his usual confidential language; assents to the decisive measures it suggested; declares it should have been sooner resorted to, "had not arrangements and reinforcements been wanting;" complains "that they were still deficient;" but adds, "we will make the most of them. Have your legion as strong as possible to second the attempt, for depend upon it we must have victory or ruin; nor will I spare any thing to obtain it." Accordingly, on the 22d, the army decamped, and marching by the way of Camden, passed the two sources of the Santee, above and undisturbed by the enemy. Lord Rawdon had previously repaired to Charleston, with a view of embarking for England; had been attended by a detachment of five hundred men, and had left Colonel Stewart in command of the main body. As Greene advanced Stewart retired, and at length took post at the Eutaw Spring. On his route to this position, and also on the morning of the battle, his foraging parties were restrained or cut off by the cavalry of the legion which held its accustomed place in the van.

In detailing the motive of Greene's early and de-

cisive movement from his refreshing encampment on the High Hills of Santee, Lee and our author differ materially; the latter insisting that it was first and principally to cripple his enemy by a battle, and *then* to confine him to Charleston, or limit him to its vicinity—the former affirming that the removal of the enemy to the sea coast was the object, and that a battle was to be risked, *if necessary, to effect it*. That accordingly he was directed to announce rather than conceal the approach of the army—a plan which was changed in consequence of the unexpected discovery, that they had reached within eight miles of the British unperceived. Our author controverts this representation, and says it would have been considered a misfortune by Greene, had his adversary retired to Charleston without a blow. This disagreement is in itself not worth deciding; but as Mr. Johnson, in supporting his side of it, sophisticates outrageously the history of Greene's designs, in order that he may deface flagitiously the real character of that illustrious man; it becomes proper to examine it with care. The only support offered for this untenable position, is the inference, (p. 206,) that had not the extensive designs of General Greene imposed on him the necessity of weakening the British armies in Carolina by a defeat, he could “scarcely be justified for renewing active operations when he did.” So that the end of the judge is to praise or to palliate the conduct of his hero, and his means, the indiscriminate use of fact and

fiction. But is there any honest or even rational ground for his assertion? By reference to Greene's letters from the 12th to the 22d of August inclusive, in the last of which he tells Colonel Lee, "depend upon it we must have victory or ruin," it would seem that he rather expected than desired an action, and at that time did not apprehend the retiring movement, subsequently made by Colonel Stewart, from Thompson's plantation to Eutaw. At his departure from the High Hills, he was likewise persuaded that strong reinforcements were to join him in a few days; and in his letter of the 21st, specifies among the advantages of taking the circuitous route by Camden, the prospect it afforded of accelerating their junction. But on the 25th, he informs Lee from Camden, that his hope of reinforcements had been disappointed. "We are thus far on our way to join Colonel Henderson, but the tardiness with which every body moves who was expected to join us, almost makes me repent that I have put the troops in motion. Near two hundred of the North Carolina Regulars, who ought to have been here four days past, are not likely to be here for four or five to come. Colonel Shelby, I believe, has gone back, if ever he set out, which I much doubt. General Pickens has not been heard of, and I fear will not have it in his power to bring any considerable reinforcements; nor do I expect Lieutenant Colonel Henderson will be able to do much more. The state troops I am told (are) all getting sickly, as is the North

Carolina regulars. Not more than one half the militia from North Carolina are arrived, and the whole that are here don't exceed four hundred. You know I never despair, nor shrink at difficulties, but our prospects are not flattering."

From this letter it may be inferred, that even if when he put his army in motion on the 22d, it had been his wish to bring Colonel Stewart to action, rather than force him to retreat, causes of adequate force and probable operation afterwards arose in the failure of his reinforcements, and the unexpected retreat of the enemy, to produce the modification of design indicated by Lee. This view of the question, proceeding from a consideration of facts inherent in the situation of the American commander, appears to receive light, if not confirmation, from the attempt of Mr. Johnson to obscure it. He affirms, with a tone of assurance, that few men in describing the subjects of their own consciousness, could surpass. (pp. 205 and 6,) "It has been asserted (by Colonel Lee) that in advancing on the enemy at Eutaw, General Greene's desire was to induce him to retreat into Charleston; that he only hazarded a battle to effect that object. But it was far otherwise; he would have esteemed it a capital misfortune, to have lost the opportunity of reducing him to a state of impotence; for without crippling him, he could not, in the event of Lord Cornwallis's retreat, have thrown himself in his lordship's front, while a superior enemy lay ready to advance upon his own

rear. It is known that when too late, Lord Cornwallis actually resolved on retreating in another direction, and had he not been baffled and held in suspense until the time had gone by, we shall have cause to show that the attempt to escape to Charleston would have been vigorously made. But for the necessity of attending to this object, General Greene could scarcely have been justified for resuming active operations when he did. And for want of the knowledge of the leading motive of his conduct, he has been charged with an unnecessary waste of human life, and hazarding more than circumstances would justify, in the instance of the attack at the Eutaw." Besides want of authority for these assertions, and the perfidious assurance with which they are made, they are intrinsically too ridiculous to be rendered credible by art or authority. The inference, that because Cornwallis did attempt, just before his surrender, to escape to New York, he designed at an earlier period to retreat to Charleston, absurd as it is, is less so than the frontless affirmation that the apprehension of this retreat, and a resolution to counteract it, determined the character and consequences of the movement from the High Hills of Santee. The resolution of General Washington to transfer the theatre of his operations from New York to Virginia, was a reluctant and unexpected one,* and was not matured until about the middle

* Extract of a letter from Timothy Pickering, Esquire, dated the 6th April, 1810. "When General Washington informed me

of August, when, in consequence of his instant directions, La Fayette assumed a position on James River, for the express purpose of preventing Lord Cornwallis's return to Carolina*—a reach of foresight sufficient to prove the extent of our founder's providence and sagacity, and at the same time to relieve General Greene from the necessity of exerting these qualities upon that contingency. Further, the army of General Washington did not depart from the southern shore of the Hudson until the 25th of August, three days after the movement of Greene, and it is not pretended that even to Sir Henry Clinton was his departure known before the 2d, or to Cornwallis communicated, until about the 16th of September, eight days after the battle of Eutaw. How then is it to be believed that the apprehension of Lord Cornwallis's return to Carolina, in consequence of the intended co-operation of the French and American forces in Virginia—a measure which was not effected until the 25th of September, could have influenced Greene to quit his renovating

of the destination of the French fleet for the Chesapeake, instead of New York; and gave me orders to provide for the march of the troops to York, he strongly expressed his disappointment. 'I wish to the Lord (said he) they would either not raise our expectations of maritime co-operation, or would fulfil them. There is now no enterprize remaining but to attempt the capture of the army of Cornwallis in Virginia, and in that I am not sanguine of success.'—Such precisely were the sentiments he expressed, and substantially his words."

* Marshall, vol. iv. p. 466 to 480.

camp on the High Hills of Santee, to brave the pestilential heats of August, and to desire, not to drive the British to the sea, but to fight and cripple them, so that he might be freer to engage the returning army of Cornwallis?

However palpable this fabrication of Mr. Johnson, a little consideration will increase its grossness. By the capitulation of Yorktown, Cornwallis surrendered to General Washington, an army exceeding 7000 men, 6000 rank and file, of whom 4017 were fit for duty.* It is therefore safe to presume, that before the investment of York, he could have marched at least 6000 fighting men to Carolina. At the battle of Eutaw, we are informed, (p. 219,) that Greene's whole force could not have exceeded 2000 men, and that the enemy's, which our author asserts were of better quality, consisted of 2300. According to Judge Johnson then, General Greene, in daily expectation of reinforcements, determines, in the feeble condition of his army, to force a superior enemy to action; that after gaining, of course, a decisive victory, he may be able to face a formidable and accomplished commander, at the head of a body of veterans, at least treble his own troops in number. He is to overlook too, that his loss may probably equal, may possibly exceed, and must certainly approach that of his first antagonist; and is to deprecate, above all calamities, his unresisting abandonment of the country contended for, espe-

* Marshall, vol. iv. p. 493.

cially as every retiring step was to enlarge the circle of his own conquest, the field of his influence, the prospect of his triumph, and the extent of his fame!

No other part of the Sketches affords a more flagrant falsification, or a more barefaced attempt to impose on the reader, than the passage now under consideration; and when it is recollected that the character of the battle of Eutaw is determined, not by its immediate issue, but by this very retreat which it forced upon the enemy, it is astonishing that so unreasonable an hypothesis should be for a moment entertained. On the 22d of May, it will be remembered our author affirms, it was the intention of General Greene to confine the enemy to the lower country, and to repair in person to Virginia, and there to oppose Cornwallis. On the 12th of August, before he had effected this purpose, he writes to Lee—"By a letter from Colonel Parker, transmitted by Governor Burke, I hear that a great part of Lord Cornwallis's army has gone for the relief of New York, which is closely besieged. It is reported that the rest of it is to operate up the bay towards Maryland, leaving only a post at Portsmouth." On the 21st, "I have a letter from Governor Burke inclosing a copy of a letter from Colonel Parker, informing that Cornwallis had taken post on or near Yorktown, on York river." On the 22d, "Cornwallis was fortifying Yorktown on York river, as I wrote you before." On the 25th, "I hear the operations against New York are not in great

forwardness, but they are ripening fast." This close correspondence, shows that from a few days previous to General Washington's determination to operate in Virginia, to the very day on which its execution was commenced, General Greene was ignorant that such a measure was in contemplation; expressed no anticipation of it in his confidential calculations, and was, of course, unprepared to oppose any hostile operations to which it might give rise.

It is a woeful mistake for an attorney, of slender understanding, pliable principles, stipendiary habits, and no learning, to assume the office and port of historian or biographer. It is evident he must be as incapable of indicating the sympathy of the passions, and tracing the course of moral events—of adjusting these to their proper causes, and those to their appropriate occasions, as a mariner is of crossing the ocean without a compass. Without a sensible tendency to the north, the sailor wanders over trackless seas; destitute of sensibility to truth, the attorney strays amid endless absurdities. This reflection, if it fail to atone, will at least extenuate the sin of our author, in furnishing his readers, not with facts, but with his own dull figments; not with a description of General Greene's character, but the *beau ideal* of his own fancy. And into this radical failing, and his instinctive and concurrent hostility to the candour and veracity of Lee, are most of the vices of his book to be resolved.

In bringing down his general narrative to this period, the adulation of General Sumpter is of force renounced, and in a review of his conduct, Mr. Johnson substantiates, or rather overshoots every observation of Lee respecting it. His chicanery can no farther avail him, although he holds out long after Greene had ceased to confide in the propriety of Sumpter's public intentions; yet being obliged to abandon Sumpter or to betray Greene, with an impulse rather of fear than of virtue, he inclines to the lesser evil, and discontinues his uncouth praise of Sumpter. In recapitulating the instances of progressive embarrassment that the militia general had occasioned to Greene, he recurs to his preposterous discontent at the reduction of Fort Granby, and has the effrontery to denominate that skilful, important, and prescribed operation, an *injury* to Sumpter, (p. 213,) "although he could not approve of the mode of resenting such an injury," *i. e.* by resigning his commission. Many of the misstatements already exposed, are here repeated—such as that the first occasion on which Greene conceived offence at the conduct of Sumpter, was upon his ordering his brigade to be disbanded, and the earliest expression of it, in his letter of the 16th of August, to Colonel Henderson; when, independently of the chagrin and dissatisfaction which were felt and declared by Greene in April, his letter of the 29th of July, quoted above, proves that he was fully convinced before that day of the insubordinate disposition of this able officer.

General Sumpter is said to be still living, and Mr. Johnson seems not to know, that fame has long since given him to history, and that he is to be written of as if he were dead. It is probable enough his offensive order to Henderson heightened the displeasure of Greene; and it is certain, that his lawless seizure of the stores taken at Georgetown, exasperated it considerably. In adverting to this fact, (p. 216,) the conflagration of that village by a buccanneer named Munson, is reproachfully imputed to Lord Rawdon, who happened to be then in Charleston; as if every licentious or predatory act, perpetrated within the precincts of the British, under all the distraction of civil war, and with the facilities of maritime exposure, were, in the calmness of historical justice, to be laid to the commanding officer of the district. Causes of complaint we undoubtedly had at the manner in which the war was conducted by the enemy; but these become contemptible, when confounded with the false and silly ones urged by our author. If there were equity in his rule, according to his own book, the memory of Greene, mild and merciful as he was, would be branded with innumerable atrocities, committed by private rapacity and personal vengeance, under the semblance of patriotic zeal or public duty. But in this case the judge misses his aim. Lord Rawdon was not the commanding officer in Charleston.

After telling us with the barbarism of a pettifogger, (p. 210,) that although the American commander was

disappointed in his expectation of reinforcements from North Carolina, he was to be *indemnified* by the riflemen of Colonel Shelby, and reprobating as "not true," the assertion of Stedman, Marshall, and Lee, that General Greene moved slowly towards the enemy, for the purpose, in part, of giving time to Marion to join him; whose motions, as far as they are alluded to by these authors, may have been swifter than light; Mr. Johnson avers, that Greene did not wait for him before the 5th of September, when he marched from Motte's, as previously to that period, he was persuaded Colonel Stewart meant to decline a battle, and did not calculate Marion's corps as a part of his fighting force.

The inconsistency between this statement and his previous asseveration, that Greene's object in breaking up from the High Hills was to fight and cripple the enemy, need not be enlarged upon. It would seem strange, if he did intend to fight, and as Colonel Shelby failed to *indemnify* him, and he considered his force inferior to the British, that he should disregard, at any point of his march, the assistance of Marion. It is probable our author rambles into these misstatements from a wish to provide, with his usual zeal, a superfluous defence of Marion, and therefore undertakes to distort the natural relation between the movements of that officer and those of General Greene.

CHAPTER VII.

THE armies that fought at Eutaw have been described as equal, both in number and quality; an estimate which corresponds with the issue. Mr. Johnson represents the British as superior in discipline, and advances a computation partly authentic, chiefly conjectural, and probably inaccurate, by which we are required to believe they greatly outnumbered the Americans; as if the vigorous fame of Greene was to be nourished, not by the truth of history, but by stale encomiastic arts. Prelusive of his account of the fight, he deals, as is his wont, disparaging regrets at all foregoing relations of it, and then descends, with peculiar virulence, upon that by Colonel Lee, (2d vol. p. 221.) "Writers who had no other sources of information to resort to but official communications, or who were reluctant at detecting the truth and exposing it," (who are they?) "were necessarily led into error themselves, or not unwilling to lead others. But, to the author, who was himself a distinguished actor in the bloody scenes of the day, we naturally turn for full and authentic information. Yet, of Colonel Lee's work we are compelled to quote the following passage

from one* who was also present, and every where on that occasion. ‘The most incorrect of all Colonel Lee’s historical memoirs, are those which relate to the movements of the army, previous to, and at the battle of the Eutaw Springs.’” After coaxing the syntax, and persuading the sense of the introduction to this *passage*, the reader will discover that it is not a quotation from Lee; will gradually comprehend that *one* represents Major Pendleton, who, being “present and every where on the same occasion,” would be more suitably adumbrated by *many*; and finally infer, Major Pendleton having neither anticipated nor emulated Mr. Johnson as an author, that the *passage*, memorable alike for distinctness and moderation, must be part of a private letter. Nevertheless, we cannot forbear to aver, in spite of the authority of a personage whose diffusive locality is at least as remarkable as any occurrence of the day, that Colonel Lee’s account, although not so full as it might have been, nor so clear as it should have been, is mainly correct, and entirely faithful. Our author next rejoices in the possession of a minute and immaculate journal by Colonel Williams; but, as he fails to make a single quotation from it, we shall consider his narrative, at best, unsupported by its authority.

Few will consent to his graduation of merit in placing the names of Hampton and Polk before that of Howard, as “distinguished men of that affair;” for the

* Major Pendleton.

world will be inclined to distribute military reputation according to military services. The reader is encouraged to yield full credit to our author's account, by the assurance that *he* submits it with confidence, and has enjoyed the unspeakable advantage (2d vol. p. 222) of surveying the field some forty years since the action—

“ Rent by no ravage save the gentle plough.”

A season much more propitious, doubtless, to the exercise of his military perception, than that would have been on which Colonel Lee beheld it.

In assigning the order of Greene's advance upon the enemy, persisting in his endeavour to depress the consequence of Lee, he says—“ The South Carolina state troops, and Lee's legion, formed the advance, under command of Colonel Henderson.” This assertion, which agrees with no other account, is not fortified by General Greene's report, and is inconsistent with the order of the battle. Colonel Lee was stationed on the right, Colonel Henderson on the left, an arrangement exacted neither by the nature of the ground, nor the situation of the enemy, but demanded by the custom of rank, in conformity with which General Marion acted on the right of General Pickens, and General Sumner of Colonel Williams; as Washington, in respect to Lee, had done at Guilford. In the morning of the battle, the legion and state troops in the van captured or killed, as Lee says, the escort of a forag-

ing party, about fifty, and previously a small patrol. According to Mr. Johnson, the foraging party, escort and all, were entrapped and captured by Colonel Lee, without difficulty or slaughter; a correction unsupported by reason or authority. Colonel Stewart formed his army in one line; his right supported by a battalion under Majoribanks, and his left by Coffin, with a reserve of horse and foot. General Greene ranged the Americans in two lines; the first, of militia, led by General Marion; the second, of continentals, under General Sumner. The legion of Lee covered the right flank; the state troops, under Henderson, the left of the front line. The reserve, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Washington, consisted of his dragoons and the infantry of Kirkwood. The first line, animated by Marion and Pickens, fought with fierceness and impression, but at length gave way, leaving the flanking parties obstinately engaged. The right of the second line was ordered to support them, and came into action with promptness and resolution. To more determined spirit, superior discipline, and a severe fire, the brigade of Sumner was forced to yield; but still on the wings the contest was maintained. The troops of Virginia and Maryland were now commanded by Greene to try the bayonet. Led by Williams, Howard, and Campbell, right against a storm of artillery and small arms, and combining in their progress with the infantry of the legion, by an evolution of which the rear of the enemy was opportunely

assailed, the regiment of Virginia, and the more impetuous of the Marylanders, pouring in a premature but destructive fire, the whole force rushed to the charge. The enemy opposed with courage not inferior, and the shock was tremendous. Ardent officers personally combatted, and encountering files fell mutually transfixed. But the Americans were irresistible. Under the complicated charge of the legion infantry, the veterans* on the left gave way; Campbell forced the centre; and the right, recoiling from the desperate close of Williams and Howard, broke in disarray at their deadly fire; and the adverse battle was either scattered in flight, or repulsed, its right to the position of Majoribanks, its left to the house seized on by Sheridan. In this furious conflict, Williams was distinguished by the gallantry of his bearing, and Campbell renowned by the splendour of his fate.

Our author (p. 227,) significantly inquires why the cavalry of the legion was not poured upon the fugitive left of the enemy, suggesting that this neglect may have been caused, either by the personal attention of Colonel Lee upon his infantry, or by the superior body of

* Stedman, speaking of this charge, says, (vol. 2d. p. 379,) "The remains of those veteran corps, the sixty-third and sixty-fourth regiments, who had served during the whole war, lost none of their fame in this action. They rushed with bayonets into the midst of the enemy, nor did they give ground, until overpowered by numbers and severe slaughter: various was the success in the centre and on the right."

dragoons under Coffin, insinuating that this circumstance did not exist in a degree to justify forbearance, (p. 228,) sagely intimating that the only test of military wisdom is actual experiment, obliquely censuring Colonel Lee, and virtually inculpating Major Eggleston, who, in the absence of Lee, commanded the cavalry. He forgets that, had an occasion for the service of Eggleston arisen, and he or his Colonel failed to embrace it, the eyes of the general overlooked the field. He forgets the direction of Eggleston's advance, which, by the victorious progress of the American army, was thrown far upon its right, on the circumference of an extensive circle, along the interior half of whose radius, the left of the enemy, retreating, gained the house, or protection around it, before they could be effectually reached by a charge, however rapid. He forgets the forest, unfavourable for the speed and career of cavalry. He forgets, in short, all the modifications of time, distance, and obstruction—the letter of General Greene,* in which he says, “the cavalry of the legion several times attempted a charge,” and the strong demonstrations on our right, complained of by the enemy.† He forgets the incessant enterprize, and uniform gallantry of the corps, so often attested

* General Greene's letter to Lee, 7th of October.

† “For, by moving forwards, I exposed both flanks of the army to the enemy's cavalry, which I saw ready formed to take that advantage, particularly on the left, which obliged me to move the reserve to support it.” Colonel Stewart's letter to Earl Cornwallis, dated Eutaw, September 9th, 1781.

by his own book, so often acknowledged by the general. This point of criticism is not made by any other writer, nor can any fair and honourable mind, recollecting the names of Eggleston, Armstrong, Rudolph, and Carrington, deem for a moment that every thing valour and discipline could perform, was not done. The rout of the British line disclosed Majoribanks, who, supported on his right by a deep glen, covered on his left and in advance, by an impervious thicket, presented a front of perilous resistance. The reserve was ordered to dislodge him, and Washington, dauntless as his adversary was formidable, lost not a moment in making the attack.

Foiled in his onset by the stubborn thicket, and fired by the approach of the state cavalry under Hampton, he instantly wheeled to his left, with a view of turning the right of Majoribanks. This evolution, exposing the officers of sections, though rapid and transitory, was marked by his enemy. He dealt a close and critical fire; and this gallant band, the horse and his rider, were laid low. Lieutenant Stuart, the leader of the front section, fell severely wounded; and of his sixteen followers, all were slain or disabled. Washington's horse was shot under him, and himself wounded and taken. Captain Watts, his second, was pierced by two bullets; Carlisle, a youthful volunteer, perished in the charge; and every officer of the corps, except two, were either killed or wounded. This slaughter was not wholly unrevenged. Kirkwood attacked

the victors with the bayonet, and forced them back with considerable carnage. Again they were charged by Hampton with the state cavalry and the bold remnant of Washington's dragoons; but the firmness of Majoribanks and the shelter of the thicket, were still insuperable; and this unconquered corps retired into connection with their comrades, occupying the garden and defending the house

The American line, victorious, and pursuing, had entered the enemy's camp, where, in quest or in consequence of liquor, they discontinued the contest, just at the moment when Sheridan, Majoribanks, and Coffin renewed it. The corps of Lee passed uncontaminated; and Sheridan, in seizing on the house, or in admitting the fugitives, was so closely pressed by the infantry of the legion, that he had to exclude many of his friends. After a vain effort to force the house, Lee withdrew out of its fire; the company of their prisoners, one of whom was the deputy adjutant general, protecting his men.

From this point of the action, the narratives of Lee and our author disagree; and the latter proceeds, (2d vol. p. 230,) "Majoribanks and Coffin, watchful of every advantage, now made simultaneous movements; the former from his thicket on the left, and the latter from the wood on the right of the American line. General Greene soon perceived the evil that threatened him, and not doubting but his infantry, whose disorderly conduct he was not yet made acquainted with,

would immediately dispose of Majoribanks, despatched Captain Pendleton with orders for the legion cavalry to fall upon Coffin and repulse him. We will give the result in Captain Pendleton's own language: 'When Coffin's cavalry came out, General Greene sent me to Colonel Lee with orders to attack him. When I went to the corps, Lee was not there, and the order was delivered to Major Eggleston, the next in command, who made the attack without success. The truth is, Colonel Lee was very little, if at all, with his own corps, after the enemy fled. He took some dragoons with him, as I was informed, and rode about the field, giving orders and directions in a manner the general did not approve of. General Greene was apparently disappointed when I informed him Colonel Lee was not with his cavalry, and that I had delivered the order to Major Eggleston.' "

With this paragraph it may be well to connect some remarks of Lee, who affirms, in substance, that, when he took charge of his infantry, General Greene was pleased to direct that the cavalry of the legion should be left at his disposal; that it accordingly followed in the rear of the right wing; and that, when he drew his infantry from the house, and found Howard, with a part of his regiment, and Kirkwood, with his incomparable Delawares, advancing again into action, he despatched an order for his cavalry, determined to fall upon Coffin with the force of his legion; that, instead of Eggleston with the squadron, Captain Armstrong,

with only one section, appeared, who informed him that he had not seen the rest of the corps since its discomfiture some time before. He further asserts, that the order under which Eggleston had, like Colonel Washington, made an unseasonable and abortive charge, was "*unfortunate,*" "*unauthorized,*" "*never issued by the general,*" "*and officiously communicated to Eggleston;*" but he does not say by whom it was thus officiated. Major Pendleton, it appears, now declares that the order was issued by the general, committed to him, directed to Lee, but delivered to Eggleston.

Without designing to deny the great respectability of Major Pendleton's character, or the weight of his testimony in any matter to which it can fairly apply; feeling, too, an apprehension that the extract here submitted, has been exposed to some transmuting accident, in its unnatural composition, with this unparalleled work; we beg leave to remind Mr. Johnson, that, in this case, Major Pendleton is to be considered not a witness, but a party. The narrative given by Lee to the public, certainly does impugn the bearer of the obnoxious order, and Major Pendleton avowing himself to have been the bearer, of course any comments or declarations of his, touching the integrity of Lee's account, are to be received with all the qualifications applicable to the condition of a person interested, and speaking in his own behalf. Whether the narrative of Lee, who had then never been authentically charg-

ed, either in his own person, or through his cavalry, with the smallest misconduct, be liable to similar deductions, it is not necessary to inquire; but it might be suggested, for the consideration of the party, that he has not selected the fairest or most favourable season, either for controverting Lee, or vindicating himself. Lee's Memoirs were published in 1812; their author died in 1818, and, for the first time, in 1822, we hear from Major Pendleton, that his account of the battle of Eutaw is incorrect; that he incurred the displeasure of General Greene on that occasion; that his assertion respecting the order to Eggleston, is unjust and unfounded. But, waiving the exceptionable character of Major Pendleton's contribution, it may be observed, that, as neither he nor his patron pretend to question the alleged provision of General Greene, in reference to this corps of dragoons; and, as they both admit that the order, though directed to Lee, was delivered to Eggleston, their comments, instead of impairing the force or accuracy of Lee's remarks, rather confirm them.

General Greene, if his sight or his suite did its duty, must have known that Lee directed, in person, the infantry of the legion. Consequently, when he issued an order to that officer respecting the operation of any part of his corps, he did not restrain its delivery to the accident of his being found at the head of his cavalry. As long as Lee was on the field alive and unwounded, there could be no propriety, especially on

a plain so narrow, in delivering to any other officer an order addressed to him; and if, as Major Pendleton is pleased to intimate, he was prancing over the ground, accompanied by a few dragoons, he was as visible to him as to his informer, and ought the more readily to have been found. It would not be difficult to show, as an order, in the sense of a military command, is substantive and complete, has a beginning, a middle, and an end, supposes, by necessary implication, a particular author, a particular agent, and a particular subject; that, by a defect or alteration in either of these constituents, the order loses its identity, and of course its existence. So the admission of Major Pendleton's declaration, that the order was issued by General Greene, directed to Lee, but delivered to Eggleston, does not invalidate the assertion, that the order which Eggleston received was not the one the general pronounced; for, according to Major Pendleton himself, *this* contemplated as the agent, the commander of the legion, and not any officer under him. If this remark be pertinent, on general principles, it becomes particularly so when the special regulation respecting the legion cavalry is recurred to; of which the order to Eggleston was a direct violation. Of this fact Lee complains, and declares that when he meditated the immediate and decisive employment of his cavalry, exercised in toil, in danger, and in arms, their pride and fire had been quelled and wasted by this premature and irregular command; the corps dispersed; and

that but one section was at hand to execute an attack, to which the whole, in combination with his infantry, would have been only adequate; the success of which would have gained a position of force and security, would have facilitated the reinstatement of the American line, and insured the destruction or capture of the British army. But Major Pendleton says, "not finding Lee with his cavalry, I delivered the order to Major Eggleston; and, in truth, Colonel Lee was very little with his corps *after the enemy fled.*" Of the truth of this latter assertion, there is no need of the high authority of Major Pendleton, to satisfy every one, at all acquainted with the history of the action. For, but a short space was required for Lee to reach the house, and failing to force it, to retreat from its fire; and Major Pendleton had taken care, by officiating an irregular direction to the general's order, that, unless he chose to remain inactive with his infantry, he should be very little, if at all, with his corps afterwards, and is, therefore, if required, the best possible authority for the fact he asserts.

In regard to Major Pendleton's intimation, that General Greene disapproved the conduct of Colonel Lee, it is not only palpably erroneous, but, if expressed (his language makes it doubtful) on his own authority, deprives his declaration of any weight, or if upon that of another person, destroys the credibility of his informer; and by the very argument which he employs to enforce his comments upon Lee, and to support his

justification of himself. For these purposes the approbation of the conduct of his suite, expressed by the general in his official report, is appealed to by Major Pendleton; who says, "censure, not approbation, would have followed an officious order ending in disaster." But Colonel Lee is not only expressly commended in the same report, and indirectly applauded by the praise bestowed on the conduct of the corps, which he in person commanded; but Mr. Johnson furnishes (2d vol. p. 235,) a letter from General Greene, in which he is eminently and emphatically approved. "There was no man that deserved greater credit than you that day; and if you are not so represented, it is my fault." So that the credibility of Major Pendleton's informer is as defective as his own competency, and the rule relied on for his justification, applies *a fortiori* to the support of Lee. The reader too, will be apt to consider the inference drawn from Greene's approving his four aids-de-camp, as very precarious; and its application to this point in the conduct of Major Pendleton, more gratuitous than logical. It by no means follows, that General Greene should express censure or withhold approbation, by reason of the unintentional commission of a fault of this kind, especially where the officer concerned was a member of his personal staff. His deportment through the day, may have been active and brilliant; his general demeanor infinitely pleasing; and the officious communication of this order being attributed to an excess, rather than

a lack of zeal, would not be suffered to eclipse the prospects of a friend, or to shade the reputation of a gallant cavalier. On the other hand, if Lee had abandoned his proper station, had arrogated the rank, and counterfeited the behests of the commander in chief; if he had shrunk from his own duty at an arduous moment of the action, and encroached at the same time on the authority of his general; if it is not certain that he would have been publicly censured, it is perfectly certain that he would not have been publicly, privately, and repeatedly praised; particularly if his services and conduct in the campaign had been of the subordinate and equivocal description insisted on by our author. Nor can there be a doubt, had such an incident as Major Pendleton reports, occurred in the conduct of Lee, that General Greene, in the course of their subsequent correspondence, would have referred to it in reply to Lee's expostulations. It is to be concluded, then, that Colonel Lee did not conduct himself, on the occasion alluded to, in a manner displeasing to General Greene; that, when he rode about the field with a few dragoons, he was eagerly seeking his misdirected cavalry; that the expression of disappointment which Major Pendleton discerned in the countenance of General Greene, arose from learning that an unauthorized order had been given to Eggleston; an order, as disastrous to the issue of the battle, as it was inconsistent with his agreement with Lee; and whose effect brings to the mind the more recent and important ac-

cident by which the French were defeated at *Quatre Bras*; nor is it improbable, his disappointment was elevated to surprise, at perceiving no better excuse assigned for this strange deviation from duty, than that "Colonel Lee was not with his cavalry;" a fact, of which, unless he could suppose Lee possessed the power of "being present, and every where, on the same occasion," a faculty peculiar to Major Pendleton, and a phrase original with Mr. Johnson, General Greene must have been already apprised, both by the order and the progress of the battle. At any rate, whether this contested order sprung from the mind of Greene, or was disengaged, by the terrors of the day, from the *cranium* of Pendleton, it was not imparted to the officer to whom it was addressed. Major Eggleston, upon receiving it, made a charge upon Coffin, which, by reason of his position, he might readily evade; or, of the strength and composition of his corps, easily repel.

But in the prelude to this *passage*, which the meek Mr. Johnson is *compelled to quote*, we are informed that General Greene, unapprized of the confusion and misconduct of his main body, issued this order for the attack on Coffin, under the impression that Majoribanks would be "disposed of" at the same time by his infantry; by which it appears that the condition contemplated by Greene, when he is said to have issued the order, did not exist at the time it was delivered; an incident which might have suggested a more

harmless exercise of its bearer's discretion, than its instant and devious communication, and gives of itself colour to the affirmation of Lee, that no such order as Eggleston received was pronounced by the general. It induces the belief, that Greene might have directed a concerted and simultaneous attack upon Majoribanks and Coffin, and might have said, "*as soon as Williams, with his infantry, shall engage Majoribanks, tell Lee, with his legion to attack Coffin.*" But how, with four aids de camp, and the extraordinary services of Doctor Irvine, General Greene could have remained, at this critical time, unacquainted with the disorder of the main body of his army, it would seem to require the ingenuity of Mr. Johnson, and the authority of Major Pendleton, to explain.

Favoured by the protection of the house, the dissipation of the American infantry, the skilful obstinacy of Majoribanks, Sheridan, and Coffin, Colonel Stewart rallied his troops, retorted the attack, and recovered his camp: both parties claimed, and perhaps with equal justice, the honours of the day; its advantages fell to the Americans; and in this respect, it differed not from a victory. On both sides, however, it was fought with signal courage, as the slaughter too plainly attested. It has been seen that Washington, charging with cavalry before, instead of after his infantry, not only failed, but lost himself and his corps; and it is affirmed by Lee, that the unlicensed direction given to his dragoons on the other

wing, was equally unfavourable to the event of the battle. Of our army, Colonels Howard and Henderson were wounded, Washington taken, and Campbell slain.

The manner in which this event is related by Lee, affords our author occasion for his favourite occupation—assailing the reputation of the writer through the imperfections of his work. It had been mentioned by Ramsay, in his history, that Colonel Campbell, after receiving a ball in his breast, asked “which army is victorious?” and being answered “that of his country,” exclaimed, “then I die contented.” Lee says,* “Colonel Campbell, highly respected and beloved, was killed. This excellent officer received a ball in his breast, in the decisive charge which broke the British line, while listening to an interrogatory from Lieutenant Colonel Lee, then on the left of the legion infantry, adjoining the right of the Virginians, the post of Campbell. He dropped on the pommel of his saddle, and was borne in the rear by Lee’s orderly dragoon, in whose care he expired the moment he was taken from his horse.” He then adds, with a comity which it might have been well for Mr. Johnson to imitate—“Dr. Ramsay has represented the death of this highly respected officer differently, from information which, no doubt, the Doctor accredited. But, as the writer was personally acquainted with the transaction, he cannot refrain from stating it exactly as it

* Memoirs, vol. ii. p. 292.

happened. The Virginians had begun a fire which was not only against orders, but put in danger Rudolph and his party, then turning the enemy's left. To stop this fire, Lieutenant Colonel Lee galloped down the line to Campbell, and while speaking to him on the subject, the colonel received his wound, of which he soon expired, without uttering a word." And these are the comments of Mr. Johnson, (2d vol. p. 233)—“An anecdote related of this officer, by several historians, and shedding lustre over his tomb, has been contradicted by Colonel Lee. Colonel Lee asserts, that Campbell received the fatal wound in his presence, and expired without uttering a word. The reader will decide between the authority of Colonel Lee, and the following testimony of Captain Pendleton, to the dying sentiments of Campbell: ‘I was not present when Colonel Campbell received his wound, but late in the afternoon I met with Colonel Campbell, carried upon a litter by some soldiers. I got off my horse and went to him. He perfectly retained his senses, but was in great pain, and seemed near his end. He asked me who had gained the battle—I told him we had completely defeated the enemy; ‘then,’ said he, ‘I die contented.’ I left him, and understood he died shortly after.’”

This anecdote, which, from the reputation of Pendleton, and its intrinsic probability, no reasonable man can question, his complimentary *backer* sets to work to *support*, under the liberal apprehension that the credit

of Pendleton is incompatible with the veracity of Lee, and with the generous hope of impairing the one, by confirming the other. But it will be easy to disabuse him, and to disappoint this "pleasure of malevolence." Suppose, for example, a man were to see Judge Johnson himself, while exalted to his annual seat in the capitol, shot full-plump in the midriff, by a musket ball, drop speechless on the floor of the court, sent into the rear by one of his associates; were to learn from his attendant that he expired the moment he was carried out; and then, several years afterwards, were to find it related by a writer, who was not an eye witness, and upon no ostensible authority, that the learned judge, feeling "the ruling passion strong in death," had inquired "whether his Sketches had defaced the memory of Colonel Lee;" and, upon being assured by a sympathetic friend, "it was completely demolished," had exclaimed, "then I die contented"—Would not the hypothetical spectator deem this account erroneous; and if placed in a situation which required his representation of the lamentable occurrence, contradict it, and that, too, without intention to "pluck a laurel from the judge's tomb?" From what Lee saw, if not from what he heard, he must have concluded that Campbell breathed his last as soon as he was borne off, and, as he fell speechless, that he continued so; a conclusion confirmed equally by the report or the silence of his "orderly." Under this natural and strong impression, it was reasonable he should con-

sider Ramsay's anecdote spurious, and, as such, should notice and contradict it. But nothing is more equivocal than the signs of death, as Mr. Johnson may learn by consulting the faculty; and, *therefore*, it is probable, upon the slightest question, that Lee's conclusion, though natural and just, was erroneous; and his expression of it, though sincere and honest, fallacious. This incidental probability, the respectable testimony referred to converts into certainty. Campbell, though in appearance dead, survived some hours, and did undoubtedly utter the glorious sentiment attested by Pendleton, and recorded by Ramsay. But Major Pendleton declares, that he thought Campbell near his end, and that he "understood" he soon expired; and every reader must be persuaded that such was the fact. Yet, suppose Colonel Howard were now to affirm that he saw and conversed with Campbell the next morning, we should all believe him, without the smallest suspicion of Pendleton's veracity; should solicit the reader to "decide," not *between*, but *by* their honest declarations, and should shudder at the barbarous thought of placing them in opprobrious contrast.

Lee left the army the succeeding day, in active employment against the enemy, and had probably as little opportunity as cause to correct his impression; an impression deeply fixed, no doubt, in his mind; and, as it followed the event naturally, he would have been guilty of suppressing the truth, had he not made the remarks alluded to. So far from prejudicing his re-

putation as a writer of memoirs, they enhance his credit with every liberal and enlightened reader, since they prove, not the infallibility of his opinions, but the purity of his design; actual error, in this case, being the highest evidence of intentional truth. But to Mr. Johnson, this matter appears in a different light; blind to the distinction between fact and opinion, he represents it as a wanton and invidious detraction from the fame of Campbell,* and has the slenderness of soul, the shortness of intellect, to array the virtue of Lee against his reputation.

In enumerating the wounded of the Americans, he observes, (2d vol. p. 236,) “Henderson, Pickens,

* To afford the reader one specimen of Mr. Johnson's modesty and candour towards Lee's literary honesty, we give the following extract from his Postscript, p. 1 :

“This undertaking was entered upon with prejudices highly wrought up in his (Colonel Lee's) favour; the author's opinions had been formed upon the ‘Memoirs,’ a work conspicuous for many specimens of fine writing, and, from perusing which, one is irresistibly forced to the belief that Colonel Lee—was every where—that he did every thing. But, when upon comparing his narrative with the official documents of the department, it became palpable that others were entitled to a share in the honours of the day, greater than had been assigned to them, and from which, in some instances, they had been altogether excluded; painful as the duty was, it would have been criminal not to have asserted the claims of the ‘venerable dead’ of Morgan, of Williams, of Pickens, of Marion, of Laurens, of Campbell, and even of Greene; nor less of some still living, whom their country ‘delights to honour.’ ”

Howard, and many other invaluable officers, were among the wounded. Marion and Williams, through the whole campaign, seem to have been guarded by the hand of Minerva." As to Lee's escape, Mr. Johnson observes a "silence that speaks;" designed doubtless to attribute it to excessive personal caution, "*frigida bella dextera*," yet his readers may be apt to remember "*negatus honor gloriam intendit*." But what they cannot collect from recurring to Tacitus, they may learn from a very different writer—Mr. Johnson himself—that from the beginning of the campaign, Lee had done more fighting than either Williams or Marion, and that in this particular action he did more than both. According to our author, he was, as usual, in the van as the army advanced, and shared in all the skirmishing of the morning. He went into action with the first line, and operated immediately on the right of Marion, until that line fell off from the contest. His legion upheld the fight, while the brigade of Sumner advanced, contended, gave way; and when Williams, Howard, and Campbell moved up in the face of a fire, denominated by Mr. Johnson "showers of grape," "a stream of musketry," they found him sustaining it, and prompt and skilful to co-operate in their brilliant and victorious charge, in which the best troops of the British line fled before the infantry of the legion, leaving a field piece in its possession. We find the corps that he conducted, if not the only one which passed uncorrupted the enemy's camp, less keen for

refreshment than victory, at least the only one that carried its pursuit to the threshold of the enemy's fortress. How much easier for a public officer to defame, than to emulate the conduct of its commander!

Williams, it appears, could never get his brigade into order after it entered the enemy's camp; and Howard, who collected a part of his regiment, and advanced to support Lee, about the time that the never-failing Kirkwood approached from the left, was immediately shot through the shoulder, after which the Americans, it seems, ceased offence, and were soon driven from the ground. Minerva, no doubt, foreseeing this catastrophe, had kept General Marion out of gun-shot, after the defeat of the first line, as we hear no more of him or his militia until the next morning, when he is detached with Lee to interrupt the enemy's retreat and reinforcements.

But "Colonel Lee, in his anxiety to exculpate his favourite corps, has cast an imputation upon the aid who delivered the order to Eggleston, by pronouncing it an officious order," &c. It is surprising that Mr. Johnson did not perceive the license of this assumption, and the violence of the *nonsequitur*. The lines in his book immediately preceding this extract, contain the letter from Greene to Lee, in which the cavalry is expressly and emphatically exculpated by their general, (2d vol. p. 235.) "There was no man that deserved greater credit than you that day, and if you are not so represented it is my fault.

The infantry of the legion deserved every thing that could be said of them also. Nor was the cavalry blameable, but less fortunate. They did not make a successful charge during the day, though they attempted it several times. Two corps may be equally disposed to distinguish themselves; one may have an opportunity, the other not; and where a case of this kind should happen, I would ask you whether you could report them to equal advantage? If they can be, then intention is every thing—action nothing. You know it is the rule with me to give a candid account, let the matter operate as it may," &c. This ought to have convinced Mr. Johnson, Colonel Lee had no anxiety to exculpate his favourite corps; for that, if indeed they had then ever been censured, was already done by the highest authority, and in the most explicit terms. He declared they had been faintly and inadequately praised, and would have been hard to bend to a needless vindication.

But, if such had been his wish, it could scarcely be collected, we should suppose, from the denunciation of the order officiated to Eggleston. How that can affect the conduct of the corps, it is not easy to conceive. Eggleston did not refuse the order, nor is any question raised on that point. And whether the order was spurious or authentic, Eggleston and the cavalry are to be condemned or approved, by reference only to the spirit of their obedience. Colonel Lee's anxiety then must have been not to exculpate his favourite

corps, but to vindicate his favourite general. He had denounced the order in question as absurd and ruinous, adverse to his own glory, to the reputation of his legion, to the fame of his commander, to his country's cause; and he declared General Greene did not issue this unskilful and disastrous mandate. His anxiety here was obviously to vindicate the memory of his general, by telling what he thought, and what we trust is now established to be the fact; and the exemplary patience with which his declaration was tolerated, the decennial silence with which the "imputation" was endured, permitted the cloudy evening of his life to be touched by the consoling reflection, that he had left the renown of his leader as spotless as it was great.

Nor is Mr. Johnson more logical or liberal in his set remarks upon the conduct of this cavalry, (2d vol. p. 234,) "its inactivity during the action, when opportunities for service certainly presented themselves, and its shrinking at the close of the battle, when ordered into action, were subjects of no little criticism at the time." We first beg leave to ask if this sly and calumnious compound, could have been deserved in any conceivable state of misfortune, by such men as Eggleston, Armstrong, Rudolph, Carrington, O'Neale, Middleton, Irvine, &c. whether it is not repugnant to their well-trying mettle, and in discord with the tone of the army. But where are the facts upon which it is founded? Who, before Mr. Johnson, has said that op-

portunities occurred which the splendid corps refused, or, what is worse, that they *shrunk when ordered into action*. Our author has the benefit of Major Pendleton's correspondence, of Colonel Williams's journal, and of General Greene's papers, but of course, he derives his defamation from neither of these sources. General Greene declares, and when put upon his candour, that they were not "blameable," but less fortunate than their comrades, and contrary to his biographer, that they had no opportunity to distinguish themselves at Entaw, though they several times attempted a charge. If it were possible to conceive any thing like timidity in men so brave, it would still be inconsistent with the rule of evidence employed for the justification of Major Pendleton, to imagine that culpable inactivity and pusillanimous shrinking, in a corps so distinguished, on an occasion so conspicuous, in the face of the whole army, could have failed to be visited with the severest censure. But Major Pendleton is made to say, that Eggleston, upon receiving the order, "made the attack without success." Had not Washington, the bravest of the brave, just done the same thing? And if misfortune be held a proof of demerit, would not equal censure attach to him and his cavalry? Yet they are justly extolled, while miscarriage in Eggleston is stigmatized as *shrinking*. That gallant and patriotic gentleman is long since entombed in the soil which his sword defended, or the learned judge would find it convenient to amend this

part of his work, so as to bring it nearer to a fair exposition of facts. But the deeds of the worthy and the brave live after them, and their fame becomes the property of the nation they protected and adorned—a proud possession, which is not often nor long resigned to the caprice of vanity, the presumption of ignorance, or the sinister and subdolous purposes of malice.

In the early part of this discussion, the apprehension was intimated, that in the translation of Major Pendleton's remarks to the pages of our author, some mutilating casualty had befallen them—an apprehension which was somewhat heightened by reading the following passage in a memoir, contributed by that gentleman to his friend Colonel Lee, when the latter was preparing his work: "Major Eggleston immediately made a charge, but Coffin retreated suddenly, without waiting to receive the attack." This quotation has been withheld, because the character and services of that officer and the corps, were considered superior to detraction; and is now introduced, not to vindicate Eggleston, but to show that, in all probability, the views of Major Pendleton respecting the conduct of the legion cavalry, differ widely from those of Mr. Johnson, and coincide substantially with those of General Greene and Colonel Lee. And that the *shrinking* was, as usual, on the part of the adversaries of the legion, the British dragoons not daring their shock, while the proximity of the house, which

garrisoned the field, afforded protection to Coffin, and exposed Eggleston to the infantry within and around it.

Our author goes on, "that the men and officers were brave, had been proved in many a rencontre," "but it was remembered that nearly the same thing had happened at Guilford." The gross and glaring contradiction of Mr. Johnson, in his remarks upon the conduct of this cavalry at Guilford, has already been exposed, and might be deemed unparalleled, but for this repetition of sin against truth and reason. "*The same thing*" here, must signify "shrinking at the close of the battle, when ordered into action;" and the writer undoubtedly means to assert, not only that Eggleston and the legion dragoons were seen to shrink at the close of the battle of Eutaw; but that it was remembered by the American army, witnessing this cowardice, that this recreant corps had shrunk nearly as basely, when ordered into action at Guilford. Without recurring to the testimony of General Greene and of Major Pendleton, in regard to their good conduct at Eutaw, it is sufficient to observe, that Mr. Johnson himself marks this for a misrepresentation, and authorizes us to contradict it flatly. For, at page 16 of this vol. he says—

"The services rendered by the two corps of cavalry on the day of the battle of Guilford, were of very different natures. No language can do justice to the gallantry with which Washington conducted himself.

There cannot be a doubt that the cavalry of the legion would have displayed equal intrepidity, had they been called upon at any period to engage in the pending conflict. But the only opportunity that the events of the day presented on the part of the field where they acted, was snatched from them by their removal before the infantry retired. Had they remained, they must have measured swords with the dragoons of Tarleton. As it was, they had no opportunity of distinguishing themselves."

How then came it to be remembered that they had *shrunk*, or done any thing like *shrinking*, in the battle of Guilford? Seeing Mr. Johnson himself declares and laments, that they were not ordered into action—were given no opportunity to engage on that occasion—that had one been allowed them, they would have equalled the gallantry of Washington—would certainly have measured swords with the dragoons of Tarleton. Our author is mistaken, his conscience is confused, his metaphysics are muddy. The *shrinking* of the cavalry at Guilford was not a subject of memory, but, like that at Eutaw, is a matter of invention; it was not, we assure him, remembered at Eutaw, but fabricated in Charleston.

As the honour of this misrepresentation is obviously above all praise, we shall only call the reader's attention to the skill of the argument—the *ultra* ignotum per ignotius of proving insinuated cowardice at one place, by acknowledged intrepidity at another. "It is

but justice," he adds, "both to this corps and to Colonel Lee, to mention that General Greene never censured either." This, it is true, is *but justice*—and that Mr. Johnson's justice. It is also true that task has been reserved for a man who vegetates in the land they fought to save, and flourishes on the freedom they toiled to establish: for one whose private excursions or official tours, must remind him incessantly of their services and merit. From Guilford to Eutaw, from the Dan to the Savannah, from Ninety Six to the Ocean, there is hardly a district, that was not penetrated by their enterprize, or signalized by their courage; and it is not improbable the learned judge has meditated the detraction of Lee and his legion, on the very ground where they overthrew the foes of his country.

Men who are prone to censure, are averse to applaud. It has been seen how sedulous our author is to diminish the merit of Colonel Lee, first by wielding the attack of Major Pendleton on his Memoirs, and then by insinuations against his matchless cavalry; and it is amusing to observe, how, conspiring with this vain and gliding effort, he endeavours to evade the weight of his conduct at the head of his infantry, (2d vol. p. 227,) "Colonel Lee was generally absent from his cavalry during the action, and bestowing his attention upon the progress of his infantry." It cannot be supposed that the friends of Colonel Lee covet for his memory the praise of such a writer as this. Although

they might not aspire to such immortality for him as was promised to Agrippa—

“Scriberis Vario fortis et hostium,
Victor meonii carminis alite.”

Yet, as his actions were somewhat connected with the independence of his country, it is natural they should desire them to be fairly recorded, and by a person possessing a competent knowledge of American history, and a decent acquaintance with English grammar. It is, therefore, to be observed by Mr. Johnson, that we deprecate *his* favour and denounce *his* injustice; and that we deplore, not the injury designed to the reputation of Lee, but that which may be occasioned to the glory of Greene. Nor is it to be imagined that we ascribe any degree of literary power to Mr. Johnson. But craft and power are very different things; as different as cunning and wisdom; and cunning, Lord Bolingbroke says, can pack the cards; though it requires wisdom to win a fair game. Now, feeble as the style of our author is, it sometimes displays a kind of left-handed slight, ability in a wicked way, such as is exemplified in the tardy and abstracted language of the sentence just quoted:

“Where pale Mæotis sleeps, and hardly flows,
The freezing Tanais, through a waste of snows.”

It is obviously calculated to represent a cold, hesitating, tame, and mechanical motion; and to exhibit

the figure of Lee rifled of the dignity of danger, the animation of courage, the transport of battle, the rapture of conquest, the activity of pursuit; while it is clear from Mr. Johnson's book, that he was longer and more continually engaged than any officer of his rank in the army, was in the charge that broke the British line, as he was by the side of Campbell when he fell.

One reflection has escaped our author, in his retrospect to the battle of Guilford; that in this action, in which the Americans were defeated, the wing where the valour of the legion fought lost not an inch of ground, while at Eutaw, where he contends they were victorious, the wing confided to the legion first broke the enemy's line, and farthest pushed their pursuit.

We have to acknowledge our obligations to Mr. Johnson for telling us that the "tomb of Majoribanks is exactly where he was buried," (p. 236,) and to notice his strange deduction from the private correspondence of General Greene, in relation to the battle. Greene writes to Lafayette, (2d vol. p. 240,) "We obtained a complete victory, and had it not been for one of those incidents to which military operations are subject, we should have taken the whole British army:" and to General Washington—"We had a most bloody battle; it was by far the most obstinate I ever saw. Victory was ours; and had it not been for one of those little incidents which often occur in the progress of war, we should have taken the whole

British army.” This *frequent occurrence*, this “little incident,” is understood by Mr. Johnson to shadow the general and irretrievable confusion of the American infantry, in the enemy’s camp : but this appears too large a substance for so small a shadow ; and we should rather consider the allusion directed to the *little slip* of Major Pendleton, the disconcerting and disastrous order to Eggleston, especially as General Greene refers to his own experience in regard to it—“It was by far the most obstinate fight I ever saw ; victory was ours ; and had it not been for one of those little incidents which often occur in the progress of war, we should have taken the whole British army ;” and especially too as this is the language of Colonel Lee, in speaking of this same *incident*. Besides, the possession and pillage of the enemy’s camp, is not only neither a frequent nor a little incident, in the general progress of war. But in regard to General Greene’s army, it might be considered a phenomenon. Nothing like it had occurred at Guilford, Camden, or Ninety Six ; nor do we hear him complaining of such a disposition in his troops being manifest on those occasions. In this light it is plain it struck General Washington, who, in his reply of the 6th of October, says—“How happy am I, dear sir, in *at length* having it in my power to congratulate you on a victory,” &c. This mistaken inference is enforced in a manner perfectly harmonious with the spirit of the work, and illustrative of the literary character of the author,

(p. 242.) "He was unwilling to excuse the loss of the prize, then almost within his grasp, by acknowledging the disgraceful conduct of his men in that instance. Their bravery previously had been such, that he obviously wished to throw the fact into the shade." Had he succeeded in obscuring this fact, it is probable he would never have been congratulated on a victory; for the possession and pillage of the enemy's camp is the best proof, generally, of their defeat; nor has its plunder, after a hard fought action, been deemed either disgraceful or disastrous. At Phillippi, Brutus took the camp of Octavius, and did not plunder it—while Antony took that of Cassius, and did; yet Antony had the advantage.

This conjecture is not only inconsistent with the nature of the subject, but in itself preposterous; for even if General Greene had wished to conceal the only evidence of his victory, the only equivalent he had for that of Colonel Stewart, could he have supposed it possible to suppress an event so notorious?—the most splendid in his own life, and one of the most important in the annals of his country; the report of which the militia would disperse on every wind—upon which the soldiers would exult, and the officers speculate. On the other hand, it appears perfectly natural, and in harmony with the character of Greene, as well as with that of the incident itself, to refer the allusion to the mistake of Major Pendleton. This was a *little incident*, venial in its nature, though disastrous in its

effect; one to which military operations, especially when affected by vicarious command, are subject; and one which General Greene would be unwilling to disclose. But the plunder of the hostile camp, if an offence, was a glorious one; and yet Mr. Johnson has the taste to represent his hero, when fresh from the field of Eutaw—soiled, we should imagine, with the smoke of cannon, the foam of chargers, and perchance with hostile blood—his brow majestic with care, and dawning with glory—his character all force and fairness—the joy of battle still beating in his veins, as “*un politique aux choux et aux raves*,” as contriving a conceit, silly, disingenuous, absurd, and affected. But so it is throughout the book—we never see the natural graces of the man, nor the noble charms of the hero; but are favoured instead with a figure of the judge’s own preparation; puffed into rueful distortion, dedecorated with artful inelegance, and tricked with ridiculous adornments. What a monument to the fame of Greene—what a return for the confidence of his daughter*—what a tribute to the hopes of his country!

* In the preface, (pages 6 and 7,) it is mentioned, that Mrs. Shaw confided to Mr. Johnson, in preference to Judge Pendleton, the numerous and well preserved papers of her illustrious father—rich fountains of national history. Every one who reads the *Sketches* must regret this preference—must lament to see the waters of Helicon turned into a horse pond; and filial piety, and a nation’s gratitude, alike disregarded.

CHAPTER VIII.

ON the 18th of November, the American general, having been joined by a few continentals, and a small body of militia, chiefly under the indefatigable Marion, marched again from the High Hills of Santee; and leaving the main army to be conducted by Colonel Williams, proceeded at the head of the light troops, in advance, as well to reconnoitre the country destined for his future operations, as to surprise or dislodge a party of the enemy at Dorchester. This last object the alarm of the movement effected. Our author says, (p. 264,) "Colonel Lee, in relating this expedition, appears to have forgotten that he did not command the party." "The fact is, indeed, notorious, that the command was given to Colonel Wade Hampton, whom Colonel Lee represents as acting a subordinate part on this occasion." A reference to Lee's account,* will satisfy the reader that Mr. Johnson's remark is untrue, as it regards him; and a moment's reflection will expose the absurdity of the assertion, that Hampton commanded an expedition, which General Greene in

* Vol. ii. pp. 378, 9, and 80.

person conducted. Colonel Lee does not mention his own name in the course of it. He uses the personal pronoun *we*, and the possessive one *our*, as he does in describing the defeat at Camden, where Mr. Johnson does not pretend "he forgot he was not present." "We being absorbed, &c. his advance was not discovered until his van fell upon our pickets." On both occasions he evidently employs *we*, to signify *the Americans*.

The army encamped at the Round O, and Colonel Skirring's successively, and about this time, was joined by Lieutenant Colonel Laurens, a young and chivalrous officer, distinguished for the elegance of his attainments, the ardour of his patriotism, for acknowledged merit, and the marked partiality of the great Washington, to whom he had been recently attached as aid-de-camp, at the siege of York. Upon the return of the general to the army, Lee was placed in command of the light troops in advance, and in the direction of John's Island. This island, of an oblong form, communicating with Charleston and the country on the Edisto, by direct inland navigation, was held by a strong detachment of the enemy, under Lieutenant Colonel Craig, and guarded, at the only ford practicable at night, by two armed galleys. Its importance to the British, as a station of annoyance, and as a depot for cavalry horses, live stock, &c., attracted the attention of Greene the moment he reached the adjacent country, and Lee was directed, (our author

says, p. 279, "the commanders of the detachments,") to examine into the feasibility of carrying it by surprise. This service he says *he* executed, and proposed a plan for effecting its object. Our author divides the merit of the plan between Laurens and Lee, and affirms, the plan being approved by Greene, the night of the 13th of December was fixed on for the enterprise, and that the main army moved on the 12th, for the concerted purpose of concealing the object, and covering the retreat of the detachment. These dates are both wrong; and the assertion that Colonel Laurens commanded the expedition, is not less remote from truth; as the letters from Greene to Lee of the 21st and 28th December, will enable us to convince even Judge Johnson. They will prove that the attempt was not made before the 28th, and in all probability was made on the night of that day; that Lee was the author of the plan, and the commander of the party. Indeed it is unjust to the memory of Laurens, to suppose that he would invade, by force of mere seniority, the province and opportunities of a fellow-soldier; and it is hardly reconcileable with common sense to imagine, that so important and perilous an undertaking would be confided to the direction of an officer, who had just joined the army, and was a total stranger to the troops.

On the 21st, Greene writes to Lee—"Dear Sir, I am afraid you are too confident of your strength, and have too much contempt for the enemy's. You are

to remember the place you are going upon is an island. I hate all islands for military operations, where we have not the command of the water. You will remember also, that the tide will govern your going on and coming off, which may make a very material difference in the risk. To this you are to add the contiguity of the enemy's whole force, and the great facility with which they can transport troops to John's Island. It is out of our power to cover you by a land march until ammunition arrives. Should we take a position for the purpose, and the enemy advance upon us, we must retire, having nothing to defend ourselves with. But if, after fully considering and attending to all these matters, you are of opinion the enterprize is warranted, and remain desirous of attempting it, I will give you all the aid in my power, and you have my consent to make the attempt, for you know I am no enemy to enterprize, and yet I think the thing may be overdone; and should we meet with a misfortune, and the measure have an appearance of rashness, it will be laid hold on by our domestic enemies, and afford our common enemy a great triumph. It is true, the object, in the present case, is important; but should you get cut off, and we driven back, the consequences would be dreadful from the effect it would have upon the country. You know I have the highest confidence in your judgment, and that of Colonel Laurens, and therefore I am willing to encourage whatever you think prudent to attempt."

On the 28th—"Dear Sir: I am perfectly agreed with you in opinion, that the enterprise you are going upon is one of the most difficult you have been concerned in; and, had I not the greatest confidence in the men and officers, I should not permit it to go on. However, I am in hopes it will succeed agreeably to your wishes. What position would you wish the army to take, or a detachment from it? Please to inform me, and at what time you would wish it to move. Our march should be as late as possible, as there can be no doubt of the enemy's getting intelligence thereof, and suspect the enterprise from it. We have no ammunition arrived yet, nor has General Wayne; but I think he must be in in the morning. There are few things you can ask in my power to grant, but I would readily consent to; but I confess I shall grant you leave of absence with great reluctance, should the enemy's reinforcements arrive you mention in your body of intelligence. If those reports prove premature, I will freely grant you what you wish; but should those troops arrive, your services will be highly important to the army, and to me in particular. Nevertheless your pleasure shall govern my determination after half an hour's conversation.

"I expected you and Colonel Laurens would have co-operated with each other, and reported together the issue of the business; but I am perfectly satisfied in whatever way you two agree to conduct the enterprise.

“ I have been despatching expresses ever since the account of the enemy’s reinforcements, which I cannot help flattering myself still are not well founded, and that if there are reinforcements coming, their numbers are greatly inferior to the account given of them. As Doctor Skinner says, I have not been frightened, but I have been confoundedly alarmed. However, upon the whole, I have come to the determination to fight, and to fight hard too, so that if the enemy beat us, their wounds shall prevent a pursuit.”

The dates of these letters show Mr. Johnson’s anachronism, and their tenour that Lee was the projector, pivot, and commander of the enterprise. Colonel Laurens, it is admitted, held the older commission; and, upon general principles, his seniority would have ensured him the command. But that general principles did not prevail in this case, General Greene ascertains, by saying in his second letter, that when he wrote the first, he had expected these two officers to co-operate. That they did not act with equal authority, is as clearly demonstrated by the same passage of the letter. “ I expected you and Colonel Laurens would have co-operated with each other, and reported together the issue of the business; but I am perfectly satisfied in whatever way you two agree to conduct the enterprise.” Wherefore, Laurens neither surpassed Lee in authority, according to general principles, nor equalled him in consequence of the particular arrangement, and surely Mr. Johnson’s logic can help

him to the conclusion, that Lee must have commanded in the affair. But it is said, (p. 297,) "we quote the official communication of General Greene, to correct the error of Colonel Lee in stating Laurens to have been second in command. A correction essential to exculpate him from misconduct in absenting himself from his own column."

Whether a disposition to justify Laurens, or to misrepresent Lee, was the motive which influenced the composition of this passage, the reader will easily determine, when he is assured that neither Lee, nor any other writer than the judge, to whose work we have had reference, insinuates that the conduct of Laurens deserved aught but praise. Had the former been the real motive, a man of common sense would suppose that the disinterested account given by Lee,* in which he applies censure to himself alone; and his assertion that Laurens was second in command, would have been industriously adopted and insisted upon. The enterprize failed, by reason of Laurens's column losing its way in the night—that of Lee having successfully passed between two armed galleys, across a deep ford, to the island upon which the enemy lay. The failure was evidently to be resolved into the chance of war, which, though it exercises a large and visible influence upon military events, is imperceptible to our author, whose philosophy is of that luminous and liberal cast, that admits no other criterion of merit than success,

* Memoirs, vol. ii. pp. 397—400.

and apprehends that every course of human agency must necessarily terminate in glory or disgrace.

With this bold but abortive enterprize, the campaign of '81 in the Carolinas closed.

To expose the errors, and designate the absurdities of our author, in his history of Wayne's expedition into Georgia, does not consist with the limits of our plan; and even its imperfect execution, we hope, renders it unnecessary. His want of credit as to facts, and of respectability as to reason, taste, and every quality essential to a biographer, must have been long since exposed; and it would neither surprise the reader to find, that these defects continue to the end of his quartos, nor please him to have additional examples of them held up to his contempt—to hear that the judge is of opinion, (p. 296,) that a triangle may have more than one hypotenuse, and that this line is not peculiar to one that is rectangular—that he considers the heroes of the *Iliad savages*, and applies the term (p. 300) to men who lived after Minos, Amphycion, and Cadmus, who are supposed to have been cotemporary with Lycurgus, whose language is still the finest instrument of human thought; who waged a war, the cause of which bespeaks a condition of some refinement; whose fame Alexander envied, and whose achievements Homer sung. His horseplay with Homer will never do, and is at least as *savage* as any thing recorded in the *Sketches*.

In giving an account of the circumstances under

which Colonel Lee returned on furlough to Virginia, for the purpose of "*intermarriage*" as the judge asserts, he suppresses the most important letter connected with that event, whether justice to the reputation of Lee be considered, or acquaintance with the character of General Greene; and in a quotation from another, (p. 235,) he stops short at the sentence most complimentary to Lee, as may be seen by reference to these interesting documents.* The reader will be enabled to determine, whether the manner in which the conduct of Lee is represented by General Greene in his public reports, corresponds with the pre-eminence assigned to him in these letters; and they will also show, how far the judge was disposed to supply any omission on the part of the general.

The judge's final effort to disparage Lee remains to be noticed. After faintly admitting that a man, who was styled by one of his illustrious comrades† *the Ulysses of the southern army*, really possessed personal courage, he says (p. 461)—"That the opinion did prevail in the army, especially while it lay at the Round-O, that such was Colonel Lee's influence with the general is very certain; *but it ought to be recol-*

* Appendix C—Letters of the 26th December, 1781; 18th February, and 7th October, 1782. The sentence that brought the judge to a halt, will be found in the last of these letters, and is as follows—"No man in the progress of the campaign, had equal credit with you, nor is there one so represented."—The letter of the 18th of February, is the one he suppresses.

† Colonel Howard.

lected how much the prevalence of such an opinion might have arisen from Colonel Lee's own pretensions on that subject. General Greene's principal advisers were Colonel Williams and Colonel Carrington; and Generals Wayne and Gist, after these two officers joined him in camp."

This impotent slander cannot even excite indignation. The just and contemporaneous impression of the whole army, is to be disregarded for the *recollected might have's* of the judge, and upon these frail contrivances of malice and folly, a charge of the most disreputable complexion against a zealous and successful defender of his country, is audaciously constructed! No instance of "*Colonel Lee's pretensions*," no proof of his arrogance is offered, other than the word of the judge, doubtful in the beginning, incredible in the middle, and contemptible at the end of the *Sketches*. The admirers of Greene will hardly believe, that the impetuosity of Wayne was the fountain to which that able commander resorted for counsel. Had such been his habit, his views of character must have been very different from those of the father of his country, and from those of the distinguished individual who now fills the station Washington adorned; who followed with modest but ardent steps his military progress, and appears to emulate his civic virtues.

Mr. Johnson may object to General Washington's estimate of the comparative capacity of Wayne and Lee, his well known personal fondness for the latter;

but he must take into view the grand and inimitable morality of that unequalled man.*

There is no species of injury which this powerless and indefatigable defamer does not attempt against Lee, and scarcely any that his ignorance does not inflict upon Greene. Of these, perhaps the most violent is his effort to establish a similitude between his character and that of Washington. He is not able to comprehend either, and can hardly distinguish between the severe sublimity of the one, and the gentle greatness of the other.

Strenuous puffing and defamatory praise pervade his quartos. Not a glow of passion, not a shade of fault, not a ray of truth, not a line of nature, appears in his portrait of Greene—which exhibits a dim and *moonlike* countenance of round perfection. Instead of following, as truth and taste would lead, the easy and natural form of Greene's character, the author of the Sketches has been guided by the toilsome dullness of his own fancy; has poured the full and meandering flow of the hero's intelligence and virtues into a canal of his own digging; as far from nature as from magnificence. No forests overshadow its fountains, no rapids precipitate its stream; no windings diversify its progress, no cataracts dignify its course—no tides accumulate its waters, no navies bound upon its flood; no surges foam along its surface, no billows break upon its shore.

* See Appendix H.

APPENDIX.

(A)

Light Camp, 27th August, 1780.

DEAR SIR—All motives of esteem and friendship contribute to my happiness in hearing that you are directed to join the light infantry, and I do assure you that I wish to do every thing in my power to procure you what you and your corps will like the best, viz. fighting and glory.

I think, my dear sir, that your present employment is very necessary, and ought not to be interrupted. I wish therefore you will stay where you are until it is finished, and join afterwards the Light Camp, where I will be happy to see you; in case, however, there was any hope of doing something, I will immediately give you notice of it, so that you may not be deprived of the honour you will certainly gain, nor I of the help I expect to derive from such a corps, as yours, and such an officer as Major Lee; but unless you hear from me you may very quietly employ these three days in your preparations.

I request, my dear sir, you will please send me a return of the officers, non-commissioned officers, and men under your command, which for a particular purpose I want to have before your arrival. After what I have once told you, you will easily guess what my object is.

With the highest esteem, and sincere affection, I have the honour to be, dear sir, your most obt. humble servt.

LAFAYETTE.

P.S. The more I have considered the situation of Paulus Hook, the more I have admired your enterprising spirit, and all your conduct in that business.

Major LEE.

Light Camp, near Totawa, October 14th, 1780.

SIR—Having received intelligence that the corps commanded by Mr. Watts will come over this evening to New Ark with

an intention of plundering the inhabitants and taking off the militia of that place, I wish you will march your legion that way and act as circumstances may require. The number of the enemy that are expected is not positively known; but as it is said to amount to three hundred, I will add to your corps a detachment of light infantry that you may be in number equal to the enemy. Major M'Pherson who commands that party being a younger officer than you, will of course be under your orders.

The destruction of Watt's corps, and if possible that of their boats; the getting of intelligence on other objects, are the three points, the execution of which is entirely left to your judgment, and to the confidence I have in your abilities.

You will as soon as possible send me by a dragoon an account of your success that I may immediately inform of it the commander in chief; the boats if taken ought to be sent up the Passaic to Aquaquiaac; the prisoners will be brought to the Light Camp.

LAFAYETTE, M. G.

Major LEE, of a partisan legion.

Light Camp, 29th October, 1780.

Here are, my dear friend, a letter for Mr. Duane and another for Mr. Samuel Adams, which I request you will seal after you have perused them. I thought it better to write to these two gentlemen; how far it may serve towards my intended object I cannot pretend to say, but I have discharged that duty which I owe to the public, in the same time that I have in this respect satisfied my gratitude and friendship for you.

The same friendship, my dear sir, induced me to give you an advice; every one of your principles on military matters are perfectly right; I don't doubt but they are no less perfect on civil affairs. But I am afraid the ideas you sometimes out of joke suggest, which you know are diametrically opposed to my republican principles, will hurt your popularity in the minds of people who believe you are in earnest.

From my soul, my dear sir, I wish you all possible success, and I ever shall not only rejoice but also glory in any advantage that may add to your laurels. Let me often hear from you, and be sure that the moment when I will meet you again will be an happy one for me. Present my best compliments to the gentlemen officers of your legion, and tell them, as well as your soldiers, that I shall ever preserve the most perfect esteem and affection for them.

I wish you will direct the bearer, the other men, and all the spies to come to me immediately.

Adieu, yours forever.

LAFAYETTE.

P.S. I have wrote on the same subject to ——— and I shall this morning speak to ——— whom I have already written to.

Major LEE.

By my first letter you will see that orders are given for the boats, and I dont believe we can remedy it; the — must certainly be had, but how can we stop the directions that are given from the quartermaster general; the only way is then to use every means in our power to get that done, which I leave to you, my dear sir, in all confidence that if it can be done by any human being it will be executed by Major Lee.

LAFAYETTE.

As soon as you get some intelligence on that head, let me know it.

Major LEE.

Light Camp, half past ten.

I am very sorry, my dear sir, that it was not in my power to be here by the appointed time; but was detained by the general for public business. We are at a loss to know with some degree of exactness, how many men have sailed, how many are arrived; the general has particularly requested that I might get certain intelligence on those two points, and to you I have recourse for obtaining that end.

The numbers of the enemy, and the disposition of their forces will prove to fix our uncertainties, and in the same time will let us know by how many men in so many hours — may be reinforced. I wish therefore, my dear sir, you will send into New York all the people that may give you intelligence; inclosed you will find the questions which I wish to be answered. Could you not send to your new friend, lay before him a copy of the inclosed note, and (if he gives a good account of the truth) promise to him hundred guineas: in despatching your several spies,

I wish you might give them orders to return to us, to have full intelligence by Monday in the forenoon, and such of them as would be acquainted with roads or circumstances might be kept with us.

We will be glad to hear also about the shipping, but though your friend is employed that way, he must not forget his principal business.

Will you come and breakfast with us to-morrow about nine o'clock. I will then speak with you upon our common affairs. I wish your man of this day may have found the means of escaping the two water centres. As to that article which you know to be scarce in camp, we pick it up in the neighbourhood.

Adieu, yours.

LAFAYETTE.

Major LEE.

(B)

Gunston Hall, December 13th, 1780.

DEAR SIR—I received your favour of the 30th November, and have the warmest sense of your very friendly offer to my son William, whose inclination I well know would strongly incline him to accept it, in which I would most cheerfully indulge him, if I had any thoughts of continuing him in the military line; as in that case it would give me great satisfaction to place him under the direction of a gentleman, who has rendered such important services to our country, and in whose friendship I could so thoroughly confide; but I have ever intended him for civil and private life; his lot must be that of a farmer and country gentleman, and at this time there is a particular domestic circumstance, which will require his return, as soon as his present time of service expires. Permit me sir, to return you my thanks for the very friendly part you have acted, and to assure you that I am with the greatest esteem and regard,

Your most obedient serv't.

G. MASON.

Lieut. Col. HENRY LEE,
Commander of one of the Continental Legions,
with the Army in Carolina.

Head of Elk, (the date torn off by accident, but supposed to be) the 17th of November, 1780.

SIR—We arrived here last night after an agreeable passage, but could find no one willing to give a soldier a night's quarters. After many entreaties, and some threats, we got our men tolerably quartered; this morning boats are ready to take us any moment, and a sufficiency of provisions for our passage. I must beg leave to tell you that I think it impossible we can subsist without utensils, as the people here deny us every thing, and I suppose it is to be the case every place where the Maryland troops have been on their march to the southward. You may rely upon it canteens is a very important thing with us, and very inconvenient to proceed farther south without them. We cannot move without a little cash.

I am, with respect, your obt. humble ser't.

JAMES ARMSTRONG.

Lieut. Col. HENRY LEE.

DEAR SIR—I have been studiously engaged, ever since the receipt of your letter by Bristol, in effectuating the completion of its contents, and never could despatch him till this morning. I have influenced Mr. Walker to aid the business of your address to Governor Jefferson, by a letter with yours, which left here yesterday noon. His confidence of the governor's immediate concurrence with your proposition, has induced me to trouble no more of the delegates on the subject. You have an answer to your address to Governor Reed. That to Rodney is in the hands of M'Lean, who I suppose has told you when he shall attend to the execution of it. That to Lee, is waiting Handy's arrival at Elk, in the care of Mr. Rudolph, who will take care to have it delivered. I have sent you two bottles, six cups and saucers, and twelve knives and forks. Charles Lee cant get your silver cups for the want of money, and I am destitute. Stoddart has not procured the loans, and I fear will not. Nathan is almost distracted about money; he says he shall be obliged if he does not get some in a very few days, to send to Virginia purposely to obtain it. He is dunned hourly.

HENRY PEYTON.

Major LEE.

(C)

Camp, January 12th, 1781.

DEAR SIR—I have this moment received despatches from Baron Stuben, informing me of the arrival of General Philips in Virginia with a detachment of 2500 men to act in that quarter. The sooner you can carry into execution your project at Georgetown the better. Take your measures so as not to fail if possible; but if you should, with as little loss as may be; for a misfortune at this time would be little less than fatal, as every thing in this country depends upon opinion. Captain Rudolph will inform you of the disappointment respecting the shoes. We have a few coming from Cross creek, which shall be appropriated to your use as soon as they arrive, and perhaps that will be in a day or two. The rest of the articles, part or the whole, will be forwarded to you as soon as Colonel Greene arrives.

Head quarters is at New Windsor.

Yours aff.

N. GREENE.

Lieut. Col. LEE.

Camp, January 15th, 1781.

DEAR SIR—By an express from General Sumpter, I learn Lord Cornwallis and General Leslie are in motion towards General Morgan. It is probable this is a prelude to a greater movement, and is intended to remove General Morgan from their flank and rear; and to dispirit the whigs in that quarter, that the garrison which they leave behind may be in greater safety, and free from insult.

Since you left this place one of General Marion's people was here, and informed me that Watson's corps lies upon the Santee at Nelson's ferry, consisting of about 200 men, that there is a party of Hessians on the other side of the river, their numbers not known. It is my opinion Watson's corps may be cut off. Please to consult with General Marion upon this subject, and take your measures according as you may think advisable.

I do not think this last object of equal importance with the other you have in contemplation, and therefore wish you not to neglect the first for the last. Conquest and glory awaits you.

Yours aff.

N. GREENE.

Lieut. Col. LEE.

Camp, January 21st, 1781.

DEAR SIR—I have your favour of the 16th and 20th. The camp kettles and salt you wrote for in your first are ordered down, and I hope will arrive safe.

The difficulties you say are greater than you expected in carrying into execution your plan of attack. Get good information before you attempt any thing. Your corps is too valuable to throw away without some important object in view. Nor would I wish you to expose them upon any other occasion. I am fully persuaded of your zeal, and I have full confidence in your discretion. It will not be prudent nor practicable, for the army to take the positions you propose. There is no mills in that quarter; besides which the enemy would cross the Pedee and fall down upon our flank, and confine us in the neck of land between the Wacamaw and the Pedee. Another objection is, we are forming a magazine upon this river above us, about forty miles, which the enemy would destroy, if we were to move down the river such a distance from it.

There is not the least danger of the enemy attempting any thing against you for eight or ten days after you have made your attack; unless it is from Charlestown; and then their force is so small, it will be out of their power. While we are in this situation, and Morgan where he is, Lord Cornwallis will not leave his posts at Camden and the Congarees exposed, to give protection to this quarter; especially as his principal magazines are in that quarter; and a division of his force will expose both parties. If you think a detachment will be necessary to cover your retreat in case of a repulse, I will send you one. But as General Marion's force is so much superior to the garrison at Georgetown, I cannot think they will venture to pursue you even if you should be defeated; which I hope will not be the case if you make the attempt.

Dont forget Watson's corps upon the Santee. Perhaps all things considered that may be the most inviting object.

General Arnold commands the troops in Virginia, and has been up at Westham, seven miles above Richmond; and burnt the public works at that place, plundered the town of Richmond, and destroyed all the stores collected at that place. All this has been done without a single shot having been fired at them; and not more than one hundred men has been embodied upon the occasion. The Baron is very angry; but says but little. The enemy had embarked and lay a little below Petersburg. All the

stores have been removed from that place, and the militia were beginning to collect.

With esteem and regard, I am sir, your most obt. humble servt.

N. GREENE.

Lieut. Col. LEE.

Camp, January 26th, 1781.

DEAR SIR—Your letter of the 23d came to hand this morning. It has been a long while on the road. Before this you must have heard of Tarleton's defeat by General Morgan. The success is so great, and the enemy's loss so capital, that I am loth it should stand alone, and am therefore going to Charlotte, to consult with Morgan, Generals Davidson, Sumpter, and Pickens, in order to see if it will not be practicable by a combination of our forces, to move the army into the neighbourhood of Ninety Six. Should this be found practicable, and provisions can be had, it will be adopted, and of course will entirely alter our whole arrangement. From the probability of the thing I wish you to accomplish your designs as soon you can, without precipitating matters; and be in readiness to act in concert with us. I have written to General Marion, who I am told is perfectly well acquainted with the country on the other side of the Santee, to give me his opinion respecting the practicability of crossing that river with a body of horse; and how far they would be exposed after crossing. I have not let him into my views in the least; but wish you to consult him on these points, and give me an account thereof. Dont let no mortal have the least intimation of what I have in contemplation.

I have ordered the detachment agreeable to your request; all except the numbers: there will not be quite as many men as you desired. They must march by land, we cannot spare a boat from this quarter without starving the army; the whole being employed in collecting provisions and forage. I cannot imagine you are in any danger on your retreat, except from the garrison of Georgetown; and if you should prove unfortunate, General Marion has men enough to cover your retreat effectually.

I expect to be absent from camp about six days. The army will not know of my going, nor would I wish your people should.

Col. White has been tried and acquitted by the court. But as the court included matters in their determination which were

not contained in the charges I was obliged to disapprove the judgment; but have released the Col. from his arrest; and he sets out to-morrow to the Moravian towns from whence he will send forward fifty more horse: after which he goes into Virginia to complete his regiment. Clothing have arrived here for those with you. General Morgan's success was glorious, and the action was conducted with great good conduct. Lt. Colonels Howard and Washington were the heroes of the day. General Morgan fought only eight hundred men, and defeated 1000 of the best troops in the British army. Col. Pickens that commanded the militia behaved to a charm, to speak in Clinton's style.

I wish you to have impressed for the use of the army, all the horses that are on the east side of the Pedee, between that and the little Pedee. In a word get all the cattle in that country fit for cavalry, wagon horses, or express horses, giving receipts for the numbers taken. We are much distressed for want of horses.

I am, dear sir, your most obt. humble servt.

NATH. GREENE.

P.S. General Stevens with his militia are gone home, by whom the prisoners of war are to be guarded to Virginia.

Lt. Col. LEE.

HEAD QUARTERS,
*Boyd's Mill, (watching Ld. C.) between
the Haw and Deep rivers.*

DEAR SIR—I am the most unfortunate of all men; while I am distressed for want of officers, I am rendered incapable of business myself, by a violent inflammation in my eyes. I have been bleeding and physicking for several days to correct it, and in part have succeeded; but the inflammation is still troublesome and my eyes weak and painful.

In this state of difficulty and distress, I am not a little embarrassed for want of more perfect information respecting the enemy's movements and intentions, as well as what is going on in their camp. I beg you to send a spy among them if possible, let it cost what it will. Any sums of money that may be necessary for this service shall be furnished you, or replaced if you make use of any of your own money.

Major Read from Halifax county has orders to join the light infantry with about 170 men all mounted. Part of them are equipped as light-horsemen with swords, the rest with pretty good arms. I have desired Col. Williams to attach them to your corps. Among them are many of the first gentlemen of Halifax county, and among the rest, Mr. Wiley Jones, a member of congress.

My dear sir, I depend greatly upon you for information, and wish to be informed of the enemy's situation this evening if possible. General Caswell and Genl. Lawson are on their march to join us, and I am in hopes will effect a junction this evening or to-morrow morning.

Yours, aff.

N. GREENE.

*Head Quarters, at the mouth of Rocky River.
April 1d, 1781.**

DEAR SIR—Your letter without date or place wrote at, was handed me this morning. We got here night before last, and should have been on our march to-day for Camden, had we not been delayed for want of boats to cross the river.

General Sumpter will have 1000 men to join us by the 20th, but he is going to take a position between Camden and Ninety Six, about thirty miles from the former. If you go over Santee you will fall in with him. We shall march directly for Camden, and avail ourselves of circumstances. If the detachment you mention low down Pedee, is on the march for Wilmington to join Cornwallis, it is almost certain that he had no idea of our scheme. All things promise well as yet. Inform yourself if possible whether any reinforcements have arrived at Charleston. Col. Morris has arrived from Virginia, and says, a report prevails there that two Hessian regiments had arrived from Europe. I dont believe it, but it may be so.

Go on and prosper, and let me hear from you as often as possible; and if you hear that Lord Cornwallis is on the march

* This letter is written in ciphers, and had the table or key inclosed in it, when we referred to it. It will be perceived that it is dated 1d April, which might be mistaken for the first of April, but it could not have been written then, as the army did not march from Ramsay's mills until the 7th. It is probable it was the 10th and was intended to represent to Col. Lee the decimal number, and to conceal from the enemy, should the letter be intercepted, the time it was written.

for Camden you must join the army immediately, that we may beat him before he gets us, by a junction with other force joining him. The light horse, in Virginia, shall have fresh orders to march for North Carolina.

Yours sincerely,

N. GREENE.

*Supposed to have been written
the 28th of April, 1781.*

DEAR SIR—I have just received your letter of 19th, two of the 23d, and two of the 27th. I note all the contents. You know best your own situation, and your own wishes, but you are not well informed of mine. I have run every hazard to promote your plan of operations, as well to oblige you, as from a persuasion the public service would be benefited by it.

On the 25th the enemy sallied. It was what we wished for, and had taken a position about a mile from the town for the purpose, on a very advantageous piece of ground. The enemy were discovered by a fire upon our piquets. The line was formed in a few minutes, ready for their reception. The light infantry lay in our front, and a heavy fire soon commenced. I ordered the second Maryland regiment to flank the enemy, and the first to advance and charge them in front. The two Virginia regiments had orders to do the same, and Col. Washington to gain the enemy's right flank and rear. Our artillery from the advantage of position was doing great execution. In this situation the action grew warm, and our troops advanced; but from some unfortunate mistake of the true state of things the first Maryland regiment being a little disordered, had orders to retire a few rods. This threw them into disorder. The second Maryland regiment seeing them fall back soon got into disorder also; and the whole retired off the ground. This encouraged the enemy, who before were retiring, and they pushed on and gained the top of the hill; and the artillery was obliged to retreat. Col. Haws's regiment was then advancing in tolerable order, within forty yards of the enemy, and they in confusion in front, but from the enemy having gained their flank, by the retreat of the Marylanders, I was obliged to order them to retreat also, to save them from being cut to pieces. I was with this regiment myself, and they suffered more than all the rest. Col. Campbell's regiment got disordered about the same time the Maryland troops did, but by his exertions, and Captain Peirce's, my aid, they were soon rallied, and the whole of the troops rallied at different times, but not in such order, or with such

spirit, as to recover the misfortunes of the day. We retired about two and a half miles and halted without loss of artillery, waggons or stores of any kind, except a few of the soldiers' knapsacks and blankets. Col. Washington never shone upon any occasion more than this. He got into the enemy's rear and took upwards of 200 prisoners, who he found retreating, and in the course of the day made several charges, and cut to pieces their dragoons. He was obliged to quit the greater part of his prisoners, though he saved upwards of — and made good his retreat out of the enemy's rear. We had about 150 men killed and wounded, and the enemy a greater number. Among the wounded is Col. Ford in the arm. A considerable number of stragglers have not yet come in, but we have heard of them. In this situation things are. You will undeceive the people respecting the consequences of the action, which at the commencement of it I was almost certain would prove the enemy's ruin, as well from the superiority of our force as the advantages of the ground. I have sent Captain Conneers to conduct the field piece to you, if you and General Marion think it will be useful. General Marion and you will cross the river together, or act separate as occasion and intelligence may dictate as necessary, but don't run great risques. I congratulate you on your late success, and wish you fresh laurels.

Yours, affect'y.

N. GREENE

P.S. Col. Williams was very active and greatly exposed. but all would not do, the day was lost.

*Supposed to have been written
the 29th of April, 1781.*

DEAR SIR—Your letter of the 28th has just been received. You write as if you thought I had an army of fifty thousand men. Surely you cannot be unacquainted with our real situation. I have run every risque to favour your operations, more perhaps than I ought; clearly so, if I had not my own reputation less at heart than the public service in general, and the glory of my friends in particular. I wrote you an account of the affair of the 25th last evening, and sent Captain Conneers to conduct the field piece to you and General Marion. The event of the day was contrary to my expectations. Whether it was owing to an order of Col. Gunby's, or the misconduct of the Maryland troops, is now a matter of inquiry. I took the position on pur-

pose to draw the enemy out, after being fully satisfied that the town could not be stormed, the works being too strong and the garrison too large to hope for success. I never had an idea of the kind unless I found the place very weak. There were not wanting mad caps enough to urge it. Had we defeated the enemy not a man of the party would have got back into town. The sally was what every body wished for, but the event was unfortunate. The loss on either side is not greatly different one from the other. I think the enemy's must have been the greatest. The disgrace is more vexatious than any thing else, though the disappointment in its consequences, is a capital misfortune. Camden must have fallen had we succeeded. I am as strongly impressed with the necessity of pushing our operations on the west side of Santee as you can be, but the means are wanting. We want reinforcements. You want detachments; and if you and General Marion separate you will be both exposed; and I am afraid our little repulse the other day will give fresh hope to the enemy, and damp the spirits of our friends; however, the best way to counteract that, is to act vigorously. In my letter to General Marion last evening, I desired him, either to detach you, or cross the Santee with you, as he might think advisable, from the information he had of the enemy's posts, numbers, and situation. I beg you not to think of running great hazards, our situation will not warrant it. If we cannot accomplish great things, we must content ourselves in having avoided a misfortune. General Sumpter has got but few men; he has taken the field and is pushing after little parties of Tories towards Ninety Six. Major Hyrne is gone to him, if possible to get him to join us, but this I know he will avoid if he can with decency, for the same reason that you wish to act separately from the army. Should he join us, we shall be strong and go on with our blockade with security. I cannot agree with you that the farther south we go the better. The posts upon the Santee and Congaree should be our great object. I am still afraid whether the Earl will quit his footing in North Carolina to come to the aid of his posts here. Mr. Carrington, one of your officers, is here with a party of horse and foot, but the most of them are without arms. They should come on to you, but they are so defenceless that I am afraid to send them. Can you not furnish them with arms? It is out of our power to do it. Once more let me warn you to be cautious.

Yours,

N. GREENE.

25th June, 1781.

DEAR LEE—I have just received your two letters of this day. In my last I gave you full liberty to act as you thought proper, and circumstances dictated to be necessary. Sumpter is on the march for the Congaree, and will prepare to go still lower down. Let your movements be correspondent with his, so far as you may find them consistent with the good of the service. We shall remain on this ground to-morrow, after which we shall move to the point agreed on.

I think the enemy will have a hard struggle in evacuating Ninety Six. I am rather inclined to think they will garrison it with Tories if they can get provisions. If the enemy's reinforcements are as large as is represented, they will try to take post at the Congarees; and nothing but the fear of our army will prevent it. I cannot think it prudent while the British army is in the field, and we want to reduce them to the necessity of retiring into the lower country, to detach any part of our horse. It is not only necessary to have a superior cavalry, but a very great superiority. By keeping ourselves collected we may effect what we wish; but by dividing we may defeat the whole. Sumpter and Marion are collecting their force; and the militia from Roan and Mecklenburgh are collecting in considerable force. Armstrong has joined us this afternoon with the North Carolina regulars. A detachment of continental troops has come up. If Pickens joins us with a considerable force it will be my wish to force Lord Rawdon to an action.

Letters from Virginia to-day, but nothing new. General Morgan with a large body of Virginia riflemen are forming a junction with the Marquis. General Cadwallader also with 2000 Maryland minute-men have formed a junction with the Marquis. The people in that quarter are in high spirits, and a defeat and capture of the Earl is strongly talked of. But this you know will require hard blows. Some of the southern army is much wished for; I mean the legion and the gallant Col. Lee.

Yours aff.

N. GREENE.

Head Quarters, June 29th, 1781.

DEAR SIR—By a deserter who came into the camp last evening, I learn the enemy have 16 waggons loaded with stores of different kinds moving up from Charleston, upon the Orangeburg road, under an escort of four hundred men and forty cavalry,

for the use of Lord Rawdon's army. He left them at Four Holes, 35 miles below Orangeburg on Sunday last, and says they could not march more than 8 or 10 miles a day, and adds that they were very sickly and much dissatisfied. I have directed Col. Washington to move down to Ancram's plantation on the Congaree, and Col. Middleton to join him at that place. If you are in a situation to form a junction with them I think you may take the whole of this escort with great ease. I beg you will take measures therefore without loss of time for forming a junction with them at that place, or advertising them where it may be effected to more advantage. Or if you think your force equal to the attempt, and that the opportunity may be lost by waiting for a reinforcement, in that case, you will move as further information may dictate to be necessary. As your collective force joined to that of Washington and Middleton will effect the business without risque, I wish you not to hazard too much to effect it. But at any rate you will inform Col. Washington what route you will move, and what you would wish him to do. I shall send a duplicate of this letter for fear one should miscarry.

I have the pleasure to inform you by letters received yesterday from Virginia, that Lord Cornwallis is retiring before the Marquis. Genl. Washington joined by the French army has laid siege to N. York with an army of 15,000 men. I have also official information from congress of the defeat of the British fleet in the W. Indies. I have several other interesting pieces of intelligence which are flattering to our interests, but am not at liberty to disclose them at present.

Part of our reinforcements have arrived, and the remainder of them are near.

I rely upon your prudence and activity, and am,

Yours aff.

N. GREENE.

High Hills, Santee, August 19th, 1781.

DEAR SIR—Your order to Mr. Lewis to procure a quantity of indigo, for the purpose of procuring clothing for your legion, I have found necessary to countermand, having got a hint that it would be thought derogatory to government, for individuals to take a measure of that sort without the order of the governor, who I believe is perfectly disposed to give every aid and support to the army in his power. The objection to the plan you proposed is, the price will be higher from the interference

of individuals, than if the whole business is conducted by an agent appointed for the purpose. It is also said the proprietors will be better satisfied to part with their property on the credit of an agent of the state, than to officers of the army where the matter is to be settled by congress. The governor proposes loading a great number of waggons to Philadelphia with this article on purpose to procure supplies for the army, and the troops belonging to the state. He is now so very ill that I cannot speak with him. As soon as he gets a little better, I will consult him further on the business; and if a separate order for your corps can be obtained, Mr. Lewis shall proceed in the business. But in future it will be necessary to obtain permits from the governor for matters of this nature. The governor, though a man of great liberality, feels for the dignity of the state, and as he is a man of great delicacy, and acts upon a liberal scale, I would wish to have him treated with every degree of respect and attention. It will be more necessary for you to be particular than any other officer, for the inhabitants are so sensible of the merit and services of your corps, that they will be much more embarrassed to speak to you upon a matter of this sort than to other persons. Gratitude and every other consideration would induce them to be silent, when they may feel sensibly. Your anxiety for the honour of your corps, and your zeal for the service, are truly laudable, but they must be bounded by considerations of a higher nature; and I am persuaded you will be no less attentive to the harmony of the state, than to the interest of your corps.

With esteem and affec. I am, dear sir,

N. GREENE.

Lt. Col. LEE.

Head Quarters, January 27th, 1782.

DEAR SIR—I have beheld with extreme anxiety for some time past a growing discontent in your mind, and have not been without my apprehensions that your complaints originated more in distress than in the ruins of your constitution. Whatever may be the source of your wounds, I wish it was in my power to heal them.

You say your friends are not disposed to do justice to your exertions. If you mean me, and any thing appears in my conduct to confirm it, it has been owing to error in judgment or accident, and not to a disinclination.

From our earliest acquaintance, I had a partiality for you,

which progressively grew into a friendship. I was under no obligations to you until I came into this country ; and yet I believe you will do me the justice to say, I never wanted inclination to serve you. Here I have been under the greatest obligations, obligations which I can never cancel, and if in this situation I should be unwilling to do justice to your reputation, I should not only be guilty of the basest ingratitude ; but there would appear a strange contradiction in my conduct.

I am far from agreeing with you in opinion, that the public will not do you justice, or that they do not do you justice. I believe few officers either in America or Europe are held in so high a point of estimation as you are. Substantial service is what constitutes lasting reputation ; and your reports this campaign are the best panegyric that can be given of your actions. For me therefore to have passed any extraordinary compliments upon them might have made me ridiculous, but could have given no dignity to you. My character has been far from being fully established, and subject to much calumny. In this situation any thing that I might have said would have only served to discover my partiality without benefiting your reputation.

It is true there are a few of your countrymen, from ignorance and malice are disposed to do injustice to your conduct, but it is out of their power to injure you. Indeed you are ignorant of your own weight and influence, otherwise you would despise their spleen and malice.

There is no inconvenience I am not ready to submit to, to oblige you, nor is there any lengths I would not go to serve you, in the line of truth and honour ; but let me intreat you not to think of leaving the army. Every body knows I have the highest opinion of you as an officer, and you know, I love you as a friend. What ever may be your determination, to retire or continue in service, my affection will accompany you ; and as far as my little influence has any operation among men, I shall always take a pleasure in paying a just tribute to your merits. You know I am not very professional. I always thought the most effectual way of serving a friend, was to conceal the friend behind the intention, lest an appearance of partiality should prejudice the design, and injure the party I meant to serve.

The money matters you mention shall be settled in any way most to your satisfaction. Capt. Pearce will wait on you, to whom I beg leave to refer you for any thing you may wish to learn or to communicate. I am unwell, and have my anxieties as well as you : otherwise I would have been more full in this letter.

Capt. Eggleston desires leave to go to Virginia. I must grant it however inconvenient. But as to that, much will depend on your final determination.

I am, with esteem and affection, your most obt. humble servt.

NATH. GREENE.

Lieut. Col. LEL.

Head Quarters, February 18th, 1782.

MY DEAR SIR—Your reports found us in bed last night. Col. Laurens set off immediately for the light troops. I cannot think the enemy mean to fight us; but if that is their wish we will meet them half-way.

Until the return of Col. Laurens and Morris, I thought you had been gone, both from what you wrote me, and what the Doctor informed me. Had I had the least apprehension that you was still with the light troops, I should have sent you the letters I meant to forward by you, but I should not have directed Morris to make inquiry after the report you promised me; which I supposed you had left in the hands of some of your officers.

I am exceedingly sorry to find that notwithstanding all that has passed between us upon the subject of your discontent, that your disgust increases, and that you harbour sentiments respecting me no less groundless than unfriendly. I do not expect therefore, that any thing that I can say will either convince your judgment, or correct your prejudice. I shall leave you at liberty to think of me as you please, and whatever sentiments you may entertain of me, I will always do justice to your merit; and shall always be happy to share your friendship and confidence, when it can be had on terms reciprocal and honourable.

You say you think you have been injured in my public reports. Take up the matter collectively and separately, and I am far from thinking so. In the course of last campaign there were eleven public reports made, in all of which you are honourably mentioned. Even in my defeats, you are spoken of with great respect. Where is there an officer that stands in the least competition with you? You make no allowances for the composition of our army. You give me no credit for the opportunities I have constantly afforded you of signalizing yourself. I have kept up your corps, and detached you on all occasions. It is true the public good, and your own glory, walked hand in

mand; and therefore I thought myself well warranted in what I did. But other officers as well as you, my dear sir, have their feelings, and are not without their claims. One officer cannot carry on the service alone, however meritorious; and jealousies and discontent have not been wanting in the army, at the opportunities afforded you, to the prejudice of others. I know I am under great obligations to you for your exertions, but you should set some value upon the opportunities, at the same time you tax me with extraordinary services.

You say no officer has been treated so cruelly as you have except General Lee. This is strange indeed. You have never been mentioned but in the most honourable terms; and the army to my remembrance, has never made a single move but that you have figured capitably in; not only in the service, but in the report, except our defeat before Camden. How different was my situation in the northern army. I fought hard at Harlem. I was in the action at Trenton and Princeton. I covered the retreat at Brandywine, and was upwards of an hour and a quarter in a hot action, and confessedly saved the park of artillery, and indeed the army, from the fatal effects of a disagreeable route; and yet in all these actions, I never had the honour to have my name mentioned to the public, either as being with the army, or having done the least thing, notwithstanding I was a general officer. At Germantown, I was evidently disgraced, although I think if ever I merited any thing, it was for my exertions on that day. I have been concerned in many other lesser services, which have all been passed over in silence. But I never murmured or complained, notwithstanding I was held in indignation for faults and misfortunes I had no direction of. I would not mention these things, but to show you how groundless your complaints are. Col. Laurens thinks you have no reason in the world to complain; and that you do injustice to your own importance to dwell upon single expressions. All I ask of you is to give yourself time to cool; and take a general view of the southern operations, and see how important a part you have played in them. After which, if your ambition is not satisfied, if the rights of friendship have been violated, I shall be ready to submit to any censure that justice may dictate. I love and esteem you, and wish you not to think meanly of me, as some of your insinuations seem to import; that to compliment General Washington, I had done injustice to you. As nothing is more remote from truth, so nothing is more wounding to my feelings. I despise a mean act, and am above duplicity. I esteem General Washington, but I should abhor myself if I was capable of so dishonourable a sacrifice. I have a regard for Col. Washing-

ton, and think him a good officer. But I do not mean to draw a comparison between you and him. Every body knows my sentiments on that head.

I am, with the warmest wishes for your health and happiness,

Yours, most affect'y.

N. GREENE

Lt. Col. LEE.

Head Quarters, October 7th, 1782.

DEAR SIR—Capt. Eggleston arrived in camp yesterday and brought me your letter of the 17th of August. I was out on his arrival, and had not the pleasure to see him; nor shall I, before Mr. Lovel sets off, by whom you will receive this letter. Nothing surprises me more than your taxing me with long silence. I had written you frequently before that letter by Captain Carnes; but never had the pleasure to hear from you but once, since you left camp, and that in a letter dated at Richmond on your way home. I confess I was a little surprised and mortified at it, as it was your last wish on parting to correspond with me. No one incident of my life ever gave me equal pain with the schism that happened among your officers. I should have been ungrateful to you, and unjust to the corps, had I not taken every necessary step in my power to set them right, consistent with my own honour and the discipline of the army. Good sense and moderation, where they prevail on both sides, will reconcile many difficulties; but when temper is wanting, and claims run high, reason is often rejected, and passion blindly pursued. This was too much the temper of your officers. Nor do I know where the matter might have ended, had it not been for Capt. Carnes's good sense and better way of thinking. I see by your letter to Major Burnet, and from some remarks in yours to me, you supposed the evil happened from the general orders not being sufficiently explained. Be assured, my dear friend, nothing is farther from the truth. Never did I take equal pains to explain an order and convince an officer as I did Major Rudolph. I told him the necessity I was under to make the disposition, the advantages that would result from it, as well as the powers and instructions given to General Gist to employ the legion in a way the most agreeable to the officers. All this was fully explained to Major Rudolph, in a conversation of two hours, before the officers sent in their resignations. And I further told the Major, that as soon as the general plan of service would admit of a disposition more favourable to his

wishes, it should be had, and that in all probability that was not very distant. I further told him, that he, in the present disposition, was deprived of no part of his command, and that all the other officers had their respective commands; and though the horse and foot were separated, in action he might go from one to the other, and command his own men, under the general command of Laurens and Baylor; and that he must go from the horse to the foot and from the foot to the horse, if they were unconnected with any other corps or command. But he insisted upon it, that the constitution of the legion was violated, that the feelings of the officers were wounded, and that I ought to recede from the orders. I told him, that was impossible; and that the disposition was perfectly consistent with the practice of all armies composed of legionary corps; and that a military disposition did not affect the civil constitution; for that there was nothing more common in Europe than for parts of the same legion to be serving in different countries. I added, that if a commanding officer could not combine his force in any manner that he might think necessary from the peculiar constitution of corps, their establishment was opposed to the public good, and an officer made answerable for consequences when he had not powers to discharge his duty. I told him also that he might be assured that I had no disposition to violate the rights of the legion; but that if he was dissatisfied, I would give him a dispensation from service until he could know your sentiments. After all this a combination took place among the officers, and a resignation followed. The correspondence on that subject you have seen; from which you must be convinced, from those letters, and from what I have just informed you, that I treated the matter with all the temper, moderation, and argument I could to dissuade them from the rash measures they were about to adopt. What was the effect? Little less than contempt. They would allow no alternative but the revocation of the order. This I could not do, and therefore accepted their resignations; and would if it had been the officers of a whole army who imposed so disagreeable a necessity. The truth of the affair was, the officers intended by the combination to cram the thing down my throat at all events, flattering themselves that their number and consequence would deter me from accepting their resignations. It is unfortunate for mankind that so few know how to set a right value upon themselves. It requires good sense, a general knowledge of men and things, an attention to the spirit of the times, and state of circumstances, as well as a regard to the rights and pretensions of others, to form a just estimate of ourselves. Men are too apt to overrate

their value ; and light minds when they render you service will make you feel their importance. Nor can you satisfy their demands in return. The legion had been useful to the public and important to me ; and the manner in which their services stood confessed gave them a high estimation, not only with the world, but with themselves. This unfortunately led to an opinion that they had a right to every thing they could ask, without regard to the service at large, or the feelings and situation of others. The officers addressed themselves to me as if they were fighting my cause, and not the cause of their country. It was true that my reputation was necessarily connected with their conduct ; but it was to their allegiance and appointments they owed their duty, and their country stood responsible for their rewards. Soldiers under the United States stand on very different grounds from those who fought under Cæsar and Pompey. There the cause was personal ; but here it is public. There the power to reward was in the commander, here it is not. All that a commanding officer in the American service has it in his power to do, is to do justice to the exertions, gallantry, and good conduct, in his public representations of both men and officers. In all other matters he has no power, and is answerable for a just economy and all public property committed to his charge. It was the high claims of the officers, and the expectations from a combination that brought that affair to so disagreeable an issue. They intended to have imposed a necessity upon me to have retracted, and were thunderstruck when they found their resignations were accepted. After all this had happened ; and you must allow it was not friendly to push matters to such extremities as to refuse me their farther services, or to have them on terms of humiliating concessions, and such as must from the nature of the precedent be ruinous to all subordination ; I say after all this had happened, before I sent off their resignations, I sent one of my aids to inform them that I was going to forward their resignations to the board of war ; but if they had a mind to receive their commissions again, nothing would give me greater pleasure ; and that if they still thought themselves injured, they might appeal to congress for redress. Happily they had got a little cool, and their friends began to tell them openly they had done wrong ; and those who they supposed to be their friends, to speak less positive of the propriety of their conduct, which brought them to listen to my proposals.

Unhappily for the legionary officers, they consulted some very wrong-headed ones of the line, who I believe urged them to the last extremity, by way of seeing how I should act upon such an occasion. I am very happy to find you and I have the

same ideas of an appeal to congress. I told the officers after they had taken their commissions, it was unnecessary to carry the affair to congress, that in all probability before an explanation could be had, a new disposition would remove the complaint; and that I was persuaded an appeal to congress on the present occasion could not produce an explanation favourable to the interest of the legion; and besides which I did not believe it would be agreeable to you, as I should be under a necessity, in justification of my own conduct, to state the matter fairly to congress. But all I could do or say, had no effect; they said I had promised an appeal to congress, and to Cæsar they would appeal. It was their wish to know their rights, and have them explained in a way that would admit of no farther disputes. I was obliged to consent, though entirely against my opinion and quite contrary to my wishes.

I know not what the determination of congress will be, but I told the officers, I was apprehensive it would narrow the plan of the legion, and place them on a far less agreeable footing, as well as put it out of the power of a commanding officer to grant them the same advantages as formerly. If any disagreeable resolution should happen in consequence of the appeal, the officers must blame their own obstinacy. I candidly told them that I knew of no exclusive rights the legion had from its constitution, and that the privilege which had been claimed and exercised by you, was rather permitted, than authorised; but if they chose to appeal to congress, and it should be found otherwise, I would be the last man in the world to invade them. I wish you had seen Major Dunn on his way home; he could have given you a satisfactory account of the whole affair. I was much indebted to him for his good offices in opening the eyes of the officers. They had taken a great dislike to poor Laurens, whose unhappy fate I suppose you have heard of, and they were determined to be removed from under his command if possible, and would listen to nothing that opposed it. Had you been a spectator, and seen the condescension and pains taken to satisfy the officers, you would have thought I was more indulgent to them than just to myself. I was sensible of their attachment to me, and felt the obligation of past services. I was determined therefore to go as great lengths as I could, consistent with my own honour and the discipline of the army. I am happy the affair was brought to no worse issue. I was apprehensive at times it might end with the dissolution of the legion.

Thus have I given you a short state of facts, and you may rest assured that I have not aggravated the conduct of the officers, or glossed my own. From a review I am satisfied with

the propriety of every thing I did. The combination of officers was both wicked and ungenerous. Major Rudolph wanted to personate you, but nature never formed him for it. He is a brave officer; but is too petulant and impatient at times.

You promise to see me this winter. I wish you may. Nothing would give me greater pleasure. You tell me you have many things to say to me, some agreeable, others not. I wish we could have a free communication; but you know I have told you long since that no man would ever be universally admired, let his talents, virtue, and conduct be as they might; much less could I expect it, who had nothing to recommend myself, but an upright heart, and a just zeal for the public good. I am not ambitious, and if I was, America is not the field for gratification. Neither the genius of the people, nor the spirit of the times will admit of it. It has been my wish a long time to retire into private life. My family is the object of my wishes; but while I continue in public stations I shall endeavour to act respectably, and to discharge my duty with honour and conscience. The great principles which have governed my conduct through life, have been, justice and moderation. They are less splendid, but more certain; and if they don't always lead in paths most pleasing, you are always certain of being right.

We have had little to do this campaign, but watch the enemy. Most part of our time has been employed in reforming the army, correcting abuses, and establishing necessary regulations. It has been disagreeable, as will ever be the case, from the disinclination natural to men to be subjected to narrower limits than they have been accustomed to range in. The horse generally, from the latitude given them by their commanding officers, and some privileges allowed from the nature of the service heretofore, had claims and pretensions highly inconsistent with a just economy. And I see from past experience there is nothing more dangerous than indulgences; for claims grow with time, and are confirmed by habit, so as to render a reform very obnoxious and difficult; and nothing but a steady resolution can effect it. However, it is a very unpopular business for the time; but where you act justly it will be satisfactory in the end; and if it is not, it is a duty we owe the public, and they have a right to exact it of us in justice to themselves.

To avoid the imputation of partiality, and to render the business complete, I am obliged to curtail the claims of general as well as other officers, and you may be sure this is not pleasing. You must not be surprised, therefore, to hear many complaints from the army; but they have no foundation but in that desire which prevails with men to be above law. I see by

your letter to Major Burnet, you think great injustice was done your legion, in the report of the battle of Eutaw; and you lament my giving credit to the idle stories, in forming my report. You may rest assured I did not. There was no man that deserved greater credit than you that day; and if you are not so represented, it is my fault. The infantry of the legion, deserved every thing that could be said of them also. Nor was the cavalry blameable, but less fortunate. They did not make a successful charge in the course of the day, though they attempted it several times. Two corps may be equally disposed to distinguish themselves; one may have an opportunity, the other not; and where a case of this kind should happen, I would ask you whether you could report them to equal advantage? If they can be, then intention is every thing, and action nothing. I meant to speak of things as they happened; but it was far from my heart to leave the least implication for censure against your corps, much less against you. It is possible I might colour the actions of some too high, and others too low, but the general representation, with small allowances for not being an eye-witness to every thing, is fair, just, and true. I do not expect to remove your prepossessions. It is natural to man to be partial to objects with whom he is intimately connected. Your temper is warm, and your heart affectionate, and you feel this bias as forcibly as any body. Could you divest yourself of your attachment to the legion, and had no former prejudices operated to discolour that report, I am persuaded you would think differently of it. You know it is a rule with me to give a candid account, let the matter operate as it may. *No man in the progress of the campaign had equal merit with yourself, nor is there one so represented.* Your combined operations with the militia, did not put it in my power to do justice to your exertions. That is an evil to which every subordinate officer is subject, from the nature and constitution of an army, and more especially in the American service, where militia officers take command from rank, and not from experience or ability. But it is my opinion if there is any part of the public who refuse to you the merit you deserve from the reports that have been made, all the reports in the world would not remove their prejudices. Names have greater influence with mankind than may be readily conceived, as Sterne says; and I am confident if your reputation has felt any violence, it has been owing to your being a Lee, and not from any thing that was done or said.

I hope you will get into no disagreeable dispute with General Washington. I think if you state the matter fairly and with temper, he will do justice upon the occasion. I think he

ought to use his influence in favour of Mr. Heard, (if) he cannot interpose his authority.

I have inclosed you a letter for General Lee, in answer to one he lately wrote me. I beg you will convey it to him by some good opportunity.

Our army has been exceeding sickly this campaign, much more so than they were the last. Indeed our sick list far outnumbered our well men; and the mortality in the months of August and September have been great.

I hope soon to have this country free from the enemy; every preparation is making for the evacuation of Charleston. The refugees are already sailed for St. Augustine. As soon as the enemy are gone I expect to go to the northward; and most of the troops that are here will march northerly also. Should I pass through Virginia, and your residence is not too far out of my way, I shall do myself the pleasure to call and see you, and pay my respects to Mrs. Lee. Mrs. Greene is at one of the sea islands for the benefit of her health. I have been lately very ill with the fever, but am perfectly recovered. I beg my compliments to Mrs. Lee, and your pardon for this long letter.

Yours affty.

N. GREENE.

(D)

Washington, Pa. 6th March, 1794.

DEAR SIR—We arrived here at half past one o'clock this day; the arrangement in getting across the river was a very good one; I had the infantry over by eleven, took the two boats to Parkerson's, I went in one myself, found another on the way, took that. Boarded a Kentucky-man on the way loaded with apples and cider, and only twelve barrels of flour—let him pass—got to Parkerson's in time to get the waggons over, which got to camp last night—but was obliged to give the tavern-keeper where we lodged, a knock in the mouth, for selling whiskey to the soldiers at a dollar a gallon—these sales he kept up nearly all night, and when I told him of his fault, he began to treat me with indignity, and I broke his mouth, which closed the business. I received a line from General Freelinghauson last evening—I dont expect he will be here before to-morrow evening;

however, that will be time enough, as I shall get in train by that time.

The people look very sour at us, but I will bring them to by good treatment; the rebuff I gave the tavern-keeper will assist me, as it will show them that they must not be too impertinent. There is no forage or any thing laid in here, nor do I know what has become of the forage-master; however, we must provide for ourselves till these people come on. We have brought all the troops and waggons up, without any sickness or accident. I shall be ready to execute your orders in two or three days—shall go to Pittsburg to-morrow morning to see my disconsolate daughter, and try to comfort her in addition to what Presley can do.

I have the honour to be, your obt. humble servt.

DANL. MORGAN.

P.S. General Biggs will hand you this, to whom I refer you for further intelligence. I saw our friends from Ohio, in Virginia, on their way to you yesterday—God blast them, do handle these fellows very roughly—they are shocking fellows. Fulton is now in this town, I intend to tame him, till I can lay my hands upon him—Nor do I think Bradford is far off. I will thank you to send me the rates of sales and purchases that you have established.

To his excellency Governor LEE.
Head Quarters.

(E)

Camp on Pedee, Feb. 2d, 1781.

MY DEAR SIR—I this moment returned from Roan county, where I left the general last evening. He had Washington's horse consisting only of 60 men, with him. The militia will not assemble or annoy the enemy unless we have a superiority in cavalry. Tarleton has 250 dragoons. The general's anxiety to collect the cavalry is very great, and he expects you to join him in three days. He supposes every thing will depend upon it. Lord Cornwallis has destroyed his waggons and formed and

equipped his army as light infantry. You may rely on it he will penetrate the country by the upper route.

The enemy crossed the Catawba yesterday morning at M-Cowen's ford, and Tarleton pushed our militia beyond Mr. Tournie's, which is 20 miles on the road to Salisbury. They were so dispirited that they will do nothing till our cavalry are able to circumscribe Mr. Tarleton's limits. I expect the enemy will be at Salisbury to-morrow, and nothing but the fresh will prevent their crossing the Yadkin the next morning.

If you knew the anxiety of General Greene, who is now exposing himself to collect the militia, which he expects only to accomplish by having a superiority of horse. Indeed our army cannot keep the field one moment after they cross the Yadkin, unless we have a superiority of cavalry.

I congratulate you on your partial success. Please to make my compliments to Carnes and the other gentlemen of the corps. Unless you are with General Greene immediately you will lose the opportunity of acquiring wreaths of laurels, and the pleasure of rendering important services.

I am, sincerely, your most obedt. ser't.

J. BURNET.

Lieut. Col. LEE.



(F)

Culp's Ferry, February 3d, 1781.

MY DEAR GENERAL—I acquainted you with my situation and expectations, on receiving orders from Col. Williams to join the army. I have hurried on to this place, where I must necessarily halt one day, for the junction of two troops of cavalry in my rear. The invitation which the posture of affairs on the other side of the Santee, and in the state of Georgia, held out to a proper attempt, was so pleasing, that I regret exceedingly my recall from that country.

I regret it not only as a soldier anxious to acquire honour, but as a citizen. The minds of the people are wavering; their general inclination favours us, but they cannot, they will not, declare, when they understand our effort is confined to the exertions of their own militia. They will expect regular troops

from us; being disappointed in this, and being obliged by our own conduct to take a part decisively, I fear instead of a general insurrection in our favour, we shall strengthen the enemy. My conclusion therefore is, that unless we can spare a force adequate to the great prospect of the day, it would have been better to have deferred operations.

Whether an adequate force can be spared you best know, as it depends on the circumstances of the two armies. I must presume that General Morgan's victory was so complete as to put it out of the power of Cornwallis to effect a junction with his North Carolina detachment, even if General Dundas has arrived there from Virginia; unless the people of North Carolina are generally in the interest of the enemy. But should his force promise a junction, *I think the recovery of the two south states would blast every advantage which his most sanguine success could produce.*

A party of horse and foot from your army, equal to the breaking down of all the outposts in the two states, and confining the enemy to Charleston, Georgetown, Ninety Six, Camden, Savannah, and Augusta, would increase daily, from 300 they would grow to as many thousand. This small party would have it in their power to dispossess the enemy of some of the above posts in the course of a few months. Militia never can force regular troops from intrenched posts.

Fort Moultrie is an object of the first consequence, and might be the source of the most lasting benefit, if taken by us—its garrison is small. Savannah and Beaufort are in the same situation. Two thousand continentals lay in prison ships in Charleston harbour. Cooper and Ashley rivers communicate directly with them.

What might not a spirit of enterprize effect? One hundred chosen infantry, with my legion would perhaps be a sufficient number. If you think proper to adopt the scheme, favour me with your full instructions; give me the additional number, place one nine pounder in some secret place near Pedee, where I may get it when wanted, honour me with frequent letters, establish a communication in cyphers, and I will devote myself to rendering you the most essential services. I think you cannot do any thing decisive with your army, as you cannot risk an action only on partial grounds. Nor do I believe Cornwallis can succeed in his scheme unless North Carolina oppose the United States.

Pardon the freedom of this address, it results from my zeal for the good of America, and for the prosperity of your arms. If you conclude that we join, I request you will be pleased to

send me your orders by an express, and give the bearer, one of my sergeants, permission to take such of the prisoners under care of General Stevens, as he may claim. I flatter myself he will bring to me some of my deserters.

I have the honour to be, most affy. your humble servt.

HENRY LEE, Jun.

The honourable General GREENE.

My friends and countrymen.

Being near your county, and well knowing the partiotism and gallantry which you have uniformly displayed in defence of your country, I conceive it my duty to inform you of the present situation of our affairs.

You have already heard of the general action between the two armies on the 15th instant. It is unnecessary to acquaint you with the effects of that engagement, as the retreat of Lord Cornwallis, and the pursuit of General Greene, best discover the real loss on each side. But a very small part of the regular troops engaged; some new raised troops behaved dastardly, which confused the regiments nearest them, and rendered it prudent to retire and postpone the decision to another day.

The enemy's small army is reduced to a very insignificant body, their most experienced general and officers, and their bravest soldiers are killed and wounded. Cornwallis has left a number behind him at New Garden Meeting-house, and is running with his broken army to some place of safety. His deluded friends, our unhappy brethren called tories, experience the imbecility of his pretences to protect them, and are prudently throwing themselves on the mercy of their countrymen. General Greene is advancing with his army in health and spirits to overtake the foe, determined to fight them as soon as he can reach them. The French fleet are victorious in Europe, in the West Indies and in America; and General Washington keeps Sir Henry Clinton close in New York. General Arnold with his army in Virginia is besieged at Portsmouth, and on the point of surrendering to the Marquis Lafayette. Every operation in every part of the world promises immediate and decisive success to America. Come then my friends, fly to your arms, and by your efforts for a few days delay the enemy's retreat till your countrymen can get up with them. Recollect your glorious exertion the last campaign, and let it not be said

that you shrink from danger at this interesting crisis. Before this can reach you, you will know whether the enemy direct their flight by Cross creek or through your county. In either case it is my hope and expectation that you will be near them, and be assured take what route they may, you will find horse and foot from General Greene's army, convenient for your junction. This letter is meant for the information of all our southern friends, but especially for such of our brave countrymen in the counties of Roan, Surry, and Mecklenburgh, as may not be in actual service under General Sumpter. Wishing you every happiness public and private, I am,

Your friend and soldier,

HENRY LEE, Jun.

Camp, New Garden, March 20th, 1781.

To the commanding officers of the militia of Roan,
Surry, and Mecklenburgh counties.

(G)

Camp, 14th May, 1781.

SIR—I beg leave to return you many thanks for your politeness in transmitting to me the letters which fell into your possession at Mott's house. Lieut. M'Pherson having mentioned to me that you proposed an exchange of the garrison taken at that post; I have only to promise, that an equal number of continental officers and soldiers shall be immediately set at liberty for all such as General Greene may think proper to send to Charleston.

Lieut. M'Pherson further informed me, that the troops taken at Wright's Bluff were understood by you, not to have adhered to the terms of capitulation, as strictly as they ought to have done: I beg you will believe, sir, I consider the charge of so serious a nature, that the most exact inquiry shall be made upon it as soon as possible. I have the honour to be, sir,

Your most obt. servt.

RAWDON.

Lieut. Col. LEE.

At sea, 24th June, 1813.

SIR—The letters which you did me the honour to write to me, with the copy of your Memoirs of the war in the southern provinces of America, reached me at a time, when the arrangements for my immediate embarkation left me not a moment to peruse the work.

I had proposed to myself to begin the study of it as soon as we should put to sea; but a further delay occurred. The box containing the book was accidentally placed in the hold, under such a quantity of other packages, as till lately rendered it impracticable for me to retrieve it.

I must undoubtedly feel flattered by your procedure in writing to me, as well as by the tenor of your letters: and I beg leave to return thanks for your politeness. One consideration alone, the conviction of your not having interiorly credited a particular statement, which you have promulgated on the faith of its currency among your party, could prevent my expressing astonishment, that you should profess any sort of estimation, or offer a complimentary attention towards a person represented in that narrative as capable of an atrocious act. No gentler description would befit the measure, ascribed to me in that statement, of sacrificing to any views of general policy, an individual not truly standing within the scope of capital punishment, or even of inflicting that punishment where justly incurred, if public duty did not exact the enforcement.

It is the most disgusting of the circumstances attending civil war, that men, holding themselves aloof from its dangers, always endeavour by virulence and hardihood of imputation against their adversaries, to disguise from themselves and others, the nothingliness of spirit which restrains them from taking efficient part in the conflict. The slanders thus raised cannot be met. They acquire substance by uncontradicted circulation, as every successive propagator feels pledged to maintain the verity of the assertion. And when the contest is over, while the successful faction has not either interest or inclination (perhaps not the means) to retract the calumny, the individuals of the subdued party are cautious not to entail on themselves outrage by controverting any charges which their victors may have pleased to fabricate. The misrepresentations thus become articles of political creed: And the most generous mind will be apt, unconsciously, to satisfy itself that it may remain exempt from the necessity of scrutinizing a statement, when the consequences of exposing its inaccuracy, would be to revolt popular prejudice, to in-

our the appearance of want of ardour in the general cause, and above all to overthrow some favourite position of the person himself. Hence it is, as I think, that you have been led to receive implicitly a representation which with very little trouble you could have proved to be incorrect.

I well know that your honourable disposition, judging from all I have heard of your character, would not deliberately advance so serious a charge as you have published against me, had you believed it to be erroneous. But to affix the brand of injustice in the execution of Isaac Hayne, was a ground-work necessary for your giving due credit to the gallant devotion which you state to have been displayed by the American officers, in reference to that measure; and you have hence been betrayed into too easy a credence of the recital you were sure to receive from all of the party in Carolina, (your only informants,) to which the unfortunate man belonged.

The strange want of reflection with which you must have listened to every story palmed upon you, cannot be more strikingly exemplified than in the communications from the town mayor to the prisoner, which you have retailed. To have supposed the town mayor capable of informing the prisoner that he was to appear before a board of general officers, you must have imagined a principal staff officer of ours ignorant of that which you, and every man in your army, and every other individual in the province, knew; namely, that we had not a single general officer in South Carolina.

Admitting unfeignedly that much of excuse, I still cannot but feel extraordinary surprise, that when you entered into a long argumentative detail (founded on an assumption quite novel) to prove that the conduct of Hayne ought not to have been treated as guilt, you avoided perceiving he could not be brought within your own hypothesis. Were your position tenable, (which your better reflection would hardly contend,) that the inroad of a skulking party gives a manumission from every tie of allegiance to the inhabitants of any district through which it passes, your advertence to period, to locality, and to particulars would have satisfied you, that the treason of Hayne could not be so extenuated; and I only wonder how the recollection could escape presenting itself. In truth, you must have indistinctly surmised that there would be a difficulty about the applicability of your principle, when you deemed it requisite to urge another vindication; a vindication totally inconsistent with the former, because it acknowledges the criminality which the other denies, and only labours to lessen its degree. I allude to the situation in which you suppose Hayne to have been placed by the procla-

mation of Sir Henry Clinton. Not having an opportunity to consult any copy of that proclamation, I can only say that I never had the impression of its bearing the sense you ascribe to it, and that I have no remembrance of its being so understood by others. Could, however, that proclamation have had the effect of annulling any of the conditions on the faith of which Charleston was surrendered, it would have stamped indelible disgrace on him who issued it, and would have been deeply disreputable to the country which in that act he represented; but how was it to bear on the case of Hayne? The part which he had to take, as a prisoner on parole under the capitulation, was clear. He had only to repair to Charleston, and surrender himself, till the remonstrance of congress could be exerted with Sir Henry Clinton, upon so gross an infraction of public faith.

The non-existence of any such reclamation on the part of congress, whose view would not be restricted to the single case of Hayne, sufficiently rebuts the construction you put upon the proclamation. Still, supposing for the sake of giving you the utmost advantage your assumption (if valid) would claim, that the proclamation did so press upon the unhappy man, I repeat that the fit course for him was to submit himself a prisoner. If from any private considerations he preferred the other alternative, he made his choice with all the obligations inseparable from it, and spontaneously rendered himself liable to all the penalties attached to a breach of those obligations. The slightest inquiry would have satisfied you, that all who exchanged the character of prisoner on parole under the capitulation, for that of a British subject, did so voluntarily in order to enjoy the benefits of disposing of the produce of their plantations, in a lucrative course of trade, not allowed to prisoners. And when you represent Hayne as having plighted only a conditional fidelity, it is wonderful you should not have at once detected the imposition that was attempted upon you, by those who made such an assertion. Where was the British officer to be found, who could have inducement, or disposition, or competence, to allow of a limited oath of allegiance to his sovereign! The tale carried falsity on the very face of it. Your penetration might, therefore, have been expected to see through the flimsy pretext, and to perceive, that this was an excuse which Hayne would naturally make to his former comrades, to mitigate the reproach attached by them to his having taken the oath of allegiance, and to soften the unfavourable construction which he must imagine would, even in their opinions, attend his perfidy under so solemn a compact. But your cause would gain no-

thing were this observation not irrefragable. Were the possibility admitted of his having established the stipulation to which you allude, it would not alter his criminality. When summoned to bear arms, (if he ever were so,) he would have to say, that he had made a condition, that he abided by the reservation, and that he was prepared to meet any consequence of adhering to it. If, instead of that course, he chose to enter into secret negotiation with the enemy, he did it knowingly under all the peril connected with the act. Nay, had he at once broken his engagement, and repaired to General Greene's army, though it would have been treason, it would not have been treason of so deep and complicated a dye, as that in which he involved himself.

Before I proceed further on this head, it is expedient that a material point should be cleared up to you. You mistake entirely in supposing that the province of South Carolina was under my command. Lieut. Col. Balfour was my senior in the army list; and my provincial rank of colonel, held for the purpose of connection with the regiment raised by me, did not alter that relation, as the colonels on the provincial establishment were subordinate to the youngest lieut. colonels of the line. Sir Henry Clinton, in order to give me the management of affairs in South Carolina, subsequently promoted me, as a brigadier of provincials; but we had no intimation of this till the commission arrived, after I had actually embarked for England: Lieut. Col. Balfour would, therefore, at all events have commanded me. A still more particular limitation of my powers existed. Lord Cornwallis, on entrusting me with the management of the troops on the frontier, had specifically allotted the whole track within the Santee, Congaree, and Saluda rivers, to Lieut. Col. Balfour, as commandant of Charleston. Camden had always been reprobated by me as a station; not merely from the extraordinary disadvantages which attended it, as an individual position; but from its being on the wrong side of the river and covering nothing; while it was constantly liable to have its communication with the interior district cut off. Lord Cornwallis did not consider how much he augmented this objection, often urged by me to him, by an arrangement whence I was debarred from any interference with the district, from which alone I could be fed, the country in front of Camden, as well as that between the Wateree and Broad rivers being so wasted, as to afford nothing beyond precarious and incidental supplies. Fixed at Camden, with seven hundred men (Lt. Col. Watson's corps never having formed part of my garrison, and the residue of the force with which I encountered General Greene, having been introduced by me into Camden three days after he sat down

before it,) I was completely dependent on Lieut. Col. Balfour for subsistence, for military stores, for horses, for arms, and for those reinforcements which were indispensable from the expenditure of men, in the unceasing activity of our service. With his posts at Motte's house, Congarees, and Ninety Six, I had no concern, further than their occasional danger obliged me to make movements for their protection; an assistance, which I had peculiar difficulty in rendering to the two former, from the works having unaccountably been so placed as not to command the ferries, through which blunder succours could not be thrown across the river to the garrisons when invested by an enemy. Hence it happened that, on the abandonment of Camden in the hope of saving those posts, and protecting the interior country, I was forced to pass the Santee by the circuitous route of Nelson's ferry. From this delay arose the circumstance, that on the day after my crossing the river I received the account of the fall of the two redoubts, pompously denominated Fort Mott and Fort Granby. The event, by throwing into your hands the only magazines of provision in the country, utterly incapacitated me from advancing: For, destitute of cavalry to face yours, I must have been unable to glean daily food for my troops; and could not think so lightly of the talents of General Greene, as to indulge the visionary expectation that he would put his fortune to the hazard of a battle, when he might reduce me to the extreme of distress by a policy unattended with risk to himself.

These particulars are not stated so much for the purpose of conveying any information, which will be interesting to you in explaining much of the campaign, as to shew, that I had not in the interior district, any immediate interest, or any course of management, the interruption of which could excite in me irritation against Hayne, or indeed call my attention to his crime. And you well know there was not any peevish acrimony in our warfare. In fact, I never heard of the insurrection which he instigated, till its suppression was communicated to me by Lieutenant Colonel Balfour.

The way I came to have any part in the affair was this. When Lord Cornwallis suddenly marched into North Carolina, he wrote to me, (then through accidental circumstances at Camden,) to assign to me the very unexpected charge of maintaining that post, and the frontier beyond the rivers. In the same letter he entreated me, as a proof of friendship to himself, that I would act cordially with Lieutenant Colonel Balfour, between whom and me his lordship knew there had been some estrangement. In answer, I assured him, that he might depend on my

giving to Lieutenant Colonel Balfour in every particular, the most zealous support.

Shortly after we had withdrawn from Ninety Six and the upper country, Lieutenant Colonel Balfour wrote to apprise me, that an insurrection had taken place in the rear of my army, but had luckily been crushed. He stated the imperious necessity of repressing the disposition to similar acts of treachery, by making an example of the individual who had planned, as well as headed the revolt, and who had fallen into Lieutenant Colonel Balfour's hands. He solicited my concurrence (absolutely ineffective in any other point of view, in a district where I was wholly under his control) that it might vouch to Sir Henry Clinton, with whom he was on ill terms, for the public policy of the measure. On the justice of it, there was not then a conception, that in possibility a question could be raised. I replied that there could be no doubt as to the necessity for making the example, to which I would readily give the sanction of my name. Collateral circumstances were then unknown to me. Immediately on my arrival at Charleston, application was made to me by a number of ladies, (principally of your party) to save Hayne from the impending infliction. Ignorant of the complicated nature and extent of the crime, I incautiously promised to use my endeavours towards inducing Lieutenant Colonel Balfour to lenity. A petition to be signed by the ladies, was drawn up as a step gratifying to me, by one of the officers of the staff, (I believe by Major Barry, the deputy adjutant general) to serve as a basis for my address to the commandant. When I opened the matter to him he appeared much astonished; detailed to me circumstances of the case with which I had been completely unacquainted; requested me to inform myself more minutely upon them; and earnestly begged me to ponder on the effect, which forbearance from visiting such an offence with due punishment, (sure to be ascribed to timidity) must unavoidably produce on the minds of the inhabitants. It was a grievous error in me that I did not at once yield to the reasoning, and to the conviction which it could not but impress, instead of still attempting to realize the hope, which I had suffered the ladies so loosely to entertain. I unluckily persevered in the effort to reconcile a pardon with some appearance of propriety. At this time I saw a lady connected with Hayne: I suppose it must have been the Mrs. Perroneau mentioned by you. I frankly told her what had passed between me and Lieutenant Colonel Balfour, stating the embarrassment in which I found myself, from the enormity of the transgression, and the objections too justly urged, but adding, that, unless there should be intervention from General

Greene. I would still try if the difficulty could be surmounted. This point, I understand, was most profligately wrested, as if Lieut. Col. Balfour and I had held forth a sort of implied condition to the unfortunate man, that he should be spared if General Greene did not interfere; and that the latter was thence withheld from exertions which might have been effectual. Lieut. Col. Balfour was never privy to the conversation between Mrs. Perroneau and me; nor could it in any case have been imagined possible, that such a communication should reach General Greene, when the attempt at any correspondence with him would have been a capital offence. It was simply an expression of my fears, that a circumstance might occur which would at once destroy all chance of my being useful. Any interposition on the part of General Greene must have been in irritating terms, and would infallibly have precluded an excuse which I hoped to obtain, and which would afford a decent pretence for a lenity, felt by me to be liable to great and well-founded censure. As a mode of gaining time, I had solicited Lieut. Col. Balfour to have the particulars of the case ascertained by a court of inquiry for my satisfaction, alleging the chance, (though I could not really believe the existence of any such) that circumstances might have been distorted by the animosity of Hayne's neighbours. This step, although a court of inquiry was the same form of investigation as had been used in the case of Major André, was an indiscretion on my part; because it afforded a colour for perversion, by seeming to imply that there might be a doubt as to the amount of guilt: whereas, by all the recognized laws of war, nothing was requisite in the case of Hayne, but to identify his person previous to hanging him on the next tree. Before that court (the proceedings of which were unavoidably thrown overboard with my other papers, when I was taken by the French at sea,) he produced documents to establish his claim of being treated as an American officer, but which only more distinctly substantiated his criminal correspondence with the enemy. So that the case, had it admitted of aggravation, would have been made worse by the result of that inquiry. He was, from his correspondence with the enemy while within our ports, a spy in the strictest sense of the word: and to that guilt was added the further crime, of his having debauched a portion of our enrolled militia, at the head of which he menaced with death all persons of the vicinage, who would not join him in arms against us, and actually devastated the property of those who fled from participation in the revolt. Such were the difficulties of the task in which I had improperly entangled myself. I notwithstanding persevered. Mr. Alexander Wright and Mr.

Powell, (I think his Christian name was Charles) in compliance with my wishes, undertook to try whether a petition for pardon to Hayne, might not be procured from a respectable number of loyalists; though they gave me little encouragement to hope success, from even their known and just influence with that body. They first applied to Lieutenant Governor Bull, who consented to sign the petition, provided the attorney general, Sir Egerton Leigh, would do so. The answer of Sir Egerton Leigh was, *that he would burn his hand off rather than do an act so injurious to the king's service.* Lieutenant Governor Bull's conditional promise of course fell to the ground, though he subsequently, from some dupery practised upon his age, joined his name with those of certain of your most active and avowed partisans: and not one loyalist of repute could be persuaded to put his name to the petition. There then remained no possible excuse for a remission of the punishment; under which circumstances, it would have been baseness in me towards Lieut. Col. Balfour, and a forfeiture of my plighted assurance to Lord Cornwallis, had I withheld my name from the measure, when, after what had passed, I could but be conscious it was deeply necessary for the public service.

The enterprize which Hayne had planned and achieved when he was intercepted and taken, had an object of singular malignity. I allude to the seizure of Mr. Williamson; and the insulting triumph with which Mr. Williamson was told, that the purpose in capturing him, was to have been hanged in the camp of General Greene, had naturally roused the indignation of all the friends of the British government. Mr. Williamson, as you know, had been a brigadier general of the American militia at the time of our invading South Carolina. When the rest of the province submitted, Mr. Williamson also adopted that line. He had not taken up arms against you, nor was he intermeddling in politics, but quietly residing in the neighbourhood of Charleston. The attempt, therefore, to carry him off, and to exhibit in his person, a proof that even mere submission to our rule should entail the utmost severity of infliction, caused great ferment in the minds of the loyalists. This was extraordinarily augmented by a dreadful impolicy on the part of the unfortunate prisoner. The number of individuals professedly of your party, to whom the capitulation had given the right of remaining in Charleston, afforded to Hayne a communication most mischievous for him. For those persons, intoxicated by an apparent change of tide in their favour, not only themselves held the language that the British government would not dare to execute Hayne, but misled the unhappy man to use the same tone of defiance to the loyalists. To have been

swayed by their resentment would have been unworthy: but they had a claim very distinct from that of passion, to a consideration of their opinions, from those entrusted with the conduct of the general concern. When their fortunes and their lives were risked in the cause of Britain, they had a right to demand that the joint stake should be so managed, as to give to them their fair chance for success in the contest: and it was obvious, that if in an hour when the highest peril was to be encountered by those who remained faithful, no terrors were to impend over a breach of the sacred ties by which they were individually bound to each other and to government, a premium would in fact be held forth to treachery, and the dissolution of the common interest would be inevitable. If we were to maintain a claim on their fidelity, it could only be by showing a just sensibility for their welfare.

You prove yourself perfectly aware of the nature of the period, and of the urgent pressure under which we laboured, when you mention the expectation you were authorized to entertain, that a French army would land in the southern provinces. We had received from the secretary at state, an intimation which led us to believe, that Bearfort was its probable destination. Advertence to this contingency, and the necessity of making provision against the event, had materially influenced the conduct of the campaign. It was the reason why, when I undertook the relief of Ninety Six, I was furnished with but barely seventeen hundred men. Even of that force, a principal proportion was composed of Hessians, or of troops just landed from Ireland, so little suited to bear the rapidity of march which our circumstances exacted, that we left numbers of them (very many dead from the heat,) along the road. The crisis may be estimated by my being obliged to risk such an enterprize with a strength, on any ordinary calculation, so inadequate to the object. In this exigency, we found ourselves surrounded by defection and treachery on all sides. The perfidy had gone so far, that, soon after my crossing the Santee, I had to communicate to Lieut. Col. Balfour the necessity for his immediately disarming a portion of his town militia, designated by me; as I knew from information not questionable, that they were in correspondence with General Greene, and had engaged to seize the gates for him, if he could slip by me, and present himself suddenly before Charleston. In such extremities, those administering the interest of their country (if they were not to bow their heads to the defection, and abjectly sacrifice the important trust reposed in them) had no option but to exert against

the mischief, that strenuous resistance which their duty required, and the purest justice authorised.

Such, sir, are the real features of a case, which you hold forth in unfavourable contrast with the tenderness of sentiment displayed in the proceedings against Major Andre! It is not my wish to enter into a discussion of the latter case: and it would be most unfair to doubt the dispositions of General Washington, or the irresistible pressure which rendered them abortive. Yet thus far I must remark. Had there been so much solicitude to save that unfortunate officer as you represent, this ostensible plea might have been advanced for him:—That his entering in disguise within your fortress, was by the direction and with the invitation of your officer commanding there. For the guilt of Hayne no shadow of palliation could be found. The story of remonstrance from the British officers to Lieut. Col. Balfour, shows how lamentably you were deceived in every respect, by the fabrications in the province. That recurrence of the British officers to the commandant, was for the purpose of urging him to secure objects for retaliation, in case of General Greene's carrying into effect his outrageous threat. They needed not to have given themselves the trouble; and, though I have no disposition to depreciate the spirit which dictated it, the proffered devotion of your American officers, was equally superfluous. General Greene sagaciously comprehended, that it was necessary to counteract the impression which the execution of Hayne was calculated to produce. Hence it was his policy to declaim against it as an undue infliction, the repetition of which in any similar case, should be prevented by retaliation. But he was too wise not to know, that the matter would not bear scrutiny, and that it must not for his ends be driven to minuter question.

Having mentioned retaliation, let me say, that Lieut. Col. Balfour and I had severally, direct orders from Lord Cornwallis to check by retaliation the merciless severity with which your civil governments treated the loyalists who fell into their power. With numbers in our hands justly amenable to rigour, each of us had taken it upon himself to dispense with that injunction: not from any doubt of its equity, but from a fear that our obedience would only extend the calamity, and from a hope, that the difference of our procedure would be the best corrective of the inhumanity. So far were the British officers from having such feeling, as the fallacious representations practised upon you have led you to suppose, that I had been informed by particular friends, of the extraordinary dissatisfaction testified by those officers, at the seeming hesitation respecting the fate of Hayne. They viewed it as a feebleness, and a dishonest desertion of the

interests, which our army was bound to uphold. This sentiment was so strong, that at a dinner which Lieut. Col. Balfour gave to the staff and principal officers on the eve of my embarkation, I thought myself bound in justice towards the commandant, to address the company, to confess that the apparent demur was imputable to me alone, to own that I had sought to find grounds to excuse a remission of the punishment, and to admit that I had been wrong in the endeavour. The acknowledgment was conscientious; and at no period since, has my reflection made me regard myself as otherwise than culpable, in not having at once given the just weight to the considerations, which so imperiously called for the example.

That the punishment of Hayne may appear an unnecessary severity, you state, that at this juncture the British cause was evidently lost in America. The opinion of an enemy, especially of an enemy so zealous and energetic as you, would be no very rational guide for an officer's conduct. There was not at that period any reason for our entertaining such a notion; nor would duty have allowed a relaxation of the exertions which the trust demanded, upon any personal conceptions of the sort. No apprehension existed of inability to cope with your joint force, should the French land in South Carolina, though the necessity of keeping the British troops in a position to be readily collected into one body, gave you for the time apparent advantages. Your circumstances were still critical. The situation must not be argued from subsequent occurrences, not then within the foresight of any one; and there were measures which would at once have altered the relative condition of affairs. Had Lord Cornwallis with his army refreshed, re-equipped, and reinforced, originally marched from Wilmington to the upper country of North Carolina, the step must have been decisive against you. Its consequences were so clear, that, ignorant of the uncontrollable obstacles, which doubtless must have existed to forbid his lordship's pursuing that policy, we every day expected to hear of his being in Hillsborough. If, leaving Virginia occupied in self-defence against such a portion of troops as he might think proper to allot for the purpose, he had proceeded to raise and organize the loyalists of North Carolina in your rear, cutting off all your supplies and reinforcements from the northward, it appeared to us that the destruction of General Greene's army was almost inevitable. We were sufficiently on the watch to prevent a junction between you and any French force that might be landed at Beaufort: And, for the ends of co-operation, instructions from Lord Cornwallis would undoubtedly have caused the field army in South Carolina to be put on a footing

of efficiency, which it did not possess during my service. Fortunate it would have been had this movement, so confidently reckoned upon by us, taken place. While it must have so seriously affected General Greene's army, it would have removed Lord Cornwallis from a position, where he was an object for the concentration of force by the Americans and French, and it would of course have precluded that fatal operation. The wisdom of Providence decreed otherwise; and the judgment of Lord Cornwallis was not left unfettered.

This letter has run into inordinate length; though you will readily understand that I have forborne to dilate on many points connected with the subject. Its prolixity has arisen from the wish to furnish you with full means of forming a sure judgment on the case. Be assured that I have not a suspicion of your having given any colour to your narrative, but what you really believed to be the true one. After the promulgation of so invidious a charge against me, I know not how it can be in your power to make me any reparation: But of this I will remain persuaded; that if my statement shall lead you to a conviction of your having done me injustice, you will sincerely regret the facility, with which you credited representations, so likely to be warped by the interests and the passions of those from whom you received them.

I have the honour, sir, to be your most obt. humble servt.

MOIRA.

Maj. General HENRY LEE.

(H)

Mount Vernon, Feb. 13th, 1789.

DEAR SIR—I send you the letter you requested for Mr. Jefferson under a flying seal, which after perusal you will be pleased to have closed for transmission. After revolving the subject in many different points of view, I could find no expedient for communicating the information in question, in so unexceptionable a manner, as by making the letter a continuation of my correspondence on the inland navigation of America.

I hope that the sentiments contained in it, which are the result of some reflection, will not be the less useful to you, for being delivered in this manner; and, at the same time, in case of any undesirable event, that I shall avoid the imputation of

having interfered in the business from selfish or improper motives. For I hold it necessary that one should not only be conscious of the purest *intentions*; but should also have it in his power to demonstrate the disinterestedness of his *words* and *actions* at all times and upon all occasions.

With very great esteem and regard, I am, dear sir, your most obt. and affect. servt.

GEO. WASHINGTON.

Col. H. LEE.

Mount Vernon, March 14th, 1789.

MY DEAR SIR—Your letter of this date, was put into my hands on my return from a ride, at the moment dinner was waiting. for which reason I have only time to express in a single word my love and thanks for the sentiments contained in it; and to assure you that my best wishes, in which Mrs. Washington unites, are presented to Mrs. Lee, and that with sincere regard and affection,

I am ever yours,

GEO. WASHINGTON.

P.S. If we have any thing which can be of service to Mrs. Lee, on her passage, please to command it.

Philadelphia, June 30th, 1792.

DEAR SIR—Your favour of the 15th came duly to hand, but at a time when I was much engaged with the secretary of state in despatching Mr. Pinckney to the court of London, and in considering other business of importance.

I shall repeat in this letter what I have declared to you on a former occasion, viz. that wishing to promote the public weal, and to make justice and impartiality the lines by which to walk, to accomplish this, every information that will enable me to work on so solid a basis, or which would enable me to investigate with more accuracy the characters of public men, or the utility of public measures, cannot fail of being acceptable to me, whilst I have any thing to do with either, particularly the latter.

Having premised these truths, I shall add, on the subject of your letter, that I can no more condemn G. K. on the evidence of Col. D——'s letter to you, than I am disposed to go into a *full* vindication of his conduct against the implications which are contained in that letter. When assertion stands against assertion, recourse must be had to collateral circumstances to come at the truth, or the preponderating weight; but these are

not necessary in the instance before us, for it will not be unfair to declare that the conduct of Col. D—— is uncandid, and that his letter is equivocal. He acknowledges in it that when I asked if he would serve, if you should be appointed to the chief command, that he gave no answer; but does not, in any part of his letter, tell you what answer he gave G. K.* to the same question; unless you take the following for one, when he was applied to, to know if he would accept of an appointment. “I told him I first wanted to know who would command the army, and said *something of you* and some others,” but are these equivocal expressions to be placed against the positive declaration of the other?—especially too, when Col. D—— in relating the conversation which passed between himself and me, has mistaken both the substance and tendency of it; for you may be assured sir, I never mentioned your name, nor the name of any man living to him as one who was in the smallest degree fixed on for the command. The secretary at war, himself, was unacquainted with the final decision when Col. D—— left the city. The truth is, I never was more embarrassed by any nomination; and the object of my conversation with the latter, was to learn the public sentiment, as far as it could be obtained from him, with respect to this matter; and to questions of this tendency he said he had heard Morgan, Scott and yourself mentioned on his journey through, and from Kentucky to his own house; and if I understood the significancy of things not expressed, he comprehended himself. I took an occasion *then* to observe, that I conceived few men were better qualified for such a command than you were, and asked if he thought your junior rank in the late army would be an objection with those who had been your seniors in it, to serve under you? His reply, when a little pushed by having the case brought home to himself, (for I wanted to draw an explicit answer from him) was, that he believed it would be an unpleasant, or grating thing, or words to that effect; but the manner, more than the expressions, throughout the whole of the conversation, which was after dinner and when we were alone, led me to conclude that it would not be relished by him. What his real intentions might be at that time, when he was speaking to G. K., or lastly to you, no one but himself is master of.

I have no hesitation in declaring to you, that the basis of my inclination was strongly in your favour; but that the result of my inquiries, direct and indirect, of military and indeed of other characters (who were well disposed to see you in nomi-

* Genl. Knox, Secretary at War.

nation) was, that if you were appointed to the command, it would be vain to look for senior officers to act subordinates; or if they consented, it would be so grudgingly, as more than probably, the seeds of sedition would be coeval with the formation of the army; such being the nature of military pride. Admitting this then, one of two things would inevitably have followed, either an army composed of discontented materials, or, of junior characters; the first might be attended with fatal consequences, the other (however excellent the officers might be) if any disaster should befall the army, it would instantly be ascribed to the inexperience of the principal officers, in stations to which they had never been accustomed; thereby drawing a weight upon my shoulders, too heavy to be borne. This was my *own* view of the subject, and the principles upon which I acted; not, be assured, because G. K. was of this or that opinion. The fact I really believe is, that he was as much puzzled as I was, to fix on the first officer, under the circumstances that existed.

How far the appointment of G. W.* is a popular or an unpopular measure, is not for me to decide. It was not the determination of a moment; nor was it the effect of partiality, or of influence; for no application (if that, in any instance, could have warped my judgment) was ever made in his behalf, from any one who could have thrown the weight of a feather into his scale; but because, under a full view of *all* circumstances, he appeared most eligible.

To a person of your observation and intelligence it is unnecessary to remark, that an appointment which may be unpopular in one place, or with one set of men, may not be so in another place, or with another set of men; and vice versa; and that to attempt to please every body is the sure way to please nobody; of course the attempt would be as idle, as the execution would be impracticable. G. W. has many good points as an officer, and it is to be hoped that time, reflection, good advice, and above all, a due sense of the importance of the trust which is committed to him, will correct his foibles, or cast a shade over them.

With great esteem and regard, I am, dear sir, your most obedient and affect. humble servt.

GEO. WASHINGTON.

His excellency HENRY LEE.

* Genl. Wayne.

Philadelphia, 7th April, 1792.

DEAR SIR—The nominations for the command of the army and the field commissions, have not yet been made, but are daily expected. Who will be brought forward as the commander is still doubtful. Lincoln, Wayne, Morgan, Pinckney, Pickens, and yourself, are talked of. 'Tis said that Knox and Hamilton are for Pinckney. My own judgment, to be candid, is in your favour, and so I have said. Morgan has more experience in that mode of warfare. But his age and infirmities give you the advantage even in that respect; in others he cannot compete.

But in whose favour the executive councils may ultimately determine, no one conjectures. I give you this in confidence, being with real esteem, sincerely,

Your friend and servant,

JAS. MONROE.

FINIS.

